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This dissertation investigates changes in funding of federal water projects and 
the development of new water policies during the administrations of Presidents Jimmy 
Carter and Ronald Reagan.  I conclude that these events precipitated a shift in the 
Bureau of Reclamation’s mission.  Carter’s proposed recommendations to terminate 
funding on several large federal water projects, dubbed the “Hit List,” as well as 
proposed water policy changes—specifically local cost sharing, increased 
conservation, acreage limitation, federal reserved water rights, and rules pertaining to 
sections 208, 303, and 404 of the Clean Water Act—significantly shaped regional and 
national politics including the Sagebrush Rebellion and anti-environmentalism.  While 
President Reagan sympathized with the Sagebrush Rebels rhetoric during his 
campaign, his administrations budgets and proposed local cost sharing requirements 
were more extensive that Carter’s.   The contrast and similarities between the two 
administrations are best seen in case studies of the two largest Bureau of Reclamation 
projects initially included on Carter’s “Hit List,” the Garrison Diversion Unit and the 







Historian Eric Foner described the 1970s as “the end of the golden age.”   The 
decade saw dramatic changes in American politics, economy, and culture.  Slow 
economic growth, stagflation, high unemployment and the exportation of 
manufacturing jobs replaced a twenty-year period of prosperity and economic 
expansion. The oil embargo of 1973 sent shockwaves through the economy and led to 
an expansion of domestic energy supplies, mostly in the West.  The weakening 
economy transformed the heart of industrial America into the Rust Belt, and fueled 
regional animosity as jobs and population continued to shift to Sun Belt states.  These 
economic and demographic shifts weakened the strength of labor unions and the 
political coalition forged by Franklin D. Roosevelt.   At the same time, economic 
change tarnished the golden age of capitalism, political scandal and socio-cultural 
changes also marked the end of a golden age of politics.  The Vietnam War and 
Watergate scandal caused many to lose trust in the government.  These issues also 
combined with social changes and the continued protest movements to end an age of 
consensus government.  American politics became increasingly partisan and culturally 
divisive.1   
 It is within this historical context that James Earl “Jimmy” Carter became the 
President of the United States in 1977.  Riding the wave of discontent following the 
Watergate scandal and President Gerald Ford’s pardon of Nixon, Carter—who had 
never held federal office—found favor with the electorate.  Carter promised to 
stimulate the economy, curb inflation, tackle the energy crisis, do more for civil rights, 
                                                 
1 Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty! An American History, Second Edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008), 
1022. 
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women’s rights, and the environment while restoring Americans’ faith in their 
government through increased public involvement. 
 To help meet these goals, Carter had included in his campaign pledge an idea 
that his predecessors had rejected as political suicide: he vowed to challenge the 
construction of federal water projects.  As Governor of Georgia, Carter had battled 
with the Army Corps of Engineers over the Sprewell Bluff Dam and won.   Carter had 
originally supported the dam, but an increased personal commitment to the 
environment led him to question the dam on the Flint River.  Educated as an engineer, 
Carter also reviewed the Army Corps of Engineers general plan and discovered the 
agency had manipulated the dam’s economic justification and understated its 
environmental impacts.  If he won the election, Carter vowed to review the economic 
and environmental record of federal water development projects.  After the collapse of 
the Teton Dam during the campaign on June 5, 1976, Carter also vowed to include 
safety in the review criteria.2   
 President Carter kept his campaign promises to take decisive steps to slash the 
federal budget by proposing within a month of taking office to eliminate funding for 
nineteen water projects.  His actions sparked a reaction that tapped into growing 
feelings of discontent building on both sides of the debate.  Within weeks a newspaper 
correspondent dubbed the projects slated for review the “Hit List.”  The vehement 
reaction of project supporters, especially to the lack of consultation prior to the 
                                                 
2 Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water, Revised Edition (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1993), 307-308.  For the Carter campaign’s pursuit of the environmental vote, 
and more see Jeffery K. Stine, “Environmental Policy During the Carter Presidency” in The Carter 
Presidency: Policy Choice In The Post-New Deal Era, edited by Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), 180-3. 
 3
announcement, resulted in claims of Carter exacting vengeance on the West, a region 
that had failed to give him a single electoral vote.   
The projects on his list represented monumental structures that had already 
been authorized by Congress.  Influential members of both parties had endured 
protracted political battles to secure authorization and in many cases annual 
construction appropriations, as many of the projects were already under construction.  
The projects epitomized what historians have termed the era of big dams or era of high 
dams that had begun with the construction of Hoover Dam.  The construction of 
Hoover and other large federal dams during the New Deal inaugurated an extended 
period of construction by the Bureau of Reclamation, Tennessee Valley Authority, and 
the Army Corps of Engineers.  By the end of the 1960s every major river in the United 
States and many of their tributaries had been dammed.  Additionally, the construction 
of Hoover Dam began a shift in the Bureau of Reclamation’s mission beyond 
irrigation to include hydropower generation and urban water supplies.3 
By the time that President Carter took office the Bureau of Reclamation’s 230 
major dams and reservoirs provided 511 billion gallons in municipal water supplies 
for 17.8 million people, nearly one-third of the population in the seventeen states 
along or West of the 100th meridian.  The agency’s fifty hydroelectric plants 
                                                 
3 The use of these two terms increased in popularity as it became more apparent that the federal 
government was ending or had ended its role in constructing large scale water development projects.  
Among the more notable uses are John R. Ferrell, Big Dam Era: A Legislative and Institutional History 
of the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program (Omaha: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Missouri River 
Division, 1993); Donald C. Jackson and David Billington, Big Dams of the New Deal Era: A 
Confluence of Engineering and Politics (Norman: University Press, 2006) and Donald C. Jackson, 
David Billington, and Martin Melosi, The History of Large Federal Dams: Planning, Design, and 
Construction in the Era of Big Dams (Denver: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, 
2005); Donald Pisani,  “Federal Reclamation in the Twentieth Century: A Centennial Retrospective,” in 
The Bureau of Reclamation: History Essays from the Centennial Symposium, Volume 2 (Denver: U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation, 2008) 611.   For an early use in the popular press,  New York Times 
environmental writer Philip Shabecoff used the term in a 1987 headline  “After 85 Years, The Era of 
Big Dams Nears End,” January 24, 1987. 
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associated with those dams and water projects produced nearly 40 million megawatt 
hours of electricity.   The Bureau also fulfilled it primary purpose by delivering 
irrigation water through over 7,000 miles of canals to 146,000 farms producing 58.2 
million tons of food, fiber, and forage.  The value of those agricultural products 
exceeded $4.4 billion ($18.5 billion in 2012 dollars).4  
The projects on the Hit List, authorized by Congress between 1944 and 1968, 
represent the backlog from this period of expansive construction.  However, this was 
not a case of leaving the best for last.  Most of the projects Carter selected to halt were 
among the most expensive, or those with the most complicated engineering.  In most 
cases they were projects that had been conceived and dreamed of at a time when 
technology and economics combined to make them infeasible.  The post-war 
development of new, larger, more efficient machines—large earth machines and 
tunnel boring machines—facilitated construction while at the same time new 
repayment schemes allowed hydropower revenues within an entire river basin to 
subsidize construction of water works.  But while these new machines reduced the 
time and complexity of moving mountains of earth and rock, they also increased the 
cost of construction.  Increased expenses complicated the legislative histories of these 
massive projects.  They slowed the initial authorization and the need to spread costs 
                                                 
4 For 1975 figures see, Federal Reclamation Projects, Water and Land Resource Accomplishments, 
1975 Summary Report (Denver: Bureau of Reclamation, 1976), 1-9, 43.  Current figures on the Bureau 
of Reclamation’s website (http://www.usbr.gov/facts.html ) show similar trends.  Due primarily to 
population growth the agency now provides municipal water to nearly twice the number of people, 
approximately 31 million.  Hydropower generation remains at an average of about 40 million megawatt 
hours a year.  While there has been a decrease of approximately 6,000 farms served to 140,000, the total 
number of acres remains approximately the same at 10 million.  These farms—20% of all farms in the 
West—account for 25% of all fruits and nuts and 60% of all vegetable production in the United States. 
Calculation to 2012 dollars is a straight inflation calculator (www.westegg.com), and is not based on 
actual commodity prices.  Websites accessed March 16, 2013. 
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over many years slowed the pace of construction, increased project overhead, and 
opened doors to further debate over annual appropriations. 
Increasingly, the debate in Congress, as well as in public and in the courts, 
came to include not only concern over the rising economic costs, but also the 
environmental costs.  The 1970s were a time of mounting national awareness.  Pitched 
environmental battles over proposed dams in or near notational monuments and 
parks—Echo Park, Bridge Canyon, Marble Canyon—during the preceding decades 
not only raised awareness, but led to the nationwide growth of the Sierra Club and 
other environmental groups.   The passage of the National Environmental Protection 
Act (NEPA)—signed by President Richard Nixon on January 1, 1970—provided a 
new weapon for these increasingly powerful groups which now had legal teams.  
Additional legislation passed in the 1970s, particularly the Endangered Species Act 
and the Clean Water Act, became weapons to stop projects deemed too destructive or 
too expensive.  
Environmental groups scored few victories even with their new legal weapons.  
The few victories they did win, combined with the expense and delays of the extensive 
litigation, threatened many traditional natural resource users.  Also leading to a 
growing backlash were new federal laws and rules placing further restrictions or 
prohibitions on traditional natural resource uses, such as the Federal Land Policy 
Management Act (FLPMA) enacted by Congress in 1976.  With a few minor 
exceptions the law ended the policy of selling the remaining government lands.  While 
maintaining the principal of multiple use of the public lands, the law also allowed 
protective restrictions, including the designation of Wilderness areas.  Further fueling 
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the ire of those favoring traditional land uses was the federal government’s attempts to 
deal with the energy crisis.  Federal/state conflict erupted over the siting of coal-fired 
power plants, the opening of coal leases, and the continued development of nuclear 
power.  Water played a central role in many of these debates as new power plants 
needed water from cooling; new coal fields needed water to utilize slurry pipelines 
proposed to transport the coal; and a massive oil shale development on the Colorado 
Plateau needed enormous quantities of water to refine the rock into oil.  The conflicts 
over land use, resource development, and water fueled by the policies of the Carter 
administration boiled over into the short-lived Sagebrush Rebellion.5 
While the rhetorical goals of the rebels came to naught, the feelings of 
resentment toward Carter and toward Washington helped sweep Ronald Reagan into 
office in 1980.  Further, the perception of environmental extremism by Carter 
combined with moral backlash stemming from the Democratic Party’s stand on 
abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, and other moral issues weakened support for 
Carter and the Democratic Party.  As a result voters swept many Democratic 
governors, senators, and congressmen from office as an increasing number of 
Democrats in morally conservative Western states fled the Democratic Party. 
Within this context it seems that the Hit List helped to end a decade of non-
partisan cooperation that had begun the “environmental era.”  But when viewed 
beyond the short term, the Hit List controversy had further impacts on the history of 
large federal water projects.  While Carter’s water policies were not as successful as he 
                                                 
5 The complaints are visible in the contemporary writings of Sagebrush Rebels such as Colorado 
Governor Richard D. Lamm and Michael McCarthy, The Angry West: A Vulnerable Land and Its Future 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).  The best history of the Sagebrush rebellion remains R. McGreggor 
Cawley, Federal Land, Western Anger: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Environmental Politics 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1996). 
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had hoped, he did succeed in cutting several projects.  Further, the Hit List combined 
with Carter’s policy initiatives and the continued efforts of his allies ended the Era of 
Big Dams.   
 Historians have argued that there are multiple factors, not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, that led to the end of large federal reclamation projects.  First, they argue 
that the growing environmental movement shifted public support from large dams by 
helping publicize their impacts.   Others point out that in an era of increased spending 
on social programs, coupled with high inflation and interest rates, large water projects 
became uneconomical.   Finally, some argue that the dam builders simply ran out of 
“good” sites to build dams and water projects.6   All of these factors contain elements 
of truth, but they do not fully explain the process that ended the U.S. practice of 
building large water projects.  For example, the NEPA complicated the construction of 
authorized projects.  It did not, however, stop any of these projects.  And while the 
best dam sites had been used, or declared off limits, engineers for the Bureau of 
Reclamation were still evaluating feasible sites for dams into the 1980s.  President 
Carter’s efforts to cut funding to authorized water projects, and his proposed policies 
to change the evaluation criteria for new dams served as a catalyst that when added to 
existing environmental and economic factors created the formula that ended the Era of 
Big Dams.  
                                                 
6 The argument that the end of construction came as a result of the exhaustion of good sites is made by 
Marc Reisner, 396-7.  David Billington, Donald Jackson, and Martin Melosi argue that it was likely a 
combination of these factors that ended construction of large dams.  However, they do not include in the 
book any discussion of the actions taken by the Carter administration.  See, The History of Large 
Federal Dams: Planning Design, and Construction (Denver: U.S. Department of the Interior, 2005). 
410-1. 
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Despite the apparent importance of the Hit List, there has been relatively little 
serious scholarly attention directed towards Carter’s water policy initiatives.  The 
aspect of Carter’s actions that has received the most scholarly attention is the effect of 
the Hit List controversy on the president’s relationship with Congress.  Political 
scientists studying these events have concluded that Carter’s proposals to cut water 
projects burned bridges with Congress, and crippled the balance of his presidency.7 
A recent book which breaks this trend is Jimmy Carter and the Water Wars by 
political scientists Scott Frisch and Sean Kelly.   While they do provide some 
discussion of the original conflict over the water project review, their book’s focus is 
presidential influence.  They use the debates over water projects, primarily on Carter’s 
veto of the appropriations bill in 1978, to explore the interaction of veto strategy, and 
presidential influence over Congress and the Pork Barrel.  They devote considerably 
more attention to Carter’s veto which normally has not garnered much attention.  Like 
the other works by political scientists, its audience is narrowly focused and its analysis 
is driven by political theory.   While it contains useful facts and historical information 
garnered from oral interviews, it does not place Carter’s actions within the broader 
historical context of the events that preceded or followed Carter’s presidency.   It also 
does not engage the significant work by historians of the 1970s and 1980s, the 
environmental movement, or water policy.8   
                                                 
7 For examples of the treatment of the events by political scientists see Charles O. Jones, Keeping Faith 
and Losing Congress: The Carter Experience in Washington,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 14 
(Summer 1984): 437-445, Paul E Scheele, “President Carter and the Water Projects: A Case Study in 
Presidential and Congressional Decision Making,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 8 (Fall 1978): 348-
364, and Tim R. Miller, “Politics of the Carter Administration’s Hit List Water Initiative: Assessing the 
Significance of Subsystems in Water Politics” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Utah, 1984).  
8 Scott A Frisch and Sean Q Kelly, Jimmy Carter and the Water Wars; Presidential Influence and the 
Politics of Pork (Amherst, New York: Cambria Press, 2008).  
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The best histories of the Hit List to date have been written by non-historians.   
The most complete and accurate description comprises part of one chapter in Empires 
in the Sun by Robert Gottlieb and Peter Wiley.  While Wiley has an M.A. in history 
and Gottlieb is now a professor of Urban Studies at Occidental College, they wrote the 
book in journalistic style.  At the time the two co-authored a syndicated column titled 
“Points West.”  So, while the narrative in the book does a good job of providing a 
brief overview of the Hit List controversy and the water policy debates, it lacks source 
citations and appears to have a few factual errors.9  
Marc Reisner’s Cadillac Desert, is the second book which offers a history of 
the Hit List.   Reisner was a journalist and this book also lacks source citations.  There 
are discrepancies between these two books, and the research for this dissertation has 
uncovered several errors in Reisner’s narrative.  Further, Carter’s water project and 
policy reviews compromise a very small part of the book.  Reisner casts Carter’s 
reform efforts as a failed attempt against the entrenched system of Congressional pork.  
While this interpretation has some merit, it dismisses the real, though limited success 
Carter did enjoy.  Further, Reisner’s narrative does not provide the historical context 
or meaning that can come from placing Carter’s reforms in the context of the legacy 
the President inherited and also the fate of water projects and reforms under Reagan.10      
                                                 
9 Peter Wiley and Robert Gottlieb, Empires in the Sun: The Rise of the New American West (New York: 
Putnam, 1982).  The hit list is discussed on pages 54-62. 
10 Three other authors have errors in their treatment of the Hit List.  Garland Haas in his version of 
events runs the story of the 1977, and 1978 votes together, getting it a little muddled in the process.  
The way he explains the events makes it sound as if Carter singled out 18 projects at the February 18, 
1977 meeting and then announced the cuts.  In other words, all the research and decision-making was 
done on that day.   Haas, a few lines later moves the story quickly along by concluding:  
Incensed senators quickly handed Carter the first serious legislative defeat of his new 
presidency by simply adding the water projects as an amendment to the Public Works 
Job Bill, which the Congress expected the president to sign.  Despite a threat by the 
president to veto the bill, the amendments went through the Senate by a vote of 65 to 
 10
My dissertation seeks to create a conversation among these political scientists 
and the political historians, environmental historians, journalists, economists, and 
environmentalists who have approached the various aspect of this story in some form, 
or whose works explain the context of Carter’s Presidency.   This dissertation builds 
upon the extensive work of historians who have explored the origins of the modern 
environmental movement, its politics, and its policies.   The best example of this type 
of work is Samuel Hay’s seminal Beauty, Health, and Permanence.  But while Hays 
does an excellent job detailing environmental politics over a thirty-year period, 
Carter’s environmental policies, of which water policy comprised a major part, only 
                                                                                                                                            
24.” He then skips forward, "on October 5, 1978, Carter carried out his threat to veto 
the Public Works Appropriations bill… 
As discussed previously, the vote on the public works bill was in March 1977, and was not the final 
vote on the budget that came in July.  There is no indication that Carter ever threatened to veto the 
public works bill passed in March.  By skipping ahead to 1978, Haas does not discuss the intervening 
year, or like most scholars, the extensive amount of work invested in crafting comprehensive water 
policy reform.  Haas also ends his story there, leaving out any discussion of the subsequent events after 
the veto.   Garland A. Haas, Jimmy Carter and the Politics of Frustration (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland 
& Co., Inc., 1992), 76. 
 In his book, Jimmy Carter: American Moralist, Kenneth Morris makes similar errors.  He uses 
the water projects to demonstrate how Carter made passing his number one agenda item, energy, 
difficult.  But, in making this point Morris gets the details wrong.  He states, “having vetoed the bill for 
federal funding of 19 water projects in 17 states... Carter alienated many of the representatives and 
senators who had already promised the federal plums to their constituents.”  But Carter did not veto the 
bill.  He revised Ford’s budget and deleted the proposed appropriations for the project.  While many of 
Carter’s opponents complained that he vetoed their projects, this is not really what he had done.  Carter 
did not veto a bill funding water projects until October 1978. Kenneth E. Morris, Jimmy Carter: 
American Moralist (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 255. 
Yet another example is Peter Bourne, who in his biography gets the numbers wrong.  First he 
says, “The Ford budget had proposed the construction of 320 dams and other water improvement 
projects.”  The number is correct but the budget did not propose the construction of that 320; 
technically it proposed funding 320 projects or proposed continued construction of 320.  Ford’s budget 
did not include any requests for new construction starts.  Bourne then moved on to incorrectly state that 
Carter cut “all but nineteen” of the 60 projects identified by the transition team.  Specifically Bourne 
wrote, “After he took office, all but 19 were axed at a savings of $5.1 billion to the taxpayers.”  Bourne 
should have stated that all but 19 were funded, or 19 were axed.   
 Bourne then incorrectly states, "His inexperienced congressional staff failed to warn him of the 
vehement reaction his proposed cuts would generate…"  This is obviously inaccurate, and based on the 
discussion in Chapter 1, a gross error.  All of his staff did warn him, and Carter made the cuts knowing 
what the consequences would be.  Peter G. Bourne, Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from 
Planes to Post Presidency (New York: A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, 1997), 373. 
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receive scant attention.11   Environmental historian, Brooks Flippen, has written two 
books on the environmental movement and the development of government policy in 
the 1970s.  Like Hay’s work, both speak to the context of Carter’s reforms, but do not 
take up the Carter period in detail.12 
In addition to histories of the environmental movement, this study also draws 
in the voices of many historians who have dealt with the history of water and specific 
water projects.  The conditions underlying the original formation of federal water 
policy and the development of large dams as multi-purpose water projects forms an 
important part of ending an era of construction.13  Marc Harvey’s Symbol of 
Wilderness does an excellent job showing how water projects inside the national parks 
system proposed after World War II helped to inaugurate the modern environmental 
era.14   Many historians have looked at individual projects or the history of water in 
specific states.  Most of these studies do not go beyond a brief mention of Carter’s 
efforts to stop the projects.15  One book, Martin Reuss’ Designing the Bayous does not 
                                                 
11 Samuel Hays, Beauty Health and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-
1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).   Additional studies include Hal Rothman, The 
Greening of a Nation? Environmentalism in the United State Since 1945 (New York: Wadsworth, 1998).  
For a journalistic approach see Philip Schebecoff, A Fierce Green Fire: The American Environmental 
Movement (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993).  
12 Brooks Flippen, Nixon and the Environment (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000) 
and Conservative Conservationist: Russell E. Train and the Emergence of American Environmentalism 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006).   
13 The best history of the Bureau of Reclamation’s early period is Donald Pisani, Water and the 
American Government: The Reclamation Bureau, National Water Policy, and the West, 1902, 1935 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).   
14 Mark W. T. Harvey, Symbol of Wilderness: Echo Park and the American Conservation Movement, 
Reprint (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000). 
15 For example see Jeffrey K Stine, Mixing the Waters: Environment, Politics, and the Building of the 
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway (Akron: University of Akron Press, 1993) and Douglas E Kupel, Fuel 
For Growth: Water and Arizona’s Urban Environment (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003).  
Norris Hudley, Jr. provides an encyclopedic history of water development in California.  But because of 
the scope of his project, he does not provide much detail for the battles over projects during the Carter 
years.  For example, discussion of Carter, the Auburn Dam which was on the hit list, and of policy 
battles over acreage limitation and the lawsuit involving the Westlands Water District, comprise only a 
few pages of the book. 
 12
even mention the project was on the Hit List or reviewed by the President.16   The one 
exception is Peter Carrels’ Uphill Against Water which does an excellent job of 
showing how local opposition to the Oahe Project in South Dakota made it one project 
Congress could agree with the President to cut.17  The one notable attempt to tell the 
entire history of water development in the West, Donald Worster’s Rivers of Empire 
essentially ends at the point that Carter challenged traditional water development. 18   
Finally, this study also brings into the conversation the voices of many politicians, 
including President Carter, who published books and memoirs in the years since these 
events unfolded.19    
This study also seeks to fill an important gap by exploring the overlooked 
significance of the Carter Administration’s water policy proposals that became its 
focus after the initial compromise over the Hit List in 1977.   Carter sought to establish 
uniform policies to evaluate projects of the four different federal agencies building 
dams—the Bureau of Reclamation, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, and the Soil Conservation Service.  Further, to further prevent the 
manipulation of calculations to justify questionable projects, Carter proposed 
establishing an independent review function within the existent Water Resource 
Council.   Other policies included encouraging non-structural options for flood control 
                                                 
16 Martin Reuss, Designing the Bayous: The Control of Water in the Atchafalaya Basin, 1800-1995 
(Alexandria, Virginia: Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998) 
17 Peter Carrels, Uphill Against Water: The Great Dakota Water War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1999). 
18 Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity & the Growth of the American West (New York: 
Pantheon, 1985).  Carter is mentioned only in one paragraph on the last page of the last chapter of the 
book.  The major battle over acreage limitation and the Westlands Water District receives a little more 
attention, comprising about five pages. 
19 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982) and White 
House Diary (New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010);  Burt Lance, The Truth of the Matter (New 
York: Summit Books, 1991); Cecil Andrus and Joel Connelly, Politics Western Style (Seattle: Sasquatch 
Books, 1998); and Richard D. Lamm and Michael McCarty, The Angry West: A Vulnerable Land and Its 
Future (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).   
 13
and regulations promoting water conservation practices in all government agencies 
and programs. 
While the administration continued to work on policy proposals through the 
balance of Carter’s presidency, Congress refused to accommodate the president.  The 
administration did take action on policy changes that did not require congressional 
action.  For example, Carter pushed for enforcement of the 160-acre limitation on 
existing Bureau of Reclamation projects and for recognition of federal reserved water 
rights.  These actions further enraged members of Congress and many in the West who 
believed that the President was acting unilaterally against long standing water uses in 
the West and over state control of water rights.   These are important areas that have 
been largely ignored by both political scientists and historians.    
This study also seeks to fill a gap by tracing the histories of the projects on the 
list that Congress voted to continue funding.  This seems to be a valid test of the long-
term impact of Carter’s actions.  While it seems fair to judge his efforts to cancel 
projects and initiate policy change as largely unsuccessful, historians have not 
explored the long term implications of his water projects review.   A review of the 
largest Bureau of Reclamation projects on his list confirms Carter’s role in bringing 
the era of large dams to an end and shaping broader environmental policy.   
Environmental groups had previously won significant battles to prevent the 
authorization of the Echo Park, Marble Canyon, and Bridge Canyon dams.   But they 
had limited success in halting authorized projects, especially once construction had 
begun.  Both grassroots and national environmental groups had sought to use the 
NEPA and other laws to stop large water projects in the courts to no avail.  Seen in this 
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light, the Carter administration and the environmental groups that it cooperated with 
made significant progress in halting environmentally damaging projects by halting 
several authorized projects, on which construction had already begun.  Further, when 
viewed over the long term, one finds that several of the other projects that Congress 
funded in 1977 over Carter’s objections were later stopped or modified by the 
continued efforts of environmental activists and other opponents of the dams.  
This study also seeks to make an original contribution by illuminating the 
connections between Carter’s water policies and public attitudes about 
environmentalism broadly.  The Carter presidency played a prominent role in 
polarizing environmental debate.  At the beginning of his term, most involved with the 
environmental movement in the United States had high expectations.  During his 
campaign, Carter highlighted his pro-environmental record as governor, and promised 
to address many environmental concerns, including ending destructive federal water 
projects.  The way in which the administration handled the announcement of the Hit 
List, and Carter’s capitulating compromise left many environmentalists frustrated.  
Further compromise by the administration and mainstream environmental groups on 
environmental issues, such as the Forest Service’s second Roadless Area Review and 
Evaluation (RARE II), contributed to the birth of “radical environmentalism.”  At the 
same time, Carter’s efforts to cut water projects, rewrite water policy and regulations 
helped to strengthen public support for water projects, particularly in the West, and to 
fuel emotions among a growing number of political conservatives that federal 
environmental laws had gone too far.  This is best exemplified by the battle over the 
Tellico Dam and the snail darter, a fish threatened with extinction because it was only 
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known to inhabit the waters to be inundated by the reservoir.  The prospect that “a 
little fish” could halt a multimillion dollar dam that was 90% complete shocked and 
perhaps scared the proponents of other large federal construction projects.  Ironically, 
as we shall see, the fact that a bipartisan congressional review determined that the 
government would actually save money by not completing the project and that 
President Carter chose not to intervene to veto the bill that exempted the project from 
the Endangered Species Act did not seem to alter their perception.20    
Public support for dams had been slipping during the 1970s as their 
environmental and true economic costs became more widely known.  Evidence of this 
is seen in the support of California Governor Jerry Brown’s opposition to the Auburn 
and New Melones dams.  It is also seen in a much publicized letter signed by several 
dozen members of Congress, including Congressman Morris Udall of Arizona, 
supporting the concept of cutting the budget by trimming unnecessary water projects.  
Udall held the powerful chairmanship of the primary committee that approved all 
water projects.   But both Brown and Udall changed their positions after the 
announcement of the Hit List.  Water districts and developers contrasted Carter’s cuts 
against the severe drought to strengthen public support for continued water projects in 
the West.21  
Further, for many in the West, Carter’s actions not only strengthened support 
for more water projects, they helped fuel the frustration and anger that sparked the 
                                                 
20 For high expectations see Stein, 183. For RARE II and the formation of Earth First! see Hal 
Rothman, The Greening of a Nation? Environmentalism in the United States Since 1945 (Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth/Thompson Learning, 1998), 181-6.  Rothman actually sees a positive benefit to the the 
creation of more radical fringe as it lent an air of credibility to more mainstream environmental groups 
(185). 
21 Reisner, Cadillac Desert, 315. 
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“Sagebrush Rebellion.”  Westerners not only loathed Carter’s cuts of projects they 
believed were vital, but also feared shifts in water policies that Carter announced at the 
same time as the cuts.  They saw the policy changes as a federal power grab and 
feared they would lose control of water supplies.  Most scholarly work on the 
Sagebrush Rebellion has focused on the FLPMA  as the primary catalyst in provoking 
the rebellion.  This is logical given the stated goal of the rebels was the transfer of 
federal lands to the states.  However, in the West, control of water is often more 
important that control of land, and there were many who recognized this.   For 
example, Senator Jake Garn (R-UT) introduced a bill in Congress during the initial 
days of the Hit List controversy—two years before what is commonly accepted as the 
beginning of the rebellion—which proposed the transfer of all federal lands in Utah to 
state control.  This was a move in part to thwart efforts to create a wilderness area in 
the Uinta Mountains that would have blocked the completion of the Central Utah 
Project. 22    
 Thus, Carter’s water policy reforms, within the context of his environmental 
policies broadly had a polarizing effect; effectively driving a wedge into what 
historian Hal Rothman called the “bipartisan proenvironment consensus.”   But for all 
the bluster of the sagebrush rebels and their talk of Carter’s “War on the West,” those 
claims were far from representative.  The calls to stop so many dam projects, and the 
call to enforce acreage limitation laws and curtail subsidies to agribusiness did not 
originate with Carter, or even East coast environmentalists; they had originated years 
before with strong grassroots efforts of people living in the West.   These individuals 
                                                 
22 Dorothy Harvey to Family, March 3, 1977,  Special Collections, University of Utah Marriott Library, 
Dorothy Harvey Papers, Accession 2232, Box 3 Folder 1.  Harvey played an important role in 
organizing grassroots opposition to the Central Utah Project during the Carter years.    
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continued their efforts during the Carter years, and continued after he left office.   The 
strong reaction against Carter’s efforts did not dissuade his allies, but emphasized that 
much more the need to continue to work for the changes he had attempted.23  
After Carter left office, his allies continued to press for a resolution to the 
issues he had attempted to address.  Congress succeeded in passing compromise 
legislation to increase acreage limitation in 1982, and as previously mentioned, to 
reauthorize two projects that had escaped cuts during Carter’s years.  At the center of 
each of these compromise measures was Congressman George Miller of California.  
Miller (D)—who came to Congress on a wave of reformers in the wake of 
Watergate—had been intent on reforming western water projects and was a strong 
supporter of Carter.  During the 1980s, Miller employed as his legislative aide Daniel 
Beard, who had preciously served as an assistant to Guy Martin, the number two man 
in the Department of Interior over water projects.  Beard’s experiences in the Carter 
Administration shaped his attitudes and opinions.  Like Miller, he was intent on 
reforming water policy and stopping the worst of the large water projects.  Miller later 
helped Beard become President Bill Clinton’s appointment to head the Bureau of 
Reclamation.  As commissioner, Beard helped to complete a process that had really 
begun with Carter’s efforts and had continued through the Reagan and Bush 
administrations, changing the mission of the Bureau of Reclamation from water 
development to water management.  The Hit List controversy played a critical role in 
motivating both Beard and Miller to seek the significant reforms they later helped to 
pass. 
                                                 
23 Rothman, 184.   Dorothy Harvey for example worked for several years after Carter left office in an 
attempt to build opposition to the CUP.  Her efforts, discussed in chapter 6 culminated in an opposition 
campaign leading up to the 1985 vote to approve an amended repayment contract.   
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Thus, while the Hit List controversy provided a short-run boost to water 
project advocates, and to Sagebrush Rebels, in the long run the controversy helped to 
motivate dam opponents and led to further shifts in opinion.  Environmental activists 
continued to oppose the projects and Miller, Beard, and others helped secure change 
through the legislative process.  Another individual influenced by the Hit List who had 
a significant and direct long term impact on public opinion was Marc Reisner, author 
of the well known exposé, Cadillac Desert.  Reisner wrote his best seller in response 
to his experiences during the Hit List controversy when he served as the 
communications director for the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).  NRDC 
had been actively involved in supporting the administration’s efforts to cut water 
projects and in attempts to educate both members of Congress and the public about the 
projects on the Hit List.  In his book, Reisner was critical of the press coverage during 
the Hit List controversy.  As someone who worked to get accurate information about 
the true impacts of the projects to the media, the negative response in Congress and 
the press to the Hit List motivated him to embark on his efforts to expose the worst of 
the West’s water problems.  In the preface to Cadillac Desert’s sequel Reisner wrote, 
“Watching Carter blown over backwards by the reaction [of Congress to the Hit List] 
it seemed to me that the West’s, and Congress’s, infatuations with water projects 
would never end.  So, Cadillac Desert was conceived as a work of history with a 
warning attached.” 24 
While Carter’s water policies were not as successful as he had hoped, he did 
succeed in cutting several projects.  His success in getting Congress to cut funding to 
                                                 
24 For the criticism of the press coverage of the Hit List, see Cadillac Desert, 315-316.  The quote is 
from Marc Reisner and Sarah Bates, Overtapped Oasis, (Washington, D.C., Island Press, 1990), xv. 
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authorized water projects, and his proposed policies to change the evaluation criteria 
for new dams served as a catalyst, which added to environmental and economic 
factors, created the formula that ended the Era of Big Dams.   While in the short term, 
Carter’s efforts fueled a backlash in much of the West, the reaction in Congress and in 
the press motivated environmentalists and other dam opponents, including George 
Miller, Dan Beard, and Marc Reisner, to continue to push for reforms that completed 
the process started by Carter.  
 
“Hit List: President Carter’s Review of Reclamation Water Projects and His 
Impact on Federal Water Policy” is divided into six chapters.  The opening chapter 
details the development of the administration’s decision to cut funding to water 
development projects.  It explores efforts to block federal water projects in the years 
before Carter took office as well as the origins of his own opposition to large federal 
water projects.   This chapter also examines the preparations of several different 
proposed lists of projects, as well as the debates within the White House about the 
extent and timing of announced cuts.  The chapter concludes by assessing the 
President’s personal involvement in the decision to move forward with the proposals 
to cut water projects from the budget.  
Chapter Two follows the development of the political battles after Carter 
announced the preliminary lists of projects.  The chapter explains how the 
administration reacted to the inevitable uproar and ultimately reached a compromise 
solution with Congress in 1977.   Rather than treating the outcome as a foregone 
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conclusion, the chapter places events within the broader context that helps to explain 
why Carter made the decision to compromise. 
 From the beginning of the controversy over the water project review, the 
administration indicated that the proposed cuts were to be accompanied by a more 
thorough water policy review.   Chapter three focuses on the administration efforts to 
review and review federal water policy.  It also examines the concurrent efforts to deal 
with a court ordered mandate to enforce or revise the portion of the 1902 Reclamation 
Act which limited farms receiving federal subsidized water to 160 acres.  This chapter 
also argues that understanding the controversy surrounding the policy review and 
acreage limitation is critical to understanding appropriations battles in 1978.  In part 
reacting to the administrations efforts on water policy and acreage limitation, members 
of Congress sought to reinstate funding for the projects cut in 1977.  The resulting 
battle resulted in Carter’s veto of that year’s public works appropriation bill.   
While Carter scored a temporary victory, his actions made members of 
Congress even more defensive.   As a consequence, a coalition formed in Congress 
and among western governors who continued to block and fight his reform efforts.  
Chapter Four examines the Carter administration continued efforts to implement 
policy reforms, acreage limitation, portions of the Clean Water Act, and federally 
reserved water rights.  These efforts, I argue, played a key role in stoking Western 
anger and are important in the development of the Sagebrush Rebellion.  Chapter Four 
concludes by investigating how the Reagan administration responded to the rebellion 
in the context of critical water issues.  Despite the rhetorical differences between 
Carter and Reagan, the practical result of reforms and budgetary restraints produced 
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strikingly similar results.  However, the nuanced differences between the two help 
illuminate the contours of the broad political landscape shaping the debate over natural 
resources, energy development, and regional growth. 
Finally, to assess the long term success and significance of the Hit List and 
Carter’s water policy review, particularly the subsequent action of congressional 
allies, the final two chapters present case studies of the two largest projects that 
Congress funded over Carter’s objections—the Garrison Diversion in North Dakota 
and the Central Utah Project.  Examining the fate of these two projects during the 
Reagan years and beyond provides an opportunity to not only compare Carter and 
Reagan’s actions, a close examination of both projects helps to understand how 
Carter’s broad water reforms fit within larger historical contexts.  In both cases the 
President’s supporters in Congress ultimately succeeded in forcing reforms that 
marked the end of the road for large scale water development in the West.  Yet, the 
differences in the way reforms came to both projects also explains a great deal about 
the historical changes that ended the federal government’s long career of building 
monumental engineering works. 
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Chapter 1 
The Hit List Controversy, 
or The Road Paved With Good Intentions. 
 
. 
I then broached the concept that was to prove painfully 
prescient and politically unpopular: limits.  We simply 
cannot afford everything people might want.  Americans 
are not accustomed to limits “We have learned that 
"more" is not necessarily "better," that even our great 
nation has its recognized limits.”   
—Jimmy  Carter commenting on his inaugural address.1 
 
Everybody has warned me not to take on too many 
projects so early in administration, but it's almost 
impossible for me to delay  
something that I see needs to be done. 
Jimmy Carter2 
 
It was an unusually mild day during an unusually mild winter.   The lack of any 
significant snowfall worried farmers, ranchers, and water officials throughout the 
West.  Western governors had scheduled a meeting with newly appointed Secretary of 
the Interior Cecil Andrus to discuss the problem, and the need for federal drought 
assistance.  However, when Andrus’s plane landed in Denver that balmy February 
morning, the governors’ moods had grown confrontational; that morning’s newspapers 
carried reports of President Jimmy Carter’s proposed budget cuts for some of the 
biggest water projects under construction in the West.    
In the West, where water users faced increasingly limited water supplies due to 
the severe drought, the announced cutbacks felt like direct retribution for the 
President’s failure to carry a single state in the West.   Politicians, news outlets, and 
water groups responded with rhetorical bluster.  For example, in its first issue after the 
                                                 
1 Jimmy Carter, Keeping the Faith: Memoirs of a President (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982), 21. 
2 Ibid., 65. 
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announcement, the newsletter of the Colorado Water Congress contained the banner 
headline, “White House Declares War on Water Users.”  The story went on to decry 
the fate of the three Colorado projects “axed in the White House massacre.”3    
Congressman Morris K. Udall, a Democrat from Arizona and head of the House 
Interior Committee, noting that the president’s official message to Congress 
announcing the cuts was dated February 21, and called the announcement the 
“Washington Day Massacre” at a congressional hearing.4   
The move to cut several of the largest Reclamation projects ever undertaken, 
after construction had already begun, during one of the worst droughts of the century, 
angered more than the governors gathered in Denver that morning.5   The 
announcement angered politicians and water users across the country.  It angered 
members of congress of both parties, but particularly Democrats whose projects had 
been slated for cuts.  To use an ironic expression, the president’s move was like 
throwing a bucket of water on Congress.  It ended the normal hundred day 
“honeymoon” on day thirty-one.   But the proposal did more than start a political war 
over water.   It was a fight between the Washington outsiders and insiders.  It was a 
pitched battle for power between the executive and legislative branches over control of 
the purse and the pork barrel.   Contrary to a popular caricature, President Carter was 
not duped by naive environmental idealists; nor did he stumble inadvertently into this 
political battlefield.  He personally, consciously, and deliberately launched a campaign 
                                                 
3  “White House Declares War on Water Users,” Colorado Water Congress Newsletter, Vol 20. No 2. 
(March 1977), 1.  
4 Felix Sparks to Colorado Water Conservation Board and Colorado Water Congress Executive 
Committee, March 1, 1977, Colorado State Archives, Governor Lamm Papers, Box 65182, Folder 
“Background material…” 
5 Grace Lichtenstein, “Western Governors Upset by Plan to Cut Funds for Western Projects,” New York 
Times, Feb 21, 1977.  
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to end what he sincerely believed amounted to wasteful spending on environmentally 
disastrous water projects.   
  The decision to move forward with the budget proposal cutting water projects 
rests squarely with Carter.    He knew it would stir up a hornet’s nest.  He was advised 
by some staff not to take action.  Vice President Mondale and others warned of the 
high political costs. Yet, despite the warnings he believed it was the right thing to do 
and the right time to do it.  He had promised to balance the budget within his first 
term.  He had promised to cut wasteful spending.  He believed strongly about the need 
to stop costly and environmentally destructive water projects.   Despite some 
improvement in the economy and signs of recovery from the severe recession of 1974-
75, the economy was still struggling.  As we shall see, Carter believed that cutting 
wasteful spending on dams would not only help his goal of a balanced budget in the 
long run, but would allow for short term investment in economic stimulus—
particularly in the “rustbelt” where unemployment remained at abysmal levels.  But 
beyond these motivations to act quickly, Carter held a strong conviction that it was 
time for the federal government to get out of the dam building business.  This 
conviction stemmed from his own experience battling federal water bureaucracy as 
governor of Georgia.6  
 
Sprewell Bluff Dam 
As governor Carter fought a tough political fight to stop an Army Corps of 
                                                 
6 In a July 1975 in a campaign press release Carter stated, “I personally believe that we have build 
enough dams in this country and will be extremely reluctant as president to build any more.”  Quoted in 
Jeffery K. Stine, “Environmental Policy During the Carter Presidency” in The Carter Presidency: 
Policy Choice In The Post-The New Deal Era, edited by Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998). 182. 
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Engineers (ACOE) dam at on the Flint River at Sprewell Bluff.7   Understanding the 
battle over the last free-flowing river in Georgia is essential to understanding Carter’s 
later actions as President.  While his efforts did garner some national attention during 
a period when he was unknown to most people living outside of Georgia, the true 
significance lies in the effect that the fight had on Carter himself.8   The experience 
completely converted Carter’s faith in the Army Corps of Engineers, and cemented his 
environmental convictions.   Carter himself pointed to his experience to prove his 
personal commitment to cutting the Hit List projects at a meeting with Senators and 
Members of Congress early in the fight.  The White House used the story to remind 
the public of Carter’s first hand knowledge of the ACOE and commitment to cut 
unnecessary projects.   Consequently, some writers have included the Sprewell Bluff 
story to varying degrees in their narratives of the Hit List. 9   
 In many ways Sprewell Bluff is representative of a great many water projects 
under, or awaiting construction during Carter’s presidency and certainly all of the 
projects on his Hit List.  Proposed during what writer Marc Reisner famously termed 
                                                 
7 Discrepancies exist in the spelling of the proposed dam at Sprewell Bluff.  The Army Corps of 
Engineers misspelled the name as “Spewrell Bluff” in their original proposals for the dam.   Thus 
government documents and many other accounts from that period  thus carry this alternate spelling.  As 
Governor, Carter corrected the spelling by executive order in March 1974.  See Kenneth K.  Krakow, 
Georgia Place Names (Macon, GA: Winship Press, 1975), 210.   Despite this change some have 
continued to use the old spelling.  For consistency the corrected spelling is used here throughout.   
8 The primary example of national coverage of  Governor Carter’s battle over the Flint appeared in 
Readers Digest, see, Eugene H. Methvin, “The Fight to Save the Flint,” (August 1974), 17-26. 
9 Of the various histories of the Hit List, the Sprewell Bluff is prominent in the accounts of Marc 
Reisner, Cadillac Desert (New York: Viking Penguin Books, 1993), 307-308, but he does not provide 
many specific details.  The best rendering is in Tim Palmer’s Endangered Rivers (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1986, 100-102.  The shortest reference is Peter Wiley and Robert Gottlieb, Empires 
in the Sun (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982), 55, in which the dam is not even named but 
referred to as “a dam on the Flint River.”  Gottlieb does not include it at all in his brief discussion of the 
Hit List in A Life of Its Own (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988).  Historian Jeffery K. Stine 
considers Sprewell bluff essential in his analysis of Carter’s environmental policies, but also does not 
explain the events in any great detail; see “Environmental Policy during the Carter Presidency” in The 
Carter Presidency: Policy Choice in the Post-New Deal Era, ed. Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis 
Graham,  179-201 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), 181.  
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“the go-go years” of the early 1950s when federal water agencies, and the vast 
majority of politicians and the public thought there was no such thing as a bad dam 
project.  With such a long list, Congress normally found it easiest to give priority to 
the best projects—those with the most justifiable needs, the best dam sites, and (at 
least on paper) the best return on investments.  They were what some would call ‘the 
low hanging fruit.”  Sprewell Bluff and the majority of the other projects on the list 
waited years and decades for authorization and appropriations to initialize 
construction.   Most faced opposition for economic, environmental, safety concerns, or 
a combination of the three. 
Congress authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to construct the Sprewell 
Bluff Dam in 1963. But construction of the project was not scheduled until 1974.  
According to Marc Reisner’s account, Carter supported the project as a state legislator 
and chairman of the Middle Flint River Planning and Development Council.10   
However, strong lobbying from friends and from environmentalists and outdoor 
recreationists after he became governor in 1970 convinced him that he needed to take 
another look at the proposal.  
In 1970 the Georgia Natural Heritage Council, a part of the state government, 
surveyed fifty- three rivers for possible preservation under the National Wild and 
Scenic Rivers Act.  The council’s report noted that the Flint was the last major river in 
the state whose fall line remained undammed, and assigned it their top 
recommendation for preservation.  The Council provided Carter with the results of 
their study and urged him to suspend the project.  At the same time Ron Miles, an 
archeology student who enjoyed spending time on the Flint, formed a grassroots 
                                                 
10 Reisner, 107. 
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effort, the Flint River Preservation Society.  Miles quickly found allies in the Georgia 
Conservancy, the Audubon Society, the League of Conservation Voters and others who 
mounted a campaign to petition Carter.  Author Eugene Methvin reported Carter 
received over 6000 letters and more than 50 visits.  This overwhelming response 
motivated Carter to personally investigate the situation.  He began by making a 
weekend inspection where he visited the site, camped overnight, and canoed the Flint 
River.  Joe Tanner, his commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources 
accompanied him on the trip.  After taking in all that the area had to offer Carter told 
Tanner, “If we are going to destroy all this natural beauty we better make sure that 
what we get in return is worth the price.” 11  
 Carter returned to Atlanta determined to learn everything he could about the 
proposed plans. Carter reported later that launching an investigation infuriated dam 
proponents such as former Congressman Jack Flint, who had shepherded the dam’s 
initial authorization.  Carter’s reaction to Flint would mirror his later reaction to 
Congress; he simply stated, “I was impervious to that displeasure.”  Having made the 
decision to investigate the project, Carter explained later that: 
My next step was to ascertain the accuracy of the facts and figures of 
the Corps of Engineers, which I didn’t have any reason to doubt. I 
considered the Corps an element of the military. I presumed that the 
officers of the Corps of Engineers were telling me the truth.12 
But as Carter began investigating the project, according to Methvin’s account, 
he “encountered only obfuscation and delay” when dealing with the Army Corps of 
Engineers.  When he finally received a copy of the NEPA statement for Sprewell Bluff 
                                                 
11 “Destroy Natural Beauty,” in Methvin, 18.   
12 Jimmy Carter, “Preface: Preserving a Georgia Treasure,” in The Flint River: A Recreational 
Guidebook to the Flint River and Environs, by Fred Brown and Sherri Smith (Atlanta: CI Publishing, 
2001), 14. 
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Dam, Carter found it “little more than promotional literature supporting dam 
construction.”  The governor pushed for a revised statement from the Corps of 
Engineers.  Faced with possible court action from either the governor’s office or the 
Flint River Preservation Society, the Corps reluctantly determined to restudy the 
project.  No longer willing to take the Corps research at face value, Carter ordered his 
own review conducted by “geologists, archaeologists, hydrologists, historians, and 
park and wildlife experts” overseen by Commissioner Tanner.   At the same time, 
Senator Herman Talmage (D-GA), a project supporter, pressed the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct their own independent review.13 
 As these studies unfolded, Carter continued to investigate the project.  By the 
time he was finished he explained “The decision on whether Sprewell Bluff Dam 
should be built is one of the most difficult I've had to make,” and he said it was the 
second most time-consuming after his key objective of reorganizing the state 
government.  Describing the amount of time spent researching he explained that “I 
have personally read all the written reports and transcripts of oral testimony made 
available to me.  I have consulted with more than 50 delegations.  I have analyzed 
several thousand letters and telegrams and numerous petitions and resolutions.”  In 
addition to his initial trip he revisited the area for a second canoe trip, and made two 
additional tours by helicopter.14 
   When he finally received a copy, the Corps’ revised impact statement came as 
a shock to Carter.  Although the National Environmental Policy Act required a 
                                                 
13 Methvin, 20-1. 
14 Jimmy Carter, "Statement on Sprewell Bluff Dam, October 1, 1973” in Frank Daniel, comp, 
Addresses if Jimmy Carter (James Earl Carter), Governor of Georgia, 1971-1975 (Atlanta: Georgia 
Department of Archives and History, 1975), 14. 
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detailed discussion of alternatives, the report “brushed aside” all other options to meet 
the project’s stated goals.  Armed with the data from the independent reports, it 
became obvious the Corps intentionally manipulated their accounting in an effort to 
justify the project.  Carter announced, “The Corps of Engineers reports and analysis 
are strongly biased in favor of completion of their proposed projects.” The Corps’ 
report claimed the project benefits would outweigh the costs, but Carter’s personal 
analysis revealed computational shenanigans that omitted significant costs, wildly 
inflated benefits, manipulated data, and broke the Corps’ own accounting rules.15   
In his official statement Carter spent considerable time—despite noting it was 
impossible to catalog all the complicated and constantly changing issues surrounding 
the project—detailing several other of the most egregious examples.  During the few 
months spent redrafting the dam’s environmental statement, the Corps had 
inexplicably “quadrupled the economic benefit assigned to recreation” claiming the 
new reservoir would provide nearly $4,000,000 in annual recreation benefits.  
However, this figur appeared grossly inflated given the independent analysis which 
found the new lake would compete with nine others within 50 miles, one of which was 
already facing bankruptcy due to under use.  
Carter also noted that the planned flood control benefits were in conflict with 
the recreation benefits.   Carter explained that drawing the water down by 10 feet to 
create room for floodwaters would coincide with times of maximum recreation 
demand and periods of peak power need would leave a substantial portion of the 
shoreline and shallow flat bottoms exposed reducing both the quantity and quality of 
recreation available.   
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
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Not only was more lake recreation not needed, Carter noted the 
recommendations against the dam by the Georgia Natural Heritage Council as noted 
above.  Further, almost all state agencies responsible for recreation strongly opposed 
the project as did the US Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife.  Carter concluded 
that a better investment could come from providing better access to natural river areas 
through easements, lease, purchase, or other acquisitions of riverbank properties which 
could be accomplished at a fraction of the cost of dam projects.    
The Corps had underestimated the project costs by using present costs rather 
than future costs which took into consideration inflation.  They used the old discount 
rate 3 3/4% as opposed to the current rate of 6 7/8%.  They calculated the loss of 
24,500 acres of forest as $248,000—the net value of the raw timber—ignoring “an 
annual loss to the state of $12 million in jobs and other income.”  The Corps claimed a 
$127,000 “wildlife” benefit from reservoir fishing permits while ignoring the impact 
of the reservoir on the existing environment and the loss of the deer, wild turkey and 
osprey.16   
The Corps of Engineers estimated flood control benefits of $127,000 annually 
with an additional $1.1 million accruing from increased use of floodplain areas.  But 
Carter noted that the Corps did not consider that for far less money land-use planning 
could be used to reduce future flood damage.  The Corps claimed 82% of flood control 
benefits would come from flood plain farmland being more highly utilized but noted 
this “benefit” did not account for the loss of the 25,000 acres of woodland and 11,000 
acres of cropland to be inundated by the dam.   
                                                 
16 For computations see “Statement,” 17.  The examples here come from Methvin, 20-22. 
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 The state’s electric utility projected that the power generated by the dam was 
not needed; by the time the project would be completed the grid would have a 17% 
power reserve without the dam.  Additionally, Carter concluded that the power plant 
likely could not even pay for itself.   To show the plant could make money, the Corps 
had to overstate the capacity of the generators.  In making his evaluations of the 
project data, Carter did not rely on his own staff.  His training as an engineer gave him 
the skills and curiosity to look carefully at the Army Corps of Engineers claims.    Joe 
Tanner, Carter’s director of Natural Resources explained to reporter Dicken Kirschten 
that when Carter challenged the Corps estimates of the generators capacity, the 
engineers insisted that their figures were correct.  Unwilling to accept their numbers, 
Tanner continued, “Carter demanded a letter of verification from the manufacturer, 
‘when the letter came back from General Electric, it said the turbines would burn 
themselves out in five minutes if run the way the corps proposed’” 17  
 Carter found more mistakes and a violation of the Corps’ own rules when he 
studied their calculations of economic redevelopment benefits.  Only one of the nine 
counties considered in their computations had been designated by the Economic 
Development Agency as required by the Corps’ own regulations.  Further, analysis at 
similar dams previously constructed in the state showed none of the surrounding rural 
counties had seen the type of economic growth the Corps claimed they anticipated for 
Sprewell Bluff.  
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Governor Carter concluded his official announcement by vetoing the 
construction of the dam and ordering the development of a state-run river park to 
protect the area.  But Carter did not end there, he officially recommended:  
 
That the apparent bias of the Corps of Engineers in favor of dam 
construction be assessed by the General Accounting Office, by the 
Congress, and by other responsible agencies—in this project and other 
similar projects now planned or to be considered in the future.  The 
construction of unwarranted dams and other projects at public expense 
should be prevented.  Establishment of priorities and providing for 
recreation, power generation, economic development, and water quality 
should be entrusted to those professionally able and motivated to make 
fair and objective judgments, solely for the benefit of those people to be 
served and the taxpayers to pay the cost.18 
 
 
"In my mind there is no doubt that I have made the correct recommendation or 
decision."  Carter elaborated on his discussion with author Eugene Methvin, “It's 
important for the entire nation to understand where this kind of planning technocracy 
goes wrong and what we must do about it."19     
 Carter’s battle with the Corps of Engineers over Sprewell Bluff Dam was 
pivotal to both Carter personally and to the broader fight against water projects. 
Environmental author Tim Palmer observed that Carter’s actions were “one of the best 
examples of a dam stopped by a governor.”  Palmer also declared that the fight over 
the Flint vulcanized “Carter’s commitment to river protection.”20  Environmental 
Historian Jeffrey Stine concludes, "by the vetoing a Corps dam project that had 
already been authorized, studied, and scheduled for construction, Carter had taken a 
highly unusual step as a governor, won major national media coverage and gained him 
                                                 
18 Statement, 18. 
19 “For “no doubt” see “Statement, 15.”  Methvin, 26. 
20 Tim Palmer, Endangered Rivers,102.  
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near-celebrity status among environmentalists critical of large-scale federal water 
projects."21     
 While Carter made his decision purely on the merits of the case, the national 
attention gained was definitely an important side benefit.   Biographer Peter Bourne 
stated that vetoing the dam gave Carter “instant name recognition with environmental 
activists as far away as California.” 22  This was important, Borne explains, because 
the environmental community was the first constituency Carter would look to for 
support of his presidential bid.  Carter recruited Georgia environmental leaders Jane 
Yarn, Barbara Blum, and Landon Butler.  The three arranged a meeting in Washington 
D.C. for Carter with environmentalists from around the country.  At the meeting 
Carter revealed his plans to run for president and solicited their help.  “It was the first 
group outside Georgia to whom he had made an open statement of his intentions.”23 
During the Hit List controversy, some of Carter's opponents had claimed the 
president had opposed Sprewell Bluff Dam in a move to gain favor among 
environmentalists in advance of his presidential campaign.  This statement distorts the 
facts.  Carter had taken steps to study and ultimately cut the dam prior to making his 
decision to run for president.  But, as historian Jeffrey Stine points out in his article, 
Carter sought to distinguish himself as a “conservationist-oriented reformer.” Seeking 
to capitalize on his personal beliefs and his record as governor, Carter attempted to 
attract supporters  from the environmental movement that “favor[ed] the protection 
                                                 
21 Stine, 181. 
22 Peter G.  Bourne, Jimmy Carter: a Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Post-Presidency (New 
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23  Jane Yarn was the Georgia director of SAVE (Save America's Vital Environment) and later head of 
Environmentalists for Carter.   Barbara Blum had led the fight to preserve the Chattahoochee River.  
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and restoration of America's rivers,  especially the scores of grassroots organizations 
throughout the country fighting the damming, channelization, or other structural 
alterations of their favorite rivers and streams."   Stine argues that Carter's efforts were 
engineered "to resonate with certain segments of the environmental movement and to 
reinforce his image as an anti-Washington, outsider candidate."  For example, Carter 
declared in July 1975 that “the Army Corps of Engineers ought to get out of the dam 
building business.”24    
The battle over the dam marked a key transition for Carter and an important 
victory for a growing percentage of the public whose attitudes about dams had been 
shifting.   More and more people recognized the important aesthetic value of free 
flowing rivers and recognized that replacing those values—as well as fishing and 
stream recreation with a lake—was not an equal trade.  Public sentiment had been 
shifting, as is evident by the fight over the proposed dams in the Grand Canyon and by 
the passage of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act in 1968.   But the growth of that 
sentiment can be seen clearly in the events of 1973.  Not only was Carter fighting with 
the Corps, but grassroots efforts around the country, aided by the national 
environmental movement, attempted to block other projects—such as the Central Utah 
Project and the Garrison Diversion in North Dakota discussed in chapters five and 
six—by filing lawsuits over NEPA compliance.   While environmentalists lost these 
cases, they succeeded in slowing their progress and called attention to the problems 
with these projects.25 
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 In addition to Carter’s veto of the Sprewell Bluff Dam, three other key events 
that helped broaden discussion of U.S. water policy and set the stage for Carter’s Hit 
List also took place in 1973.  All three involved publications critical the water 
development agencies and their big water projects.   The first of these was Disasters in 
Water Development published in the spring, followed by, second, the release of the 
National Water Council’s final report and third, the publication of a book blasting the 
Bureau of Reclamation by Ralph Nader’s study group.  
Environmental Policy Center 
In April 1973, a coalition of environmental groups, led by Brent Blackwelder 
of the Environmental Policy Center (EPC), joined together in the publication of a 
booklet detailing the worst projects then under construction or in the planning stages.  
The organization of the Environmental Policy Center is an important part of the 
environmental movement in the United States.  This includes Brent Blackwelder's role 
in fighting water projects which is also a important part of this history. 
David Brower founded Friends of the Earth in 1969 after he left his leadership 
role at the Sierra Club.  One of the organization’s key staff figures in the early days 
was Joseph Browder.  Browder emerged as the leader of the staff faction wishing to 
focus on environmental policy and processes—legislative and administrative—in 
Washington DC.  David Brower increasingly saw the staff as overly focused on 
policymaking in Washington.  This dispute eventually led to the majority of the East 
Coast staff breaking away to create the Environmental Policy Center.  This 
Washington DC-based organization was a “quasi-lobbying, quasi-research and 
advocacy group of policy experts” narrowly focused on environmental protection 
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using the legislative, administrative, and political processes.  Robert Gottlieb argues 
that this break marked an important step in the United States environmental 
movement.  The creation of EPC complemented a “parallel shift towards 
professionalization based on the use of law and science occurring within other parts of 
the movement.”26 
 Of the many issues taken up by EPC, Brent Blackwelder’s efforts made 
fighting water development one of their key successes.  This also made Blackwelder 
the first lobbyist to work full-time on river protection.   Blackwelder, began his 
environmental career as a volunteer with Friends of the Earth in 1970 while living in 
Washington and earning a doctorate in philosophy.  He worked for the League of 
Conservation Voters in 1970 to help defeat House Public Works Committee chairman 
Fallon.  This success led Blackwelder to target electoral opposition at other members 
of Congress supporting questionable projects.27     
Tim Palmer explains that unlike many who became involved in fighting water 
projects, “Blackwelder had not been an avid canoeist or fisherman.”  Merely seeing 
pictures of the damage caused by channelization motivated his actions.   He became 
zealous in fighting the destruction of “special places” “for no good reason and at 
public expense.” As Robert Gottlieb noted, EPC was one of the few Washington DC-
based environmental organizations to form effective ties with local grassroots 
organizations.  Blackwelder was perhaps the best staff member at EPC to accomplish 
this.  He was instrumental in the formation of the American Rivers Conservation 
Council in March 1973, the first national organization focused on river protection.  
                                                 
26 Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring. 144. 
27 Palmer, 131. 
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Thanks to Blackwelder, “dam fighters who were flailing away on their own began to 
find each other to form coalitions.” 28   
The Environmental Policy Center along with American Rivers Conservation 
Council and other groups published the following month “Disasters in Water 
Development” written by Brent Blackwelder.  The booklet documents the reasons why 
thirteen of the nation's worst water projects should not be built.  All of the projects 
posed serious environmental consequences and had questionable economic 
justifications.  The majority of these projects also faced significant local opposition as 
well as court challenges.  Tim Palmer argues, called people to action “as no single 
publication has ever done.” 29   
Table 1   Projects listed in 1973 “Disasters in Water Development” 
   
Central Arizona Project Arizona BR 
Central Utah Project Utah BR 
Garrison Diversion North Dakota BR 
Nebraska Mid-State Nebraska BR 
Teton Dam Idaho BR 
Cache River Channelization Arkansas ACOE 
Meremac Park Dam Missouri ACOE 
New Melones Dam California ACOE 
Oakley (Springer) Dam Illinois ACOE 
Sprewell Bluff Dam Georgia ACOE 
Trinity River Canal Texas ACOE 
Duck River Dams, (Columbia and Normandy) Tennessee TVA 
 
 Although they had not been deauthorized, four of the thirteen projects—
Nebraska Mid-State, Sprewell Bluff, Oakley Dam and the Trinity River Canal—had 
been stopped by the time Carter took office.  A fifth, the Teton Dam had been 
completed and catastrophically failed.  Blackwelder had not questioned the safety of 
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the dam site, but instead had objected to the inundation of the canyon behind the dam.  
Of the remaining nine projects, the administration would recommend that all but the 
New Melones Dam be defunded or modified.  A second, the Cache River 
Channelization was subsequently cleared by the administration.  
 
National Water Council  
The work of Blackwelder at the Environmental Policy Center and the American 
Rivers Conservation Council was an important step in facilitating grass-roots efforts to 
block water projects and in keeping national attention on the nation's worst water 
projects.  Blackwelder's was not the only voice attracting national attention.  Two 
other organizations attracted national attention in their criticism of federal water policy 
and water projects.  The first of these was the National Water Council (NWC). 
During the political battle in 1968 over the authorization of the Central Arizona 
Project critics won some important concessions.  The best-known are the removal of 
proposed dams from the Grand Canyon and a ban on studying water transfers from the 
Pacific Northwest to the Colorado River Basin.   A lesser-known concession was the 
creation of the National Water Commission “to review issues of water development 
and come in, it was hoped, and set the terms for the future water agenda.”  Differing 
from its previous attempts, Congress designed the NWC to be more inclusive in its 
review.  The commission selected staff from a growing pool of academics and multiple 
disciplines—such as political science, economics, and resource planning—studying 
water related issues.30 
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 39
The NWC published its final report in 1973.  It did not receive much attention, 
especially from the water industry, its intended audience.  However, as Robert Gottlieb 
explained, “the report provides an interesting commentary on the state of water policy 
and its shifting focus.”  The commission's analysts strongly criticized interbasin 
transfers and advocated non-construction-oriented solutions.  They highlighted 
numerous issues previously ignored by water developers and their congressional allies 
such as environmental concerns, water quality, and inefficiencies in both existing 
projects and regulations.   The report called for "a shift in national priorities from 
development of water resources to restoration and enhancement of water quality.”31   
 
Ralph Nader’s Study Group 
 Following on the heels of the National Water Commission report came the 
second voice critical of federal water projects and policy to gain national recognition, 
the latest in a series of exposes written by “Nader’s Raiders.”  Damming the West was 
largely an economic critique of the Bureau of Reclamation’s economics.  Similar to 
Carter’s discoveries of the Corps’ practice of cooking the books to favor construction, 
the Nader report exposed to a broad public view a similar practice in the Bureau of 
Reclamation—overstated benefits, underestimated costs and “an unjustifiably low 
discount rate.”  Efforts had been made to reform the process under virtually every 
president since Truman.   As the study’s authors, Kip Viscuisi and Richard Berkman, 
explained, those efforts ultimately resulted in the passage of the Water Resource Act of 
1964 and the creation of an oversight organization, the Water Resource Council.   
While the idea seemed sound, according to Nader’s group, the influence of the water 
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agencies—particularly the Army Corps of Engineers—resulted in governing principles 
“so misguided that [they were] beyond repair.”32  
 Throughout Damming the West, the authors consider environmental concerns, 
but primarily through an economic lens.  That is, the authors argued that the costs of 
environmental damage—both real and intangible—were not included in current cost-
benefit accounting.   As an economic indictment, the book also noted the enormous 
subsidies given to irrigators, which due to the lax enforcement of acreage limitation 
laws fell to a small group.   Viscusi and Berkman concluded that more farm land was 
not needed in the United Sates; and that by putting more land under irrigation in the 
West, farmers in the East are forced out or cost the taxpayer through increased use of 
USDA farm surplus.   
 In the chapter on “the analytical deception” of the Bureau’s cost benefit 
analyses, the authors note the problematic practice of setting minimum discount rates 
for Bureau projects rather than using the true cost.  They advocate that the discount 
rater should be “standardized across government agencies.” They note for example 
that the Department of Defense used a ten percent discount rate for its construction 
program.  Using such a rate would render most water development projects 
economically unjustifiable.33     
   In many ways Damming the West advocated for the type of reshaping of the 
Bureau of Reclamation that Carter pushed as president, and that ultimately came 
gradually a decade later.  “Although the Bureau of Reclamation should cease its 
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irrigation activities, there is no reason why it should cease to exist.  It must still 
operate and maintain its existing dams and other facilities.  More important, the 
Bureau should apply its seasoned expertise in a saner way to the West’s modern water 
resource needs.”   In words close to those used by Governor Carter regarding the 
Army Corps of Engineers, the book concludes, “Until such time as the Bureau of 
Reclamation is ready to scrap or revamp its destructive new activities and concentrate 
on constructive ones, we call upon Congress and the President to freeze all Bureau of 
Reclamation construction.”34 
  
Carter’s Presidential Campaign 
 
Stuart Eizenstat noted that candidate Governor and President Carter felt deeply 
about environmental protection, pointing out his opposition to block the Sprewell 
Bluff Dam.35  Throughout his campaign Jimmy Carter promised to cut the federal 
budget, and to cut funding for dams.  Tim Palmer wrote that at a Los Angeles 
fundraiser at the beginning of his campaign in October 1974 Carter spoke at length 
about his experience battling the Corps of Engineers over Sprewell Bluff Dam.  
Because of the distorted data used to justify that project he advocated for a GAO 
review of every Corps of Engineers project just as they had done on the Sprewell Bluff 
Dam.  He continued, stating that the corps had distorted their analysis of the New 
Melones Dam in the early phases of construction on California’s Stanislaus River.  He 
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“strongly urged California voters to support Proposition 17,” the ballot initiative to 
halt construction of the dam.36   
Proposition 17 failed by a narrow margin, but the vote demonstrated strong 
public opposition to the dam.  Opponents continued to fight the project and during a 
primary campaign stop in Los Angeles in June 1976, Carter again told supporters in 
California that he opposed the controversial New Melones Dam.  During the campaign 
at a Missouri rally, Carter also told a crowd that he opposed the Meremac Dam in that 
state.37  
 For those paying attention, the Carter campaign continued to issue statements 
regarding his pro-environmental agenda.  Curtailing water projects was important to 
Carter, but was only part of an array of issues he felt needed attention.  Further, the 
press continued to report on his environmental credentials.  For example, in October 
the New York Times editorial board published a piece laying out the two candidates’ 
environmental records.  The piece was motivated in part by a press release from the 
League of Conservation Voters.  The Times noted that while there had been many 
similarities between the candidates; their environmental records were as different as 
night and day.  As proof of his environmental credentials, the paper specifically noted 
Carter had stopped the Sprewell Bluff Dam.   Also that month, a similar article 
appeared in the journal Environment contrasting the environmental positions of the 
two candidates based on their record and on their responses to a questionnaire.38 
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After the election, the Times ran an article entitled “Conservationists Expecting 
Carter to Open New Era for Environment.”  The article once again pointed out that 
Carter had promised in his campaign “a great reduction” in stream channelization and 
dam building and added, “The government’s dam-building era is coming to an end.”   
In December the Los Angeles Times ran a longer though similar story.  Reporter 
Robert Jones interviewed officials from several environmental groups and described 
how they had made wish lists of environmental priorities they hoped would be 
“transformed into an environmental agenda for the Carter administration.”   Jones 
went on to cover several of the agenda items in detail, including the ACOE.  He 
quipped, “With the arrival of Jimmy Carter, the Army Corps of Engineers will be 
facing its single greatest test…[as it] is faced with a President who has said he wants it 
out of the dam business altogether.”39 
  Environmentalists were not the only ones taking note of Carter’s stance on 
dams or his past experience with Sprewell Bluff.   Supporters of projects also began to 
take note of the prospect of a new form of opposition to water projects.  For example, 
in Maine, the Bangor Daily News ran an editorial by its Washington Correspondent 
Donald Larrabee reporting on Carter’s campaign record.  Larrabee reiterated for his 
readers Carter’s statement during the campaign that “the federal government dam 
building era has come to an end.”  Larrabee then asked rhetorically, “Would Carter go 
so far as to kill a project on which several million dollars have been spent for 
planning?  No one knows for sure but his record on water resource projects as 
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governor can only give proponents of the Dicky-Lincoln dam a few quivers of 
uncertainty.”   Larrabee noted that the Ford Budget included funding to complete the 
studies for the dam.   While noting that Carter would be submitting revisions to the 
Ford budget, Larrabee concluded “it is doubtful, however, that the Carter 
administration will focus immediately on the individual water resource projects.  
There are greater priorities.” 40   
 As it turned out, Larrabee underestimated the President-elect.  Carter entered 
office with plans to move quickly on a multitude of priorities.  As indicated by his 
diary entry quoted at the beginning of the chapter, Carter found it difficult to delay 
moving on an issue when he saw something that needed done, and he saw a great deal 
that needed to be done.  The overriding concern was to boost the economy.  The nation 
had just begun to recover from the worst economic downturn since the Great 
Depression.  At the end of 1974 unemployment had risen to 7.1%, inflation ran at 12% 
and real economic growth was negative 5%.   Unemployment continued to climb 
peaking at 9% in May 1975.41    
President Gerald Ford, who is perhaps best remembered for his gimmicky and 
ineffective “Whip Inflation Now” scheme, actually had succeeded in ending the 
recession of 1974-75 prior to the election by restraining spending while providing tax 
cuts to stimulate economic growth.  However, while economic growth had returned 
and inflation had fallen to 4% in 1976, the recovery had slowed just before the 
election, and unemployment remained high hovering around 8%.  To keep the country 
from falling back into a recession, upon taking office Carter proposed a jobs creation 
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bill and a tax rebate plan.  Additionally, Carter recognized that excessive deficit 
spending during the Vietnam War had been part of the cause of the economic 
downturn of the 1970s and he had campaigned on a promise to balance the budget by 
the end of his first term in office.  Thus, Carter believed that moving quickly to cut 
large water development projects not only fulfilled his campaign promise to do so, but 
also would demonstrate his commitment to his promise of working toward a balanced 
budget.42    
Thus it turned out that while Larrabee editorialized that there was “no pressing 
need” for Carter to make a decision on the Dickey-Lincoln Dam, he was justified in 
worrying about Carter’s actions and too easily dismissed the president elect’s potential 
for moving quickly.  The Dickey-Lincoln project had already appeared on a list of 
questionable projects prepared by Carter’s transition team. 43      
 
Transition Document 
Feeling confident they had a chance to win the election, Carter actually set up 
his transition office prior to the election.  This allowed a head start on developing 
goals and strategies.  In early May 1976, not long after the Pennsylvania primary 
victory on April 27, Carter agreed to a proposal by Jack Watson, who had been his 
head of the Georgia Department of Human Resources “to create a policy planning 
organization to prepare for his transition from candidate to president should he win in 
November.”  While it began as a small operation of volunteers, the organization had 
grown to include a small paid staff as the campaign prepared for the convention and 
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then transitioned to the national campaign.  As the campaign entered its final weeks, 
Watson’s group produced a series of briefing books and option papers on the issues 
most likely to confront an incoming Carter administration which they delivered to 
Carter at the end of October.44 
Environmental policy was an important part of the transition team’s agenda.  
Joesph Browder, a cofounder of the Environmental Policy Center (EPC), began to 
work for Carter very early in his campaign by preparing memos on resource and 
environmental issues.  In the summer of 1976 Browder left EPC and joined the Carter 
campaign to coordinate environmental planning.45   Carter had enlisted the help of 
several environmental activists during his campaign.  Many of these individuals found 
mid-level positions in his administration.   
The transition team outlined ambitious goals for the administration, as they 
moved forward.  The decision to attack the water projects within the first month of the 
administration was a reflection not only of the president’s personal conviction that 
these water projects were wrong, but of his desire to deliver on promised fiscal 
responsibility by revising Ford’s budget for fiscal 1978.  Traditionally, new presidents 
accepted the budget of the outgoing president for their first year in office.  Rather than 
accept President’s Ford’s budget for fiscal 1978, Carter was determined to keep his 
campaign promises to work for a balanced budget by using his prerogative to submit a 
revised budget to Congress. 
One of the quirks of the US government is its fiscal calendar and budgeting 
policies.  Beginning with the budget ending in 1977, the federal government ends its 
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fiscal year on September 30.   Thus, when Carter took office the budget for FY 1977 
had already been set.   Further, the Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921 stipulated a 
deadline by which the president must submit their proposed budget to Congress.   
While there is no deadline for the non-incumbent president to submit budget revisions, 
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 stipulated that Congressional 
committees must provide their respective budget committees with suggested budget 
estimates by March 15.  Thus to be fully considered, President Carter's revised budget 
request needed to be submitted no later than late February or early March.    
Carter determined that if he was to keep his campaign promise of a balanced 
budget by the end of his first term, he would need to begin cutting immediately.  If he 
opted not to revise the budget, no significant budget changes would take effect until 
October 1978.   Additionally, Carter’s team also saw the revised budget as a way to 
maximize a much needed economic stimulus.  As a consequence, prior to the 
inauguration in December 1976 the president’s transition team had identified mid-
February as their deadline to submit the budget revisions to Congress.46   
The transition team had been organized into major blocks, such as domestic 
policy, then further divided into teams.  The team working on natural resource issues 
consisted of Kitty Schirmer, Kathy Fletcher, and Dan Beard.  By early December, the 
three had drafted an extensive document outlining critical issues and major policy 
goals.  Appropriate material was collated into a briefing document for the yet unnamed 
cabinet members.  The packet for the Secretary of the Interior designate filled a three 
                                                 
46 Fritz Mondale, Stu Eizenstat and Jack Watson to Carter, no date, Legislative Agenda, page 11.   
JCPL, Domestic Policy Staff Papers-Stu Eizenstat, Box 119, Folder 4 “12/1/76-12/6/76.   Also see , 
Eizenstat to Carter, Mondale and Secretaries-designates, December 27, 1976, box 119, folder 7. 
 48
inch binder.47  
Of the three involved, Kathy Fletcher was the individual on the transition team, 
and later the White House staff with the most involvement in the water projects 
review.  Fletcher had a degree in biology.  After graduation she spent four years in 
Denver working first for the Rocky Mountains Center on Environment before 
becoming the staff scientist for the Environmental Defense Fund.  Fletcher was deeply 
involved in a number of environmental battles over Western energy development 
issues.  She appeared as a witness at various congressional and other government 
hearings.  In August 1976 on the advice of Joe Browder, she was hired by Carter aide 
Jack Watson to work on advanced planning for the transition team.48  
The transition document was both extensive and ambitious in its scope.   Under 
the tab “Critical Issues” the team identified more than twenty urgent problems 
spanning the responsibilities of the entire department—“Public land and resource 
management, Indian Affairs, parks, wildlife, and recreation”—that needed immediate 
attention.   The list identified broad concerns such as “the critical need for leadership.”  
The second issue recognized the growing tension between states and the federal 
government over development and regulation of natural resources, an issue that would 
only become more tense and problematic during the Carter Administration.  Among 
the major concerns were proposals for reorganization, including the creation of the 
new Department of Energy.  But, the transition team also recognized the creation of 
the DOE could also open an opportunity for the creation of a Department of Natural 
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Resources, and recommended that the secretary designate be prepared to consider 
“optimum organizational patterns.” 49      
The transition document shows that the team crafting the domestic policy 
placed significant emphasis on water resource reform.  They anticipated making 
reforms in two critical ways.   The initial thrust would be to make recommendations to 
modify the Ford budget for Fiscal Year 1978.  But beyond the immediate cuts to 
questionable water projects, Carter’s transition team saw water policy reform as part 
of Carter’s broader desired effort to make government more efficient through 
reorganization and more responsive to environmental protection in line with other 
critical issues.  These included federal strip mine legislation, coal and oil shale leasing 
reforms, the implementation of the Federal Land Management Policy Act, rangeland 
improvement, and resolving Indian claims to land, water, fishing rights and other 
issues on reservations.   But of all these, water resource reform was literally near the 
top of the list.  
 
The Honeymoon is Over 
 Part of the reason that Carter expected to be able to consider so many reforms 
was that the administration hoped for good relations with congress.   Democrats held a 
two-thirds majority in Congress and sixty-one senate seats.   But rather than harmony, 
the president and Congress quickly became frustrated with each other.  Political 
scientist Garland Haas explained that part of the problem was a large number of 
Democrats elected in the 1974 election were independent-minded and disinclined to 
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submit to party discipline.  "They had raised their own money and run their own 
campaigns, and they felt little debt to the national Democratic Party, its congressional 
leadership, or its president."  The second major reason was a restructuring of power in 
the House of Representatives took power from the chairmen of the twenty-two 
standing committees and parceled it out to 172 subcommittees.   
Now, suddenly, relatively junior Democrats could be elected 
subcommittee chairs, from which position that could become policy 
entrepreneurs, after the administration, bargain with high officials, or 
simply grab publicity.  Since they were no longer under the thumb of 
full committee chairs, several of them became aggressive and 
freewheeling.50   
 
Finally many Democrats, especially liberals, were against Carter because they 
were convinced that he was trying to lead the party and the nation in the wrong 
direction.  Authors Burton and Scott Kauffman share a similar view that Carter faced 
considerable obstacles with Congress.  They add that in his dealings with Congress, 
strong personal rivalries among congressional leaders were problematic.  They note 
that at the beginning of the Congress, Representatives Phillip Burton and Jim Wright 
engaged in a bitter battle for House Majority Leader.  In the Senate there was an 
ongoing conflict between Henry Jackson Chairman of the Energy Committee and 
Russell Long of Louisiana Chairman of the Finance Committee.  These conflicts 
among party leaders often made it difficult to rally votes purely along party lines.51 
But the Kauffmans note that Carter’s difficulties extended beyond Capitol Hill. 
They observed that the coalition of voters that had backed Carter's presidency was 
diverse and the "different constituencies expected different things from the president-
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elect."  They also point out that the election had been close and Carter lacked a clear 
political mandate.  Further, a record low voter turnout suggested Carter would have a 
difficult time claiming the majority of Americans were behind him.52   
Also problematic for Carter was his image.  Carter had to battle a widely held 
perception that he was inexperienced.  The press had become more aggressive in 
investigating politicians after Watergate.  Carter inadvertently antagonized the press 
during the campaign by remaining vague on specific policy proposals and by tailoring 
his message to different audiences.  This "discernible hostility" carried over after the 
election.  Shifting demographics also posed a problem as a relocation trend toward the 
Sun Belt exacerbated regional politics and eroding it had been the traditional power 
base of Democrats.  They note urban centers of the North and East had maintained or 
lost population; and the 15 fastest-growing metropolitan areas were in Florida, Texas, 
Arizona, and Colorado.53 
But all was not bad, the Kauffmans note that there were some things going well 
for Carter. The middle-class was better educated and better paid.  Despite the political 
scandals, Americans look forward to the Carter presidency in terms of "feeling good 
about things."  Perhaps most significantly, Carter was not ignorant to the changes and 
challenges he faced as president.  His advisers, particularly his pollster Pat Caddell, 
warned the president about these issues.54 
 Carter quickly ran into another problem with Congress.  He overwhelmed the 
political system by submitting reforms on many fronts simultaneously.  Carter 
explained in his memoirs that he wanted to be a good president.  He defined that as 
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maintaining peace and successfully meeting the country’s challenges.   He explained, 
“so the major thrust of my transition effort was toward inventorying the country's 
problems and determining what should be done about as many of them as possible.  At 
least for me, it was natural to move on many fronts at once.”55 
 Burt Lance, Carter's friend and his first head of Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) explained,  
The sheer speed with which the Carter administration moved 
ahead simultaneously with the many complex programs on energy and 
other issues in January 1977 was due to Jimmy’s acute intellect.  His is 
probably the most intelligent chief executive the country has ever had.  
Jimmy is a gifted serial, multisubject (sic) thinker, able to discuss in 
minute detail any one of his complex programs and to shift fluidly to 
another without hesitation. 56  
 
The responsibility to move forward with recommendations to cut water 
projects from the revised Ford budget fell to Burt Lance.  In early December Carter 
was briefed by the transition team which had been divided into “Policy Development 
and Agency Liaison Clusters.”  Kathy Fletcher briefed the president-elect on water 
resources development reform.  It is assumed that Carter provided a green light to 
move forward with budget revisions and the transition team passed their information 
to the Office of Management and Budget and the Council of Environmental Quality.57 
 
Leaked Briefing Book 
 The week before Christmas, Jack Watson, the head of Carter’s transition team 
mailed Secretary of the Interior designate, Idaho Governor Andrus copies of the 
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briefing book prepared by the “Interior/Energy Cluster.”  The book was bound in a 
three- inch, three-ring binder.  Governor Andrus had given a copy to his assistant, Joe 
Nagel, to review.  After Christmas, Nagel met with Dave Clemens, an AP writer based 
in Boise.  Clemens saw the book on Nagel’s desk and out of curiosity asked what it 
was.  Nagel explained about the book and Clemens asked to see it.  Nagel, who was 
accustomed to Idaho’s open records law which stated that any document written with 
public funds was open to review, did not think twice about letting Clemens look at the 
book.58    
Clemens’ subsequent AP story began appearing in papers on December 29.  
Different versions of the story ran in many papers the following two days.  The story 
discussed many of the key reforms the transition team outlined, but the bulk of the 
story discussed the proposed funding cuts for water projects.  Some papers published a 
longer version of the story that included a complete list of projects.  Other versions 
mentioned only that forty-four Army Corps of Engineers projects had been listed, 
completely failing to mention the sixteen Bureau of Reclamation projects.59   
Clemens’ story stirred some controversy; some treated it as speculation more 
than fact.  During Andrus’s confirmation hearing a few weeks later, several senators 
asked about the proposed cuts.  Andrus downplayed the issue, offering assurances that 
he would be looking at projects from a safety standpoint given ongoing concerns after 
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the failure of the Teton Dam the previous June.  He also stated that he had just begun 
to read the briefing book himself when he read about it in the papers, and subsequently 
stopped reading so he could report in his confirmation that he had not formed any 
preconceived ideas about projects that needed cut.  Perhaps convinced that Carter 
would not act on the recommendations, or sure that he could talk the president out of 
making cuts, Andrus continued after his confirmation to offer assurances to members 
of Congress in public, and to them or their staff in private.60  
In January, perhaps unknown to Andrus, OMB and CEQ began reviewing the 
list.   Fletcher and the transition team had identified 60 projects as candidates for 
defunding.  They compiled their list based on previous lists of questionable projects 
prepared by OMB for the Nixon and Ford administrations.  In addition, the team 
coordinated through Joe Browder with EPC and Brent Blackwelder.  Working 
collaboratively, OMB and CEQ cut that list to thirty-five. 61  Lance moved the process 
forward, despite some reservations about the decision.   He wrote later in his memoirs 
that, “To the President, this was a case of a campaign promise that needed to be kept.  
To me, it was a case of a campaign promise that could have been kept later—in a 
second term.  Jimmy promised to cut out pork-barrel spending, and he aimed to do it 
right then.”62 
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In his discussion of Lance’s treatment of the list, authors Peter Wiley and 
Robert Gottlieb in their book, Empires in the Sun, insinuate that the preparation of the 
list had been somehow fraught with controversy.  They wrote that the final decision 
meeting on the list, discussed below, “came after three months of bureaucratic 
infighting between the Bureau of Reclamation, the Army Corps, OMB, and the 
Council on Environmental Quality over the funding of water projects."  This statement 
is flawed for three different reasons. First, OMB and CEQ had reviewed the document 
in less than a month, not three.  Second, CEQ and OMB worked together and there is 
no evidence to suggest any controversy or “infighting” between them in narrowing the 
list.  One might expect infighting between these two and the Bureau or Reclamation or 
the Corps of Engineers.  But, there is also no evidence that either agency had any 
consultation or input into the lists at this point.  The evidence, as demonstrated below, 
is quite the opposite.  Thus the authors’ final flaw is including the latter two agencies 
in his statement at all.63 
 By early February, CEQ had completed its review and identified 22 water 
projects with environmental or economic problems and another eight projects with 
environmental problems.  Staff director Steve Jellinek explained to Lance that they 
had cut the down the list “primarily because they are either substantially complete or 
are scheduled for little or no funds in FY 1978 as a result of environmental opposition 
or other factors.”  Jellinek concluded his memo by noting support for the president, 
“The Council believes that a clear statement is needed from President Carter of his 
intent to base water resource funding priorities on sound consistent economic and 
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environmental policies.  The 1978 budget revisions provide a major opportunity for 
such a statement.”64  
 With the input from CEQ, Lance passed his recommendations to Stu Eizenstat 
and the Domestic Policy Staff.  Eizenstat prepared a briefing memo for Carter’s 
review to make the final decision on the budget recommendations.  This is another 
area of the historical narrative that needs correcting.   In perhaps what is the most-read 
version of the Hit List controversy, author Marc Reisner made a serious error in his 
narrative in Cadillac Desert.   In essence, without giving a date, Reisner states that the 
president flew to Georgia on a working weekend.  He returned having decided to 
move forward.  Reisner wrote “He called up his chief lobbyist, Frank Moore, and told 
him to put Congress on notice that he wanted to cut all funding for nineteen water 
projects.  That same day, Cecil Andrus, who knew nothing of this, stepped on a plane 
and flew off to Denver for a western governors’ conference on that year’s severe 
drought.”65   
 Reisner then presents another version of the story, that “according to one of 
Carter’s own legislative aides, however, the source of the news was none other than 
Carter himself.  ‘He told Frank Moore to put the Hill on notice that he wanted those 
projects cut.  The projects had been selected at a meeting attended by Andrus, but he 
didn’t know they were actually going to go ahead with the idea.  He was opposed to it 
from the start.”  
 While it makes for a good story, it is questionable if the President actually sat 
aboard the plane “smoldering” over the report and “imagining himself running an 
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incinerated nation from an airplane.”  Carter, joined by Georgia Senator Sam Nunn 
spent part of the short flight (1:45 minutes) trip in a briefing over the airplane with 
Gen. AW Atkinson, Joint Chiefs of Staff.   It is questionable how much time Carter 
would have had to read a memo during the flight.  A more significant error is that 
Carters’ trip to Georgia took place over the second weekend in February.  He flew to 
Georgia on Friday February 11.  It would not have been possible for Carter to make 
the decision on the flight to Georgia the same day that Andrus boarded his flight for 
Boise—prior to his Sunday meeting with western governors in Denver—on February 
18.66   
It is possible that Carter made a decision to move forward with removing the 
projects from the proposed budget sometime during the weekend trip to Georgia.  
Monday morning following their return, February 14, Carter included the proposals on 
the agenda for the weekly cabinet meeting.  According to Christopher G. Farrand, 
acting assistant interior secretary—a holdover from the Ford administration—Carter 
asked Andrus and Army Secretary Clifford L. Alexander Jr. for their advice on the 
lists at the cabinet meeting.  Alexander had been sworn in earlier that day.  Andrus 
recommended against moving forward, stressing the “political sensitivity of the 
proposed decisions on certain public works projects.  The President asked for Mr. 
Andrus’ analysis of all such projects now being evaluated by OMB.”  According to 
Farrand, the president requested Andrus’s response by five o'clock that afternoon.67 
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After the cabinet meeting adjourned at 10:20, Andrus returned to his office and 
with Farrand’s help spent the balance of the afternoon poring over project documents 
before crafting a memo providing the analysis of the Bureau of Reclamation (BuRec) 
projects as requested by the President.   In the memo Andrus wrote that many of the 
projects were of “dubious merit” and he supported the cuts.  However, he argued that 
the final decision to “terminate or modify” should only be made after a review of the 
projects.  He stressed that the focus should be shifted away from cutting individual 
projects toward a comprehensive policy review.68   
Turning his attention to specific BuRec projects, Andrus provided a ranking for 
which most deserved the ax.  The Garrison Diversion project topped the list because of 
concerns lodged by the Canadian Government.  Andrus noted the Central Arizona 
Project (CAP), because of its scope, expense, and environmental degradation was 
identified as “one of the least meritorious” BuRec projects.  He also noted that the 
Congressional authorization of the CAP had involved the authorization of other 
projects in the upper basin as a political trade off.  If the CAP was cut, there would be 
“no reason whatsoever to pursue the Upper Basin Projects in Colorado.”   
The strategy of water reform is a complicated one, given the powerful 
political forces behind the traditional authorizing system. An 
Administration strategy should not be confined to individual projects or 
groups of projects, but to develop a more rational water development 
system involving improved planning, current discount rates, and more 




Mr. President let me stress again what I mentioned in the cabinet 
meeting this morning:  If we attempt to alter any of these projects for 
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whatever reason, our action will act as a catalyst to create political 
coalitions in the Congress. I discussed this with the Vice President and 
he concurs with this comment.  I am not arguing against eliminating 
some of these projects—some definitely merit action—but, I want you 
to know that there will be political retaliation from the Congress when 
we do. 69 
 
 Farrand told reporters that the White House called the Department of Interior 
the following day, February 15, asking for recommendations for more projects to cut.  
Farrand reportedly took the call, and told them to cut the three Colorado projects 
linked to the CAP.  It's unclear if Farrand is being truthful about the phone call given 
that Andrus included the Colorado projects on his list.  However, it is conceivable that 
Farrand simply reiterated that the Colorado projects made the most sense as Andrus 
had outlined in his memo.70 
What is clear is that President Carter forwarded Andrus’ memo to Stu Eizenstat 
soliciting his feedback.  Eizenstat agreed with Andrus that policy reform should 
accompany action on specific projects.  But, he disagreed with limiting the number of 
projects to cut.  Eizenstat argued that the best strategy was to recommend against 
funding all thirty-five projects identified as controversial.  He argued that deletion of 
some but not all would open the administration to charges of political favoritism, and 
would not “diminish the inevitable outcry.”71    
Presenting the president with other possible options, Eizenstat concurred that 
the four reclamation projects identified by Andrus were the most critical, adding that 
there were six Corps projects in the same critical category.  He thus recommended 
                                                 
69 Ibid. 
70  “Draining the Water..,” 542. 
71 Stu Eizenstat to Carter, February 15, 1977,  JCPL, White House Central File, Subject File: Natural 
Resources,   
Box NR 14 Folder “NR 7-1  1/20/77-3/15/77.” 
 60
halting expenditure of FY77 funds for these ten projects, effectively suspending work 
on the projects immediately.  Regardless of what action the president took, Eizenstat 
singled out three projects as deserving “special attention:” Garrison, Meramec River, 
and New Melones.  He concluded his memo advising Carter “you should personally 
advise Congressional leaders prior to sending the budget” if he deleted project funds, 
and that he agreed with Andrus that it was important to back up any decision to delete 
funds with a commitment to veto.  To remind the president that there was significant 
support for the cuts, Eizenstat attached the letter from the seventy-four members who 
supported his promise to cut.72  
The following day Carter had still not made his final decision regarding the 
specific projects to cut.  But he requested that Eizenstat’s team move forward with 
preparations.  Carter asked for a draft of a letter he could send to Congress announcing 
the cuts to the “questionable projects.”  Stu Eizenstat, Jim McIntyre, and Bo Cutter—
the latter two both senior staff at OMB—completed the draft during the day.  
However, they left the exact number of projects blank in the draft to “leave some 
flexibility in the number of projects to single out at this point, the presumption being 
that the more projects chosen for deletion the more political heat we will face from 
Congress.” 73  
In the memo, the three advisors again noted that Secretary Andrus was 
concerned with the difficulty in choosing all thirty-five projects.  They stated that 
Frank Moore believed “that if we take this tiger on we should take as many as possible 
now rather than a few now with more to come.”  But, they noted that Moore also 
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believed that Congress would fund most, if not all, of the projects regardless of the 
president’s recommendation.    
 They concluded the memo by discussing the alternate option proposed by 
Andrus.  His recommendation was to select two or three of the worst projects to delete 
and curtail funding for the rest pending review.  But they argued, this alternative 
“would raise almost as much potential heat” as deleting funds for a larger list.  
 
Carter’s Final Decision 
 
 Mondale supported Andrus’s opinion.  Andrus had indicated this in his 
Monday memo.  Like the President, Mondale himself had impressive environmental 
credentials.  Mondale was friends with Gaylord Nelson.  The two had co-sponsored 
the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.  Mondale had also been a sponsor of the Clean Air 
Act and the Clean Water Act.  In his recent memoir Mondale notes that early on in the 
environmental battles there was not widespread support (pre-Earth Day) but that was 
changing.  “Americans had begun to abandon the old Wild West mind-set, the attitude 
that there was always an open frontier.  The new conviction was that, acting together, 
we could do something to protest our air and water.”74 
Despite his environmental mindset and accomplishments, Mondale did not 
agree with the plan to push for cuts to a big list of environmentally damaging projects.  
He felt that moving forward with the cuts was simply bad politics.  He recalled years 
later in his memoirs,   
“My advice was that we should pick two or three of the most egregious 
projects and go after those.  I thought we were letting the politics get 
away from us, and that pretty soon we would face nothing but 
                                                 
74 Walter Mondale with David Hage, The Good Fight: A Life in Liberal Politics (New York: Scribner, 
2010), 42-43, quote from page 46. 
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roadblocks on the hill.   But Carter felt deeply about the matter.  He had 
developed the veto list in consultation with environmentalists and 
budget experts whom he trusted, and he felt this was part of his promise 
to govern in a new way—to represent the broad public interest instead 
of cobbling together the special interests.”75  
 
President Carter now needed to make his decision.  Secretary of the Interior 
Andrus, Vice President Mondale, and others encouraged the president to move slowly 
and only propose budget cuts to a few of the worst projects pending a completion of 
the review.   Frank Moore, Carter’s congressional liaison thought that there would be a 
strong reaction from Congress regardless of whether the number of projects was 
minimal or large.  He thus recommended proposing immediate cuts to the entire list.  
Eizenstat and the OMB staff backed Moore’s suggestion.   
The conflicting advice to the president, and the strong concerns of Mondale 
and Andrus motivated Carter to bring those voices together for another meeting before 
making his final decision.  Late in the afternoon of Thursday, February 17, Carter met 
with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Cecil Andrus, Bert Lance, Cliff Alexander, 
Lt Gen John W. Morris, General Earnest Groves, Stu Eizenstat, and Frank Moore.   
There is some question if Mondale was present at the meeting.  Andrus remembers 
Mondale being present, but the President’s Daily Diary, compiled by the White House 
Staff did not note his presence.  Andrus did not mention Mondale’s presence when he 
described the meeting at the subsequent congressional hearing on Feb 23.  Also, Lt. 
General Morris did not mention his presence in his oral history interview.  Finally, 
Christopher Farrand did not mention Mondale being present in his account given to 
reporters in April 1977.  Given that sources contemporary to the event agree that 
                                                 
75  Ibid, 183.   
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Mondale was not present, it seems safe to assume that he was not at the meeting.  
While it is possible that Andrus intentionally distorted the facts in later interviews in 
an effort to distance himself from the president's decision; it is also possible that 
Andrus remembers Mondale supporting his position and with the passage of time 
simply forgot when and where that support was conveyed to the president. 
Prior to the meeting, President Carter may have sought out additional input; he 
called Ralph Nader.  Nader was not in, but returned the call an hour later.  They talked 
for seven minutes.  After the call he went to the meeting in the cabinet room.  The 
meeting lasted almost 45 minutes, was over by 5:24.76    
In his memoirs Andrus recalled,  
I argued that we should use a scalpel instead of a meat-ax.  Pick one or 
two really bad irrigation proposals—projects in which taxpayers would 
shell out millions to benefit a few dozen already-wealthy farmers—and 
use them to bring new accountability to the Bureau of Reclamation.  
This way, nobody could accuse us of waging a ‘war on the West.’  If 
we ganged up on every project, opponents would put together a 
coalition that would kick our butts.77 
  
It's clear from the memo cited above that Andrus gave an explicit warning 
about the backlash the president's decision would create.  But it also seems equally 
clear that the exact language used in the memoir, particularly the ‘war on the West’ is 
a later addition.  No doubt this is an embellishment due to the benefit of hindsight.    
In an oral history interview Lt. General Morris stated that all present advising 
the president were opposed to moving forward with the big list.  Others have reiterated 
this point; however, given Eizenstat and Moore’s attitudes expressed in writing the 
day before, it seems that they would have supported moving forward with the cuts.   In 
                                                 
76 Daily Diary of President Jimmy Carter, February 17, 1977. 
77  Cecil D Andrus, Cecil Andrus: Politics Western Style (Seattle, Sasquatch Books,  1998), 48. 
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any event, according to Morris, after listening to the reasons everyone gave for 
restraint, Carter said, ‘Thank you very much” but he was going to do it anyway.   
However, in light of their concerns Carter instructed the Army leaders at the meeting 
to stay after and work with Eizenstat on narrowing the list.  Morris reported the list 
was 35 projects long and they narrowed it to twenty.   They had removed Richard B. 
Russell dam from the list.78 
After the meeting Carter had two short phone calls with Eizenstat and Moore.  
After dinner Carter spent about an hour and a half in the oval office that evening, not 
leaving until after 11:00.  Sometime that night or the following morning, Eizenstat 
provided another draft of the official letter to Congress.  Eizenstat’s discussion with 
the Army official had led to the selection of ten projects.  Carter reviewed the 
recommended list, and personally added the Richard B. Russell project in his home 
state in an effort to avoid the appearance of bias in his selections.   He also considered 
for a time including the Narrows project in Colorado to the list, but ultimately decided 
against it.  Thus Carter decided to completely cut funding to nineteen projects and 
planned to begin an official review of the 287 other water projects then under 
construction. 79   
 
 
                                                 
78 Oral history of Lt. Gen Ernest Graves by Dr. Frank N. Schubert, 1985, Research Collections, Office 
of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alexandria, Virginia, 168.  alternate title Engineering 
Memoirs, Lieutenant General Ernest Graves,  Engineering Pamphlet 870-1-52 (Washington D.C.: Army 
Corps of Engineers, 1997) 
79 Presidents Daily Diary, Feb 17, 1977.  On the draft letter to congress, Richard B. Russell had been 
written in by hand.  Also added in the same handwriting was the Narrows Project, which did not appear 
on the final version.  Jimmy Carter to Congress, [Draft] February 18, 1977, JCPL, Office of 
Congressional Liaison, Frank Moore Files  Box 50 Folder “Water Projects, 2/15/77-4/16/77 [OA 
6473].” 
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Table 2  The 19 projects included in the original February 22 list. 
 
Auburn Dam California BR 
Central Arizona Project Arizona BR 
Central Utah Project Utah BR 
Dolores Colorado BR 
Fruitland Mesa Colorado-Wyoming BR 
Garrison Diversion North Dakota BR 
Oahe Unit South Dakota BR 
Savery-Pot Hook Colorado  BR 
Atchafalaya River Louisiana  ACOE 
Cache River Arkansas ACOE 
Dayton  Kentucky  ACOE 
Dickey-Lincoln Maine ACOE 
Freeport Illinois ACOE 
Grove Lake Kansas ACOE 
Lukfata Lake Oklahoma ACOE 
Meremac Park Dam Missouri ACOE 
Paintsville Lake Kentucky  ACOE 




Yatesville Lake Kentucky  ACOE 
   
The following morning, February 18, Carter toured the Department of Interior 
and spoke to 1,100 employees.  It is presently unknown, but seems likely that he did 
speak further with Andrus about the Hit List.  After returning to the Department of the 
Interior, Carter spent part of his afternoon calling Senators.  In 2010, President Carter 
released a compilation of entries from his personal diary as president.   His wrote in 
his entry for Feb 18 that they had begun to contact members of Congress about 
“deleting nineteen water projects” from the budget.  He also wrote that he had been 
calling Senators about the confirmation of Paul Warnke to serve as director of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.   This would probably explain at least some 
of the phone conversations shown in Carter’s phone log.   However, one wonders if, 
for example, he might have discussed the CUP with Senator Orrin Hatch while 
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discussing Warnke’s confirmation? Or, did the Garrison Diversion come up in his 
conversation with North Dakota Senator Quentin Burdick?80 
Since taking office, Secretary Andrus, along with other members of the 
president’s cabinet, had been instructed to prepare a weekly update on the major issues 
in his office.   Although he had visited with the president earlier in the day, Andrus 
prepared his memo at the end of the day as he prepared to leave town.  He had planned 
a short visit to Idaho prior to flying to Denver Sunday morning to meet with Western 
governors about the ongoing drought.   While the reaction Andrus received in Denver 
has been well reported, the contents on his memo that Friday are revealing.   Andrus 
wrote “I believe that you made the right decision on the water projects.  My list of 
deletions was expanded from four to eight.  The people will get the message and 
although the political consequences will be considerable, they can be overcome.”81     
These few lines in the memo are significant because in his version of events in 
later years, Andrus has told others and published in his memoirs that he did not know 
a final decision had been made on the water projects prior to leaving Washington that 
weekend.  In his own memoirs Andrus wrote that the February 17 meeting “ended 
without resolving the issue.  I assumed that everyone would then make a case in 
writing to the president.  Carter would go off alone, as was his want, and make up his 
own mind.”   It is difficult to know if the oversight is due to a faulty recollection of 
events many years later.  The President had asked for Andrus’ recommendation in 
writing earlier in the week.  A more likely explanation is that the statement is part of 
                                                 
80 Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2010), 23. Presidents Daily 
Diary, Feb 18, 1977. 
81 Memorandum to the President for Secretary of the Interior, February 18, 1977.   Andrus Papers, Box 
8, Folder 4. 
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an effort to distance himself from an unpopular and controversial decision.   What is 
absolutely clear from the evidence is that Andrus had clear knowledge that a final 
decision had been made prior to his departure.82 
In Andrus’ defense, what may not have been known was when that final 
decision would be made public.  Perhaps he had assumed that the list would not be 
made public until the White House sent the official budget revisions to Congress, 
scheduled for Tuesday, after his visit to Denver.  The revelation in Sunday’s paper 
thus did come as a surprise.  Having banked on avoiding a confrontation over cutting 
water projects at a conference on federal drought assistance, Andrus saw the 
publication of the list as a serious leak.  He wrote in his memoir, 
My assumptions were those of a novice in the wars of Washington D.C.  
What the meeting did was set off alarms among hit-list proponents.  
They decided to force the issue. Worried that the sweeping proposal 
would be watered down, they leaked their briefing book with the list of 
targeted projects to the press.  As the Carter administration's chief 
public lands manager, I stepped off a plane in Denver to be met by a 
reporter holding the wire copy in his hand and asking for my comment. 
83  
But, here again there are discrepancies with Andrus’ retelling of events and the 
evidence.  First, as discussed above, the transition team’s list and briefing book had 
already been “leaked” to the press inadvertently by Andrus’ own staff weeks earlier, in 
late December.  Further, the reporters and politicians meeting his plane were not the 
first to tell Andrus of the cuts.  While it is true that he could have stepped off the plane 
knowing about the cuts and still have been met by the reporter, in a speech to the 
American Rivers Conservation Council's conference in 1980, Secretary Andrus told 
                                                 
82 Andrus, 48. 
83  Ibid,  48-49.  Andrus reiterated this point in his Oral History Interview with the Author, July 13, 
2010. 
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the audience that “he did not know that the list had been announced when a reporter 
asked him for comments."84  
 But according to Keith Higgenson, who would later be named by Andrus as 
Commissioner of Reclamation, Andrus had learned about the publication of the list on 
the plane trip from Boise to Denver.   The Governor of Idaho, John Evans who 
replaced Andrus, sent Higgenson as his representative to the meeting.  Higgenson was 
on the same plane as Andrus.  
And I picked up the morning paper, and in the paper was announced 
President Carter's "Hit List" on western water projects I came down the 
aisle and I said, "Good morning, Secretary Andrus. Have you read the 
morning paper?" He said, "No, I haven't had a chance to read it yet." I 
said, "Well here, take mine. You'll need to read this because you're 
going to be met in Denver by eighteen angry governors." "What have 
they done?" he said. I said, "The President has announced a 'Hit List' on 
western water projects."  His response was, "They told me they 
wouldn't do it this way, that they'd give me an opportunity to have a 
meeting with the governors to explain the rationale for the Hit List 
before they announce it." I said, "No, they've gone ahead and 
announced it. You're going to be faced with these governors who are 
going to want to know what's going on. That'll be more important to 
them today than the drought. 85 
  
If Higgenson’s account is accurate, then it proves that Andrus did actually 
know about the cuts briefly.  In his defense, it is also true that he did not know about 
the list before he got on the plane.  It is important that Andrus has told others since 
that he learned about it from a reporter, rather than the newspaper that morning.  Both 
suggest that he was not expecting, nor did he know the decision had been made public.  
It seems here that Andrus has embellished the story to make it more dramatic.   
Another point that can be taken from Higgenson’s account is that Andrus had been 
                                                 
84  Palmer, Endangered Rivers, 200. 
85  Keith Higgenson, Oral History Interview conducted by Brit Storey, 53-5. 
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given some type of assurance from the White House that the decision would not be 
announced until after his trip.  The two points are related in that they both reflect 
Andrus’ desire to distance himself from Carter’s controversial decision.   
 Regardless of when he found out, newspapers accounts of the drought meeting 
reported that Andrus “walked into a hornets nest” when he met with the governors.  
Andrus faced an onslaught of complaints from the governors present, most of whom 
had found out about the cuts from the morning papers.  The newspaper story 
specifically noted reactions from Colorado Governor Richard Lamm and California 
Governor Jerry Brown.  Lamm had already been in contact that morning with the 
state’s two senators that morning.86   When asked, Governor Lamm told the New York 
Times reporter Grace Lichtenstein that his reaction to the news was “controlled 
indignation.”  Like others, North Dakota Governor Arthur Link said that he learned 
the news from a reporter calling Saturday for a comment.87   
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Figure 1  Map of Hit List projects. 
 
The experience with the governors left Andrus in a foul mood as well.  Given 
that the announcement surprised and embarrassed him, Andrus felt sure that the 
information had been leaked.  Not only was Andrus irate over the public 
embarrassment in Denver, he was also upset because he had been offering assurances 
for weeks that the cuts would not happen.  In later years, Andrus would relate that the 
leaks came from environmentalists on the White House staff.  In some instances, 
Andrus has specifically implicated Kathy Fletcher.  But at the time, Andrus did not 
place blame on White House staff, but on western politicians.  When Andrus discussed 
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his theory about the leak the following day at the cabinet meeting, he wrote in the 
margins of the agenda that they suspected it may have been the leak came from one of 
the members of Congress.  He specifically wrote the names of Congressman Gunn 
McKay (D-UT), Senator Gary Hart (D-CO) or Congressman Frank Evans (D-CO). 
In his diary that evening Carter wrote, “One of the most difficult problems we 
face is maintaining the confidentiality of memoranda and other discussions within the 
White House office structure, and at the same time having key staff members 
conversant with what issues are being assessed.”  While he does not disclose what the 
sensitive leak was about, one can speculate that it was in response to the publication of 
the “Hit List.”   In his 2010 commentary Carter noted, “Constant leaks of sensitive 
information—much of which was often distorted—were to plague us during the entire 
term.  Government officials with special interests … were eager to use their 
knowledge of inside information to further their causes.”88   
 Apparently there may have been some reason for Carter to suspect a leak from 
a staff member, but it is unclear if the accusation that Kathy Fletcher was the source of 
the leak is accurate.  Andrus and others blamed her for leaks later as the administration 
moved forward with its review of projects.    However, Stuart Eizenstat investigated 
the matter and assured the president that she had not been the source of the leak.   
Perhaps Eizenstat was not convincing, or Andrus believed that Eizenstat was covering 
for a member of his staff.  In the ensuing battle over the proposed cuts, Fletcher 
became a scapegoat for administration officials—such as Andrus—who sought to 
distance themselves from the initial decision and members of Congress perturbed by 
the entire situation.  Especially after leaving the administration, with an eye toward 
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continuing his political career, Andrus has found it convenient to lay the blame and 
responsibility entirely at the feet of Fletcher.89 
 What is clear from the evidence is that the “leak” came from several sources.  
At least one newspaper, the Scottsdale Daily Progress, reported on the cuts in 
Saturday's paper before the story broke nationally.  According to their story, Charles 
Thompson, aide to Representative Bob Stump, said he was contacted late Friday by 
“Tom Free” an assistant in the White House Congressional Liaisons’ office who told 
Thompson of the recommended cut.  While Thompson missed the name of Jim Free, 
the important note is that Stump’s office received the information Friday night and 
then tipped off the paper.  Because the Daily Progress was an afternoon paper, the 
story made it out ahead of most national coverage Sunday Morning.    
The story also reveals that the Liaison’s office was a bit haphazard in 
contacting members of Congress.   The paper reported that while Stump’s office had 
been contacted, Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative John Rhodes had not.  
When contacted by the paper, Rhodes, the House minority leader, was shocked at the 
news.  He said “I don't have a thing to say.  I haven't heard of it before.  I don't believe 
it.  It apparently came from a very low ranking official of the White House and until 
we get the word from President Carter himself I don't put much credibility behind 
it."90   
Other papers ran independent stories, or localized the wire story.  Several of 
these stories indicate members of Congress, or members of their staff, contacted 
newspapers upon learning the news.  For example, the Colorado Springs Gazette 
                                                 
89 Cecil Andrus interview with Author, July 10, 2010; for Eizenstat’s investigation see Stu Eizenstat to 
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Telegraph, based its story on a press release from Frank Evans’ office in Pueblo.91  
Papers in Utah ran stories about the proposed cuts to the Central Utah Project (CUP).   
Provo’s newspaper reported Sunday that Utah Congressmen Dan Marriott (R) and 
Gunn McKay (D) said that Andrus had offered assurances within the last two weeks 
that there would be no cuts to the CUP.  The paper also reported that the Bureau of 
Reclamation's project manager for the CUP said the proposal was a complete surprise 
to him.92  The Salt Lake Tribune reported that Andrus not only assured Marriott the 
CUP would not be cut, but that Andrus promised to inform him before any action was 
taken.93  
It is somewhat ironic that only a few weeks before the announcement Cecil 
Andrus sent a letter to every Western governor.  Andrus explained that as a governor 
he had been critical of the federal government for failing to consult with the affected 
governor on the discussion and development of federal proposals.  “To keep from 
making the same mistake” himself, Andrus told them he had designated Joe Nagel as 
his personal representative to Governors.94    
As for the national story by Gaylord Shaw that ran in the Washington Post and 
the Los Angeles Times, he stated his information came from “White House officials.”  
It is unclear if Shaw received “leaked” information from White House staff, official 
statements from the White House press office, or was reporting the information 
secondhand from members of Congress.   
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 In an oral history interview, press office staffer Patricia (Pat) Barrio stated that 
the White House began receiving calls on Saturday while the White House staff was 
still in the process of notifying affected members of Congress.  She stated, “I 
remember well because it was a Saturday, and I was press duty officer, and suddenly 
got all these irate phone calls about something we had not yet announced and I had not 
been briefed on.  It was quite an interesting day.”95  Thus it is possible that Shaw may 
have been one of the calls received on Saturday; though it is unclear what if any 
information the press office provided that day.   
 One universal complaint in all the stories about the announcement of the 
proposed funding cuts was the lack of consultation by the White House with members 
of Congress and Governors affected by the cuts.  Some were not notified before they 
found out from the press.  Even those who were notified by the White House 
complained about the lack of consultation.  Rather than seek any opinion or input on 
the decision, the decision was made unilaterally by the White House.  When asked 
about the lack of notification, Congressional Liaison Frank Moore told New York 
Times reporter Martin Tolchin that “water projects were a deletion from the budget.  I 
never knew it was the tradition to tell people what's going to be in the budget before it 
was being released.”96  
On Tuesday February 22, Carter signed and the White House submitted the 
official budget message to Congress.  Carter described in his diary that day that the 
budget cuts were:  
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A much more careful assessment of the long-range commitments on 
expensive projects, including military weapons, new social programs, 
the construction of dams and other water projects, and so forth.  I may 
not win on all these deletions and revision from the budget this first 
time around, but I intend to be persistent about them.  Many people 
who want to see the budget balanced before I go out of office don’t 
want to have their own pet projects removed.  I’m determined to go to 
the public with these issues if necessary in order to prevail.97 
 
 His diary entry shows, yet again, that he did not act out of ignorance.  
President Carter knew he faced significant opposition.  The entry also demonstrates 
that he was not stumbling blindly into the abyss.  He was not inept, but had made a 
calculated decision.  Carter understood that—just as he had been advised by Mondale, 
Andrus and all the others—Congress ultimately would make the final decision, and the 
chances were that they would not follow his recommendation on every budget cut.  
Perhaps most important of all, he also believed he had made the right choice for the 
country, and that the public would see it the same way.   
 
 
On the Defensive 
 
 With the official budget document in its hands, Congress reacted swiftly.  The 
following day, Wednesday, February 23, the House Interior Committee summoned 
Andrus.  Washington Post reporter Richard Lyons observed that members of the 
committee “complained bitterly.”   Powerful Arizona Congressman Mo Udall who 
chaired the committee stated he learned of the proposed cut to the CAP from a news 
reporter.  He called the administration’s actions “The Washington Day Ambush.”   
 Andrus reported to the committee that Carter’s actions should not have come 
as a surprise. “During the campaign last year, President Carter was going before the 
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American people and saying some of these projects would be looked at, that he would 
ask for a review.”  Andrus also emphasized that the administration was not seeking 
deauthorization of any project and that if a project can be justified after the review the 
president “would not object to having it put back into the budget.”98 
 Already picking up the mantra of a “War on the West,” Congressmen Eldon 
Rudd (R-AZ) and Teno Roncalio (D-WY) both accused Carter of penalizing the West 
for failing to vote for him.   Many of those who spoke also complained about the 
process employed by the White House staff.  To take unilateral action without 
consultation on projects that had already been scrutinized and approved by Congress 
on multiple occasions.  Udall said, “It’s like a murder case where the judge call the 
defendant in and says ‘Your execution is set for May 10th and now we will have the 
trial.” 
Many histories of the Hit List have noted that Udall had signed the January 
letter to the president encouraging cuts to spending.  When Andrus pointed this out to 
the complaining Congressman, Udall explained he had believed its authors referred to 
future water projects, rather than those already under construction and complained that 
he had been “mousetrapped” into signing.99  Other accounts suggest that at least some 
of the others who signed the same letter later clarified that they supported cutting 
spending on any new projects, not cutting funding to existing projects.    
 The only thing that Andrus offered the committee was the commitment that 
open public hearings would be held on each project prior to a final decision being 
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made in April.  He also opined that he did not believe the president would impound 
funding for the projects should use its prerogative to fund the projects despite his 
recommendations.  George Miller spoke at the meeting to support the administration.  
As he left the meeting Andrus told Lyons, “The message I got from it was that if a 
member had a project he didn’t want it cancelled.” 
 Gaylord Shaw, the reporter for the Los Angeles Times covering the hearing 
reported that after the hearing Udall commented he and the other supporters of the 
nineteen projects would “press efforts to save them. ‘I think it is a fight we can win, 
even if it means voting appropriations over Carter’s objections.” 
 
Conclusion 
  The battle lines were thus drawn.  Vice President Mondale observed, “People 
forget how deeply Carter felt about wilderness and natural resources.  He saw these 
dam and irrigation projects as cheap politics and bad environmental policy.”100 Thus 
motivated by a deep and sincere belief in environmental protection, and by his 
personal experience fighting the Army Corps of Engineers over the Sprewell Bluff 
Dam, Jimmy Carter decided to cut economically questionable and environmentally 
destructive water projects.  His conviction coupled with his desire to cut federal 
spending led him to take action sooner than later.  Faced with the short deadline to 
make any significant dent in federal spending during the first half of his presidency, 
the administration acted swiftly to revise President Ford’s budget.   
Many histories and commentators have accused the president of naïveté 
concerning either the decision or its timing.  For example, Marc Reisner thought the 
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mishandling of the announcement “demonstrated a capacity for mind-boggling 
political naiveté.”  Lt. General Morris for another was extremely critical of Carter.  In 
an interview he stated his belief that Carter had been operating under the supposed 
belief “that with the support of the environmental groups, he would steamroller 
Congress.”  Robert Gottlieb stated, "if he had known the ways of Washington better, 
Carter might have suspected that the Hit List would raise a hell of protest."  However, 
the record clearly suggests that Carter was aware of the likely consequences of his 
actions.  He wrote in his diary on Friday, February 18, “I know this is going to create a 
political furor, but it’s something that I am committed to accomplish.  These projects 
ultimately would cost at least $5.1 billion, and the country would be better off if none 
of them were built.  It’s going to be a pretty touchy legislative fight to get these 
projects removed permanently.”101 
 Carter’s diary entry clearly shows that Carter was not ignorant or naive about 
the political ramifications of his decision, nor the expected reaction of Congress to the 
announcement.  Instead, his entry, as well as his actions leading up to the decision 
show that the decision was made because Carter believed that it was the right decision, 
and that doing the right thing was more important than making the wrong decision to 
get the politics right.  Political scientist Charles Jones agreed writing about Carter’s 
decision to reduce funding for water projects, “Perhaps more than any other issue, this 
one illustrates the trustee president's determination to do what is right, not what is 
political.”102 
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 Author Robert Gottlieb disagrees.  He argues that the announcement was made 
for “political and media effect” as a demonstration of Carter's outsider status rather 
than as the "culmination of the political process.”  He goes on to emphasize that this 
approach created problems for Carter because the White House did not “develop an 
educational and organizing effort” prior to the announcement in order to "combat 
long-standing biases about water development.”   Instead his announcement prior to an 
effective media campaign allowed the opposite to happen.  It allowed supporters of the 
water projects, “the water industry,” which had been losing support among the public 
to mobilize.  “Now the hastily developed Hit List enabled the water industry to launch 
a state-by -state attack on the program, while revitalizing its own agenda.”103  
 In a sense, both authors are correct.  Their statements are not mutually 
exclusive.  Jones’s comment that Carter chose to do what was right, rather than what 
was politically expedient does not make the decision apolitical.  Gottlieb is correct in 
noting that the decision conveys its own political meaning, reinforcing Carter's image 
as an outsider.  More importantly, Gottlieb recognizes that Carter's decision did not 
just raise the ire of politicians, water developers, and water users.  The timing and 
method of the announcement put the administration on the defensive, and allowed the 
water interests to quickly gain the high ground in a lengthy and vicious political battle, 
and a battle for public opinion.
                                                 
103 Gottlieb, A Life Of Its Own, 63. 
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 Chapter 2 
Dog Fight on a Political Minefield 
 
 
“The water projects were indeed outdated 
boondoggles, but if Carter had 
deliberately set out to alienate Congress 
he could hardly have done a better job.” 
-John Farrell1 
 
 “The confrontation with the Democratic 
leadership which probably best illustrates 
the divergence between Carter and 
Congress came in February 1977 over the 
president's decision to cut the water 
projects funds from the federal budget. 
-Garland Hass2 
 
The die had been cast.  Within the first month of taking office, Jimmy Carter 
made a hard decision: taking on Congress and challenging the deeply entrenched 
power system and political traditions of the pork barrel.  He was confident he was 
doing what was best for America.  He was keeping a campaign promise.  With the 
decision made and his budget recommendations announced, the administration now 
faced an even greater challenge; amidst the noise of political reporting swirling around 
the new administration setting itself up in Washington and a dozen other major policy 
proposals, the Carter administration had to sell Congress and the public its plan.  To 
do so would require convincing a skeptical public that these projects needed to be cut; 
and then in turn convince them they needed to pressure Congress to actually make the 
cuts. But because of the way the administration announced its budget revisions, the 
                                                 
1 John Aloysius Farrell, Tip O'Neill and the Democratic Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
2001), 458.  
2 Garland A. Haas, Jimmy Carter and the Politics of Frustration, (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 
Inc., 1992), 75. 
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Carter team found itself on the defensive.  Rallying public support, and convincing 
Congress to swallow that bitter pill, would prove to be a long and challenging political 
battle.  The "deep scars" of the ensuing political fight would color perceptions and 
opinions of the Carter presidency for the remainder of his term in office and hobble his 
reelection campaign.  It also rallied and re-energized an old political lobby that had all 
but conceded its glory days were in the past and had confined itself to an active but 
mundane future.  But the reaction of the water lobby and of the majority of Congress 
only convinced Carter and his supporters of the need for water policy changes.  
 
 Confident in his decision, and guardedly optimistic, Carter set his 
administration to take on the challenges that lay ahead.   While virtually every one of 
the senior staff consulted by Carter had expressed concerns or reservations about his 
decision, Carter's team put those concerns aside and turned to their allies for support.  
One of the first was the veteran dam fighter, Brent Blackwelder, who worked at the 
Environmental Policy Center, headed the American Rivers Council, and had been 
helpful in the transition team’s effort in selecting the water projects they had targeted. 
 Blackwelder had a long history at the center of efforts to stop numerous dam 
projects in the United States.  He spearheaded efforts and created strong coalitions 
against some of the worst water projects.  Some claim he had inspired and helped 
author the Hit List.  Blackwelder told author Robert Gottlieb that he got a telephone 
call from the White House on Friday, February 18.  They told him the president was 
recommending cutting off funding for 18 projects, and asked for help getting favorable 
press coverage.  Wiley and Gottlieb retold the conversation in their book: 
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‘How naïve,’ Blackwelder thought.  There was no way he could drum 
up press coverage over a weekend.  ‘They had jumped off the deep 
end,’ he concluded.  Blackwelder was surprised that Carter had taken 
such a precipitous step, even though it was a step advocated by the 
Environmental Policy Center.3  
 
 Despite the reservations he remembered in later years, Blackwelder certainly 
did try to help “drum up” some press.  It is unclear at this point what role Blackwelder 
played in informing Gaylord Shaw’s Times article which broke news of the list to a 
national audience.  If Shaw called Blackwelder after he was tipped off by another 
source, or if Blackwelder was Shaw’s source is a question that still needs answered.  
However, there was some communication between them as Shaw quoted Blackwelder 
in his article.  For the press he hid any surprise or criticism and instead praised the 
President for action Blackwelder had long endorsed.  “Carter has a lot of guts.  He is 
doing what is right, eliminating these projects that have no economic justification or 
have safety problems or have horrendous environmental impacts.”4    
Blackwelder also played a role in securing more positive press the following 
week.  A press release issued February 28 indicated that Blackwelder had done what 
he did so well; he helped to rally a coalition of environmental groups to support the 
president.  Twenty-one major environmental groups joined together in a campaign to 
raise citizens’ support for Carter's decision.  The coalition organized a news 
conference to accompany the announcement.   Once again Blackwelder’s voice 
appeared in print to support the President, joined by John Burdick, executive director 
of the Citizens Committee on Natural Resources.5   
                                                 
3 Wiley and Gottlieb, Empires in the Sun, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982), 57. 
4 Gaylord Shaw and Paul E Steiger, “Carter Seeks to Halt 18 Water Projects: California Dam Is One,” 
Los Angeles Times, February 20, 1977.   
5 Philip Shabecoff, "Citizens' Support is Sought for Plan to Cut Dam Funds," New York Times, March 1, 
 83
 Brent Blackwelder also quickly took action to update his pamphlet entitled, 
Disasters in Water Development.   The revised pamphlet contained updated 
information on the original 13 projects noting three had been stopped and a fourth, the 
Teton dam, had catastrophically failed.  The updated report contained detailed 
descriptions of fifteen water projects, six of which were from the original 1973 list.  
Nine of the projects described in the report were also on the Hit List.  One Hit List 
project, the Trinity River Canal had been in the 1973 version but not in the 1977 re-
release.  Like the original, a coalition of environmental organizations, including 
Blackwelder's Environmental Policy Center and the American River’s Council, funded  
Table 3  Projects included in Disasters in Water Development II 
 
Auburn Dam California BR 
Central Arizona Project Arizona BR 
Central Utah Project Utah BR 
Garrison Diversion North Dakota BR 
Narrows Dam Colorado BR 
Oahe Unit South Dakota BR 
O'Neill Unit Nebraska BR 
Cache River Arkansas ACOE 
Dickey-Lincoln Maine ACOE 
Lock and Dam 26 
Upper Mississippi 
River ACOE 
Meremac Park Dam Missouri ACOE 
Russel Dam (Trotter's Shoals) 
Georgia& South 
Carolina ACOE 
Susitna River (Devil Canyon) Project Alaska ACOE 
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway AL & MS ACOE 
Trinity River Canal Texas ACOE 
  
                                                                                                                                            
1977. 
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the publication.   The coalition featured Disasters in Water Development in its press 
conference and the environmental organizations used it to help generate citizen 
support.  They also used it to lobby Congress, delivering a copy to each member. 
 Despite Blackwelder’s quick efforts, additional support for the President was 
slow to appear in the press, mostly because the White House had been—to use a 
newspaper metaphor—scooped.   The proponents of the cut projects had made it to the 
press first, and cast the story to fit their needs.  To dig out of the hole, the 
administration needed to launch a media barrage of its own.  Surprisingly, despite the 
magnitude of the announcement, the Carter administration seemed ill-prepared to get 
its story out, especially given the speed and bitterness of the attacks before the White 
House made its official announcement.  For example, it took until late Wednesday, 
February 23 for CEQ “to get out a hastily pulled together press release sketching the 
questionable features of the 19 projects.”6 
But the efforts of Carter, his staff, and his allies seemed to amount to the little 
Dutch boy with his finger in the dike, or maybe in this case, a dam.  The proponents of 
the cut projects poured out the press releases and the stories.  They cast themselves as 
victims, and Carter and his staff as misinformed amateurs—or worse.    
Making matters worse, the project proponents outnumbered the president.  
Political scientists have long used the concept of an Iron Triangle to describe the 
alliance between members of congress, the agencies building water projects, and their 
local booster—businesses who benefit from construction of the projects or the 
subsidized water and benefits.  Other descriptions of the concept are more nuanced.  
                                                 
6 J.  Dicken Kirschten. “Draining the Water Projects Out of the Porkbarrel," National Journal, 9 no 15 
(April 9, 1977), 546. 
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They create polygons with a few more points.  But the principle is the same, multiple 
vested interests working together to push for water development projects.  Carter was 
now up against them all.  The press releases and attacks came from members of 
Congress in Washington, from state legislatures, governors, mayors, water districts, 
chambers of commerce, booster clubs.  Each one pointing out how Carter’s decision 
was the wrong one, at the wrong time, and for the wrong reasons. 
One of the first demands made of the White House was for the justification, 
logic, and process behind the President’s decision.  For example, even as Carter was 
sending the official statement to the Hill calling for the cuts, the Colorado delegation 
was meeting with Andrus and his aid Charles Parrish “demanding” to see the paper 
trail.  The Colorado delegation took their demands one step further threatening to file a 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to get the information.   In other ways 
their reaction is representative.  Both Senator Floyd Haskelll (D-CO) and Gary Hart 
(D-CO) worked together along with the bulk of the state’s representatives, particularly 
Congressman Frank Evans (R-CO).   Only Congresswoman Pat Schroeder (D-CO) 
supported the president.  The delegations of other states, such as Arizona and Utah, 
worked unanimously to fight for their Hit List projects.  As mentioned previously, the 
Colorado delegation also complained about the lack of consultation.  They also felt the 
speed of the decision explained the president’s behavior.  They simply could not 
understand how the president could make a decision in a week’s time to cut projects 
that had been studied and debated for years.  Senator Hart stated in his press release, 
“How can it happen that in the span of one week, these projects were cut without 
consultation?”  Finally, they are also representative of how project proponents kept the 
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story and their position in the news.  Gary Hart’s office produced four press releases 
during the first week after the announcement went public.  Their offices continued to 
issue press releases and updates at every opportunity to keep the story in the news.7  
The members of the Colorado delegation, led by Senator Hart, were not the 
only ones to protest and demand to see the justification used to kill their projects.  In 
the days and weeks after the cuts, the White House fielded multiple calls and letters.   
For example, on February 23, Congressman Tom Bevill (D-AL), who did not even 
have a project on the initial Hit List, blasted Carter for infringing on his turf.   An irate 
Bevill barely managed to veil his anger, complaining the announcement “had forced a 
great deal of attention on my Public Works subcommittee on appropriations.”  He 
continued, stating that they had been “inundated with questions” about the reasoning 
used.  To rectify the problem, Bevill requested copies of the transition memorandum, 
complaining that it had already been extensively quoted in the press but that his 
committee did not have a copy.   He also defended the projects, and the work of his 
committee.  He also reminded the president of their previous conversation in which 
Bevill recommended Carter accelerate water resource projects. He wrote, “I fail to see 
how the deletion of all of the 19 projects of the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of 
Reclamation will accomplish that objective.”8 
The White House staff tried their best to keep up, but they faced two critical 
challenges.  Carter’s decision to keep staffing levels lower than Ford’s really left the 
                                                 
7 For Hart’s press releases see Gary Hart Papers, Box 52, Folder 1, “Hart Pledged Fight for Water 
Projects,” February 21, 1977; “Senators Want Explanation for Water Project Cuts,” February 22; 
“Senators Seek Explanation on Funding Delays, ” February 28.  Also see, Floyd Haskelll Papers Series 
iv, box 1, folder 118, “Meeting on Colorado  Water Projects, February 22, 1977. 
8 White House Central File, Subject File, Natural Resources.  Box NR 14, Folder NR 7-1  1/20/77-
3/15/77, Tom Bevill to Jimmy Carter, February 23, 1977. 
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White House shorthanded.  Further, the staffing shortages had already created a 
backlog that they were trying to get out of.  For example, the Congressional Liaison’s 
office was trying to determine how to respond to Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine 
who had been waiting since January for a reply to his initial inquiry about the project 
in his state.   The January 17 memo asking for consultation prior to any decision on 
the project had gone unanswered.  Muskie sent another letter on Feb 22 after the hit 
list announcement leaving an embarrassed liaison staff wondering how to proceed. 9   
 Members of Congress did more than protest, issue press releases, and demand 
information from the White House.  The president had taken on many powerful 
members of Congress who felt that—like the law of physics--Carter’s actions 
demanded an equal and opposite reaction.  For example Russell Long of Louisiana 
had several projects from his state on the Hit List.  As chairman of the Senate Finance 
Committee, the bulk of Carter’s legislative agenda—energy policy, economic 
stimulus, tax reform—fell within the jurisdiction of Long's committee.  After a 
February meeting with Senator Long, White House senate liaison Dan Tate reported 
back to his boss that Long had threatened to put the president’s economic stimulus 
plan “in the deep freeze.” Tate also reported that Senator Muskie, Chair of the Senate 
Budget Committee, threatened to hold up consideration of the budget resolution to 
save the Dickey-Lincoln project stating, “The president might not get what he wants 
                                                 
9 Dan Tate and Bob Russell to Frank Moore, February 23, 1977; Muskie to Carter, January 17, 1977; 
Muskie to Carter, February 22, 1977, JCPL, Office of Congressional Liaison, Box 50. 
 88
unless certain members of Congress get what they want.” Tate emphasized, “The 
threat was hardly veiled.”10 
 But the negative reaction was not limited to those in political power.  The 
announcement also angered many water users, particularly in the drought-stricken 
West.  But, judging from constituent mail sent to Senator Frank Church (D-ID) those 
who felt strongly enough to write letters favored the president by a margin of 4 to 1.  
Many pointed out safety concerns after the collapse of the Teton Dam.  An attorney 
from Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, wrote to Church supporting Carter, “It is tragic that a dam 
had to collapse and people had to die before the pork in the barrel turned so rancid as 
to warrant inspection.”  The majority expressed concern over the environmental 
destruction caused by the projects as their primary objection, while some also 
complained of the project’s lack of economic justification.  Those writing against the 
President often pointed to the drought and the ever-present need for water in the West.  
Others just expressed anger and unbelief.  For example one constituent wrote: 
If my mother had told me that I was an illegitimate child, I could not be 
more shocked, astonished, and disgusted than I was to hear President 
Carter's proposals to drop funding of some 19 irrigation and power dam 
projects from his budget.11    
 
The negativity of the congressional reaction, as well as the statements of 
support from the environmental community and others only convinced Carter that he 
needed to fall back to the strategy he had used to deal with the occasional 
intransigence of the Georgia state legislature.  He would go over their heads to the 
                                                 
10  Dan Tate to Frank Moore, JCPL, Office of Congressional Liaison, box 50, Folder “water projects,” 
quoted in Scott A. Frisch, and Sean Q. Kelly, Jimmy Carter and the Water Wars: Presidential Influence 
and the Politics of Pork. (Amherst, New York: Cambria Press, 2008), 69-70. 
11 For “it is tragic”, see Scott W. Reed to Church, February 23, 77;  for “if my mother” see, Ray Horn 
(Blackfoot) to Church, February 23, 1977, both in Boise State University, Frank Church Collection, 
Mss 56, Series 1.1 (Legislation), Box 108, Folder 2.  
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public to put pressure on Congress.  Carter had already made plain to congressional 
leaders prior to the inauguration that he was not afraid to take that action.   Tip O’Neill 
and others had warned the president then not to try it.  But, their warnings went to the 
same place in Carter’s brain that stored all of the warnings about not cutting the 
projects in the first place.  That place was a little furnace that fueled his determination 
to do what he thought was right.  
 Convinced that winning the public to his side was the only way to deal with 
Congress, Carter began to take action and to accept offers of help.   On February 28, 
Carter met with singer John Denver for 10 minutes right before meeting for two hours 
with Governors attending the National Governors Conference.  The purpose of 
Denver’s visit was to inform the president that he was “available to help me with any 
major programs that we had to put over to the American people, including 
environmental quality or the reduction of expenditures for unnecessary dams, energy 
policy, particularly with emphasis on conservation.   He and Robert Redford and 
others, I think, can be used with effectiveness and we intend to do so.”12 
Carter delivered on this promise a few days later.   In an effort to get his 
message out, Carter hosted a question-and-answer meeting with eighteen editors of 
major newspapers across the country on March 4.  William Smart, the editor of the 
Deseret News in Salt Lake City, wrote that of all the responses Carter gave, the one 
about the Hit List “was by far the longest and most intense.”  Carter told those 
gathered that, ‘The ultimate decision will be made by Congress but my own judgment 
is that none of the projects is worthy and none ought to be completed.”  Another report 
                                                 
12 Jimmy Carter, White House Diary, (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2010),  29; hereafter White 
House Diary. “The Daily Diary of President Jimmy Carter ,” Feb 28, 1977. Available online by date,  
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/diary/. Hereafter cited as “Daily Diary.” 
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quoted Carter as saying, “My opinion is several of these projects—I'm not going to 
single them out—would  be better not built if they didn't cost anything, if they were 
free...” 13 
 
Figure 2 Editorial Cartoon lampooning Carter’s visit with John Denver as more 
important than western water problems.   Milwaukee Sentinel, March 9, 1977. 
 
The following day Carter had his first call-in show with Walter Cronkite.  The 
president thought this would help him stay in touch with the American people.  He 
stated in his diary, “The congress has got to know that I can go directly over their 
heads when necessary.  And, of course, I wouldn’t hesitate to do it.”  Undoubtedly he 
was thinking of the battle over budget reductions and the water projects when he wrote 
this.  Stu Eizenstat elaborated in 1994 on the president’s belief in town hall meetings 
                                                 
13 William B Smart, “Carter Still Firmly Against Funding Utah Projects,” Deseret News, March 5, 
1977;  
J.  Dicken Kirschten. “Draining the Water Projects Out of the Porkbarrel,”  540. 
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and radio call-in shows to appeal to the people over the heads of Congress.  Carter 
believed that the people “would support him if he made ‘right’ decisions.”14 
 But as Carter pressed his case with the people, Congress continued to lodge 
complaints at the president.  The same day as his meeting with newspaper editors, 
Frank Moore hand delivered a letter from Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd at 8:00 
p.m.  Byrd tried to convey to the president the “strong feelings” of he Senators 
involved in the cuts.  He explained, “The universal complaint—and I believe it is 
justified—is that these Senators were not consulted and given an opportunity for a 
discussion of the matter prior to the action taken.”15 
 That same day Frank Moore also requested that Carter attend a meeting with 
members of Congress the following week that Moore had been planning for over a 
week.  He intended the meeting as an opportunity for members of Congress to meet 
with Andrus, Burt Lance, and Clifford Alexander to answer questions about their 
projects.  But Moore told Carter that “We are encountering some resistance and 
dissatisfaction from members because you will not be at the briefing.” Carter agreed to 
drop in briefly during the meeting scheduled for March 10.16      
In the intervening period, attitudes on Capitol Hill got worse rather than better.  
On March 8, Carter hosted his regular breakfast meeting with democratic leaders.  
Carter wrote in his diary that day that the leadership continued to express serious 
concerns about his agenda.  Carter confided, “The water resources and dam projects 
                                                 
14 White House Diary, 30; Stuart Eizenstat, "President Carter, the Democratic Party, and the Making of 
Domestic Policy," in The Presidency and Domestic Policies of Jimmy Carter edited by Herbert 
Rosenbaum and Alexej Ugrinsky (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 5. 
15 Robert Byrd to Jimmy Carter, March 4, 1977 and Frank Moore to Byrd, March 4, 77 in JCPL, 
Natural Resources Subject File, Box NR 15. 
16 Frank Moore to Carter March 4, 1977, JCPL, Natural Resources Subject File, Box NR 15. 
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have caused some consternation in the Congress and I don’t know if I’ll win on this 
subject or not, but I am going to pursue it for four years until we cut out some of the 
unnecessary projects.”  The president’s comments, slightly different than those of his 
entry on February 22, reveal an increased level of doubt.  His wording had changed 
from “I may not win on all of these … the first time around” to “I don’t know if I’ll 
win.”  But, if indeed this change does point to an increase in doubt, both passages 
express his determination to press ahead with what he considered the correct choice 
regardless of the consequences or his chance of victory.17  
The other interesting note about this entry is that Carter contrasted the attitude 
of congressional leadership with that of General John Morris, chief of the Corps of 
Engineers who he met with the same day.  Carter wrote, “He’s very eager to see us 
eliminate some of the pork barrel projects.”  The contrast is striking, especially given 
that most authors who have covered the Hit List have pointed to the intransigence of 
the Army Corps of Engineers as an organization that actually was lobbying against the 
president’s plan in Congress.  Morris may have been duplicitous with the president.  It 
is also possible that his opinions did not trickle very far down the chain of command.  
In either case it is interesting to note that in later years, as noted in Chapter 1, Morris 
has been quite critical of Carter’s efforts.18   
Also on March 8, newspapers carried more stories about the escalation of the 
water review and also strong words against the President’s policies.  The National 
Water Resources Association and the Water Resources Congress sponsored a joint 
                                                 
17 White House Diary, 30. 
18 Oral history of Lt. Gen Ernest Graves by Dr. Frank N. Schubert, 1985, Research Collections, Office 
of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alexandria, Virginia, 168.  Alternate title Engineering 
Memoirs, Lieutenant General Ernest Graves, Engineering Pamphlet 870-1-52 (Washington D.C.: Army 
Corps of Engineers, 1997). 
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“emergency” in Washington D.C. on Monday March 7.  At the meeting attended by 
more than 100 water officials, about 25 from Colorado, the Denver Post reported that 
Kathy Fletcher told the group about the criteria being used to evaluate all water 
projects.  But in the Post’s article this turned into a one-inch, red-letter, banner 
headline, “New Water Policy Perils 300 Projects.”  The paper also stated that:  
Fletcher warned that an “adequate” EIS [Environmental Impact 
Statement]—one that has survived a court test—would not necessarily 
satisfy environmental concerns about specific project construction.  
Even such a statement and its approval by a court Fletcher said, “is not 
a demonstration that environmental impacts are acceptable.”19  
 
Governor Lamm granted an interview to New York Times reporter Grace 
Lichtenstein.  Lamm tempered his comments and acknowledged that he did not harbor 
grandiose plans or even hopes for major new water projects.  He did, however, defend 
the Colorado project that had already been authorized and cut off by Carter.  He 
explained his stance to the reporter saying: 
A Georgia boondoggle is a Colorado vital project.  I don’t mean there 
aren’t boondoggles out here.  But reclamation has been an important 
ingredient in the West, and you don’t cut off projects already started.20  
 
 The level of consternation in Congress jumped even higher the following day.  
During a Senate Subcommittee on Public Works Appropriations hearing that day, 
word came of a new expanded hit list.  During the hearing committee members grilled 
Andrus and vented their anger.  Once again word of the list had come from the media 
without consultation or notification from the executive branch.   Andrus stated he had 
only learned about the list at the end of the work day the previous day.  He tried to 
                                                 
19 Leonard Larsen, “New Water Policy Perils 300 Projects” Denver Post, Mar 8, 1977. 
20 Grace Lichtenstein (NY Times Writer) “Carter’s Funding Stand Intensifies War of Water Politics,” 
Salt Lake Tribune, March 8, 1977. 
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reassure the angry senators that the list was an “in-house” paper, and not a final 
draft.21   
 The newspapers that day reported that the new list leaked from the Department 
of Interior included another 45 water projects in the West.  The angry Colorado 
delegation became livid as the list added four more projects in their state— Dallas 
Creek, Frying Pan-Arkansas, Narrows, and the San Juan-Chama.  Congressman Frank 
Evans, whose district included several of these projects, issued a press release stating:   
When we talk about Fryingpan-Arkansas and the other projects, you 
begin to talk about major water sources for Pueblo, Colorado Springs, 
and Western Slope communities.  The administration is cost-cutting 
necessities of life for Colorado and we will not put up with this.  I am 
declaring warfare on Carter.22 
 
 It was during the uproar over the expansion of the list of projects that an AP 
writer based in Olympia, Washington, first used the term “hit list.”   The headline ran 
“Ray lashes Carter’s ‘Hit List.’” Washington Governor Dixie Lee Ray had dispatched 
a terse telegram to Carter on March 9 in response to learning that the Third 
Powerhouse project at Grand Coulee Dam had been included on the list as well as the 
Bacon Siphon and Tunnel needed to expand the Columbia Basin Project.  The 
governor’s office made the telegram public on March 10.  Governor Ray, like her 
colleagues noted above complained that the White House had taken the action without 
consultation.   She also found it “incomprehensible” that the administration could 
consider discontinuing construction of the hydroelectric plant at a time the nation 
sought to reduce dependence on foreign oil and fossil fuels.23    
                                                 
21 Morley Fox to Arizona Delegation, March 9, 1977, Frank Evans Papers, Box 4, Folder “Water 
Projects.” 
22 Stan Usinowicz “Water Projects List Grows.” March 9, 1977 Durango Herald. 
23 AP, “Ray Lashes Carter’s ‘Hit List,’” The Spokesman –Review, March 11, 1977, 1.   
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Table 4 Projects “added” to Hit List  for failing to meet one or more review criteria as 
confirmed by Andrus on March 8, 1977. 
 
Applegate Oregon BR 
Bacon Siphon & Tunnel Washington BR 
Brantley New Mexico BR 
CVP- San Filipe California BR 
Dallas Creek Colorado BR 
Dickenson Unit North Dakota BR 
Frying Pan-Arkansas Colorado BR 
Jensen Unit CUP Utah BR 
Lyman UT/Wy BR 
Narrows Dam Colorado BR 
North Loop Nebraska BR 
Nuaces River Texas BR 
O'Neill Unit Nebraska BR 
Sacramento River Division California BR 
San Juan-Chama CO/NM BR 
San Luis Unit California BR 
Southern Nevada Water Supply Nevada BR 
Grand Coulee Third 
Powerhouse 
Washington BR 
Tualatin Oregon BR 
Fulton Illinois ACOE 
La Farge Wisconsin ACOE 
Plametto Bend Texas ACOE 
Red River Waterway Ark-Tex ACOE 
Tallahala Creek Mississippi ACOE 
Trinity River Canal Texas ACOE 
Tyrone Pennsylvania ACOE 
 
With feeling running high on Capitol Hill and the administration still cleaning 
up from the first list debacle, White House staff attempted to regroup in preparation 
for the meeting schedule for the following morning.  Stuart Eizenstat and Frank Moore 
wrote a memo to update the president and prep him for the meeting.  With the 
escalating tensions, Vice President Mondale was to run the meeting.   
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OMB Director Burt Lance was to give a full briefing on the ongoing review of water 
projects which had generated the latest press.  They expected Lance to discuss the 
initial screening criteria, information to be gathered, public hearings, public 
availability of information developed, and the April 15 deadline for recommendations 
to Congress before Carter arrived.  Andrus, Alexander and CEQ chair Warren would 
also have described their role.24   
The memo conveyed additional background information to Carter and provides 
valuable information on the status of Carter’s overall efforts.  Vice President Mondale 
had met earlier that day with Senate Democrats.  Mondale relayed that their main 
concerns were “whether you fully realize the political pressures they must bear [and] 
whether you personally feel strongly about this issue or are being guided mainly by 
staff.” Moore and Eizenstat also informed Carter that there were now three “lists” in 
Congress’ hands, the original list of 19, the list leaked within the last twenty four 
hours which Andrus confirmed to both the Senate Committee and the White House “as 
needing further review.”  The third list consisted of thirty seven Corps of Engineers 
projects which failed the economic test as the higher interest rate of 6 5/8% which 
Senator John C. Stennis (D-MI) had requested and been given.25  
 Finally, Moore and Eizenstat provided Carter with a list of talking points.  
Essentially all of the points they suggested focused on answering the two questions 
that Mondale had brought away from his meeting earlier that day.   They encouraged 
Carter to express understanding of the projects importance and also of the political 
pressures his proposed cuts had brought to bear.  Encouraging empathy they suggested 
                                                 
24 Stu Eizenstat and Frank Moore to Carter March 9, 1977, JCPL, White House subject file, natural 
resources, box NR 14, folder NR-1. 
25 Ibid.  Emphasis in original. 
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Carter relate, “I understand the political pressures you feel; I went through it with the 
Sprewell bluff dam in Georgia.”  They also thought that the president needed to 
address the new list and to remind those attending that in his original letter he had told 
Congress that the administration would be “undertaking a study of all water projects, 
including the 19 for which no funding was recommended for FY 1978.”  Finally, they 
wanted to make sure the president emphasized that he was not acting unilaterally.  
That he could not implement the cuts on his own and that the administration would 
work closely with congress to achieve their goals.26  
Carter spent 30 minutes at the briefing with thirty-five members of Congress, 
and had thirty-five-minute follow up meeting with “senior White House staff” 
afterward.  Carter wrote in his diary that day that he “had a rough meeting” with the 
members of congress.  He continued:  
They are raising Cain because we took those items out of the 1978 
budget, but I am determined to push this item as much as possible.  A 
lot of these would be ill-advised if they didn't cost anything, but the 
total cost of them at this point is more than $5 billion, and my guess is 
that the final cost would be more than twice that amount27   
 
The significance of this diary entry is clear.   Carter understood both at the 
time that the water projects review was causing divisions with the Congress.  But 
rather than pick his battles and play politics with a Congress controlled by his own 
party, Carter was determined to push forward at all costs.  He understood that these 
water projects represented the worst of an endemic problem of government waste.   
Unfortunately for Carter, he was unable to make any real converts to his way 
of thinking.   If anything, the meeting symbolized not only the growing “breach” with 
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27 “Daily Diary,” March 10;  Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982), 78. 
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Congress, but also the administration’s challenge to win the public relations campaign.   
The White House did allow reporters access to the meeting, and the President did not 
appear before the press at the end of the meeting.  The administration did not even 
issue a press release.  The extent of its coverage of the meeting was the Press 
Secretary’s daily briefing that followed the meeting.  In contrast, congressional 
participants at the meeting made hay.  They were talkative with the press corps when 
they left the meeting and quick to issue press releases for the papers back home.    
The afternoon paper in Scottsdale, Arizona, made the meeting front page news.  
The article quoted Utah Senator Jake Garn.   While Garn was a Republican, he noted 
that even the Democrats present at the meeting questioned the cost effectiveness of 
cutting the projects.  He optimistically predicted that "the chances are overwhelming” 
that Congress would fund the majority of the projects over Carter’s objections. 28   
Senator Barry Goldwater told the press that “it was evident when the president 
spoke that he has his mind definitely set against these water projects without knowing 
anything about any facet of them”  He pointed to his home state’s pet project as an 
example explaining that none of the cabinet members at Carter's session appeared to 
know anything about the project.  “It is disappointing to me that people in high places 
have not taken the time to more fully understand the desperate need for water and 
water conservation in the arid regions of the West.”29  
 Senator Garn later related that one of the primary objectives of western 
senators and members of congress had been to educate the president on that very topic.  
Their sentiments echoed the comments made to the press by Governor Lamm a few 
                                                 
28 AP "Carter Firm on CAP Cut," Scottsdale Daily Progress, March 10, 1977. 
29 Ibid. 
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days earlier.  They believed that as someone from the South he was more accustomed 
to the problem of how to get water off of land rather than on to it.  Garn related that at 
the end of this part of the discussion Carter turned to and asked Senator Barry 
Goldwater--who had been quietly listening—for his thoughts.  According to Garn, 
Goldwater told Carter that westerners valued three things: gold, women, and water.  
He also quoted Goldwater as having said, “You can have our gold and our women; but 
damn you, Mr. President, don’t touch our water!”30   
Because the unofficial list of projects which failed an initial screening had 
been confirmed earlier in the week by Secretary Andrus, many at the meeting 
demanded more information from the President on the decision process.  The 
Colorado delegation pressed for the information they had requested under the Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA).  Unprepared to answer adequately these questions, Carter 
requested his budget director to update him on the status.  Following the meeting Burt 
Lance explained to Carter that the Colorado delegation had claimed access to the 
material based on their legislative responsibilities.  After describing the documents 
that would be included in fulfilling their request, Lance stated:  
The release of the documents requested could provide additional 
ammunition with which to attack the decision to delete the nineteen 
projects.  The release of the information could permit the decision to be 
cast in partisan terms.  Council on Environmental Quality staff and my 
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staff are not anxious to have some of the information released.31 
 
But as the administration worked to try douse the flames from the morning 
meeting—by moving the hearings out of Washington, and working on the FOIA 
request—they did not realize the severity of the brush fire the meeting had kicked up.  
Returning to Capitol Hill from the morning meeting, the senators set about the 
scheduled work.  The Senate agenda included floor debate for an emergency 
appropriation measure to fund job creation and public works that Carter and most of 
the Democrats felt was urgently needed.  The bill presented a perfect opportunity to 
the two Democratic senators from Louisiana who were not thrilled with the President 
for cutting several projects in their state, and who were not satisfied with the answers 
they had received from Carter or his staff at the meeting.   Senators Johnston and Long 
took the opportunity to introduce an impromptu amendment and send a clear message, 
“Carter cannot kill water projects without congressional approval.”32  
The amendment had five parts. The first section was a statement of facts to 
make the Senate's view on the president's action clear.  Congress authorized the 
projects after protracted hearings and consideration extended over many years.  
Congress approved yearly authorizations.  Clearly Congress wanted the projects to 
continue.  Further, if Carter wanted to stop them, he needed to follow the law instead 
of taking unilateral action.  To make this point clear, the amendment’s second part 
                                                 
31 Bert Lance to Jimmy Carter, JCPL, Box 12, Folder 3/10/77.  
32  The president’s schedule showed the meeting took place in the morning from 8:43-9:13. Daily Diary, 
March 10.  The debate on Johnston’s amendment began before 2:00 as it was interrupted by a vote 
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stated the president was to spend the funds appropriated for FY 77.  Adding further 
emphasis to this point, section three essentially stated that the Senate preemptively 
blocked any deferral or rescission of funds.  Johnston noted that this section was 
technically not necessary, but had been included in case the previous section had 
something legally wrong.  Section 4 “reiterated” the discount rate to be used was set in 
law either by the appropriation of the project or by the Water Resource Development 
Act of 1974.  Again, reminding the president the he could not change the law by 
himself to reevaluate the projects at a higher interest rate.33    
The final section stated that if the amendment was found by the courts to be 
invalid, the entire piece of legislation would be invalidated.  Several of the senators, 
particularly Edmund Muskie (D-ME) felt this measure was a bit too harsh.  Johnston 
admitted that he did not believe that section was absolutely essential, but wanted to 
send a strong message.  Agreeing that they did not need to hold the jobs bill hostage to 
send the message, Johnston agreed to drop it without debate.34   
For the most part, the floor debate was pretty mundane.  While there were a 
few concerns that needed to be worked out, there were not heated exchanges.  The 
only vitriol was the anger and complaints lobbed at the president.  The amendment 
presented the perfect opportunity for project proponents to lodge formal complaints; 
something they had done and would continue to do at every opportunity.   For his part, 
Senator Johnston took the opportunity in his introductory remarks to point out what he 
considered to be the insanity of the president’s decision to cut projects in his state.  He 
singled out the Bayou Chene, Boeuf, and Black project as an example.  Those who 
                                                 
33 Congressional Record, March 10, 1977, 7120-1. 
34 Ibid, 7122-3. 
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supported the president and opposed the project panned the project as corporate 
welfare.  This was the much maligned project that had as its primary benefit the 
capability of a sole company to tow oil rigs out to sea. 
 But Johnston defended the project.  The old channel through the Bayou was 
360 feet wide.  The company constructing the rigs had been building them as wide as 
the channel for some years.  However, they needed to build larger rigs to take part in 
the deep water drilling.  The Army Corps of Engineers’ project called for the widening 
of the channel to 440 feet.  The company had begun building the new platforms 440 
feet wide after the authorization of the project in anticipation of its completion.  
Johnston pointed out that there was at the time of the debate $200-$300 million dollars 
worth of construction already sunk by the oil company.   At that point, the project was 
about one-third complete and total cost of just over $22 million.  But until it was done, 
there was no way to get the new drilling platforms out into the Gulf of Mexico.  He 
complained that environmentalists had tried to stop the project with a NEPA lawsuit, 
but had lost in the courts.  Now he thought they had attacked the project by convincing 
Carter to include it on the Hit List.  He felt such a move was hypocritical because to 
stop the project would put 5000 people out of work at the very time the Senate was 
passing legislation to try and create jobs.  It would also reduce gas exploration at a 
time when Carter was pushing his energy policy.35 
Senator Muskie, who remained angry at the White House, spoke at length in 
favor of the amendment.  His anger was palpable, permeating the pages of the printed 
record.  He declared that he could not be “more offended” with any other action Carter 
or any other president could take as he was over the water projects.  What really 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 7121. 
 103
bothered him was the way Carter had taken the action.  Muskie conceded that the 
president may be right that some of the projects might be bad, but he "violently 
object[ed] to the procedure" used by the president.  It did not help that Carter had 
included Dickie-Lincoln Dam in Maine on the list.  Muskie, like others, had requested 
the documentation used by the White House to justify the cancellation and had 
received two pages.  He called those pages “totally inadequate,” "the flimsiest kind of 
evidence,” and “a disgrace.”  He noted those two pages did not discuss the ongoing 
environmental impact statement, something he called a “critical distortion.” He 
complained the president intended to stop the project on environmental grounds before 
the environmental impact statement was completed, a fact which was not even 
addressed in the recommendation to the president.  While he was not sure the wording 
of the amendment was effective legally, Muskie nonetheless concluded,  
There are times when you have to fight fire with fire.  When the 
executive aborts established procedures, I, as one member of the 
Senate, am going to look for any thing I can fire back -- anything I can 
fire back.36 
  
Washington Senator Warren Magnuson (D) railed against the release of the 
extended hit list which included the third power plant at Grand Coulee Dam.  He said 
he was "flabbergasted" because the project had a positive cost benefit ratio of 42 to 1.  
He challenged the President to find any project with a higher return on investment.  
Magnuson—like Long, Muskie and others—continued to vent frustration about who 
had created the lists.  Despite Carter’s declarations that he personally felt the cuts 
needed to be made, the senators believed the work was that of a “third or fourth rank 
bureaucrat,” anonymously disparaging to Cathy Fletcher.  The senators also expressed 
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concern that conducting field hearings would be disruptive to their schedules.  They 
thought that would be a colossal waste of time and energy.  Magnuson stated that in 
the long run he was confident they would win and override the president's veto, but 
that the fight would stop everything else in the interim.37   
The floor debate also revealed some regional concerns.  Senator Moynihan 
from New York spoke in favor of the amendment despite the fact than none of the 
projects were in his state.   Moynihan said he wanted the Bayou widened “so that the 
rigs could get into the Gulf of Mexico and find gas to keep the people in the Northeast 
warm and the factories working.”  But he wanted to remind the Senate that for every 
dollar that came from Louisiana or Washington to complete those projects $10 would 
come from New York.  Moynihan used the moment to make the point express what he 
believed was “a legitimate expectation” that for supporting the projects in the South 
and West, those senators would support extending the public works/unemployment 
measure from the previous year which gave more funds to states with above-average 
unemployment.38   
The measure was bipartisan.  Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker (R-TN) 
said he had been listening to the discussion “enraptured.”  He was so “delighted with 
the amendment” he asked to be a co-sponsor.  Subsequently a gaggle of others all 
requested to be co-sponsors as well. They all stood up on the floor asking to be 
included and calling out their names as if to say 'count me in too.' 39  
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One issue in the proposed amendment that was unclear was the statement 
necessitating the use of the original interest rate and the cost benefit.  Gaylord Nelson 
(D-WI) believed that the amendment would legislatively block the proposal of the 
president to reconsider projects at the higher rate.  Johnson answered that it was not 
legislatively blocking the president but only reminding the president what was in the 
law on the books.  “No one in the executive branch, not the president, the secretary of 
the interior or anyone else, can change that interest rate unilaterally.”40   
The debate on the amendment was pretty straightforward.  Only one person 
really took any kind of stand against the amendment.  Nelson stated that some of the 
projects on the list were indeed bad.  He stated that he was not qualified to pass 
judgment on all nineteen.  But he said,  
It is clear to me that some of them are disasters from every standpoint, 
the welfare of the country, the benefit-cost ratio, ecological impact—all 
kinds of ways.  I do not support the procedure followed by the 
president.  I believe it was precipitous.  On the other hand, I respect and 
support the instinct of the president to finally say, “For heaven's sakes 
let us not dam every river, every stream and every watershed in this 
country just as a part of some project that is desired by some groups or 
members of Congress.”41 
 
 He pointed out his state's own recent experience with the La Farge Dam under 
construction by the Corps of Engineers that was stopped by the courts.  It would have 
been the largest water resource project in the history of Wisconsin.  The Army Corps 
had already spent $18 million on the project, including the purchase by condemnation 
of 9,500 acres, effectively “chasing over seventy-five farmers off the land.”  While La 
Farge was to function as a flood control project, Nelson noted that for half the cost the 
government could have bought every single farm in every building in every village on 
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the shores of the floodplain of the river.  Similar to Carter's experience in Georgia, 
Nelson found the cost benefit analysis to be totally flawed.  In this case the Army 
Corps inflated the recreation benefit five-fold.  Ultimately the project was stopped 
because despite a 1965 warning about water quality disregarded by the Corps of 
Engineers, it was determined that the water in the lake would be in violation of state 
and federal water quality laws.  Nelson concluded, "anybody who says to me that the 
Corps of Engineers is not prepared to build anything we ask them -- anything -- does 
not know the politics of the Corps or the Congress.”  He concluded by emphasizing 
that he did not think all of the projects were bad.   He recognized that some had merits.  
But he did not want the Senate to take action  
that would handicap the president in providing some long needed 
national leadership to force us to address ourselves very carefully to 
these projects and start rapidly cutting back on them, because we are 
wasting money.  We are damaging watersheds, ruining rivers, and the 
cost-benefit ratio and lots of them is not there.  In many cases the cost-
benefit ratio is a sham.42 
  
Two other senators expressed some concern, but did not advocate holding off 
passage of the amendment.  Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR) opposed the Cache River 
project in his state.  He worried the president would not be able to stop the 
channelization that was taking place that year if the amendment passed.  In his 
testimony he said that “about a week before the president announced the deferral or 
rescission of funds for all the projects” the army corps has started the second section 
of channelization 3.1 miles.  Bumpers continued, “I'm not here to defend or to 
condemn this particular project.  But there is one thing that I know to an absolute 
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certainty, that if the president is going to be successful in stopping the project it should 
be stopped right now before any additional works.”43 
The other major concern that surfaced was over the Meramec Park Dam in 
Missouri whose senators were split.  The junior senator, John Danforth (D), opposed 
the dam while Senator Eagleton (D) favored the dam but was willing to stop it pending 
the outcome of a referendum in the adjacent counties—a plan then being debated by 
the Missouri state legislature.  In the end, Danforth was successful in winning an 
amendment exempting the Missouri project, allowing Carter the option to defer funds 
and stop the construction project.44   
The message from the Senate to President Carter was loud and clear.   As if it 
needed explaining, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-WV) told the press later 
that afternoon bluntly, “The road can be smooth or the road can be rough.”  A report in 
the National Journal called the Senate action an “unexpected move."  But, the White 
House responded to the action with a message of its own.  Based on information from 
a “spokesman for the Carter administration” they explained that while Carter did not 
intend to impound any appropriated funds, they did hold out the “possibility of a veto 
of future appropriation bills that include projects the president considers 
unsupportable.”45  
 
Veto Strategy, Vote Study.   
Johnson, Long, and the other senators essentially put Carter on notice that in 
their opinion, Congress held responsibility to fund or cut the projects.  But if they 
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expected Carter to heed the warning shot across his bow, the president disappointed 
them.  He instructed his staff to begin to prepare an analysis of the veto options and to 
draft a letter to Congress.  Led by Ann Dye, White House staff evaluated their success 
of sustaining a veto by studying potential supporters of water projects using 1976 
voting and letters to the president prior to and after the announcement of the cuts.  The 
study concluded 168 members might be expected to vote to sustain the veto, more than 
the 156 needed.  But it also noted the numbers could change if state delegations pulled 
together.  Dye also noted that western state members were more “water-conscience” 
(sic) at this time; and their 1976 votes did not guarantee they would vote the same 
way.   In a handwritten note to Moore attached to the report, Dye concluded: 
Basically, I think this looks pretty grim.  If you subtract the western 
members (except Phil Burton who Rick indicates is with us) you get 
141 votes.  The key people on any such vote would probably be Eager 
and John Rhodes (who likes his Arizona project).46 
 
While the Congressional Liaison staff calculated the strength of their ultimate 
weapon against Congress, Carter worked to repair some of the damage and salve some 
of the wounds.  He sent a letter to Congress.  He first attempted to express that he was 
not ignorant of the ramification of his decision by stating he was aware of Congress’s 
concerns.  He stated that he believed it was "essential to involve the Congress in 
developing a coherent water resource policy.”  But, he promised, he would not take 
unilateral action again.  Instead, he promised to meet with congressional leaders to 
establish “a dialogue and close corporation on the issue” and also promised that in the 
future, any recommendations for deletion would be discussed with the members of 
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Congress, noting the time constraints would not be as severe as those faced when 
preparing revisions to the Ford budget. 47    
He went on in subsequent paragraphs to justify his cuts, noting the 
authorizations for many projects were old and did not reflect current economic 
conditions.  He tried to avoid the appearance of blaming Congress for authorizing the 
objectionable projects, and instead blamed changing conditions and evaluation criteria.  
In the end, he argued the projects needed to be cut because of the “enormous sums of 
money,” and environmental concerns involved.  He reiterated that he could not meet 
his commitment to balance the budget without congressional cooperation stating 
“every ongoing program of government must be continually examined in the light of 
the harsh realities of a tight budget.”48   
Carter again took personal responsibility for the decision to recommend 
discontinuing funding and assured Congress that he had used rational criteria in 
selecting projects.  He emphasized that he had not and would not make arbitrary 
choices regarding specific projects and promised the review process would be 
completely fair and allow for public input.  Carter also attempted to quell the rumors 
of new or expanding project lists noting the “exaggerations” resulting from “the 
misunderstanding of various lists which I had never seen and which had no official 
sanction.”  He concluded the letter by noting the problems “too severe to ignore,” on 
several projects, without singling them out by name.  For example, he referenced the 
potential treaty violations (posed by the Garrison), and the earthquake hazard at the 
                                                 




Auburn Dam.49  
In spite of his efforts and promises to work more closely with Congress, that 
same day Carter spoke at an energy conference in Charleston, West Virginia, where he 
again stated his willingness to go over Congress’ head to the American people.  He 
said, “I am determined to let the American people know about this particular concern... 
I am very determined to present to the American people my side of the story."50 
Despite the president’s repeated attempts to emphasize to Congress and the 
nation that he personally felt strongly about cutting the projects, project proponents 
continued to shift blame to Kathy Fletcher and others in the White House.   So, did 
they somehow remain ignorant of Carter’s personal convictions, or did they simply not 
believe the president’s statements?  Both could be true, but it seems the more  likely 
explanation was that by shifting blame to “a low level bureaucrat” in the White House 
it was easier to convince their constituents—and perhaps themselves—that the 
president did not understand their projects and that they should be funded.  As 
discussed earlier, this effort to shift blame is evident in the remarks of several Senators 
during the floor debate of the Johnston amendment.    
Another example is stories which circulated in various newspapers.  For 
instance, the Denver’s Rocky Mountain News carried a story on March 18 under the 
headline, “Girl in the White House Infuriates Dam Boosters.”  The story reported that 
many on Capitol Hill claimed Kathy Fletcher was the “prime mover behind the 
President’s surprisingly firm effort to halt dozens of public works projects.”  The story 
reported that the White House denied the allegation and went so far as to say “it was 
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unfair to Carter to assume that some lower level aid is responsible for the order barring 
new construction contracts on water projects.”  But the story also continued by 
explaining that they did confirm that Fletcher had created a list as part of the transition 
team.  In this case, the Rocky Mountain News generally tended to favor the President 
in its reporting, at least when compared to the Denver Post.  And while they presented 
a fair and balanced story that sought to repudiate the allegations of Fletcher’s role, it is 
easy to see how someone opposed to Carter’s cuts could read the article and still place 
blame on a young environmental idealist.  The paper not only made note of her young 
age, twenty seven, but also concluded the article with a note that some might consider 
guilt by association.  The story noted that in a CBS documentary featuring Robert 
Redford on the defeat of the proposed Kaiparowits Power Project in southern Utah, 
“Redford spent most of his time listening to Fletcher.”51 
Kathy Fletcher also took the blame for leaking the “second Hit List” that hit 
the papers in early March.  The President had heard—though it is unknown from 
whom—that she was responsible and directed Stu Eizenstat to quietly look into the 
matter.  Eizenstat reported his finding back to the president two weeks later on March 
21, clearing her name. He told the president, “I am convinced, as are others, that 
Kathy was not the source of the leak.” 52 
As evidence he pointed out there were five other administration representatives 
at the meeting who said that Kathy did not distribute the list and made no statement 
speculating that 90 to 95% of the projects would be cut.  Further, Assistant Secretary 
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Christopher Farrand (a Republican holdover) told Eizenstat that Kathy “did not see 
and could not have had access to the list before or during the meeting of the 
Congressional Environmental Study Conference where they supposed that the leak 
occurred.”   Eizenstat concluded, noting “as you may know, since you spoke to me 
about this matter, the Interior Department has assumed full responsibility for the 
release.”53   
 
Hit List Hearings 
 Despite the continued stories in the press defending the water projects against 
the “attacks” of the administration, the Carter Administration pinned its hopes on the 
hearings.  Carter often styled himself as a populist; he thought that the hearings would 
provide the opportunity for the public—whom he believed supported him—to hear his 
side.  Unfortunately, the hearings did not quite work out the way Carter had hoped.  
Even though the White House had made every effort to ensure a fair and balanced 
hearing—for example they equally divided the time between those speaking in favor 
and those speaking against the projects—virtually every politician and person of 
influence in their respective communities spoke to support the project, and condemn 
the President and everything about his water project review.  The project’s supporters 
seemed to win the press’s vote, if not the public’s.   
Governor Scott Matheson’s comments at the hearing in Salt Lake City are a 
good example.  Matheson, a Democrat, had just taken office.  He replaced the very 
popular Calvin Rampton who retired after four terms.  Matheson enjoyed very high 
approval ratings as well.  Matheson’s remarks not only defended the Central Utah 
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Project, but also demonstrated both the anger of the majority in the West as well as the 
idea that Carter and other political leaders did not know the West.  He declared with 
rhetorical flourish: 
We’ve conquered the desert with water.  We’ve nurtured our crops with 
water.  We’ve sustained our populations with water.  Water is the basis 
of our existence.  When Washington talks of shutting off the primary 
element in our life system, you can understand why we recoil in 
horror….Our state was born on the principle of sacrifice.  Our state will 
grow on the same principle.  But, we must have the freedom and 
opportunity to control our own destiny.  Our destiny is controlled by 
the availability of water and our wise use of it…Westerners have 
always said that they knew more about what they were doing than did 
the federal bureaucracy.  We argued that we knew how to administer 
our own lands, mine our ore, manage our forests and plan our highways 
and cities.  The only major limiting factor has been the lack of 
economic resource, largely caused by federal domination of our lands 
and of our water.  There has always been the feeling that the federal 
government didn’t trust us.  The feeling was mutual … and still is.54 
 
Another example at the same conference was Congressman Gunn McKay (D-
UT).  News reports covering the hearing noted that McKay was the only member of 
the state’s entire congressional delegation appearing at the hearing.  While he spoke 
on behalf of the entire delegation, he also stated that it was also in protest that the 
hearings broke with what they considered the congressional prerogative over the 
examination of water projects.  McKay told reporters, “Our view is that the proper 
forum for defense of the project is before the congressional committees which are 
already acting on this and other water projects.”  Like many other CUP defenders at 
the hearing, McKay also pointed out that the courts had resolved any questions about 
the environmental objects raised when it upheld the project’s environmental statement.  
Complaining that in effect two branches of the government had approved the project, 
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Carter had no business stopping it.  He concluded, “in effect, the environmental 
philosophy of a small group of presidential advisors is elevated above the law of the 
land.  We cannot allow such a procedure to be established.”55 
 McKay’s comments echo many of the same concerns and complaints that the 
supporters of the water projects had been making over the previous month.  These 
included the president’s interference with Congress’s normal business, the lack of 
authority and even the illegality of the president’s actions, and the arbitrary action of 
Carter.  His comments also reflected the belief that a small group of environmentalists 
that had sway over the president, again pointing to the influence of Kathy Fletcher, 
among others.   
 These commonalities turned into a news story that would not die, in part 
because the administration did not seem to be learning from its mistakes.  At the end 
of March the press reported a “third Hit List,” this time covering small watershed and 
drainage projects.  In reality, the initial announcement was only that the Soil 
Conservation Service would review all 1,185 projects authorized using the same 
criteria—safety, economics, and environmental objections—used to review all 320 
major water projects.  Colorado Congressman Jim Johnson and aids for Haskell and 
Hart used the announcement to spin the story against the Carter administration.  They 
complained to reporters that once again they had not been notified and expressed 
anger at the sudden, unexpected announcement.  Johnson, noting the administration 
planned the same kind of review on the small projects, retorted, “They can forget it.  It 
                                                 
55 Larry Weist, "Utahns Protest Procedure of Central Utah Project Hearings," The Daily Herald, March 
25, 1977. 
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was a sham.  The President said he was against those projects before they ever had the 
review.  The whole hearing process was nothing but a PR process.”56 
As the hearing process neared completion on the original nineteen projects, the 
administration was completing its review of the additional water projects.  Various 
lists had been releases or “leaked” at various points in the screening process.  At one 
point another list of 45 projects under review was allegedly distributed by Kathy 
Fletcher, placing some of the blame for the political fallout once again at her feet.  
Cecil Andrus sent a copy of the list to Frank Moore noting that he had heard from 
Senator Henry Jackson that Fletcher distributed the list at a White House luncheon.  
There was no evidence in the archives if Fletcher was actually responsible for this 
“leak.”  It is possible that she actually did not, but was once again blamed as she had 
been for the original and second leaks. As noted above, Andrus has and continues to 
place the burden of blame—it seems unfairly—on Fletcher for the entire Hit List 
debacle.57 
On March 23 the White House released the official results of the review.  The 
administration decided to remove three of the projects—Dickey-Lincoln Dam, 
Painstville Dam, and Freeport, IL from the original list of nineteen because the 
projects were still under feasibility or NEPA review.   Fourteen projects were added to 
the list for more extensive review prior to a decision on the final budget 
recommendations to Congress the President had promised on April 15.  Because most 
of the fourteen had been circulated on the unofficial lists, the reaction to the 
announcement was mild.  The White House also insured that Frank Moore’s office 
                                                 
56 Steve Lang, “Six More Water Projects Face Review” Rocky Mountain News, April 1, 1977. 
57 Cece (Cecil Andrus) to Frank (Frank  Moore), No Date, Box NR1-5, Folder “3/16/77-4/15/77;”  Cecil 
Andrus Interview with author, July 13, 2010.  
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had properly notified each member of Congress affected by the announcement prior to 
its release.58   
Table 5 – March 23, 1977,  Official Results Of The Review Of Water Projects. 
 
Removed from Hit List 
Dickey-Lincoln Maine ACOE 
Freeport Illinois ACOE 
Paintsville Lake Kentucky ACOE 
   
Officially Added 
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway AL & MS ACOE 
Tensas Basin  Ark-LA ACOE 
Fulton  Illinois ACOE 
Hillsdale Dam Kansas ACOE 
Bayou Bodcau Louisiana  ACOE 
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet Louisiana  ACOE 
Red River Waterway Ark-Tex ACOE 
Tallahala Creek Mississippi ACOE 
Applegate Oregon ACOE 
Tyrone Pennsylvania ACOE 
La farge Wisconsin ACOE 
Dallas Creek Colorado BR 
Narrows Unit Colorado BR 
Lyman UT/Wy BR 
 
 
April 5 Meeting with Democratic Leadership 
The sensational “revelation” of another hit list in the press only fueled the 
flames of discontent that were still hot over the objectionable hearing process.  The 
bad publicity and consternation of Congress came at a bad time for the White House.  
The water project review was far from the administrations only priority, in fact it 
seems that they felt it should have occupied less time and generated less trouble then it 
had.  While White House staff attempted to find a way to convince Congress and find 
                                                 
58 Edward Walsh, “Asks $844 Million in Drough Aid: Water Projects Added to ‘Hit List,’” Washington 
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a way forward on the water projects, Carter also—as noted in Chapter 1— 
simultaneously pushed a significant number of other important legislative packages 
through Congress.  One of his top priorities had been an economic stimulus package 
including a $50 tax rebate.  Tip O’Neill and other Democratic leaders, in a 
monumental effort to support Carter, had worked hard to push the measure quickly 
through the House.  In spite of their prompt action, the package bogged down in the 
Senate.   
In early April Carter held a private meeting with House and Senate Democratic 
leadership in an effort to come to some agreement on the passage of the tax rebate and 
move the rest of Carter’s legislative agenda forward.  In the process, Robert Byrd 
pressed Carter to make some compromises on the Hit List in order to win votes on 
other important issues.  He complained to Carter: 
Mr. President, you raised the water projects question.  Today in the 
Senate we would lose on the [tax] rebate.  We’d get no more than 40 
votes... I can’t tell you, Mr. President, how much the water project list 
is doing to our efforts...Two senators from Mississippi are doubtful, 
and one or two in Alabama and Arizona.  We've already lost two in 
Colorado and I think the senator from Maine (Hathaway).  If we were 
to have a vote today we would lose hands down.  Some senators aren't 
going to come along as long as those water projects are on the list.  It's 
a battle you don't need.  It will cost you—and us—here and on other, 
more important battles.  Its timing was 100% off.  Senator Long will 
vote for the rebate but he won't put his arm around any other senator so 
long as water projects in his state are on the list.  If we lose, it would be 
a defeat for the president and for the Senate Democratic leadership.  I 
want to be honest with you Mr. President.  I’d be very insincere and 
dishonest with you if I didn't say this.59      
 
It must have been a rare display of emotion for a man who was reported to 
have played it pretty close to the vest.  But Carter remained unmoved.  He refused to 
                                                 
59 From White House leadership meeting, Wednesday, April 5, 1977 8-9, Steve O'Neill papers, Elizabeth 
Kelly files, box 9, folder 3, quoted in Frisch and Kelly, 77. 
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make any kind of trade or deal on the water project cuts.  Dan Tate—Carter 
congressional liaison assigned to the Senate—attempted to follow up with Byrd to no 
avail.  Tate wrote to Carter a few weeks later that his refusal to deal on the water 
projects had 
Confirmed the fears of those senators in attendance that you are all take 
and no give, that your decisions are irrevocable, and your demands are 
non-negotiable.  The concern around the Senate is that you are naïve or 
selfish or stubborn, perhaps all three.  Most senators see you as hard-
nosed and they respect that, but they also see some signs which, to 
them, indicate that you are hard-headed and, even worse high-handed.60   
 
The exchange between Byrd and Carter reveals many things, none of which has been 
demonstrated before.  President Carter personally felt strongly about the water 
projects; strongly enough that he refused to back down, or use them as a bargaining 
chip.  Thoughts of canceling the request for the tax rebate may already have been in 
his mind.  Growing increasingly concerned about controlling inflation, rather than 
stimulating the economy Carter dropped the rebate request on April 14.  This move, 
incidentally, did not win him any favors with Congress, particularly with Tip O'Neill 
and the Democratic leadership who had gone all out to support the president and 
secure the tax rebates passage in the House.  Ironically, Carter's determination to push 
ahead with unpopular policies caused just as much friction.  But this exchange not 
only exemplified the ongoing problems between Carter and Congress, it presaged 
continued troubles ahead as the administration completed its review process and 
prepare to take the debate to Congress. 
 
 
                                                 
60 Farrell, 458. 
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Final Recommendation  
Following the public hearings for the projects, Department of Interior staff 
returned to Washington D.C. to begin their re-evaluation.  The president had set mid-
April as the target date.  Andrus sent his final recommendations to the White House on 
April 14 writing under signature: “If you need other info please call and I will be 
available.  Remember that haste sometimes creates problems.  BE CAREFUL & 
GOOD LUCK.”61  On April 15, Carter reviewed Andrus’s report, and made his 
recommendations.   He personally wrote the outline for his message to Congress to 
accompany his final recommendations.  He instructed Eizenstat’s staff to prepare the 
memo and “Prepare [the]dam project statement listing those which will be eliminated 
or cut back. In every case, itemize objections in strongest terms.”62 
Carter submitted his final recommendations to Congress on April 18. 63  For 
the Bureau of Reclamation projects on the list, the president accepted Secretary 
Andrus’ recommendations.  The president gave the green light for a few of the smaller 
projects on the original list, including Lyman in Wyoming and Dolores, and Dallas 
Creek in Colorado.  Andrus recommended several of the larger projects, including the 
Central Arizona, the Central Utah Project’s Bonneville Unit, and the Garrison 
Diversion to be allowed to proceed with significant modifications.  He recommended 
Auburn Dam only proceed if a safe plan could be guaranteed.  Because of strong local 
opposition, the Oahe Unit remained on the list to cut completely.  It was the only 
                                                 
61 Andrus to Stu,  undated handwritten memo, Office of Congressional Liaison, Frank Moore Files,  
Box 50, Folder “Water Projects, 2/18/77=10/6/78 [CF, O/A 625].” Capitalization in original.  
62 Carter to Stu, April 15, 1977, JCPL, Box NR1-5, Folder “3/16/77-4/15/77.” 
63 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977, Book 1, 651-654; the same 
version of this statement including the individual summary sheets for each projects White House, Office 
of the White House Press Secretary, “Statement on Water Projects,” April 18, 1977 in Carter Hit List 
Binder, U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, History Program Files, Denver.   
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Bureau of Reclamation project actively under construction to be cut.  During the 
review process, Andrus had added the Narrows Unit in Colorado to the review list, and 
now recommended it also be cut, along two other smaller Colorado projects; the 
Savory-Pot Hook, and Fruitland Mesa projects. 
 
Table 6  Final Hit List—Recommendations to Congress April 18, 1977 
 
Zero Funding Recommended 
Applegate Oregon BR 
Auburn Dam California BR 
Fruitland Mesa Colorado-Wyoming BR 
Narrows Dam Colorado BR 
Oahe Unit South Dakota BR 
Savery-Pot Hook Colorado  BR 
Atchafalaya River * Louisiana  ACOE
Bayou Bodcau Louisiana  ACOE
Cache River Arkansas ACOE
Grove Lake Kansas ACOE
Hillsdale Dam Kansas ACOE
La farge Wisconsin ACOE
Lukfata Lake Oklahoma ACOE
Meremac Park Dam Missouri ACOE
Russel Dam (Trotter's Shoals) 
Georgia& South 
Carolina ACOE
Tallahala Creek Mississippi ACOE
Yatesville Lake Kentucky  ACOE
Duck River Dams, (Columbia and 
Normandy) Tennessee TVA 
*Including Bayous Boeuf, Black and Chene  
Modification Recommended 
Central Arizona Project Arizona BR 
Central Utah Project Utah BR 
Garrison Diversion North Dakota BR 
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet Louisiana  ACOE





Figure 3  Map of Final Hit List Projects 
 
Stuart Eizenstat announced the president’s decision in the White House press 
room.  When asked if Carter would veto the water project funds Eizenstat said "we're 
taking no position on that.  Our hope is that Congress will find the proposal 
acceptable."  Eizenstat also answered a question about the finalists being fashioned to 
placate powerful members of Congress.  He insisted that was not the case, but the 
newspaper reported that was not the feeling among others in Washington who saw 
projects pushed by Senators John Stennis and Russell Long were no longer on the 
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list.64   
Those whose projects Carter spared had reason to celebrate, and that is exactly 
what the small town of Cortez, Colorado, did.  Cortez and surrounding communities 
had voted for the Dolores Project.  Community organizers quickly prepared plans.  
The following day stores closed and schools let out early in Cortez, Mancos, Dolores, 
and Dove Creek.  The event featured a parade, speeches, and barbecue with free beef, 
beans and beer.  Local bean farmers provided free beans, ranchers provided 1,200 
pounds of free beef, and the local beer distributor provided kegs of free beer.  Area 
housewives prepared barrels of free salad.  The newspaper reported that more than 
4,000 people showed up, including Governor Lamm who flew in for the event.65  
 But the President’s final announcement did not please everyone.  Once again 
the press had managed to scoop the story.  Wyoming Senator Malcolm Wallop 
complained in a letter to Frank Moore that his office received the official message 
from the president on April 19, “only four days later than I received most of the same 
information from members of the Wyoming press corps.”   He continued satirically, 
"the distance from the White House to Capitol Hill seems to vary from year to year 
depending upon the relative state of congressional-executive relations.  I hope that in 
the near future you can work to ensure that the 11 block distance up Pennsylvania 
Avenue will be less than the distance to Wyoming, and that it will take fewer than four 
days to traverse.”  Getting to the heart of the letter, Wallop complained the President's 
statement was brief and did not include any details about the specific “relative 
                                                 
64 Lee Roderick, “CUP Status On Water 'Hit List' Examined,” The Daily Herald, April 19, 1977. 
65 “Cortez throws a party” (no attribution or date retained on clipping), Frank Evans Papers, Box 4, 
Folder, “April Clips.”   
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importance” of each of the justifications for cutting the project.66 
Frank Moore, who had been trying to repair his reputation since the 
inauguration—based on what he considered the inaccurate charge of not returning 
phone calls—did not respond for three weeks.  Moore’s May 10, 1977, letter blamed 
the press and pointed out that Wallop's office received the president's official statement 
several hours in advance of the official press release by the White House.  But he 
explained the press had been calling White House and administration officials for 
weeks asking questions.  Moore assured Wallop that senior staff had tried their best to 
keep the information from the press until his office notified members of Congress.  He 
apologized, and then noted he passed the senator’s request on to OMB.67 
 Colorado Governor Richard Lamm, who had been outspoken about the cuts 
since Andrus got off the plane in Denver that Sunday morning in February, stayed on 
the offensive.  He sent a strongly worded, yet balanced letter to Congress in the days 
after the release of the final list.   Lamm responded in the letter to Carter's official 
release which had been carried in the papers.  Lamm said that the article 
Carried a report of your domestic counsel which proposes a shift of 
federal funding from ‘expensive water projects’ in the West to 
economic stimulus in the heavily populated Northeast.  The reasons 
given were that 'expensive water projects already in place have done 
little to alleviate drought or flooding,’ and that water storage isn't an 
adequate insurance against drought.68 
Lamm did not immediately criticize the President.  In fact he gave him a 
compliment on his Monday night speech on energy.  Rather than blame Carter for the 
bad decision, he expressed a belief that the President was getting “ill considered and 
incorrect advice on the meaning of water storage projects to the West.”  Lamm pointed 
                                                 
66 Malcolm wallop to Frank Moore, April 20, 1977.  Natural resources box NR 15 
67 Frank Moore to Malcolm Wallop, May 10, 1977. Natural resources, box NR 15. 
68 Richard D. Lamm to  Jimmy Carter April 20, 1977, natural resources box NR-15 
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out the domestic counsel statement was wrong and that “most of our major cities 
would be totally incapable of supporting their present population without its water 
projects.”  For example, Lamm explained that 200,000 acre-feet of the 265,000 needed 
would come from reservoir storage.  Further, Fort Collins, Colorado Springs, Pueblo, 
Boulder, and Greeley were totally dependent on reservoir storage.  He mentioned most 
other large cities in the West were in the same situation.69 
He went on to say that Colorado was already looking at many of the policy 
solutions Carter proposed—“conservation and efficiency, water pricing, groundwater 
management, and thoughtful land-use decisions.”  But he explained that the reality 
was that many of the proposed solutions had serious drawbacks.  For example, 
groundwater recharge was usually impractical because it was not possible to extract all 
of the water pumped into the aquifer.  Lamm also noted the tremendous expense and 
energy needed to pump and retrieve.  He concluded: 
We are willing to work with you to examine these policies.  But 
frankly, Mr. President, we are worried about the quality of the advice 
you are getting about the West.  Contrary to your statement that water 
projects have done little to alleviate drought, these water storage 
projects are our first line of defense against drought.  Without them, our 
cities would become ghost towns, and our irrigated farms would 
disappear.  I urge you re-examine your policies relating to the West.  
They do not serve you well.70 
The White House reply to Lamm was less than enthusiastic, bordering on 
patronizing.  It was not even clear if the President had been given the letter to read.  
The domestic policy staff responded to Lamm May 13.  It was prepared by Kathy 
Fletcher—a fact which would have undoubtedly rankled Lamm had he known—and 
signed by Stuart Eizenstat.   After thanking him for his “thoughtful letter” they said 




that they “appreciate deeply you're concerned about the impact of the drought in the 
West, and realize that water storage projects are and will continue to be important.  
The president hopes to improve all our water resource programs by making certain 
they are effective and efficient.  We look forward to working with you and other 
western governors in this effort.”  To Lamm, these words likely rang hollow based on 
the administration’s past performance.71 
Governor Lamm's letter is not the only example of the critical response the 
administration's final recommendations received.   The Denver Post published an 
editorial excoriating the President.  Like Governor Lamm, the paper's editors criticized 
the president's choice in advisers.  Specifically the paper suggested the President “get 
better advisors, or insist that they begin responding to real questions not their own red 
herrings.”   However, they chose a different part of the president's statement to attack, 
Carter’s argument that for a comparable cost water projects created fewer jobs. 
Specifically, the President message stated:  
The current pattern of water project distribution is contributing to the 
federal dollar drain out of the heavily populated Northeast or economic 
stimulus is needed.  Many of our water projects simply shift economic 
development for no apparent policy reason.   
 
The Post interpreted this in perhaps a different way than the president 
intended:  
 
Perhaps the biggest canard the President was handed (for release under 
his name 10 days ago) was the claim that spending federal dollars on 
western water storage was somehow depriving the “heavily populated 
Northeast:” of needed “economic stimulus”  This is simply ridiculous.  
It pyramids false assumption and compounds it into incredible error.  
Since when has the federal budget insisted that to help one part of the 
country you had to withdraw financing from another area?  Good 
programs rise and fall on their own merit.  The government flings 
money by the billions at ill-defined social targets with no thought 
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whatever of a dollar payback, plus interest…Probably, President Carter 
is concerned about the potential out-migration from the energy-short 
cities of the Northeast to the Sunbelt states of the Southwest, including 
Colorado.   This is a serous concern.  But the way to meet this 
challenge is to make the Northeast competitive.  The Northeast should 
be given all kinds of assistance from the federal government.  The 
theory that the rest of the country should be made economically weaker 
doesn't (to hazard a pun) hold water.  That's the first lesson the 
President's water advisors should learn.72 
 
President Carter's statement discussed the federal dollar drain, that is, states in 
the Northeast paid more taxes than they received back in federal spending.  Carter 
simply noted the same thing that Senator Moynihan had pointed out in the March 10 
debate on the Johnston amendment.  States in the Northeast had a higher rate of 
unemployment.  As a fiscal conservative, Carter simply suggested that instead of 
investing limited federal funds into water development projects, the government could 
“get more bang for its buck” by spending that money on economic stimulus.  His 
argument was not against creating jobs in the West, but that because dams were capital 
intensive more jobs could be created by investing the funds in different public works 
projects.  Carter felt those jobs should be created in the areas with the highest 
unemployment.  While the Post's editors complained about this statement, ironically 
they did little to refute it other than offer their own red herring. 
However, while Carter did not explicitly discuss the issue of regional spending 
disparity, it was nonetheless a real problem and source of complaint for politicians at 
every level in the economically struggling Northeast and Great Lakes states.   The 
steel and automobile industry had been particularly hard hit by the “Great Recession” 
of 1974-75.  Both industries had been facing increased competition from foreign 
manufactures.  Further, American automobile companies had been unprepared for the 
                                                 
72 “Posts Opinion, Western Water: Some Lessons for Mr. Carter's Advisers” Denver Post, May 1, 1977. 
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sudden shift in consumer tastes.   The practice of “planned obsolescence” of American 
manufactures, the oil embargo and inflation motivated consumers toward vehicles that 
not only got better gas mileage, but that also lasted longer.  This resulted in large 
layoffs and higher unemployment in the Rust Belt.  Further contributing to high 
regional unemployment, as the economy slowed down during the recession and other 
industries cut production, they closed their older industrial plants in the region shifting 
production to newer plants that had been built in the Sun Belt during the Post WWII 
expansion.73 
Even though the regional population shift had been creeping since the end of 
WWII, the recessions of the 1970s made the economic losses in the Frost Belt more 
pronounced.  The high unemployment also exacerbated another problem faced by 
cities in the region, suburbanization.   As the closure of older industrial plants led to 
the loss of tax revenues cities had to either raise taxes, cut services, or both.  This only 
promoted more “flight” from cities which led to a “self-sustaining downward 
economic spiral.”  Increasingly, politicians began to see economic growth in the 70’s 
as zero sum game leading to strong regional support for Carter’s efforts.  As we shall 
see, this regional tension only intensified during the Carter administration and the 
reactions of Governor Lamm and the Denver Post would be come even more 
pronounced and strident.74    
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The Denver Post’s editorial provides yet again more evidence of how water 
project supporters continued to lash out at the president.  Like other examples noted 
previously, it expressed anger, but did little to discuss the projects on their merits.  
Furthermore, like many others who spoke out against the president, it pointed to 
Carter’s ignorance of the West, and highlighted the regional tensions that underlay the 
debate over the Hit List.  President Carter began his term in office with a popularity 
deficit in the West which his policies did not improve.    
In contrast to Governor Lamm and the Denver Post, other water development 
supporters continued to criticize the entire process.  As noted above, many water 
project proponents thought the hearings and entire review process were a sham, as 
exemplified by the comments of Congressman Jim Johnson.  The final results of the 
review process did not change any minds.  Another example is former Commissioner 
of the Bureau of Reclamation, Ellis Armstrong.  Armstrong gave the keynote address 
at an American Society of Civil Engineers national conference later that summer.  In 
his address, he stressed the need for rational planning to meet the nation's natural 
resources needs.  He singled out Carter's “hit list approach” as an example of 
spectacular failure to achieve that goal.  He contended that the administration’s 
“attempt to demonstrate a sound course of public policy consideration” was biased to 
“appease the extremists of the so-called ‘Environmental’ groups.”   Speaking about 
Blackwelder’s Disasters in Water Development he continued:  
[T]he half-truth, several year old propaganda of the “Environmental 
coalition Groups” was hastily polished up and further enhanced by 
selective data from OMB and CEQ.  They bear the familiar hallmarks 
                                                                                                                                            
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2008), 625; and Tim Palmer, Endangered Rivers and the Conservation 
Movement (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1986), 182-3. 
 129
of shallow research, a dearth of technical understanding, and a half-
truth approach with an apparent unwillingness to tell the whole story. 75  
 
 
May Meetings with Democratic Leaders 
In the weeks after the release of the final list, Carter continued to face criticism 
in the press from his opponents from both parties.  The president and the project’s 
proponents continued to speak past each other while trying to convince the other of 
their position.  But increasingly, with the hearings complete and the decisions made, 
the administration magnified its focus to improving working relations with the 
Democratic congressional leadership to win support and backing for the bill.  At his 
regular weekly breakfast meeting with the Democratic Congressional leadership on 
May 3, Carter tried to sell them on the rationality of his final recommendations.   
I feel very strongly about the need to show fiscal restraint.  I hope that 
you can support our analysis on the water projects.  We have gone back 
and assessed them in a very professional way with the Army Engineers 
and the Interior Department.  I see developing an unnecessary 
confrontation with Congress. 
 
O’Neill pushed the president to reciprocate.  If he wanted to see his water 
project cuts pass, then he would need to expand aid to the unemployed and poor.  He 
concluded, “I can read this Congress, but if there is no move to serve those who need 
compassion we’ll run into a heap of trouble.”  Tip O’Neill’s response shows that not 
only did they remain unconvinced, but that a gulf separated their basic political 
philosophies.76  
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 Carter responded, “perhaps we have excessively emphasized fiscal restraint.  
We don't want to appear callous and we are not wanting to rob the poor.” 77  But while 
he took a conciliatory tone with O’Neill, he complained in his diary that day that the 
leadership did not understand his position at all.  The allegation that his administration 
was “neglecting social programs in order to try to balance the budget in four years” 
irritated Carter.    
I took strong exception to this... because the Congress doesn't oppose 
what we put forward, there's been very little knowledge about the 
progress that we're trying to make.  In my opinion there is no way to 
have available financial resources in two or three years for better 
healthcare, etc., if we don't put some tight constraints on unnecessary 
spending quite early.78 
 
Undoubtedly the news that the House Subcommittee had passed budget 
recommendations funding all of the Hit List projects but one that same day probably 
did not help the President’s mood.  Walter Mondale, Stu Eizenstat, and Frank Moore 
huddled after the vote to review strategy.  They wrote to Carter the next day providing 
a status update and recommendations.  They noted that the markup by the full 
appropriations committee was scheduled for May 25 and predicted it would follow the 
subcommittee's recommendations.  If the committee followed that course they 
predicted the full House would follow based on a recent House vote.  Two weeks 
previously, California Congressman George Miller had attempted to attach an 
amendment to strip funding for water projects out of the concurrent resolution.  
Miller’s amendment failed spectacularly by a vote of 252 to 143.   Despite that 
                                                                                                                                            
Elizabeth Kelly files, box 9, folder 3, quoted in Frisch and Kelly, 78-9. 
77 Ibid. 
78  Carter included this passage in both his 1982 memoirs and the expanded collection of annotated 
excerpts published in 2010.  See, Keeping Faith, 77, and White House Diary, 45-6. 
 131
outcome, the three thought that they could possibly do better on the House floor, "if a 
more intensive lobbying effort is employed.  They also noted that of the fifty-five 
members on the full committee, only eight voted for the Miller-Emery amendment. 
The three recommended that they should take no actions to defer or rescind 
1977 funds and focus on modifying the budget for 1978.  They based their 
recommendation on the Johnston amendment which the conference committee had 
accepted which indicated the Senate's intentions.  They also recognized that it could be 
easily overridden because it would be an impoundment and could be defeated by a 
simple majority in either house; whereas a veto of the 1978 appropriations could be 
overridden only by two-thirds vote in each house.  They also noted the presence of a 
final decision on the projects announced in April that indicated there would be no 
recessions or deferrals sought.  Despite that, they noted that Andrus believed the 
administration had an obligation to seek deferrals on projects that had been determined 
the unjustified.  But Andrus recognized that there were political problems pursuing 
that course of action.   
The second recommendation on the 1978 funds included the following 
strategies.  First, they had considered initially issuing a critical statement of the 
subcommittee.  However, Frank Moore determined that would not help the cause.  He 
recommended instead sending a personal letter to each member of the full 
appropriations committee indicating the serious need to delete funding for the project.  
Further, they recommended that the letter emphasize the budgetary concerns rather 
than environmental. 
Second, when the bills moved to floor debates, they would secure sponsors for 
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amendments to delete all eighteen projects.  They thought offering amendments to 
delete only some of the projects “would appear to place the administration in the 
posture of further conceding.”  Finally they stated that if the appropriations bill 
included funding for “an unacceptable number of water projects, a veto could be 
used.”  Frank Moore believed they would have a “decent chance of sustaining such a 
veto in the house which would vote first.”  They concluded the letter, suggesting 
continued expressions of concern from the president, vice president, and Secretary 
Andrus, and "privately the leadership should be told explicitly that a veto is likely, so 
that there can be no complaint that Congress did not know your intentions.” 79 
The memo also included the draft letter to members of the House 
appropriations committee.  Carter extensively edited the letter before he signed off on 
it.  He added that he was not only disappointed but concerned  The words “deeply 
disappointed” were in the draft and Carter changed it to read “I am deeply concerned 
and disappointed.”  In the second paragraph, Carter added the word careful to the first 
sentence which reads, “my recommendations, announced April 18, were the result of a 
thorough and detailed review by the Corps of Engineers, the Secretary of Interior, 
Office of Management and Budget, and by me and my staff.”  He concluded, “if 
wasteful spending is to be curtailed and necessary programs financed, and the budget 
balanced by FY 1981, the Congress will have to assess and eliminating needless and 
counterproductive projects.”80 
   Carter responded on May 31 to a letter from Russell Long about the interest 
                                                 
79 Walter Mondale, Stu Eizenstat, and Frank Moore to Jimmy Carter, May 4, 1977, White House 
Subject File, Natural Resources, box NR- 15, folder NR-1 
80 JCPL, Office of Congressional Liaison Moore, Box 50, Folder Water projects, 2/18/77-10/6/78 [cf., 
O./A 625] 
 133
rates used to calculate benefit-cost ratios.  He explained to Long that he consulted with 
OMB to “supplement my own views on the subject.”  Carter remained convinced that 
using the higher discount rate was appropriate.  He knew that lower rates had been 
used in the past but explained, “I think today's rate should be used in assessing today's 
expenditures.”  It was obvious to Carter why proponents of the projects preferred 
lower rates because they improved the score.  But he pointed out that a substantial 
number of economists favored an even higher rate.  He took time to emphasize that 
besides the economic arguments, he had also considered environment, safety, and 
employment impacts.  He concluded, “I'm glad to have had the benefit of your 
thoughtful views on the subject and, while I do not expect you to agree with me, I 
believe this candid exchange of views is highly constructive.  Thank you for taking the 
time to write.”81 
 At another White House meeting with the Democratic leadership on May 19, 
Carter again found himself on the defensive.  This time House Majority Leader Jim 
Wright (D-TX) confronted the President with another argument project proponents 
had been using effectively; they pointed out that the administration supported millions 
of dollars in foreign aid for water projects without any requirement for cost-benefit 
justification.  Western politicians in particular, resurrecting the platitude that the West 
was a colony of the federal government argued that if the administration could support 
foreign aid without a positive cost-benefit ratio, why could it not help its own citizens?  
When Jim Wright brought this point up with the president he reportedly smiled and 
blushed saying, “I was wondering how you would fit that in!”  Wright responded:  
                                                 
81 Jimmy Carter to Russell Long, May 31, 1977, White House Subject File, Natural Resources box NR 
15, folder NR-1  5/1/77-5/31/77. 
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Mr. President, we're getting along fine despite the efforts of the news 
media.  But I see this little cloud on the horizon no bigger than a man's 
hand... So before we get set in concrete on the water projects, I would 
like to bring in Tom Bevill, Bizz Johnson, and a half-dozen others to 
talk about it...82  
 
Carter encouraged the meeting and subsequently Cecil Andrus met with Tip 
O’Neill and Jim Wright the following week for a breakfast meeting.  Andrus reported 
back to Carter following the meeting that O'Neill was desirous to resolve the issues, 
but that members represented by Jim Wright did not think the House would make any 
further cuts than they already had.  Wright believed the majority opinion was that the 
House had already met many of the president’s objections by eliminating Grove Lake, 
with the possibility of the Senate eliminating up to two more projects for a total 
savings of $200 million.  Andrus concluded: 
Frankly, Mr. President, in my opinion the speaker is an ally and wants 
to be helpful, but we are headed for a confrontation that will probably 
require your veto (if you choose to).  The house knows it cannot 
override, therefore, they will send the bill back to Mr. Bevill’s 
committee instead of risking the override vote and we will be right 
back where we are today.  I am not optimistic about any change in their 
posture, but I would also add that they are acutely aware of your 
personal firmness in this matter.83 
 
Carter had an opportunity to follow up with Tom Bevill in a private lunch two 
days later.  The lunch had been arranged following Wright’s suggestion at the May 19 
meeting.  The president also found the House leadership did not want to move further 
than they already had.  While his personal pet project— Tennessee-Tombigbee 
waterway project—had been spared, Bevill continued to oppose further cuts.  Just as 
he had from the day the list was announced in February, Bevill considered funding of 
                                                 
82 “White House Leadership Meeting, Wednesday, May 19, 1977,"-10, Thomas P. O'Neil papers, 
Elizabeth Kelly files, box 9, folder 3, quoted in Frisch and Kelly, 79-80. Smiling and blushing in the 
description used to describe the president's reaction by John Brademas in his meeting notes. 
83 Cecil Andrus to the president, May 25, 1977, Handwriting file, box 27. 
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water projects a congressional prerogative and resisted any interference by the 
President.  If Carter understood the politics of Bevill’s position, he did not let on.  
Instead he used his engineer’s logic and attempted to discuss the merits of the project 
on a case-by-case basis.   Bevill left the White House unmoved.    Political scientists 
Kelly and Frisch question if Carter understood how much his cuts threatened Bevill’s 
political power base.  “His ability to provide funding for other member’s projects—
and protect that funding—was the basis of his influence.”  To acquiesce to Carter’s 
request for project cuts would erode Bevill’s power and in turn threaten the 
Tennessee-Tombigbee as he would no longer be able to trade votes to overcome any 
future challenges to its funding.84   
 These meetings with political leaders in May, and the House Appropriation 
Committee’s actions clearly indicated to Carter and his administration that they faced 
enormous political challenges to secure any further budget cuts to water projects.  As 
Andrus indicated, increasingly, the administration began to move in the direction of 
preparing for a veto of the appropriations bill.  In early June, the administration began 
to court allies in anticipation of such an outcome.  On June 9, Carter sent letters to 
sixty-three House members who signed the February 14 letter prior to the 
announcement of the hit list encouraging Carter to cut funding.  He also sent letters to 
the 142 members of the House who voted on April 27 for the failed Miller amendment 
that attempted to trim $100 Million in water projects funding from the concurrent 
resolution.  The virtually identical letters expressed concern over the House 
Appropriations Committee’s reporting out a bill funding all but one of the deleted 
projects.  Adding insult to injury, it also added construction starts for twenty new 
                                                 
84 Frisch and Kelly, 80.   
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projects.  Like the letter to the members of the appropriations committee, Carter 
concluded, “If wasteful spending is to be curtailed and necessary programs financed, 
we will need to work together to eliminate needless and counterproductive projects.  I 
personally appreciate your assistance in this effort.”85  
 
Preparing for the Worst – Veto Strategy 
When the House took up consideration of the appropriation bill on June 14, the 
White House worked with Butler Derrick (D-SC) to amend the bill.  Derrick, joined 
by Silvio Conte (R-MA), a longtime opponent of pork-barrel spending, offered an 
amendment to strip all 18 of the water projects.  After a heated debate, the “Derrick 
Amendment" failed, but only by a small margin, 194-218.  Despite the failure of the 
amendment, Carter and his allies had reason to celebrate.  The 194 votes in favor of 
the amendment and against the water project’s funding was well above the margin 
needed to prevent the House from overriding a Carter veto. 86 
 Once again, Carter ensured that he reached out to his supporters and allies in a 
further attempt to build strength and support.  Carter sent personalized letters to each 
of the 194 members of the House who voted for the Derrick-Conte amendment.  In the 
letter he stated, “It was a difficult test, on an issue to which I am deeply committed.  I 
am encouraged by the outcome of the vote and I am especially grateful for your 
support.”   The White House also held a special reception June 21, hosted by the 
Congressional Liaison’s office, Derrick, other members of Congress and their staffs, 
White House staff, representatives of environmental groups, and lobbyists who 
                                                 
85 Carter to [Member of Congress], June 9, 1977 JCPL, Box NR 15, Folder 6/1/77-6/9/77. 
86 Gaylord Shaw, “House Rejects Bid to Halt Water Projects,” Los Angeles Times, June 15, 1977, 
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worked to build support for the president on the Hill.  Some of the environmental 
supporters invited included Brent Blackwelder, John Burdick, and Ed Osann.  Moore’s 
office invited Derrick, Conte and twenty-five other members of the House. 87  
Frank Moore requested the president to spend a few minutes with them.  
Moore thought that even just two-minutes would go a long way with his supporters.  
Carter gave a tentative OK, but did not attend according to the handwritten notes on 
the form.   It is unknown why Carter chose not to attend.  His schedule diary indicates 
that he could have attended if he chose.  Perhaps the reason was  his penchant to 
conduct business via paper rather than face to face.   He may have been too buried in 
paperwork and the matters of the day to justify leaving his desk.  Whatever the reason, 
Carter missed a golden opportunity to support his ground forces, and boost their 
morale for the oncoming battle.  As discussed shortly, his absence also may have led 
to a miscommunication or misunderstanding in the coming weeks that would prove 
especially difficult.88 
Of further interest to this study, Carter Congressional Liaison’s office analyzed 
the vote on the Derrick-Conte vote.  Frank Moore’s team found the House largely split 
along regional lines with members from the North, East, and Midwest supporting the 
president's position 137-52, conversely the South and West opposed the president by 
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44-145.  The voting thus proved the rhetoric exemplified by Moynihan, Matheson, 
Lamm, the Denver Post, and others discussed previously.89 
In another interesting note, political scientists Frisch and Kelly find 
Congressman Derrick's support for the administration surprising in that it came despite 
the fact that the Richard B. Russell Dam was partially located in his district.  
Traditional interpretation of iron triangles would suggest the opposite would be true.  
To account for this anomalous behavior they suggest the fact he was elected in 1974 
and that he was a “reformer sympathetic with the deficit control philosophy that Carter 
brought to the White House.  When push came to shove, Derrick chose principle over 
his concern about the reelection.”  But perhaps there is another explanation that Frisch 
and Kelly did not consider.  Derrick’s personal principles—like Carter’s—may have 
included not only economic but an environmental ethic regarding such projects that 
influenced his actions.  He may also have been influenced by the success of the efforts 
by the National League of Conservation Voters that demonstrated “traditional” 
unconditional support of water projects could increasingly backfire.90 
While the House version of the bill succeeded, it did not do so by a veto-proof 
margin.  With Carter's threat of a veto hanging in the air, Senator Stennis convinced 
his subcommittee to cut more projects.  He felt that if they cut eight additional 
projects, bringing the total to nine, the president might agree to the halfway measure.  
Additionally, to make the compromise more acceptable to the president, the Stennis 
subcommittee agreed to delete all new starts by the Army Corps of Engineers.  Stennis 
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told reporters “he did not know whether his panel's proposals, if enacted, would be 
sufficient to avoid a veto.”91 
When word of the subcommittee’s actions reached the White House, Eizenstat 
apprised the president that the subcommittee provided half funding for the Bayou 
Bodcau project in Louisiana, a nod to Senate Finance Committee Chair Russell Long 
and Energy And Natural Resources Committee member Bennett Johnson.  The 
subcommittee included full funding for Richard B. Russell dam which the president 
opposed and some modifications of five other projects suggested by the president.  
Further, it fully funded an unmodified Central Utah Project, which Eizenstat noted in 
his memo, “you have privately indicated to Frank [Moore] and me that you have an 
objection to this funding.”92  Eizenstat concluded the memo advising the president that 
he should:  
At least make an effort to knock out all of the projects in the Senate; 
and then support Senator Stennis's position or some similar 
compromise as a fallback position.  To do otherwise may put us in a 
weak position in the conference. In order to get congressional passage 
of our water reform policy in the near future and in the long term, we 
will need the full support of those congressmen who voted with us to 
knock out all of the projects.  Therefore, at this stage, we should take 
no action, which signals them to retreat from the administration's 
determination.93   
Heeding Eizenstat's advice, the Carter administration backed a Senate floor 
amendment, sponsored by Thomas McIntyre, to strip all the projects the president had 
recommended for cuts.  The amendment failed during floor debate on July 1 by a vote 
of 52-34. During the consideration of the bill that day, Colorado Senator Floyd 
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Haskelll offered an amendment to restore funding to eight projects cut by Stennis’ is a 
committee.  Haskelll remained upset with Carter, but now was upset with Stennis, 
whose committee had cut three Colorado projects to reach a number they thought the 
president could agree to.  According to the newspaper report Haskelll then “noted 
bitterly that six of the eight water projects in the Senate bill were in states with 
senators on the subcommittee.”  He also noted that the $1.6 billion Tennessee-Tom 
Bigbee had made it off of Carter’s list despite being an environmental disaster "subject 
to leash laws in 50 states."  In the end he argued, the projects did not succeed or fail on 
the merits, but on “the fortunes of committee assignment.”  Haskelll’s amendment 
failed by a vote of 19-73.   The Senate adjourned before final approval on the bill was 
taken.  In the end, the Senate approved the Public Works appropriations bill on July 13 
by a vote of 85 to 3.94   
 
 
Table 7  List of Nine Projects Cut by Senate 
 
Fruitland Mesa Colorado-Wyoming BR 
Narrows Dam Colorado BR 
Oahe Unit South Dakota BR 
Savery-Pot Hook Colorado  BR 
Grove Lake Kansas ACOE 
La farge Wisconsin ACOE 
Lukfata Lake Oklahoma ACOE 
Meremac Park Dam Missouri ACOE 
Yatesville Lake* Kentucky ACOE 
* The only project of the nine to subsequently receive funding to completion. 
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Compromise: Carter Anxious To Avoid a Veto. 
The bill now moved to the conference committee.  With the threat of a Carter 
veto in the air, the committee considered what could be done to compromise with the 
president, who appeared determined not to budge an inch.  Speaker Tip O'Neill was 
anxious to avoid a veto battle.  Tip O’Neill’s biographer, John Ferrell wrote, "O'Neil, 
the ultimate party loyalist,” had made it his goal to avoid a first-term veto and the 
prospect of a Democratic Congress trying to override a Democratic president. Not 
only did O’Neill have political reasons for avoiding a veto, he had also started to 
warm to the President.  In addition to their weekly breakfast meetings, O'Neill had 
dined privately at least twice with the Carters, and had flown on Air Force One to 
accompany Carter to his Notre Dame commencement address.  Their relationship 
warmed.95 
Further, in early June, Ivy Sprague had warned O’Neill to avoid a veto. He 
wrote:  
If Congress were to override [an appropriations bill], the damage to 
Carter would be considerable.  This argues strongly for an 
accommodation.  Even a failed override attempt would be damaging as 
we go forward with energy, tax reform, health insurance, 
reorganization, and other critical legislation.96 
 
But O’Neill was likely not the only one looking to avoid using the veto.  At a 
speech delivered early in his campaign, Carter had created a list of traits that described 
his vision for America.  In this list he included, “I see an America with a president 
who does not govern by vetoes and negativism, but with vigor and vision and positive, 
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affirmative, aggressive leadership.”  This type of feeling may explain why Carter was 
reluctant in his first year in office to use the veto extensively.97   
 With both Carter and O’Neill looking to avoid an embarrassing veto, O’Neill 
called Carter on the phone to try and secure a compromise.  O’Neill offered to cut out 
all of the new starts the House had included in its version of the Bill, along with a 
provision to remove any funding for the $2.1 billion Clinch River Breeder Reactor 
Project which he also opposed.  In a move that shocked his senior staff and allies in 
Congress, without hanging up the phone to think about the offer or consult with those 
around him, he agreed to it on the spot.  Later, in his 1982 memoir Carter described in 
the compromise with Tip O’Neill “a hasty agreement:” 
 
The speaker had called me during the heat of the congressional debate 
to say, "Mr. President, we have worked out a good compromise on the 
water project... with all of the Senate deletions maintained, no new 
projects approved, and a reduction of funds for the Clinch River 
Breeder Reactor.  If you can accept this without a veto, I believe we 
can get it through the Congress."  I thought for a few seconds, 
considered the progress we made in changing an outdated public-works 
system, decided to accommodate the speaker, and then agreed to his 
proposal.98 
 
To his advisors, calling the decision “a hasty agreement” must surely have 
seemed a colossal understatement.  In an oral history interview, Eizenstat reported that 
he was in the room when the call came in from Tip O'Neill.   “He made the decision, 
without Frank Moore, without staff consultation.  And I said to him, you can’t do that, 
we have 194 Democrats who will support you, what did you do?”  
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The compromise undermined the positions of Carter’s staunchest 
congressional allies.  Further, he had once again taken action without conferring with 
his staff or his allies on the Hill who would feel betrayed.99  Even more baffling, the 
compromise contained a flaw; there had been no promise from Bevill or Stennis that 
the cuts would be permanent.  As Marc Reisner noted, it is unclear if O’Neill had 
promised the projects would be deauthorized, or if Carter had made an assumption or 
taken it on good faith.  But if Carter had read or been briefed on any of the press report 
of the Senate debate on July 1, he would have known that Stennis and his Republican 
counterpart Milton R. Young (R-ND) had both stated that they considered their cuts 
only apply to that year’s budget.  Young stated a preference to fund all the projects, 
but knew that to do so would result in a veto.  He specifically stated, “However, most, 
if not all, of those projects being deleted now will be in the program next year or 
shortly thereafter.  I cannot help but feel this whole situation will settle down, and we 
will go back to our old procedures.”100   
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100 Walter Pincus, “Senate Works on Funding Bill for 9 Projects Carter Fights,” Washington Post, July 1, 
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For his part, Senator Stennis attempted to reassure Colorado senators Hart and 
Haskelll who, as noted above, were upset that three of their state’s projects had been 
cut.  Echoing Young, Stennis recognized they had to cut some projects to avoid 
Carter’s veto; but, he stated, “next year all of these matters will be considered that 
senators desire and put in some kind of appeal if they deserve it.”101 
The newspapers repeated these statements.  Walter Pincus’ article in the 
Washington Post stated in two different places, “The conferees made clear they 
considered their actions on the bill only temporary funding delays.”  The article 
repeated a few paragraphs later that specifically for the water projects, the conferees 
said, “Funding cuts for hit list projects originally approved by the House and dropped 
by the Senate were only a delay until next year.”102  An article appearing after the 
House approved the conference committee report quoted Tom Bevill speaking about 
the projects cut, “We intend to finance them... this is a temporary position.  We are 
just going along to get this bill through.”103 
President Carter signed on August 8, 1977. In his signing statement Carter 
called the bill "a precedent-setting first step in trimming spending on unnecessary, 
expensive, and environmentally damaging construction projects.”  He claimed success 
in getting Congress to cut nine projects in response to administration’s 
recommendations.  He called it “unprecedented progress” and vowed to continue a 
“major effort” to cut spending on wasteful water projects and work for comprehensive 
water policy reform.  Carter stated he "remained very concerned" about the “ten 
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projects remaining in the bill.”  He called on Congress to take action on these deleted 
projects which should be “deauthorized immediately.” 104  
Carter wrote of the compromise in his memoirs, 
 
I made some mistakes in dealing with Congress, and one that I still 
regret is weakening and compromising that first year on some of these 
worthless dam projects… This compromise bill should have been 
vetoed because, despite some attractive features, it still included 
wasteful items which my congressional supporters and I had opposed.  
Signing this act was certainly not the worst mistake I ever made, but it 
was accurately interpreted as a sign of weakness on my part, and I 
regretted it as much as any budget decision I made as president.105 
 
Carter's allies did feel betrayed about the decision.  But no amount of hindsight 
was needed to realize that.  His supporters immediately howled in protest.  A 
spokesman for the coalition for water project review… termed the compromise “a 
complete cave-in” at the White House “We believe the president has betrayed his 
friends,” the spokesman said.  The article noted that Congressman Derrick felt 
especially betrayed.  Derrick told reporters that Frank Moore had assured him—at the 
June 21 reception held to celebrate Derrick’s work rallying support for his amendment 
which proved Congress could not pass a veto proof bill—that the president would 
never sign the public works bill if it contained money for the Russell project.  Derrick 
told the reporters that came "direct from the president."106 
Derrick joined eight other representatives—Moffatt, Tucker, McHugh, Edgar, 
Tongas, Bedell, Miller, Maguire, and Kosstmayer—who sent a joint letter expressing 
“deep disappoint[ment]” and “dismay” that Carter had decided to compromise.  Carter 
sent individual handwritten letters in reply asking for their continued support.   
                                                 
104 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977, Book II, 1461. 
105 Keeping Faith, 79. 
106 Walter Pincus, “Panel Drops 9 Projects on “Hit List,’” Washington Post, July 21, 1977. 
 146
My goal is the same as yours, to eliminate the pork barrel water 
projects and to build a production model breeder reactor only where it 
is needed and we are sure of the best design.  With your help we have 
already made surprising progress.  This will be a continuing struggle 
which cannot be concluded at one stroke. Stick with me, and together 
we have a good chance to win.107     
 
According to an interview with Frisch and Kelly in April 2008, Butler Derrick 
stated that Carter “never fully regained his credibility in the house” after he failed to 
veto the bill.  He continued, telling Frisch and Kelly, the decision to veto was a critical 
moment in the presidency:  
I do believe the water bill was, to a large degree, the downfall of the 
administration.  Not because he was not on the correct side of the issue, 
he was, but when he 'blinked' he wrote the obituary for his 
administration and the second term.108 
 
Derrick is certainly not alone in this assessment. Frisch and Kelly contend that 
the hit list was a major source of criticism by members of Congress, the media, and 
the public—along with the battle over the Panama Canal treaty and $50 rebate.  
Further, “his early decision to favor fiscal control over fiscal stimulus, which partially 
played out in the water projects fight, caused Carter to seem indecisive and 
feckless.”109  
 This caricature stuck with many of his critics for the balance of his presidency.  
This criticism of the president was further ingrained by events later that summer and 
fall.  Carter Biographer Peter Bourne noted that the Hit List compromise was the 
beginning of a period which saw the administration losing momentum and running 
into trouble in the late summer and fall during the same time as Burt Lance's 
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resignation and the energy bill getting bogged down in the Senate.  He argues this hurt 
Carter, particularly with the media who saw Carter as “vulnerable and on the 
defensive,” particularly after their role in ousting Lance.110 
The entire affair over the Hit List left Vice President Mondale feeling 
exasperated.  His own personal friendship and loyalty to Carter kept him from 
confronting the president directly.  He would continue, as he had done previously, to 
try and help steer the president out of messy, unneeded confrontations with Congress.  
It proved to be an incredible challenge which left him so frustrated that by 1980 he 
even, for a time, considered resigning.111 
Time has softened some of the strong feelings, and undoubtedly mindful of his 
legacy Mondale now takes a moderated view.  In his 2010 memoir he stated:  
We won a little on the merits, be we lost a lot on the politics.  Over 
time, however, I believe Carter changed the way people think about 
those federal infrastructure projects.  The New York Times editorial 
page came around to our side, noting the environmental hazards and the 
international frictions caused by diverting rivers.  Environmental 
groups raised their level of scrutiny on dam and diversion projects, and 
voters applied a more balanced view to the benefits and costs.112 
 
In many ways, the trouble in 1977 over the water project review was a direct 
result of Carter’s core personality that clashed with the political style of Washington.  
Stuart Eizenstat, observed:  
 
                                                 
110 Peter Bourne, Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Planes to Post Presidency (New 
York: A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, 1997), 415. 
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Jimmy Carter possesses a preference for making decisions ‘by paper’ 
rather than ‘by people,’ insisting on full data and complete written 
materials and eschewing decisions by oral argument whenever 
possible… Jimmy Carter possesses the belief that there are 
comprehensive answers to problems... Far from thinking too small, he 
thought too boldly at times, wanting more than the political system 
could produce.  He believed in laying out a total solution to rally 
support, although he was always willing to settle for half a loaf at the 
end.”113 
 
 Eizenstat’s insightful observation gets at two important points that this 
narrative has shown thus far.  Carter’s preference to “make decisions by paper” 
created significant friction with Congress.  Many politicians and observers in 
Washington noted it in 1977 and since.  The preference did not just affect the outcome 
of the hit list, but proved problematic for every major policy item on Carter’s cluttered 
agenda.   Specifically affecting the outcome of the debate over Carter’s “review of 
water projects” was the decision to move forward without consultation, or even prior 
notification of Congress.  The continued reliance on paper to convey the outcome of 
the review also prevented many in Congress from feeling a part of a review project 
that they felt also violated their prerogative. 
 Further, Carter’s belief in “laying out a total solution” rankled congressional 
members who felt that his solutions amounted to arbitrary decisions, that in some 
cases violated not only tradition but what had been written in the law.    
 Over the course of the first six months of his presidency, Carter had taken on a 
thorny political issue.  He did so knowing the choice involved serious political 
ramifications and consequences.  However, it also seems that Carter was not prepared 
for the extent and voracity of the onslaught which continued to catch him off guard.  
                                                 
113 Stuart Eizenstat, "President Carter, the Democratic Party, and the Making of Domestic Policy," in 
The Presidency and Domestic Policies of Jimmy Carter.  Page 4 
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To use a water metaphor, the Carter administration’s mistake acted like giant boulders 
dropped into the fast flowing currents of congressional politics, each one creating new 
rapids and dangers which imperiled his raft.  Having successfully run the rapids, 
Carter settled for his “half loaf.”  While he did not realize it at the time, doing so 
punctured his raft and left his administration bailing water to save the boat. 
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Chapter 3 
Intermingled Waters or 
New currents in Federal Water Policy: 




The day of considering money to be the 
only solution to water problems is over.  
We want results not in the form of more 
dams and canals and the like, but in the 
form of more rational use of this very 
precious resource. 
—Cecil Andrus, Secretary of the Interior1 
  
 
The White House was a busy place during the early months of the Carter 
Presidency.    The administration simultaneously pushed forward an economic 
stimulus package, governmental reform, the creation of the new Department of 
Energy, and several other legislative efforts that under any other president would have 
been considered significant.  Many have argued that the White House tried to do too 
much too fast.  Carter himself wrote in his diary a week after taking office, 
“Everybody has warned me not to take on too many projects so early in the 
administration, but it’s almost impossible for me to delay something that I see needs to 
be done.” At a leadership breakfast a little more than a week later, House Speaker Tip 
O’Neill warned Carter, “You have an awful lot of balls in the air at the same time.”  
Intermingled with an economic stimulus plan, income tax reform, comprehensive 
energy bill, and government reorganization, the water project review certainly was not 
the only major issue occupying staffers’ time.  But, as referenced in Chapter 2, 
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24 (June 11, 1977): 900-903. 
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Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus, President Carter, and the White House staff 
considered it important.  Andrus had considered comprehensive water policy reform a 
far more obtainable goal, and more important in the long run than cutting controversial 
water projects.  Rather than alienating members of Congress by blocking authorized 
projects, Andrus believed policy reforms, not more dams, held the key to solving the 
nation’s water problems.  In a tacit exchange for his solidarity behind the President’s 
push to cut water projects, Andrus insisted that water policy reform be included in the 
package.  Carter agreed and indicated in his April 1977 message announcing the 
outcome of the water project review that policy reform efforts would precede quickly.2   
The President and Andrus did not expect their reform to sail through congress 
like a pleasure boat on a placid river, but they soon found that resistance in the 
corridors of Congress and—more importantly—in governors’ offices across the West, 
posed serious challenges to any effort to advance comprehensive reforms.  Yet the 
White House domestic policy staff, partnered with Andrus and his senior staff, 
continued to work on the issue.  While once seen as two different issues, by early 
1978, it was apparent that the separate streams of water policy reform and the Hit List 
had begun to run together; the two streams meeting at the political confluence of 
state’s rights.  As the Department of the Interior moved forward, coordinating with 
other agencies, hashing out technicalities at meetings. and conducting extensive field 
hearings, opponents to increased federal involvement in water regulation entrenched 
themselves further and fortified their battle lines for a fight that would continue the 
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remainder of the Carter Presidency.  Compounding the challenge, the administration 
also simultaneously found itself dealing with a third stream.  Federal court rulings 
previous to the administration required they tackle the thorny issue of enforcing the 
long neglected acreage limitation provisions of reclamation law.   Each of these issues 
individually—water policy, acreage limitation, and stopping projects on the Hit List—
taken together they proved too.  The political coalitions in the West and South 
supporting large water projects fought back blocking many of Carter’s water policy 




 Carter’s veto of the Public Works Appropriation Bill, and the subsequent vote 
by the House of Representatives to sustain his veto, ended the Hit List saga, but it did 
not end Carter’s differences with Congress, his problems with the West, or other 
important water policy issues that had challenged the administration. If anything, in 
many ways it made resolving the remaining issues even more troublesome.  While the 
Carter administration attempted to move its package of water policy reforms forward, 
and continued its fight against wasteful projects, it also worked simultaneously on 
another water policy issue that had taken on a life of its own, acreage limitation.   
The issue revolved around a clause in the original 1902 legislation creating 
federal reclamation projects.  Although it never had been strictly enforced, for reasons 
stated below, the law stated that a farmer could only receive enough water to irrigate 
160 acres.  Because of judicial rulings prior to Carter’s term, the administration had to 
resolve a problem that no one had really wanted to tackle.  Understanding the 
controversy over acreage limitation is essential to understanding the history of Carter’s 
 153
water policies.  And while the Hit List is mentioned at least in passing in virtually 
every study of Carter’s domestic policies or biography of Carter or his contemporaries, 
virtually none discuss acreage limitation.  Understanding the controversy over acreage 
limitation is to understand its relationship and interaction in the debates over water 
project cuts and water policy reform.  During Carter’s presidency the enforcement of 
the law complicated dealings with Congress; it contributed to the perception of many 
that Carter was anit-West by attacking traditional western agriculture; and it fueled 
feelings of Sagebrush rebels.   
In an effort to stave off speculation and monopolization of government 
irrigation projects, Congress had included provisions in the original 1902 Reclamation 
Act limiting the size of irrigated farms using project water.  The purpose of the 
acreage limitation and correlating residency requirement was to insure the government 
distributed the benefits of the water subsidy as widely as possible. These provisions 
were strengthened by subsequent amendments to the law, including the 1926 Omnibus 
Adjustment Act that implemented many significant changes in an effort to save the 
reclamation program.   
 However, like the original 1902 Act, the new 1926 legislation contained 
ambiguities.  For example, while the law had reiterated the acreage limitation 
provision, it had not restated or repealed the residency requirement.  Under the 
conservative Hoover administration, the Bureau of Reclamation interpreted the 
omission of the residency requirement in the 1926 law to mean that it was no longer in 
force.  Additionally, Congress inaugurated a new phase in the agency’s history by 
authorizing new massive construction projects beginning with the Boulder Canyon 
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Project Act.  As the Bureau of Reclamation began these new projects, new controversy 
over the application of the acreage limitation provisions surfaced.   
 Historians have traced the development of the acreage limitation provision, and 
it transformation with the large construction projects.   Much of this literature was 
produced during the 1970s when the provisions came under the scrutiny of the public, 
Congress and the courts.  But the history of the scrutiny of the law, the decisions of the 
courts, and the actions of Congress in the 1970s has largely been overlooked.   Often 
the issue is simply summarized by the conclusion that the Reagan administration 
resolved the issue with the passage of the 1983 Reclamation Reform Act.3   
A good example of this is the treatment by Norris Hundley in his encyclopedic 
work on California water.  While Hundley treats controversies of the 1930s through 
1950s in some detail, the court cases along with the public and congressional debate of 
the 1970s are completely absent.  Without any mention of this previous history, 
Hundley simply states that, “In 1982 President Reagan’s administration and corporate-
farm interests nationally pressured Congress into increasing the acreage limitation 
from 160 to 960 acres.”  After a brief explanation of the victory for agribusiness, he 
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simply concluded that “The concept of the family farm, long a sham, could now be 
declared officially dead.”4 
The short treatment of the legislation is likely explained by the fact that 
Hundley goes on to explain how even the increases in the limitations did not end abuse 
of the system during the Reagan and Bush administrations.  One might assume the 
thinking behind such a decision would have revolved around the question, when the 
legislation has little effect, why take the time to discuss the details of its creation and 
passage? 
 The history of the debates and passage of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 
is important as it reveals that it was not simply the product of Reagan’s alliance with 
corporate interests.  The issue had previously been taken up by the Carter 
administration, and the final legislation passed in 1982 bears striking resemblance to 
the package that was endorsed by Carter himself.  Thus, regardless of the omission in 
Hundley’s work, understanding the full history of the legislation shows that it was not 
simply a land or power grab.  
 The issue of acreage limitation enforcement and reform was a priority of the 
Carter administration.  Its importance to the administration has largely been 
overshadowed by the controversy over the Hit List and the broader water policy 
review.  But even if President Ford had won reelection, acreage limitation would have 
been an issue due to a series of court decisions prior to 1977.  In fact, much of the 
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confusion and controversy surrounding acreage limitation originated in four 
significant court cases that predated the Carter administration.   These four cases each 
challenged difference aspects of the acreage limitation provisions. However, each case 
struck at the heart of the issue. Significantly, each case involved the same large water 
projects in California that had been the focus of the original debates over enforcement 
in the 1930s and 40s.   
The Central Valley Project and the All American Canal were two large 
projects that served existing farms.  Many of these farms exceeded the 160-acre limit 
prior to the project’s construction.  Thus the primary issue from the 1930s into the 
1950s was that if the law would apply to these existing farms, or if the owners would 
be made to sell the excess lands as a condition of receiving federal water.  During the 
New Deal, President Roosevelt supported the application of the law as he believed it 
would open the door to new family farmers, “the ‘Grapes of Wrath’ families of the 
Nation.”  With the death of Roosevelt and the resignation of Ickes in 1945, the 
commitment to enforcement slackened under the Truman administration.  The Bureau 
of Reclamation adopted a policy described by Hundley as “technical compliance.”  
Essentially the Bureau adopted a policy of allowing larger farmers to divide their land 
into smaller units on paper to meet the provisions, while maintaining the land under a 
single operation.5 
Throughout this time period, opponents of the policy continued their 
objections.   It is interesting to note that Hundley argues it was the plight of white farm 
workers during the Depression that temporarily attracted the sympathies of New 
Dealers toward enforcement of acreage limitation.  When those workers found factory 
                                                 
5  Quoted in Koppes, 617.  For technical compliance see Hundley, 266-272. 
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jobs during WWII and farm labor returned to the domain of immigrant workers, 
interest in the issue began to wane.6  While that generalization may hold some truth, it 
does not apply universally.  Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, first under 
President John F Kennedy and later under Lyndon Johnson administrations attempted 
a more forceful implementation of the law.7  And the subsequent court battles that 
would renew the controversy over acreage limitation in the 1970s originated with 
individuals concerned about the conditions of immigrant Mexican workers.   
The first case to be heard by the courts challenging the Bureau’s policy of 
technical compliance was located in California’s Imperial Irrigation District (IID).  
The Department of the Interior originally did not place acreage limitations on the 
projects in the Imperial Valley.  It was viewed as a special case since the land and 
original canal had been constructed with private money.  In 1933, shortly before 
leaving office, Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur affirmed this interpretation 
in an official letter to the irrigation district.  He believed that Congress had recognized 
the vested water rights of the valley’s farmers without regard to acreage limitation.8 
 Attorneys at the DOI  believed that Wilbur, who was a physician and not a 
lawyer, had stepped onto shaky legal ground providing the exemption.  The DOI 
Solicitor partially reversed Wilbur’s decision in 1945 by holding that the acreage 
limitation provisions applied to the Coachella Valley County Water District.  But, it 
would not be until 1964 that the DOI completely overruled Wilbur and extended the 
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law to apply to the Imperial Irrigation District.  Subsequently, the government sued the 
district in an attempt to enforce the provisions.  Needless to say, a lengthy legal battle 
ensued.9  
 District Judge Howard D. Turrentine of Southern California U.S. District Court 
heard the case, United States v. Imperial Irrigation District.  After an “extensive 
hearing” Turrentine handed down his decision on January 5, 1971.  He ruled against 
the government finding that Reclamation law and thus the acreage limitation did not 
apply to the IID.  Essentially, Turrentine sided with the Wilbur letter, determining that 
in the Boulder Canyon Act, Congress had exempted the district from acreage 
limitation.  In a move that surprised many of the Department of Justice lawyers 
working on the case, the Nixon administration declined to appeal the case.  U.S. 
Solicitor general Erwin Griswold said, “It is not just that I think an appeal… would be 
unsuccessful, but that I think it ought to be unsuccessful.”10 
National Land for People, a group of small California farmers, filed a federal 
suit in 1975 charging that the Government had never really enforced acreage 
limitation. In April 1976, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San 
Francisco ruled in favor of the small farmer, ordering the Government to enforce the 
1902 act.  As a result, the Bureau of Reclamation began to study the extent of the 
problems in anticipation of rulemaking to satisfy the court’s ruling.  The Bureau of 
Reclamation had last completed a study on acreage limitation in 1964 at the request of 
the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.  During congressional hearings 
in 1976, a new study was inaugurated.  By early February, the Bureau had completed a 
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rough draft.  Commissioner Gil Stamm distributed copies to his regional Directors and 
solicitors for comment. 11 
Noting the acreage limitation provisions of reclamation law were “designed to 
provide farm opportunities to families, widely spread the benefits from the 
reclamation development and prevent speculative gain from the federal investment in 
the reclamation project,” the study concluded that “overall the acreage limitation 
provisions had effectively accomplished these objectives.”  The study's authors 
believed the low incidence of violations provided sufficient evidence to claim this 
success.   However, they did concede there were problems and abuse of the provisions.  
Further, they noted that conflicting interpretation and enforcement of acreage 
limitation provisions by Congress, the Department of the Interior, and the courts 
complicated the administration of reclamation law.12   
 In August, Andrus announced that given the court ruling, he had decided to 
enforce the original interpretation of the acreage limitation provisions of the 1902 act.  
As a result, he also announced that one million acres of federally irrigated farm land in 
eighteen western states would be redistributed in a national lottery on the 
homestead principle of 160 acres for a farmer and each member of his family.  
The announcement caused instant outrage throughout the West among those 
already riled by the recently resolved Hit List controversy, and the recently announced 
fast-paced comprehensive water reviews.  To those claiming Carter had declared a 
"War on the West," Andrus's announcement only provided more evidence.  While the 
owners of the corporate farms in California's Central Valley were shaken by the 
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announcement, Andrus shocked and outraged Imperial Valley farmers by announcing 
that they too were now subject to the acreage limitation provisions. 
The livid Imperial Valley farmers were among the most vocal critics.  In mid-
September, at the annual meeting of the California Republican Party, farmers mounted 
a massive protest.  Hundreds ringed the San Diego Convention Center waving 
placards that read “FAIRNESS FOR FARMERS” and “SAVE THE IMPERIAL 
VALLEY” while more than 50 farmers drove their huge tractors around the building.  
It was a stunt they would repeat on at least two more occasions.   
In early October Andrus announced a series of ten public hearings on the new 
regulations would be held in seven Western states and Washington, D.C., beginning in 
November.  An article in Time quoted him as saying, "We expect plenty of testimony, 
plenty, about how the West was won.”   But the article also indicated that Andrus and 
Carter were sympathetic to the farmers plight.  It stated:  
Peanut Farmer Carter, however, is troubled by the proposed breakup of 
some 5,000 farms in the Western states. He owns 2,000 acres of 
Georgia soil (the land is not affected by the 1902 law, since it is not 
irrigated by federal projects). Said Carter: “Seventy-five years ago, 320 
acres for a husband and wife for irrigated land was all they could 
handle. Now, with massive development and large machinery, a larger 
acreage is necessary for an economically viable farm operation. So the 
law needs to be changed. But,” Carter added, “for the present we don't 
have any alternative but to enforce the law.” 13 
 
Farmers across the West complained bitterly of the administration’s decision to 
strictly enforce the law.  In a common form of protest, farmers in California took to 
streets in their tractors in protest demonstrations.  On the evening of October 22, after 
meeting western governors in Denver to discuss his water policy reform efforts, 
President Carter traveled to Los Angeles to address a Democratic Party fund-raising 
                                                 
13 “The Homestead Act Hits Home,” Time, October 17, 1977, 26. 
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dinner.    Newspaper reports estimated that 2,500 farmers—mostly from the Imperial 
Valley—protested outside the fundraiser’s venue, the Century Plaza Hotel, while “a 
squadron of tractors and heavy equipment” paraded up and down the street.  At the 
DOI acreage limitation hearing in Fresno California, 150 people testified over two 
days while farmers “took over several downtown streets” with a tractor parade while 
other picketed with signs reading “Take our land, take our lives,” and “Don’t talk 
about the Farmers with your mouth full.”14 
The largest protest occurred at the hearings held in the Imperial Valley, chaired 
by Assistant Secretary of the Interior Guy Martin.  The hearing—held outdoors at the 
Imperial Valley Fairgrounds in El Centro, California—got off to an early and chilly 
start at 8:00 a.m due to the long list of speakers scheduled to testify.  Martin faced an 
estimated crowd of over 3,000 people seated in the grandstands, while 1,200 tractors 
and other farm implements filled the infield behind him.  The morning’s testimony 
was frequently disrupted by the noise of tractors driving as well as a news helicopter 
that was circling above.  The spectacle created a circus atmosphere.  To limit the 
disruptions, after about an hour Martin negotiated with the organizers to quiet the 
tractors and in exchange for a 45 minute demonstration period at noon.  Martin 
recalled later with great humor the spectacle created by the massive demonstration.  
As the crowds began to dwindle in the afternoon, Martin negotiated to move the 
balance of the hearings into the adjacent auditorium.  The balance of the hearing 
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transpired without incident.  Of the 120 plus speakers, only six spoke in favor of 
enforcing acreage limitations in the Imperial Valley.15   
 
Figure 4 Guy Martin, second from left, chairs the Department of Interior field 
hearing at the California Mid-Winter Fairgrounds in El Centro, California. 
Imperial Valley Press photo, Monday November 23, 1977 
    
As the hearings were underway, the domestic policy staff wanted the president 
to make comments on the “160-acre excess lands problem.”  In a memo, Andrus 
advised against that position.  He told the president, “Let me continue to take the heat 
and you announce the solution after the first of the year.” Later in the month, Andrus 
reported to the president that he was moving forward on both the excess lands and 
                                                 
15  “Thousands Jam Acre-Limit Hearing; exemption pushed,” Imperial Valley Press, November 21, 
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water policy review hearings.  While one wonders if it was with a feeling of relief or 
optimism, Andrus reported, “There is light at the end of the tunnel.” 16    
 
Figure 5 Some of the 1,200 tractors participating in the protest demonstration enter 
the grandstand arena prior to the hearing. Imperial Valley Press photo, Monday 
November 23, 1977. 
 
 That week the Department of the Interior Solicitor, Leo Krulitz, reported to 
Andrus, on the field hearing in Sacramento.  Krulitz revealed to Andrus that the 
important issue for most was not the actual number of acres they would be limited to, 
but how many people could join together and how much leased land could be farmed.  
Participants also wondered if the final policy would include a formula for calculating 
an “economically viable family farm.”  This expanded on an older concept of land 
                                                 
16 Andrus to Carter, November 4, 1977; Andrus to Carter, November 18, 1977, Andrus papers, box 6, 
folder 5.  
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equivalency.  Should farmers on poorer quality land be given enough water to grow 
the same amount as a farmer on the best land?  Those in Sacramento now wondered if 
the type of crop grown, prices, and how many harvests could be made would be used 
to compute a quantity of water to make a profit large enough to make the family farm 
viable.17  
 
Figure 6 Len “Boro” Borozinski (San Diego Union) editorial cartoon appearing in the 
Imperial Valley Press, November 18, 1977. 
 
 Krulitz concluded for political reasons that the 160 acre limitation must be 
changed.  “I doubt that it ever represented an ‘economically viable family farm.’  I'll 
bet 160 acres was simply a convenient number for surveyors—as a quarter section.”  
He recommended that the actual number was not “particularly important” as long as it 
                                                 
17 Krulitz to Andrus, November 16, 1977, Andrus Papers Box 11 Folder 30. Emphasis in original. 
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was determined on a “rational basis” and was not too large.   He also recommended 
that a residency requirement should only apply to new buyers and existing landowners 
should be grandfathered.  Finally, he did not have a suggestion for leasing restrictions, 
and stressed again that the number needed to be rationally justified and not arbitrary. 
 The results of the hearings were mixed at best.  As Krulitz’s report to Andrus 
shows, the testimony raised as many questions as it solved.  The hearings also did 
little to resolve bitter feelings in the West.  If constituent mail is an indication, the 
issue continued to remain a hot topic in people’s minds.  Idaho Senator Frank Church, 
for example, received 113 letters about acreage limitation in the few months after the 
hearings.  While thirty-nine were form letters, seventy-four were unique, each one 
expressing a concern about how their personal farms could be impacted by the sudden 
enforcement of the law.18   
Many of the farmers’ letters expressed shock and outrage that the old, 
neglected law should suddenly be enforced.  Some expressed no knowledge of the 
law, and felt that it was the Bureau of Reclamation’s responsibility to have told them 
about it.  They took the failure to inform or enforce the law as proof it was never going 
to be enforced.  Some of the writers had more than 160, some didn't live close enough.  
One older couple leased their 160 acres to Green Giant because of their age.  They 
explained that they did not want to have to sell to a new owner and move away.   One 
irrigation district wondered about the expense of adding turnouts in canals to smaller 
farm units, and what would happen to small parcels of “excess land.”  Another district 
worried about the social consequences to rural communities of an influx of new 
farmers, and an increase in population.  Most commented in some form that both the 
                                                 
18 Boise State University, Frank Church Collection, Mss 56, Series 1.1 (Legislation), box 108, folder 3. 
 166
country and farming practices had changed too much in 75 years to make 160 acres 
viable. 
While the courts mandated the administration take action to enforce the law, it 
did allow an opportunity to tackle an important issue.  For Carter it came down to an 
issue of subsidies.  He and others in the White House—perhaps influenced by the 
Nader Task Force book, Damming the West, and other environmental writers—felt 
most beneficiaries of federal water were not paying their fair share.  They had 
discovered during their work on the Hit List a few that water pricing policies 
encourage wasteful consumption and half of Bureau of Reclamation irrigation water is 
wasted.  Carter continued to feel that “wise management and conservation” were 
needed, not “expensive water projects.”19 
The poster child for the most severe abuses to the reclamation law, and some 
of the biggest subsidies, resided in the Westlands water district.  Because of additional 
litigation, the water district’s original contract had been deemed invalid.  Congressman 
George Miller succeeded in passing legislation requiring a review of the project.  Guy 
Martin chaired the investigative task force on the Central Valley Project.  By early 
1978 they had documented “serious problems... ranging from spending-ceiling 
violations in unauthorized construction to unenforced excess land restrictions.”  
However, Andrus emphasized in a news release that the CVP was “not typical” of 
most projects.  While true of Westlands, violations were not as wide spread as critics 
                                                 
19 For “wise management” see, Dick Kirschten, "The Quiet Before the Shootout Over 'The Water Law 
of the West,'" National Journal 10 (January 28, 1978): 151. 
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had been saying about other reclamation projects. Official Bureau of Reclamation 
statistics suggested that only 1% of the 11,000,000 acres were in violation.20 
Dick Kirschten interviewed Bureau of Reclamation Commissioner Keith 
Higginson for his National Journal article.   Higginson reported to Kirschten that “the 
Bureau's mail was 3 to 1 against the administration.”  Higginson also reported the 
primary concern was the residency requirement.  The original Reclamation Act 
required farmers to “live in the neighborhood” of their farms.  A 1909 interpretation of 
that clause defined neighborhood to mean 50 miles.  When Congress made major 
amendments to the Reclamation Act in 1926, they did not include the residency 
requirement, and as a result, the Bureau stopped enforcing it.  However, in 1972, a 
federal district court ruling stated that the 1926 amendments had not superseded the 
residency requirement, and ruled it was still in force. 
Similar to the findings in Senator Church’s constituent mail noted above, 
Higginson reported to Kirschten much of the mail had come from “retired land holders 
who have moved away from their farms but retain ownership because they depend 
upon the income from leasing.” Because Reclamation had not kept records concerning 
absentee ownership in reclamation projects since 1926, “Higginson thought the 
residency issue was ‘potentially explosive’ since they had ‘no idea’ how much 
irrigation land is held today by potentially ineligible absentee owners.”21   
Following the hearings in November, Andrus had developed a tentative plan to 
allow a husband and wife to farm 640 acres, provided no more than 320 were owned 
and no more than 320 were leased.  The proposal included the option for up to two 
                                                 
20 Ibid 
21 Ibid, 152-3. 
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children to join the farming operation with leasing privileges which could raise the 
total to 1280.  Anything larger would need action from Congress.  But before Andrus 
could implement the new rules, California growers filed a lawsuit to delay 
implementation of the rules by claiming the need for a NEPA study of the new rules.  
The court ruled in favor of the growers, stalling Andrus’ plans for over a year.  Both 
the administration and the growers hoped the delay would give Congress time to act.  
While he did not say it at the time, in an interview Andrus indicated that part of the 
logic in choosing a strict interpretation of the original 1902 law was to motivate 
Congress to take action to permanently solve the problem.22 
Kirschten concludes, “Although it has cost them politically in the West, Carter 
may have succeeded in arousing widespread public skepticism about the politics of 
water projects.”23  If the enforcement was a publicity stunt to generate nationwide 
concern for western water projects, the political costs in the West were much higher 
than Kirschten may have realized.  The Denver Post editorial, quoted above, from the 
same time is a good example of the vitriol in the West aimed at Carter.  Another 
powerful example from Colorado is a guest editorial, by Jack Ross, in the Colorado 
Water Congress Newsletter from April that year.   
  
Even though [Andrus] knew that 160 acres is inadequate, the Secretary 
of the Interior proposed some new regulations on August 25, 1977 
which were designed not only to require strict adherence to the letter of 
the law for the first time in 75 years, but to go way beyond what the 
law requires in one of the most vicious and burdensome bureaucratic 
schemes to interfere with the farmers' life and livelihood that has been 
tried by any administration.  
 
                                                 
22 Ibid, 151; Cecil Andrus interview with Author, July 15, 2010. 
23 Dick Kirschten, "The Quiet Before the Shootout Over 'The Water Law of the West,'" National 
Journal 10 (January 28, 1978): 153. 
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After noting the “bureaucratic maneuvers” had been held up by legal challenges Ross 
continued:   
 
How long will it be before they crank up the machinery of big 
government to try to do it again? No one knows; but it is certain that 
unless the basic law is changed, they surely will try, again, claiming 
that they want to “protect” the family farmer against giant corporate 
agribusiness.24 
 
Ross informed the newsletter’s readers that the National Water Resource 
Association (NWRA) had responded to the outcry from western farmers against the 
Carter administration by forming a special drafting committee in November 1977 to 
craft a legislative solution to present to Congress.  Senator Frank Church introduced 
the bill on behalf of the NWRA as S. 2818.  Ross concluded his editorial with a call to 
support the bill including personal contact information for members of Colorado's 
delegation and a call for financial support of the NWRA’s lobbying efforts.  Ross 
recommended an appropriate donation was ten cents per irrigated acre or $20 per 
$100,000 of farm-related business volume. 
 Another example of the harsh, sometime paranoid fears expressed about the 
administration was a letter to Congressman Frank Evans (D-CO) from the past 
president of the Colorado Water Congress, Ralph Adkins.   Perhaps responding to 
Ross’s editorial, Adkins wrote Evans in May about the two bills in the Senate 
proposing reform, and urged his support of S. 2818.  Adkins contended that of the two 
bills, 2818 represented a better solution for “a majority of Western water users.”  
Having said that, Adkins then launched into an attack of the administration.    
 
                                                 
24 Jack Ross, “160 Acre Issue Hits Colorado,” Colorado Water Congress Newsletter 
21 Number 4 (April 1978), 1-3. 
 
 170
I say to you quite frankly we cannot live with the repressive proposals 
being put forth by Secretary of Interior Andrus.  They are a thinly 
disguised drive for land reform that has nothing to do with the realities 
of producing food and fiber for our country in 1978.  People aren't 
going away and, if we want to have more of our people and those in 
other countries go hungry or starve, all we have to do is adopt the 
Andrus platform.25 
 
 In addition to the written attacks in letters and newspaper, there is also 
evidence that in at least one case the attacks became physical.   Vice President 
Mondale made a second tour of the West that the administration called a “listen and 
learn” mission.  Joined by Secretary of Agriculture Bob Bergland and Cecil Andrus, 
they made stops across the West.  On a stop in Amarillo, Texas, angry crowds threw 
eggs and snowballs at Bergland as he tried to explain Carter’s farm policies.26    
 An inset in the US News and World Report article highlighted the 
administration’s outspoken critic in the West, Colorado Governor Richard Lamm, 
whom they styled as a “new breed of Western Democrat.”  The article quoted Lamm 
as saying,  
The perception of Jimmy Carter in the West is worse than the reality, 
but we all know perception is the name of the game in politics.  He has 
made some mistakes, getting off on a bad foot with the so called Hit 
List on water projects.  Unfortunately, Carter will be a heavy burden 
for Democrats to carry this election year.27   
 
Further emphasizing the central problem that most critics of Carter in the West, 
and Lamm himself had contended previously, Lamm told the magazine that the 
Democratic Party was “on the wrong side of the federal-vs-state issue.”   
                                                 
25 Ralph Adkins (Colorado Water Congress past president-76-77) to Frank Evans, May 9, 1978, Frank 
Evans papers, box 23, folder “water issues.” 
26  “The Western Revolt Against the White House,” US. News and World Report, April 3, 1978, 52-53. 
27 “New Breed of Western Democrat,” US. News and World Report, April 3, 1978, 53. 
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As critics lashed out at the administration, and Senator Church introduced his 
legislation in early April, Secretary Andrus did not complain about those issues.  
Rather, he complained about the bureaucratic infighting holding up the water policy 
review.  He told the president, “Policy by committee has cost us ten days because of 
departmental differences,” and went on to note the paper on excess lands was in a 
similar position.  The Office of Management and Budget had the paper for two weeks 
at that point, but other departments were still “lint picking.”  He expected the issue to 
be resolved by April 12.28      
 In May 1978, President Carter took a second trip to Colorado to visit the Solar 
Energy Research Institute in Golden, Colorado.  The Washington Post reported that 
Senator Haskell was “vexed” because Carter planned on bringing Secretaries Andrus 
and Bergland.  When he found out, Haskell told Carter on the phone, “You are 
bringing with you the symbols of the two most hated Carter administration policies in 
the West and you better take the time to meet some of these other people.”  As a 
result, the president agreed to schedule meetings with residents concerned about farm 
and water policies.  Haskell’s office still speculated the president’s public relations 
event might be ruined by a “bunch of farmers demonstrating outside the solar 
facility.”29 
In words that echoed the sentiments of Governor Lamm, Washington Post 
correspondent David S. Broder wrote after Carter’s trip that even thought the White 
House attempted to spin it in a positive light, he believed “the Western trip ultimately 
underlined—rather than erased—the doubts that are undermining the credibility of the 
                                                 
28 Carter to Andrus, (April 7, 1978, Andrus papers, box 8 folder 5 
29 Edward Walsh, “Haskell Vexed as Carter Takes 2 Unpopular Aides to Colorado,” Washington Post, 
May 3, 1978. 
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Carter administration.”  In his article, Broder reported Andrus "volunteered that the 
action that really poisoned Carter's relationship with the West -- the misguided effort 
at the beginning of the administration to kill off a score of Western dams and 
reclamation projects -- was a ‘disastrous mistake.’” This was an admission that Andrus 
had made with increasing frequency since Mondale’s fence mending tour earlier in 
January.30   
Acreage limitation was only half of the equation producing Western anger, 
fear, and anxiety between the summers of 1977 and 1978.  While Andrus was busy 
trying to solve that problem, Carter had also tasked him with heading up the 
administration’s primary goal, comprehensive water policy reform.  In ways that 
Andrus did not expect, Western anger, already inflamed over the Hit List, and also 
being fueled by his acreage limitation proposals, would evolve into a fiery furnace that 
would test his ability to mediate between Carter and the West. 
 
Comprehensive Water Reform 
Comprehensive water policy reform had been on Carter's political agenda 
while running for office.  His transition team had devoted more attention to it than to 
the Hit List.  But in the early days of the administration, the focus had been on 
revising President Ford's budget.  After having his cover blown prior to his meeting 
with Western governors, the loyal Andrus agreed to move the president's budget cuts 
forward on the condition that water policy review was a part of the package.    
 In his April 18, 1977 statement announcing the administration's decisions on 
water resource projects, President Carter recommended “the development of major 
                                                 
30 David S Broder, “Carter Out West: A Credibility Problem,” Washington Post, May 10, 1978. 
 173
policy reforms” in five areas.  His proposals included more realistic project evaluation 
criteria, dam safety; cost sharing; water conservation; and “redirected public works 
programs” which is the name the administration gave to cutting water projects on the 
Hit List.   As discussed in Chapter 2, the president’s announcement drew criticism for 
several reasons.  Colorado Governor Richard Lamm took exception to Carter’s 
statement that water development was not effective against drought.  The Denver Post 
criticized the notion that water development in the West was contributing to “dollar 
drain” out of the Northeast.  
The president followed up on his announcement, dedicating part of his May 
23, 1977 environmental message to Congress wherein he initiated a comprehensive 
review of national water policies.  President Carter designated secretary Andrus as the 
chair of this review, to be conducted by the Water Resources Council, the Office of 
Management and Budget and the Council on Environmental Quality.  The president 
also added water research and federal reserved water rights to the list of policies to 
review.   
The same day, Secretary Andrus unveiled the new policy proposals at the 
National Conference on Water held in St. Louis, Missouri.  Press releases from the 
Department of the Interior, including a copy of Andrus’s speech, stressed the 
importance of the announcement, which included an expanded list of nine points.  The 
press coverage demonstrates that the Administration saw water policy as an 
opportunity to redouble their efforts to present their case directly to the public ahead 
of the president’s opponents who had been so sharply critical.   Andrus began by 
taking the opportunity to recast the Hit List in a positive light.  In his address, Andrus 
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explained that President Carter's list of water projects recommended for elimination 
showed the "renewed awareness and sensitivity toward water resources and a 
commitment to examine each water resource and to seek its resolution."31 
 Andrus’ St. Louis speech also highlighted several important issues the 
administration had not previously tackled.  While he concluded his speech by stating 
the obvious conservation and more efficient use of water, other items did not seem so 
benign to critics who viewed them with growing suspicion.  For those convinced it 
was real, it was easy to see the boogeyman of increased federal interference.  One 
potentially dangerous issue, in their opinion, was the quantification of federal reserved 
rights.  Andrus also proposed efforts between state and federal governments to 
eliminate laws and rules or institution which hampered integrated water management.  
While on its surface the idea seemed simple enough, some worried that any effort to 
resolve such conflicts would result in more federal control over water.  Another idea 
setting off alarm bells was Andrus’s proposal for the adoption of sunset legislation to 
deauthorize water projects on which construction had not begun eight years after the 
authorization.  The idea was anathema for project proponents that had spent years 
securing authorizations at great effort.   
Andrus’s speech did generate some positive press.  J. Dicken Kirschten, wrote 
an extended article for the National Journal.  Kirschten  pointed out that the serious 
drought as well as the increasing costs of cleaning up polluted water made the time 
right for the administration "to convince Americans that 'wise management and 
conservation' may be better answers to water problems than the expensive 
construction projects of the past.”  He also pointed out that Andrus’s speech had also 
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expanded the scope of the review to take in all agencies related with water use.  For 
example, he explained that by Andrus emphasizing safe drinking water as a “primary 
concern,” he had taken in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Kirschten 
state that the EPA’s programs over municipal sewage treatment works and safe 
drinking water programs “involve[d] more federal funds than all conventional water 
resource programs combined.”32 
 Kirschten’s article also provides some insight into the participants.  He 
observed that over eighty percent of the participants were from outside the federal 
government.  Quotes from participants reveal that the audience included supporters 
and critics of the president.  Henry Caulfield, political science professor at Colorado 
State, told Kirschten that policy review was timely because, "in spite of the 
galvanizing effect of the Carter Hit List, political support for new large-scale federal 
water-development projects is on the wane."  Conference organizer Gary D. Cobb, 
acting director of the federal Water Resources Council, noted a willingness among 
participants to consider new cost sharing.  But he also noted that an increased fiscal 
role would necessitate an increased role in decision-making and regulation. 
Carter’s opponents to the Hit List also reacted quickly to Andrus’s speech and 
the new policy review. Former commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, Ellis 
Armstrong, responded to Andrus in a speech of his own at the keynote session of the 
ASCE Conference on Energy, Environment and Wild Rivers in Water Resource 
Planning and Management, Moscow, Idaho, July 6, 1977.  Armstrong appropriately 
titled his talk, "Emphasis on the People."  In his address he stressed the need “for a 
                                                 
32 J. Dicken Kirschten, “Turning Back the Tide of Long-Time at Water Policy," National Journal 9 No. 
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balanced perspective that considers all factors” when making policy reforms.  He also 
noted that such comprehensive efforts required objectivity.  His speech reflected the 
fear of many in the West that based on their handling of the Hit List, the White House 
staff was too biased.  He stated:  
This is not a perfect world, nor is it ever likely to be a perfect world.  In 
the first place, with our diversity, few if any would agree on what a 
perfect world is.  And the same applies to programs and projects.  
There must be tradeoffs, and what they are will be defined somewhat 
differently by different viewpoints.  We desperately need, and we must 
have, comprehensive, multidiscipline, full system approaches on 
formulating programs for the future.  And this can't be done by 
uninformed, tunnel-visioned, amateurs and zealots.  It requires 
competent, objective, honest leadership. 
 
The balance of the speech was a review of the 9 points in Andrus' speech.  
Armstrong warned that while on the surface they all sounded good, the distortion of 
the facts by those with an agenda could have serious consequences and ramifications 
for water use in the West.  And while it is unknown how much circulation Armstrong's 
comments received, they reflect the anxiety Westerners felt about the president's water 
policy review.  The extent of those concerns and the depths of that anxiety would soon 
be made manifest to the administration.33 
 The review committee worked quickly, and published a series of “issue an 
option” papers in the Federal Register on July 15 in July 25, 1977.34  In July and 
August the review commission held regional hearings in eight cities across the 
country.   Criticism of the Water Policy Review Commission’s initial work was once 
again swift and abundant.  The publication of the papers came at a time of heightened 
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emotion as the Senate debated the Hit List.  To many, this just added another log on 
the fire.  In addition to the concerns raised at the regional hearings, Secretary Andrus 
and the White House took considerable flak from members of Congress, and Western 
governors.   
 Two of the primary complaints early on mirrored complaints about the Hit 
List.  The president was making monumental policy decisions at breakneck speed and 
many wondered how objective and thorough a review could be that was completed in 
so little time.  Adding to the sense that the review was simply for advancing a 
predetermined agenda was the fact that, once again, there had been no direct 
notification. 
Both of these complaints, for example, can be seen in a July letter from Felix 
Sparks, the director of the Colorado Water Conservation Board, to its board members.  
Sparks began his four-page memo complaining about the hearing scheduled in Denver 
later that month.  He wrote, 
In accordance with the finest traditions and fumblings of the fledgling 
Carter administration, an announcement has been made that hearings 
will be held in Denver on July 28-29, 1979, to receive comments on the 
new national water policy being proposed by the president.  As usual, 
we have received our information from newspaper accounts and other 
indirect sources.  Despite the president's repeated promise to keep the 
governors of the respective states informed on matters of critical 
interest to the states, Governor Lamm, and presumably other concerned 
governors, have not been personally advised of these hearings and 
apparently no effort will be made to do so. 35 
 
Sparks also noted that the purpose of the hearing was to discuss policy papers 
to be published in the Federal Register on July 15.  Because of the normal delay of 
mailing the publication, Sparks and the board members would have only a few days to 
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read and prepare their responses.  He also complained that the agencies involved, DOI, 
OMB, and CEQ “have been packed from one end to the other with key people who 
have opposed any further water resource development in the United States” and he 
predicted their proposed policies would be formulated for the purpose of terminating 
further water resource development.  Again, he maintained that these factors indicated 
the policy decisions had already been made.  He questioned how the review committee 
could draft their final opinion papers within a month of the last hearing.36  
Sparks followed up with his board on July 20, indicating that the copy of the 
Federal Register had just arrived.  He noted wryly that one of the most controversial 
issues, native American and federal reserved rights had not been included, presumably 
because the administration couldn’t get it written in time.  Despite its absence, Sparks 
noted that the papers contained more than they could evaluate in the week remaining 
before the hearing.  He thought, at best it would take two months to "intellectually 
analyze the various options," with a preference to at least six months. Therefore, he 
once again told his board that the hearings would be virtually meaningless and he 
speculated that was probably the entire purpose of the hurried schedule.  Ironically, he 
confessed that on the whole, the review papers could provide a meaningful and 
worthwhile discussion of policy options and a “framework for responsive national 
policy,” but not in the time allowed.37   
An editorial by Steve Arhens, the political editor at the Idaho Statesman, 
provides another view of the high-pitched rhetoric coursing through some westerner’s 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 Felix Sparks to board, July 20, 1977. 
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minds.  Specifically reacting to the publication of the water resource policy papers in 
the Federal Register, Ahrens began his editorial stating:    
If the United States had counted on Jimmy Carter to win the West 100 
years ago, descendants of Chief Joseph, Sitting Bull, and Crazy Horse 
would be governor of Idaho, president pro tem of the Idaho Senate, and 
Speaker of the House. 
 
After pointing out the oft-cited fact that Carter lost all of the West except Texas and 
Hawaii he asked: 
 
So what does Carter propose to do to win the West’s trust and allay its 
suspicions about his politics? Carter threatens the West's water supply. 
It must have been a descendant of Gen George Armstrong Custer who 
dreamed up the new Water Resource Policy Study.38  
 
While likely intentionally over-the-top, Ahrens comments still provide an 
example of how serious a threat many in the West considered Carter's policy review.  
The balance of his editorial painted a doomsday scenario that envisioned regional 
transfers, social equity, federal purchase of water rights to reallocate them to the most 
socially desirable and economically productive use—by condemnation if necessary.  
While Carter's policy reforms posed a threat to everyone in the West, Arhens best 
reflects the concern that these policies threatened the very way of life for the Western 
farmer and rancher whose water supply could be subject to “significant redistribution” 
to municipal and industrial uses. 
But it was not just pundits complaining.  In his weekly memo to the president, 
Cecil Andrus wrote at the beginning of August that Republican members of Congress 
had complained that the review was "just a cover for federal takeover of private water 
rights.”  Andrus told the president, “Nothing is more politically volatile in the West.”  
To help calm the fears, Andrus quickly took steps to meet some of the primary 
                                                 
38 Steve Arhens, “Water Policy May Lose West Again for Carter,”  Idaho Statesman, July 31, 1977. 
 180
concerns.  He personally consulted with key members of Congress from the West, 
notably Gary Hart, to reach some sort of deal on the water projects and water policy 
reform.  Andrus noted in his memo to Carter that after consulting with Hart and others 
they decided that in an effort to give opportunity for feedback and to dilute fears the 
administration was trying to quickly push through a takeover, they extended the time 
allowed for public comment.  He also emphasized that from a public relations 
standpoint, they would make a point of emphasizing in the press the reason for 
extending the time frame was an effort to “go to the people, in Carter style, to see their 
suggestions and recommendations.”   They agreed to extend the public comment 
period by ninety days.   Andrus also explained that they made a concerted effort to 
reach out to the press and “forcefully” emphasize their understanding of the “vital 
importance” of water in the West and the administration's commitment to seek public 
input on the proposals.39 
 Despite these efforts, Andrus still had his work cut out for him.  Western 
politicians aggressively defended their turf.  The issue was particularly thorny 
because, as noted above, it revived long-standing fears that the federal government 
may make an effort to preempt state water laws.  In September Andrus attended a 
meeting of the Western Governors’ Conference held in Alaska.  At the meeting and 
afterward, Andrus exchanged words with Governor Lamm over the issue.  In his 
response to Lamm’s letter, Andrus stressed his personal knowledge of the West and 
the administration's “sensitivity” to water issues.  But rather than back down, Andrus 
concluded:  
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My own knowledge of the West leads me to believe that western water 
will be in increasing demand and ever shorter supply.  It's precisely 
because of this sensitivity that we believe the debate must go on.  
While the discussion promises to continue to be spirited, I hope it will 
also be as amicable as it has been to date.40 
 
 Briefing the president on the conference, Andrus wrote that the administration 
was “still taking flack on water projects and water policy.”  But Andrus thought he 
could handle the problem if “given some leeway.”41 
 However, the trouble in the West began to intensify as Western politicians 
began to look forward to the 1978 elections.   In mid-September Andrus explained that 
he and Vice President Mondale had been working on a strategy for “reclaiming solid 
posture in the West.”  Their plans included securing a political appointment for 
someone from the West.  Andrus also encouraged the president to make additional 
stops in the West on his way to California.    At the end of the month he asked for time 
to meet with Carter “to discuss plans and political strategy” before his trip West and 
before meeting with western Senators on October 6.42  
In his briefing memo to the president explaining the purpose of the meeting, 
Andrus laid out their strategy for moving forward with the water policy review.   He 
encouraged the president to “listen but not acquiesce to their demands.”  Andrus felt 
that the administration could place more emphasis on welcoming public comments.  
He explained that it would also hopefully avoid the senators preempting the 
announcement of the administration’s proposals, as had happened numerous times 
with different Hit List and water policy announcements.  Andrus instructed the 
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president that they planned to take and review public comment until October 20, then 
have Carter announce the updated proposal in Denver on Oct 22.  Concluding, “We 
will be playing offense then and it will be easier to maintain positive visibility.”43   
When commenting in his diary about the October 6 meeting with “30-40 
western senators irate about the national water policy,” Carter wrote, “This was a busy 
day putting out fires.”  As coordinated with Andrus, Carter pushed the idea of 
comprehensive planning and involvement of stakeholders—state and local officials, 
and private interests—as well as recognition of specific regional problems, and the 
need to prioritize spending.  During the course of the meeting, the senators continued 
to complain about the schedule not allowing enough time for analysis and comment.  
Carter backed off from his schedule, and extended the comment period to the end of 
the year and with final decisions in February.  Carter wrote of this compromise, “I 
think they went away assuaged.”44 
After the meeting, Andrus wrote that he thought the meeting had been “very 
beneficial,” and noted that he was preparing position papers for the president’s 
approval in consultation with Mondale and Jack Watson.  On October 14, Carter held 
an additional meeting before his trip west, this time expanding the audience to include 
House members, “to get their support for the evolution of a comprehensive” national 
water policy.45 
During the last week of October, Carter made a multi-state tour of the West 
that ended at the fund raising dinner in Los Angeles mentioned above.  On his way he 
stopped in Detroit, Des Moines, Omaha, and Denver.   The President spent about half 
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of his five hour stop in Denver discussing water policy.   His first stop was a 
roundtable meeting on the proposed water polices.  He did some “fence-mending” by 
reinforcing the administration’s message that the western water users would play a 
role in crafting the new policy.  He told those gathered that “there will be absolutely 
no federal pre-empting of state and local prerogatives in the use of water.”  After the 
open meeting, Carter met behind closed doors with western governors.    Montana 
Governor Thomas Judge left the meeting impressed with Carter commenting to news 
reporters that “I believer there is a better relationship with him than there has been 
with any president in recent years.”46 
After the Denver meeting, Andrus applauded Carter “Your visit to Denver 
helped our “water image’ tremendously.  It’s too bad the Panama issue pushed water 
off the front page.”  Andrus also spoke to the National Water Resources Association 
sometime between October 24-28 and told Carter he had emphasized the 
administration’s position by using Carter’s Denver comments.   However, Andrus also 
acknowledged in his memo that the administration’s polices had created “an 
accumulation of problems.”  Andrus believed that if the Democratic Governors in the 
West were to “play party line,” that the White House would need to solve some of the 
problems by March.47  
 
Walter Mondale’s Tour of the West  
 
While the administration worked to solve their differences with the governors, 
the White House also made plans to further address the negative impressions of Carter 
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in the West.  The President tapped V.P. Mondale accompanied by Secretaries Andrus 
and Bergland to tour western states after the New Year holiday.  As noted above, the 
trio and their entourage of staffers experienced strong opposition, including protests 
and in at least one instance hostility manifested by pelting Secretary Bergland with  
eggs and snowballs.  They also faced opposition and hostility from many newspapers 
in the West.  The Denver Post editorial accompanying the news of the trio’s trip is 
revealing of both the hostility and of the continued anger and frustration over the Hit 
List and new water policy proposals.  The newspapers editorial board wrote:  
 
President Carter took office a year ago amidst promises he would run 
an open people-oriented presidency.  Since then the president has 
angered and confused thousands of Westerners with secret White 
House maneuvers over natural resources.  
This week VP Walter Mondale is visiting Colorado and other parts of 
the West in a fence-mending role to find out what is bothering 
westerners.  Well there is a strong message he can take back to Carter.  
Environmental staffers, pretending an expertise they do not always 
have, last winter ripped savagely into Western reclamation spending—
ripping out long-planned or partly-finished projects—with no 
explanation.  Then the administration dumped a huge proposal for 
water policy changes on the West and Midwest.48 
 
 Despite strong editorials, such as the Denver Posts’ it seemed to Andrus that a 
great many reporters, politicians, and the public in the audiences at their many stops 
had started to hear the administrations message.  After returning to Washington, 
Andrus wrote Mondale that, “by all bench marks, the trip has to be judged a success.”  
That success is seen in the press coverage and newspaper reports which help explain 
some of Andrus’ optimism over the reception to the administration’s message.  That 
message was not new; the administration had been trying since the original 
announcement of the proposed cuts to prove that their actions were not vindictive.   
                                                 
48 “Why the haste, Mr. Carter, in your resource plans,” Denver Post, January 10, 1978. 
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Mondale repeatedly told reporters that there had never been a War on the West.  
Perhaps the reason why westerners were willing to listen to Mondale now was that he 
also demonstrated that he understood the source of their way of thinking.  Mondale 
acknowledged that the water review had played a central role in creating the 
perception or idea of a “War on the West.”  In its reporting of the trip, the Washington 
Post quoted Andrus as saying, “We really screwed up on the way we handled the 
water projects.”  It was quite possibly the first time that Andrus made the admission in 
public.  The admission went a long way to help calm frazzled western nerves.  Andrus, 
known as a straight shooter had admitted the mistake as if to explain they understood 
and would not do it again.  Keeping that tacit expectation would be challenging, to say 
the least.49   
 Within days, the Washington Post was editorializing that Mondale may have 
gone too far in his concessions to western governors, in effect painting the 
administration into a corner.  “Despite his excesses in the ‘Hit List’ fight, Mr. Carter 
has been on the right track in reassessing federal water policies.  The economic and 
environmental standards for future water projects should be tightened up.”  The paper 
argued that instead of continuing the pledge of non-preemption laid out by Carter 
himself at the Denver conference, Mondale had pledged “non-interference.”  The 
editorial’s authors pointed out that many of the administration’s proposals did not 
challenge the states’ legal right to water, but sought to influence their decisions.  They 
suggested this type of effort could be seen as a kind of “interference” that Mondale’s 
pledged had ruled out.   The paper remained hopeful that Westerners would be 
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Retreat in ‘War on West,’”  Washington Post, January 15, 1978.  
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cooperative, but ended by proposing, “Where cooperative efforts stall, we hope the 
administration is prepared to be less friendly and more firm.”50   
As if responding to the Washington Post, the White House proved that not 
everyone had gotten the message from Mondale and Andrus.  Within days of the 
Post’s editorial, the White House announced its budget recommendations for Fiscal 
Year 1979, which recommended fifteen percent cuts to the CUP.   Rod Decker, the 
political reporter for Utah’s Deseret News declared the move “A salvo in Carter’s War 
on the West,” pointing out that Mondale said “The war is over” during his trip two 
weeks previously.   
Decker’s column provides valuable insights into understanding the way many 
in the West viewed the White House.  Lacking the vitriol in similar pieces in other 
western papers, Decker provides a more rational explanation of the problem.  He 
explained that what many westerners called the “War on the West” was a “federal 
campaign to retard the economy and control the resources of the western United 
States.”  Decker also explained that the war began with the Hit List, and included the 
crack down on acreage limitation.  He concluded insightfully: 
It is unfair to blame all the friction between Washington and the West 
on Carter.  The bickering began before he came to office, and federal 
courts are responsible for much of the trouble.  But Carter has surely 
intensified the conflict.51  
 
Despite the setback in relations, Andrus had been meeting with Western 
governors on water policy review.  The final meeting was scheduled for February 17.  
He explained that “it is tough, but they are responding.  With the exception of Dick 
Lamm, they are trying to be reasonable.”  However, they did not finalize all of the 
                                                 
50  “Water Pressure in the West,” Washington Post, January 22, 1978. 
51 Rod Decker, “A Salvo in Carter’s War on the West” Deseret News, Jan 26, 1978. 
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issues.  Despite the goal to have the final recommendations ready to announce in 
February, Andrus wanted to make sure that he had reached a consensus with the 
governors before moving forward.   As a result Andrus met again with the Governor’s 
Conference at the end of February or early March.  Andrus reported to Carter that his 
round of talks “went better than I expected and, with the exception of Governor 
Lamm, we are making positive gains on water problems.”  The same memo also 
mentioned the President’s upcoming tour of the west.  Andrus noted the budget 
hearings were going well with the exception of Senator Burdick “and his Garrison 
Project.”52   
During the week of March 6-10 Andrus spent a day in Utah and met with 
Governor Matheson on water policy.  As the head of the National Governor’s 
Association over water policies, Matheson played a key role in crafting policies which 
struck a balance between state and federal policies, and also balancing the needs of the 
arid West and increasing concerns in eastern states over aging infrastructure.  Andrus 
told Carter in his memo following the trip that he would deliver the Water Policy 
Review in the next week.  However, he advised the president, “prudence dictates that 
discussion with the Governors and Congressmen move slowly so that you can cut on it 
after the Panama votes.”53  
As Andrus worked with western governors to smooth the road for the water 
policy review, in public he was also trying to soften the expectations.  In an interview 
quoted by the Washington Post, Andrus even downplayed the use of the term reform.  
In Carter’s original message he had called for “comprehensive reform.”  A year later 
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 188
Andrus stated that it was instead “a major effort to review” rather than a reform.  He 
added, “A great deal more has been made of it than should have been.”   Margot 
Hornblower, who had been following the issue for the Washington Post, reported that 
Andrus and other key administration officials had grown reluctant to push through any 
revision which would cause a backlash.  As a result, key issues, such as resetting the 
discount rate, which Andrus had called “imperative” during the initial water project 
review process, were now “dismissed as politically unfeasible.”  
 But Hornblower noted that the Council on Environmental Quality and the 
Office of Management and Budget, which were also working with the Department of 
the Interior on the review, favored “a bolder approach.”   She also reported that 
Andrus favored the use of cost sharing to solve the discount rate issue.  He believed 
forcing state legislatures to debate the issue of funding their portion of water project 
would “shine the light of day” on the true costs and limited benefits of the 
controversial projects.  The states and local people could then “accept or reject the 
projects.”54 
 But despite the success that Andrus made negotiating directly with governors 
to build solid support for the water policy recommendations, he did not placate all of 
them.  Upset over the status of the Garrison Diversion Project, North Dakota filed a 
lawsuit in state court protesting that the new water policies required an environmental 
study under NEPA.  The Federal District Court in North Dakota granted an injunction.  
The decision prohibited Andrus from presenting the President the water policy report.  
The Eighth Circuit vacated the decision on March 21.  Andrus reported to Carter at the 
end of the week that he could now expect the final report on his desk by Monday April 
                                                 
54 Margot Hornblower, ”Politics Shriveling Water Revisions,”  Washington Post, March 12, 1978. 
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3.  Andrus reassured Carter that while they had made concessions due to the concerns 
and politics involved, that the final product went a long way to achieving the 
president’s original goals.  Specifically, he said, “We have ‘sanitized’ some of the 
politics, but, there is a lot of meat and needed reform.”55 
 However, Andrus did not keep his expected timetable.  Now instead of delays 
from the negotiations with Matheson and the governors, the slow down was due to 
conflicts from within the administration.  As Margot Hornblower had indicated in her 
March article, Andrus’s partners at OMB and CEQ were not as keen on some of the 
concessions he had made.  Andrus reported to Carter on April 7 that they had 
completed the policy paper. He explained that “Policy by committee has cost us ten 
days because of departmental differences.56  
On April 28 Andrus was finally able to tell Carter that the water policy paper 
was in the White House for his review.  He explained that some of the suggestions 
from his negotiations with the governors had been “changed by the OMB process,” 
and that he wanted to review them with Carter before he made his “final cut.”  Andrus 
concluded:  
It is a good document and can be a solid plus for us, but someone has to 
be in charge or we will not follow through and end up with another 
disaster. There will be support for reform on the Hill and we need to 
take advantage of it. 57  
 
Andrus followed up the next day with a special memo specifically on the water 
policy review.  Rather than “chat about it” as Andrus had asked, the message came 
back from Eizenstat requesting a brief statement.  Andrus wrote the president that he 
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still wanted to talk on the phone. Andrus emphasized to Carter as he was preparing to 
make his final cuts that: 
Cost sharing is the most important element of reform.  It does many 
things, requires state legislative action, hearings on state level, will 
diminish backlog and discount rate problem will not have to be 
addressed and most bad projects eliminated.  
 
 
 Andrus also warned the president about language that had been added to the 
draft through the internal review at OMB and the White House, pushing water 
marketing to solve water shortage problems.  They had advocated for state water 
exchange plans, allowing the export of state granted water rights outside a state.  
Andrus warned that such schemes would put the administration “on the defensive.”   
He sensed that Governor Lamm and others would interpret it as an attack on state 
rights and a federal power grab to control water in the West.  Despite the warning,  
Andrus concluded that he was optimistic about the final product and was encouraged 
by contributions by Governors, especially Matheson.58  
The President joined by Secretary Andrus announced the results of the policy 
review at a press conference on June 6.  He largely followed the advice of Andrus in 
making the final revisions.  For example, the announced plan cut any efforts to raise 
the discount rate on existing projects.  But in June, when Andrus sent the President a 
summary of the way the water policy proposals were being treated in the papers, even 
the supportive Matheson had turned critical of the final document.   Matheson told 
reporters that he had “the ‘uneasy feeling’ that a lot of the language in the message 
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which appears innocuous will provide the basis for a heavy hand of additional 
bureaucratic costs and delays”59 
 The center piece of Andrus’ plan was local cost sharing.  The negotiations with 
the governors had resulted in a refinement of the formula.  Revenue-generating 
projects like municipal water and hydroelectric power would require state or local 
governments to pay ten-percent of the project cost up front.  Non-revenue producing 
projects, like flood control dams would require a smaller five-percent local cost share.   
The local cost share and other changes would only apply to new authorizations.  But 
they anticipated states which volunteered for cost sharing could have their projects 
moved to the front of the line.   In a move to appease smaller states, Governor 
Matheson won a provision that the local cost share could not exceed one-quarter of 
one percent of the states general revenues.60  
Environmental groups, which had been working closely with the White House 
staff were quick to praise the proposal.  A coalition of twenty-four environmental 
organizations applauded the proposals to make water conservation a specific objective 
in calculating cost-to-benefit ratios.  Further, Carter asked Congress to appropriate $50 
million to help states complete water plans and implement water conservation 
programs.  While disappointed the plan did not mandate conservation measure for 
irrigation, environmental groups also praised the anticipated reduction the subsidy of 
irrigation water by charging farmers more for the water and limiting water contracts to 
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five years—as opposed to the old practice of forty years—to allow for more frequent 
price adjustments.61   
 
Figure 7 Jimmy Carter and Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus conduct a briefing 
on new water proposals, June 6, 1978.  JCPL, Carter White House Photographs, JC-
WHSP, NLC-WHSP-C-05999-17.   
   
The controversy over the administration’s water policy reform continued to 
smolder in the West.  In Colorado particularly, animosity remained intense.  Governor 
Lamm continued to speak out, taking the administration on at the mid-July meeting of 
the Four Corners Regional Commission.  Andrus reported to Carter after the meeting 
that Nevada Governor O’Callaghan had spoken out in defense of the administration, 
but concluded, “it appears that Lamm, and probably Colorado, is a lost cause.”  After 
the spring tour of the West, which met with limited success and the continued 
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controversies, Andrus estimated that outside of the states along the coast (Hawaii, 
Washington, Oregon, and California), their only chance in the interior West was 
probably New Mexico.  The following week, Andrus reported that Senator Gary Hart 
had called “expressing concern” over the West’s reaction to the Administration’s 
policies and the future impact on Democratic politics.  But as bad as it was, Andrus 
would soon find out it could get even worse.  Just as Andrus prepared to convert the 
water policy review into Carter’s Water Policy Initiative, including working with 
Congress to implement cost sharing and other policies, Carter and Congress squared 
off again over the Hit List.62    
 
FY 1979 Appropriations and Carter’s Veto of the Public Works Bill 
President Carter had originally set a quick deadline for the water policy review.  
In his mind he thought that it could be done in six months.  If the problem had simply 
been one of evaluating alternatives logically, as was his custom and training as an 
engineer, six months undoubtedly would have been enough time.  For those who had 
invested years into the investigation, planning, and political maneuvering needed to 
begin water projects, as we saw with Felix Sparks, six months hardly seemed adequate 
to evaluate the policies that had underpinned their projects for decades. 
To his credit, Carter had delegated the review to Andrus, and allowed Andrus 
to slow down the pace to placate the politicians from Colorado, Utah, and elsewhere 
that had been protesting the loudest.  The slower and more deliberate process, 
including prolonged negotiations with Western Governors, and the National 
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Governors’ Association—particularly through the involvement of Scott Matheson—
resulted in reform recommendations that had a real chance of action by Congress.   
Unfortunately for the administration, no policy decision—however great or 
small, limited or comprehensive—takes place within a vacuum.  Countless other 
elements influenced the events and politics in Washington D.C.  The White House had 
been working with Congress on its energy reform package that had bogged down in 
the Senate.  President Carter had negotiated a treaty with Panama to quell increasingly 
anti-American attitudes that could have resulted in the deployment of U.S. troops to 
protect the Canal Zone.  The White House would spend considerable time and 
political capital to secure its ratification.  Implementing comprehensive water reform 
would have been a grand accomplishment had those been the only distractions.  But 
unfortunately, they were not.  
As has already been suggested—at least in passing—the Carter administration 
was also moving on many other issues that impacted the West, including several 
related to water.  Thus simultaneously, they had taken on the water projects review, or 
Hit List, and water policy review.  Additionally, because of court decisions made prior 
to taking office, the administration also had to tackle the issue of acreage limitation on 
Bureau of Reclamation projects and implement new regulations regarding the Clean 
Water Act, as well as other touchy issues in the West.  But it was the combination of 
water project funding, water policy reform, and acreage limitation that served as the 
stock for a potent brew of political trouble poured out on the White House.     
 The question of what to do about the projects that Congress funded over 
Carter’s recommendations—the eight projects Carter had agreed to allow into the 
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appropriations bill with a promise not to veto—was on the minds of White House staff 
before Carter had even signed the Appropriations Bill into law.  Would Carter and the 
White House continue to push for their cancellation, or would they only work to seek 
deauthorization of the projects that had been cut?   The domestic policy staff worked 
on options, and arranged meetings with allies during the fall.  Brent Blackwelder and 
other environmentalists offered their suggestions and support. 
 Initially, it looked as if Carter would not take such a hard line, realizing the 
political damage that had been done by the early fight over the Hit List, especially 
given his desire to move forward on the water policy reforms already discussed.  In 
fact, at a White House meeting in mid-October, Carter made some assurances to 
western politicians that the ongoing drought in the West had softened his position. 
Leaving the meeting, Utah Congressman Dan Marriott told waiting reporters that 
Carter “said that he did not intend to continue fighting over these projects and in fact 
would consider accelerating them to completion rather that waiting for 15-20 years 
down the line.”  Marriott left the reporter with the impression that Carter would no 
longer fight reclamation projects.63 Utah newspapers jubilantly carried the news that 
Marriott and Gunn McKay had confirmed that “the President indicated a better 
understanding of CUP’s purposes… [and] that Carter actually “singled out” the CUP 
as a reclamation effort he now supports after learning more than he initially knew 
about it.”64 
However, during the regular daily White House briefing later that day, Deputy 
Press Secretary Rex Granum clarified that Carter told the congressmen he believed 
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“many of the water projects were unnecessary,” adding that he doubted Carter planned 
to expedite the projects.  Subsequently, the Press Secretary’s office released a 
statement to further clarify what had transpired at the meeting.  It explained that in 
response to Marriott’s question about the projects that had been funded over his 
recommendations, Carter had not made any budget decisions.   
 He added that he had learned more about the CUP and that he would 
probably support its continuation as modified.  Still as source of 
concern to him, he said, are the remaining projects, which are still 
being considered as part of the fiscal 1979 budget process.  He said 
there were a couple of projects he still strongly opposes.65  
 
 In late November Carter met again with those who supported his cuts.  He 
wrote in his diary that “They wanted to plan mutual strategy on a water policy 
acceptable to them and to me.  After listing the groups and interests they represented 
Carter added, “Good people and natural friends.”  While by the end of his term 
environmentalists would increasingly despair that Carter had not gone far enough in 
pushing environmental policies, his action on the Hit List—particularly his comments 
here and “natural friends”—really illustrates that Carter’s true nature as an 
environmentalist motivated him cut the water projects, as much as his fiscal 
conservatism.  An interesting contrast can be made here with President Nixon who 
supported environmental legislation largely as a political move.  The general public 
may not have elected Carter because of his environmental credentials, but certainly 
those with concerns about environmental policy were familiar with his beliefs and 
supported his election and continued to look to him for continued change.66 
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By the end of the year, Carter had still not made up his mind.  He had been 
lobbied by members of Congress from the West, by his environmental allies, and by 
his staff.  But, he still had not made a final decision.  Stu Eizenstat, Jim McIntyre and 
Frank Moore wrote the President with suggestions on how to approach the issue in the 
preparation of Carter’s budget recommendations for FY 1979 due out in January.  
They indicated their memo was a follow up of previous conversations about the issue.  
They recommended funding the projects pending the water policy review after which 
they would recommend deletions.  They also discussed the chance for success in 
cutting the Cache Basin and Richard B. Russell projects to which Carter had  strong 
personal objections.  Reading their memo, Carter finally made up his mind.  He chose 
the fourth option listed on the memo, “Delete all projects funded by Congress against 
the recommendations,” adding in the margin with some exceptions, specifically the 
CUP.  On the cover of the memo Carter wrote to Eizenstat, McIntyre, and Moore, "I 
cannot in good conscience recommend that all these be funded.  My budget is what I 
think should be funded.  We won't make another major battle on these.” 67 
Despite the political fallout, Carter did not believe the projects should be 
funded.  At least, his conscience would not allow him to personally recommend it.  If 
Congress chose to add the funding, then it would be their decision.  He would push, 
but he would not make it a “major battle.” But sometime after signing off on the 
memo, Carter changed his mind.  The final budget recommendations released in 
January included funds for seven of the nine projects funded as part of the 
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compromise with Congress.  Only the Garrison Diversion and Auburn Dam received a 
recommendation for zero funding.68    
Carter also dispatched Vice President Mondale on a sweeping tour of the West, 
accompanied at times by Andrus and Secretary of Agriculture Bob Bergland.  The 
group was met with hostility, which at least in one case manifested itself physically.  
But, the tour also helped to mend some fences, at least temporarily.  As had been 
pointed out earlier, soon after their trip the White House announced its FY 1979 
budget that cut the funding requested by the Bureau of Reclamation by half.  Utah 
politicians and newspapers, apparently accustomed to seeing the worst, failed to 
mention (and perhaps realize) that other “Hit List” projects had been cut completely. 
In a radio interview shortly after the announcement on February 1, 
Representative Marriott lashed out at the president.   
Utah has been dealt a sharp blow from the Carter Administration.  They 
have gone back on their word now a half dozen times. Cutting funding 
by half cripples the project.  Deep down they want to cut the project out 
completely. It makes you mad when the administration is against you 
like this, but the Utah delegation are working together on this.69 
 
 Marriott and the rest of the delegation would work closely with Governor 
Matheson to lobby Congress for full funding of the project, including new 
construction starts for the Uinta and Upalco units of the CUP.  The White House did 
not include any new construction starts in its initial budget recommendations.  Instead, 
they had opted to withhold recommendations until after the completion of the water 
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policy review.  Critics presumed that this was because the White House wanted to 
make the new construction starts subject to the new policies, and perhaps that way kill 
some of their projects.  Those fears seem unfounded, for while there may have been a 
few projects subject to the new policies, they were primarily intended to regulate new 
project authorizations. 
 President Carter's stated goal that winter was to move past the Hit List 
controversy.  As  his comments on the December 28 memo pointed out, he was not 
looking for a major battle over water project funding.  In fact, as he had begun to 
indicate in October, Carter increasingly believed that water project funding should be 
accelerated the projects under construction.  He believed this would save money in the 
long run by lowering overhead costs and also starting repayment sooner.  But as the 
water policy review entered its final stages that spring, Carter's attitude began to 
harden. 
   In April 1978 Jim McIntyre, Carter’s director of OMB, encouraged the 
president to rethink his veto strategy.  He argued that Congress interpreted Carter's 
reluctance to use the veto as a major weakness, and was “less willing to negotiate over 
our wide range of issues.”  McIntyre believed that demonstrating a willingness to use 
any veto "would create a greater respect and concern for our position on the Hill, and 
provide a stimulus for greater agency support of your positions.”  While McIntyre did 
not suggest the Public Works appropriations bill as a potential target, action by the 
House appropriations subcommittee, headed by Tom Bevill, made it a distinct 
possibility.70   
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During the spring, the subcommittee had held hearings, debated the president's 
recommendations, and considered alternatives.  On May 3, 1978 the subcommittee 
made its final changes and approved a version to report to the full Appropriations 
Committee.  The administration had two concerns. First, Bevill’s committee had cut 
out all funding for the Water Resources Council.  Andrus protested to Bevill, that 
sustaining that action “would be extremely unfortunate.”  He continued, stating the 
administration, “regarded water policy as an extremely high priority and suspension of 
WRC funding at this time would certainly be a step backward in efforts to improve 
water resource management.”71 
The administration’s second concern was that the proposed appropriations bill 
H.R.  12928 included funding for the nine projects that had been cut the previous year.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is unclear if Speaker O'Neill had promised to 
permanently cut those projects when he proposed his compromise to President Carter.  
But Tom Bevill and others had made it clear at the time that they had only removed 
funding to avoid the president's veto and they intended to restore funding the 
following year.  True to his word, that is exactly what Bevill had done. 
 These events put the White House in a difficult position.  President Carter's 
priority had clearly shifted to the comprehensive water policy reform.  However, 
Carter and his domestic policy staff had advocated for the permanent deauthorization 
of the nine projects.  Bevill’s bill threatened both.  The full House Appropriations 
Committee considered the bill on May 31, 1978.  Jim McIntyre wrote George Mahon, 
the committee's chairman, warning that the administration opposed the significant 
funding increases above their recommendations.  Despite the letter, the committee 
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voted on June 1 to send the bill to the full House without modification.  A week later 
the rules committee gave a green light, making the bill ready for floor debate.72   
 Speaking to a group of editors and news directors on June 9, Carter expressed 
that his overriding concern as President was the worsening problem of inflation.  He 
felt that Congress did not adequately support his efforts to control spending in an 
effort to curb inflation.  Speaking broadly he added that, “Whenever a tangible, 
specific effort is made to control inflation, it always touches a very powerful 
constituency group…” Carter confided in his diary a few days later that he was 
discouraged with the Democrats in Congress.  He wrote that they pressured him  to 
spend “more money on defense, water projects, public works, transportation, 
education, health, labor, almost across the board.  Public opinion will be on our side.”  
He added that he believed confrontation would be bad, but unavoidable.73 
 That Carter included water projects funding in the laundry list of 
Congressional overspending gave no indication that he planned to make it agenda item 
number one.  However, the following day, on June 12, Carter took action to do just 
that by meeting with congressional leaders supportive of the administration’s stance 
on water projects.  He told them it had been a mistake not to veto the appropriations 
bill in 1977.  The administration planned on three amendments to the pending 
legislation.  The first would remove the eight water projects that Congress had not 
funded in 1977; the second limited the number of new starts; while the third proposed 
that water projects use full-funding accounting.  This simply meant that while they did 
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not in most cases appropriate the full cost of the project in a single year, it required 
that the full cost of the project be carried as an obligation in future budgets.  While 
project authorizations generally included a cost-ceiling that capped the total cost of a 
project, this amount was not reflected as an obligation in the budget accounting.  In 
other words, the proposal made it impossible for Congress to appropriate a small 
fraction of a project to get it started while “hiding” the huge costs to complete the 
project.74   
That same day Carter sent a letter to Congress encouraging members to 
support these amendments and warned "budgetary constraints and inflation make it 
imperative that the appropriations process be responsible and restrained.  Sound 
projects and program should be funded at reasonable rather than excessive levels.  I 
cannot approve the proposed legislation in its present form.”75   
Within a few days the House of Representatives began debate on H.R. 12928.  
During the course of debate, the president’s allies offered their amendments.  Despite 
whatever feelings of betrayal they may have still harbored from Carter’s compromise 
and failure to keep his promise to veto, Congressmen Edgar, Miller, and Derrick, 
respectively agreed to reprise their roles to sponsor the amendments.  All three failed, 
but they saw Edgar’s amendment to strip funding for the projects cut in 1977 as the 
most important.  It was the test of the ability to sustain a veto.  It failed by a vote of 
142 to 234.  If a veto override vote had those same results, the president’s veto would 
have been sustained.  But, if every member had voted, it would have fallen three votes 
                                                 
74 Frisch and Kelly, 100. 
75 Jimmy Carter to members of Congress, June 12, 1978, JCPL, personal secretary and writing file, 
6/12/78. 
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short if the president only had the 142 members on his side.  The result was not as cut-
and-dried as it had been in 1977, but it looked encouraging. 
 The House passed the bill and the Senate took up action. During early 
September, having just had his veto of the defense spending bill sustained, White 
House staff ratcheted up their support for a veto.  The domestic policy staff and 
Congressional and Public Liaison began preparing for a veto.   Kathy Fletcher 
reported to Stuart Eizenstat after the first week, “I believe the veto would be 
sustained.” Others voiced their support as well.  Andrus wrote the president on Sept 15 
that he supported a veto.  Gus Speth, a member of the CEQ, wrote to Press Secretary 
Jody Powell, on September 20: 
The call for a veto extends far beyond the environmental community.  
The president will lose credibility on the good government issue if we 
do not veto this bill.  Appreciation of the correctness of the veto will be 
widespread if we do veto it.76 
 
Still threatening a veto, the Senate did not take any significant action, as they 
had in 1977, to move the bill closer to what the president wanted.  The Senate passed 
its version of the bill by an overwhelming margin of 89-5.  A bipartisan group of 
forty-five senators wrote to Carter on September 20, 1978 encouraging him to accept 
the final legislation expected to be reported out of the Senate.  “We urge you to give 
your careful attention and your every consideration to the strong and overwhelming 
                                                 
76 Frank Moore, Anne Wexler, Stuart Eizenstat to Carter, September 20, stated a team had been working 
for three weeks.  Kathy Fletcher to Stu Eizenstat, September 6, 1978,  Gus Speth to Jody Powell, 
September 20, all quoted in Samuel D. Hoff, “Veto Strategy and Use by the Carter Administration," in 
The Presidency and Domestic Policies of Jimmy Carter edited by Herbert D. Rosenbaum and Alexej 
Urginsky (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994) 306-7.  For Andrus support see Andrus to Carter, 
September 15, 1978, Andrus Papers, box 6, folder 5 
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congressional support of this highly important measure before acting on any [veto] 
recommendations.”77  
As the conference committee met to work out differences between the two 
versions of the bill, Carter agreed to meet with Congressmen Tom Bevill and Jim 
Wright, the House Majority Leader, at the White House to try and work out a 
compromise.  However, the two were unable to offer Carter anything substantial 
enough to move from his position.  In Carter's mind, Congress had simply gone too 
far.  Not only did the final version of the bill fund six of the nine projects that had 
been cut previously, it contained new construction starts for fifty-three projects, 
mandated the hiring of 2300 new civilian staff for the Corps of Engineers, and 
eliminated funding for the Water Resources Council, which the White House intended 
to oversee the implementation of the comprehensive water policy reform proposals 
submitted to Congress for June.  Despite suggestions that a veto could impact Carter’s 
energy bill that was also in the final stages of passage, Carter remained committed to 
veto the bill.  Stating it was a decision that he did not enjoy and that was not easy to 
make, Carter, singling out his concern for inflation, vetoed the bill on October 5, 
1978.78 
                                                 
77 Frisch and Kelly, 101. 
78 Frisch and Kelly, 103-107.  For other’s treatment of the veto see, Mark Reisner, 321-3; William 
Ashworth, Under The Influence: Congress, Lobbies, and the American Pork-Barrel System, New York: 
Hawthorn/Dutton, 1981), 166-7; and Samuel D. Hoff, 306-7.  Carter’s veto message is found in Public 
Papers of the Presidents, Jimmy Carter, 1978, book 2, 1706.  The paraphrase about “enjoy” and “not 
easy” come from remarks to reporters that day, also from the same source.   
Hoff sees inconsistencies with the president's remarks on the day of the veto and in his memoirs.  He 
stated to reporters "this has not been an easy decision for me to make.  It's something I do not enjoy" 
(public papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1978, 2:1706).  From his memoirs, Hoff points out 
Carter's statement "I made some mistakes in dealing with Congress, and one that I still regret is 
weakening or compromising the first year on some of those worthless dam projects... later, on this issue, 
I was not so timid.  In October 1978 I vetoed the annual Public Works bill because it included some of 
the same projects.”  I would argue that there is no inconsistency here between these two statements.  
Just because you are not timid about using the veto power does not make it “an easy decision.”  And 
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The White House had continued its efforts to build support in the House to 
sustain his veto between the passage of the bill and the veto.  In their analysis, political 
scientists Scott Frisch and Sean Kelly, observed the administration developed a two-
pronged strategy.  Not only did they take the issue to the media—in Carter style, you 
make a direct appeal to the public to put pressure on Congress—the congressional 
liaison staff mounted an intense lobbying effort directly with members of the House.  
The authors contend sustaining the veto was the most difficult the liaison's office had 
undertaken up to that point in Carter's presidency.  At one point, the White House 
hosted 200 House members at a briefing on the president's concerns.  The president 
also became intensely involved directly briefing House members, media, and making 
phone calls and writing personal notes as prescribed by the liaison office.79   
 As he was lobbying for support from House members, Frisch and Kelly argue 
that Carter was operating at a disadvantage; he was unable to offer “substantive 
benefits to a member of Congress in order to curry favor.”  They contend that to do so 
would have gone against his personal beliefs and alienated core supporters.  They also 
cite statements by Frank Moore that they never engaged in “buying votes.”  While he 
may not have had much to offer, others suggest that Carter in a limited degree offered 
some incentives.  In his biography on Tip O'Neill, William Farrell states that the 
White House did trade in favors, “a bridge in Arkansas, an Army base in New York, a 
                                                                                                                                            
just because he felt it was the right thing to do did not make it enjoyable.  And when one considers the 
context of the 1977 decision, something Hoff may not have done, the statement about "timid" is 
understandable.  That is, the president made the decision quickly and by himself at a time the president 
was willing to compromise and maintain relations with Speaker O'Neill.  Further, the comment in the 
president’s memoirs is also made with the benefit of hindsight.  It could be argued that Carter only 
came to see the 1977 compromise as a mistake after Congress reinstated funding for the projects in 
1978. 
79 Ibid, 107-113. 
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presidential photo opportunity for one congressman, some public work support for the 
New Jersey delegation”80 
 In their detailed analysis of the White House lobbying effort in the vote, Frisch 
and Kelly found that as of the evening before the veto, more than 100 votes were 
unknown or undecided.  The House moved to override the veto the same day Carter 
signed it, October 5.  During the floor debate several representatives noted that the 
White House and Democratic Congressional leadership had intensely lobbied for 
votes.81  Representative Robert Michel (R-IL) stated:  
I don’t suspect I can turn any vote around on the Democratic side of 
this issue, for you have all been subject to the greatest pressure already.  
Your leaders both in this body and the other are all against your 
president.  I cannot imagine if the situation were reversed that we 
Republicans would treat our President that way.82 
 
 Jim Wright, stated in his remarks that the administration’s lobbying effort was 
“The most intense and extreme pressure I have ever seen emanating from the White 
House in the 24 years in Washington.”  But not all of Carter’s efforts were successful.  
Frisch and Kelly noted that the Liaison’s office had asked Carter to phone 
Congressman Sid Yates (D-IL).  Carter reported back that he thought Yates sounded 
“brainwashed” but that he thought he shifted him around.  Despite the phone call, 
Yates voted against the president.83   
                                                 
80 Frisch and Kelly, 141; Ferrell, 462.  James A. Speer notes that Carter’s consistent public position was 
against “horse trading” for votes, but also states that he did reluctantly engage in it on a few occasions.  
See, “A Baptist President” in The Presidency and Domestic Policies of Jimmy Carter edited by Herbert 
D. Rosenbaum and Alexej Urginsky (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 104.  83-116, 104 
81 Frisch and Kelly, 134; the House debate is contained in Congressional Record, 124 part 25 (October 
5, 1978): 33704-28. 
82 Remarks of Robert Michel, Congressional Record, 124 part 25 (October 5, 1978): 33710. 
83 For Jim Wright see, Congressional Record, 124 part 25 (October 5, 1978): 33723.  The phone call to 
Yates is discussed in Frisch and Kelly, 141.  They pointed to Carter’s effort as an example of his 
success, but must not have checked how he actually voted.  For the vote see the voting results in, 
Congressional Record, 33727-8. 
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Some argued that if Carter’s primary objection in vetoing the bill was because 
Congress reinstated the cut projects, it suggested ignorance or misrepresentation of the 
facts.  Frank Evans, for example, pointed out that while the Savory-Pot Hook and 
Fruitland Mesa projects had been included, it was only a small sum to conduct a 
restudy to see if the projects could be changed to meet the president’s objections.  He 
explained, “We want to go back to the drawing boards, yet the president is treating 
these projects as though we were trying to go the way we were last year, and that is 
not correct.”   He also argued that the Narrows Unit, the third Colorado project that 
had been cut in 1977 and had been included again was because the Bureau of 
Reclamation had restudied the President’s five stated objections, and “gave a clean bill 
of heath. The people upstairs on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue disagreed with 
the experts in that regard.”84 
 Tom Bevill’s remarks are particularly revealing.  Bevill reminded the House 
about what he considered “the most misunderstood” part of the bill and the president’s 
subsequent veto, the agreement reached when the President signed the public works 
bill in 1977.  Bevill stated that he believed “the language of the conference report was 
very explicit.”  It contained three points. First, that Congress had retained the right to 
select projects; second, all authorized projects would be considered on their merits in 
the 1979 appropriations bill; and third, the elimination of funding is a policy applied 
only to 1978 appropriations.  “This language was specifically communicated to one of 
the President’s top aides who voiced no objection to the specific nature of last year’s 
agreement.”85 
                                                 
84 Remarks of Frank Evans, Congressional Record, 124 part 25 (October 5, 1978):  33713.  
85 Remarks of Tom Bevill, Congressional Record, 124 part 25 (October 5, 1978): 33720. 
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 Bevill also clarified that only three of the eight projects had received 
construction funding in the appropriations bill: Narrows, Yatesville, and Bayou 
Bodcau, while three others received funding for restudy, the Savory-Pot Hook, 
Fruitland Mesa, and Lukfata Lake in Oklahoma.  The La Farge Dam in Wisconsin and 
the Meremec Park project in Missouri received no funding.   
 Despite the strong support in the House for the appropriations bill when it 
passed originally, the lobbying on behalf of the administration appears to have made a 
difference.  Carter’s key allies for the 1977 battle over the Hit List—George Miller, 
Silvio Conte, Tobby Moffet, Edgar, Butler Derrick—voted to support his veto.  
Showing further support for the president, the next month Congress rejected the 
Omnibus Rivers And Harbors Authorization bill of 1978 which contained $4 billion 
worth of future project authorizations.   The vote did not resolve much.  Congress and 
the president still had to negotiate appropriations funding for the fiscal year that had 
begun four days previously.  They also had to work out other important issues related 
to water policy.  But the vote did resolve the political drama of the Hit List that had 
been playing out in the White House and on Capitol Hill for an impressive run of 
twenty months.  
 But the sting of losing the fight over the veto remained with many members of 
Congress who had battled the president over funding water projects.   They 
subsequently responded by unilaterally blocking the administrations attempted to push 
forward legislation to reform acreage limitation and to implement key elements of the 
comprehensive water policy reforms, as well as legislation unrelated to water.  Thus, 
the story of the Hit List is critical to understanding the Carter presidency.  In many 
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ways the initial announcement in February 1977 set the tone for the next four years.  
Daniel Beard explained that to him it felt like Carter had dug a twenty-four-foot deep 
hole and thrown them all into it.  They would spend the next four years digging their 
way out.86   
Because the administration’s experience was so fateful, most histories of the 
Carter presidency include at least a brief discussion of the Hit List controversy.  
Further, because virtually everyone—including administration officials and even 
Carter himself—in retrospect consider at least part of the Hit List episode a mistake; it 
is presented, in most narratives, as an open and shut case.  The reality is quite the 
contrary.  Rather than a story about a brief episode over deletion of funding for dams, 
angering Congress in the process, the Hit List and the administrations continuing 
efforts to implement water policy reforms was an ongoing issue throughout the 
balance of Carter’s presidency. 
 In his discussion of the Hit List controversy, Carter biographer Peter Bourne 
keenly observed: 
For Carter, it was a clear matter of principle.  For Congress, his refusal 
to play by the rules was further evidence of his insensitivity to their 
needs.  For the media, accustomed to the regular compromise of 
principle in Washington, that he canceled any of the projects suggested 
naiveté.87 
 
The perceptions Bourne describes would only intensify as the three separate 
issues of water policy, acreage limitation, and water projects development now 
converged, like streams of water, into a river coursing through the West Wing in 1977 
                                                 
86 Dan Beard Interview with Author, July 27, 2010. 
87 Peter G. Bourne, Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Planes to Post Presidency (New 
York: A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, 1997), 373. 
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and 1978.  Taking on Congress and their tradition of back-scratching, he had 
challenged them not once, but twice to cut controversial projects under construction.  
Taking a hard stance against the economics of western agriculture, they had 
challenged long-standing traditions ignoring acreage limitation provisions in 
Reclamation law.  Pushing for rational comprehensive water policy reform, they had 
threatened the tradition of water law in the West that had left states in control of 
regulation.   While he had taken the moral high road in every case, Carter found that 
because of perceived insensitivity, Congress became increasing difficult to deal with 
as the administration tried to push legislative proposals to implement his water policy 
initiatives and acreage limitation proposals.   And for a President who had banked on 
using his bully pulpit to go over Congress’s heads in such situations, he found that the 
media and public opinion increasingly found him naïve for even trying to continue 
with his proposals.  But ever one to do what he considered the right choice that is 
exactly what he would try to do. 
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 Chapter 4 
River to Rebellion or Clouded Waters:  
 Division and Lack of Clarity in U.S. Water Policy 
 During the Carter and Reagan Years. 
 
 
What is the top problem facing water 
users today? Section 404 (Dredge and 
Fill Permit program)? Section 208 (Water 
Quality Management Planning)? The 
Endanger Species Act? Project Funding? 
NEPA? Federal Reserve Rights? At a 
recent Colorado Water Congress-
sponsored meeting of some 40 water 
leaders from through out the state … it 
was agreed that all of them represented a 
piece of the one, major, over-riding 
problem: UNWARRANTED FEDERAL 




By the time James Watt delivered his talk 
at the National Water Resource 
Association’s 15th anniversary 
convention in October 1982, the water 
industry had come to recognize, rhetoric 
notwithstanding, that division and lack of 
clarity rather than consensus held sway in 




 For a moment in October 1978, it seemed, President Carter had good reason to 
celebrate the House vote sustaining his override of the Public Worked Appropriations 
bill.  Given his growing concerns about inflation, the bill represented too much 
spending on the wrong projects, and sustaining his veto was a victory.   Some critics 
chided the President for vetoing the bill containing important energy appropriations 
                                                 
1 Colorado Water Congress Newsletter, 21 No 9 October 1978, 1.  Underlining and all caps in original. 
2 Robert Gottlieb, A Life of Its Own: The Politics and Power of Water (San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1988), 65.    
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for the sake of his Hit List.  In reality, his opposition had not just been about his Hit 
List projects, it had also been about construction authorizations for fifty-six new water 
projects, inflating the federal bureaucracy by 3200 employees.  But more than 
anything Carter's motivation had been his determination to make the right choice.  
Carter historian, Charles Jones, wrote about the Hit List, “Carter was not willing to 
make just one symbolic foray right into this political hornets nest.”  Jones argues that 
Carter “persisted in his efforts to delete projects” and make policy improvements for 
the balance of his time in office.3  But, as the President moved forward with efforts to 
implement new water policy, he soon found that his veto, combined with the ongoing 
concerns—particularly in the West about the water policy review and the enforcement 
of acreage limitations—severely hampered his administration's efforts to implement 
the water policy initiatives.  Additionally, the administration also supported two other 
efforts that threatened to redefine water use rights and that greatly angered many in the 
West.  To continue the water analogy, the streams of events—water projects, water 
policy, and acreage limitation—had met to form a river.  The way forward down that 
river was strewn with boulders and rapids of Carter’s own making.  Despite his 
enthusiasm for paddling white water in kayak and canoes, the next two years would be 
a rough ride.   
 Between the fall of 1978 and 1980, the Carter administration fought for its 
water policy initiatives, successfully implementing many changes using executive 
orders and revising agency rules.  But the biggest changes required congressional 
approval.  During that time, the administration attempted to secure legislation 
                                                 
3 Charles O. Jones, The Trusteeship Presidency: Jimmy Carter and the United States Congress (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 146. 
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implementing its cost-sharing proposals, funding for the Water Resource Council, and 
its preferred solution to the acreage limitation question.  In addition, the administration 
continued to back attempts to establish claims to water rights for federal lands and 
deal with implementation of Clean Water Act provisions. 
 
Clean Water Act  
 
 In 1972 Congress passed the Water Pollution Control Act, also known as the 
Clean Water Act.  The sweeping law implemented many new policies and rules to 
prevent and clean up water pollution.  Three specific provisions had a direct impact on 
water development projects.  Section 208 and Section 303 of the law respectively 
required states to implement plans to control water pollution from specific sources, 
and from the cumulative impact of dispersed sources.  Section 303 required states to 
identify and report to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which waterway 
failed to meet quality standards.  Section 404 of the law required the Army Corps of 
Engineers (ACOE) to regulate the disposal of fill material, specifically from dredging 
operations.  Concern had grown that the muck removed from rivers and harbors, and 
other excavation operations had been used to fill in wetlands.  The law’s impact 
became even more significant after court challenges broadened the interpretation and 
application of the Act.   
Under section 404, the Army Corps of Engineers had limited its regulation of 
dredge and fill operations to navigable rivers and streams.  The courts had long 
maintained that the federal government had jurisdiction over navigable waterways 
under the commerce clause of the constitution.  However, after the passage of the law, 
the National Resource Defense Council and the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) 
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filed lawsuit to force the ACOE to broaden their regulation of “dredge and fill.”4   The 
District Court in DC ordered the Corps of Engineers to expand its existing permit 
program for “discharge and dredge” and “fill material” to cover all waters of the 
United States.   
 In early May 1975, the ACOE released a press release bemoaning the new 
burdens the courts had imposed on the agency.  The press release from the Office of 
the Chief of Engineers claimed that “federal permits [might] be required for ranchers 
enlarging a stock pond or the farmer who wants to deepen an irrigation ditch or plow 
his field.”   It was a strategy that Thomas Kimball, President of the National Wildlife 
Federation, felt was aimed “to scare farmers and ranchers into support for the 
narrowest definition of the Corp’s responsibility possible.  Kimball complained about 
the tactic largely on the basis that even the broadest interpretation of the proposed 
regulations did not propose extending regulation to stock ponds and plowed fields.5  
 The NWF joined with National Resources Defense Council and eight other 
environmental groups and issued their own press release on May 16.  The press release 
attacked the “national scare campaign” and chided the Corps for taking their 
interpretation to “such absurd extremes.”   They noted that the result of the lawsuit 
was to bring “areas of ecologically critical coastal and inland wetlands” into the permit 
program administered by the Corps.  The groups further explained that the 
environmental groups had never asked for regulations which would extend the 
jurisdiction to extremes.6   
                                                 
4 The state of Florida joined the suit, intervening on the side of the environmental groups. 
5 Thomas Kimball to Howard Calloway, May 12, 1975, BSU MS 56 Frank Church Collection, Series 
3.3.3, box 60  folder 13. 
6 NRDC, “Corps Scare Campaign Scored” May 16, 1975, copy in BSU MS 56 Frank Church 
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 As a result of the court’s action, the ACOE published new regulations on July 
25, 1975, requiring a permit before undertaking any activity involving fill material.  
This covered any pond larger than 5 surface acres and all streams and creeks up to 
their headwaters and on adjacent wetlands.   The regulation was being phased in and 
they were to be fully phased in by July 1, 1977.   
Members of Congress in both houses recognized the impact of the regulations 
and began working on legislation to change the regulation.   Action resulted in the 
passage of the Wright Amendment in 1976.  The Senate passed a different version 
(Baker-Randolph) of the bill and the Congress adjourned before the differences could 
be worked out in conference.7  
As a result, implementation of the new rules fell upon the Carter 
administration.  Thus, in the early months of the administration—while it conducted 
the Hit List Review and initiated the policy review—Carter’s staff also launched a 
review of the 404 permit system due to be completely phased in by July 1.  Secretary 
of the Interior Cecil Andrus reported to the President in late March that the White 
House Staff had nearly created another water crisis in the process.   Andrus reported 
that he had met with staff from OMB, CEQ, the Corps, and White House Domestic 
Policy Staff discussing options for revising 404 permits.   He explained to the 
President, “When I discovered that not one of them had been West of the Mississippi, 
                                                                                                                                            
Collection, Series 3.3.3, box 60, folder 13. 
7 For a legal history of see, John R. Kramer, “Is there National Interest in Wetlands: The Section 404 
Experience,” in Richard E. Warner and Kathleen M. Hendrix, eds. California Riparian System: 
Ecology, Conservation, and Productive Management (Berkley: University of California Press, 1984),  
242-256.  Also See J. David Aiken, "Balancing Endangered Species Protection and Irrigation Water 
Rights: The Platte River Cooperative Agreement," in Great Plains Natural Resources Journal 119 
(1999): 120-158 which takes up the issue of instream flow.  For the use of Section 404 to stop later 
project see, David Gillilan, Instream Flow Protection: Seeking a Balance in Western Water Use 
(Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1997), 260-263. 
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I realized what the problem was.  We resolved the problem and, in my opinion averted 
another clash over water.”8 
 Andrus did not explain the nature of the averted crisis, but it could have been 
one of any of the three sections of the Clean Water Act mentioned above.  
Environmental groups had begun using the legislation in unexpected ways to try to 
slow or stop water projects.  For example, according to section 404, under the court’s 
interpretation, the earth or concrete used to create a dam now constituted “fill 
material” which now required a permit to place in river.  Under sections 208 and 303, 
runoff or return flows from irrigated fields could be classified as a pollution source 
and face regulation.  Because section 303 could also be applied to dissolved minerals 
in water, increased salinity in the Colorado River as a result of water development 
projects could be regulated, or even more significant, become grounds for litigation.    
Both of these issues added to the discontent growing in Colorado.  Water users 
expressed anger and pushed politicians to correct the problems.  For example, Fred 
Caruso, a former director of the Colorado Water Congress, wrote to Governor Lamm 
urging his official support of the “Wright Amendment to bring Sec 404 back in line 
with the original congressional intent.”  Caruso was particularly upset because the 
Wright amendment which passed the House in 1976 failed in the Senate by a single 
vote and neither of Colorado’s senators voted.  Wright had reintroduced the measure 
in 1977 and Caruso encouraged Lamm to lobby the state’s congressional delegation to 
ensure its passage.9 
                                                 
8 Andrus to Carter, March 25, 1977, BSU, Andrus papers, box 8, folder 4 
9 Frank Caruso to Richard Lamm, June 15, 1977, Colorado State Archives, Papers of Governor Richard 
D. Lamm, box 67180, folder “Water Projects” 
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 Caruso, the Colorado Water Congress, and other water users had legitimate 
reasons to want the law changed quickly.  Environmental groups had begun to threaten 
Colorado projects with lawsuits or other delays.   For example, in April, the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) had threatened a lawsuit to require the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to enforce Colorado’s implementation of 
state water quality standards.  Arguing that “salinity was the most serious pollution 
problem in the Colorado River basin,” EDF contended that the state needed to 
implement a regulatory mechanism.   
The Colorado Water Congress had reported the threatened legal action in its 
newsletter and expressed concern for two reasons.  First, the EPA had given notice in 
the Federal Register on January 7, 1977, that it intended to "fund legal actions against 
itself by organizations such as the Environmental Defense Fund."  If the EPA was in 
fact supporting the EDF legal action, then it was essentially making laws by the 
courts.  The second concern is that implementation for salinity control requirements 
could threaten some irrigated agriculture along the Colorado River.  Lawsuits sought 
for the EPA to define the maximum salinity level for the Colorado River, and require 
the standards to be incorporated into state water quality management planning under 
section 303(e) and 208 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water 
Act).10 
Another development troubled the CWC’s members in late June when the 
Environmental Defense Fund, Trout Unlimited, and the Wilderness Society had sent a 
                                                 
10 “EDF Gets Into Salinity Issue with EPA” Colorado Water Congress Newsletter 20 (April-May 1977), 
1-2. 
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letter requesting COE abstention from acting on 404 permits for any Colorado River 
Storage Project application until after a programmatic EIS of the Colorado River.11 
 That summer, the Environmental Defense Fund moved forward with its lawsuit 
against the EPA and Colorado to force stricter regulation of salinity.  The case, and the 
escalating involvement of the water users and water development organizations, 
demonstrates the significance of the issue in their minds.  In November the Colorado 
Water Congress (CWC) and the National Water Resources Association (NWRA) 
joined the case, challenging the Environmental Defense Fund.  By the early spring, 
James Watt, President of the recently formed Mountain States Legal Foundation filed 
motion to join suit on behalf of NWRA and CWC charging that “the environmentalists 
[were] seeking to upset a proven basin management program in order to pursue their 
objectives of limiting growth in the region by restricting the use of available water 
resources.” 12  
 After hearing the case, the District Court ruled in the EPA’s favor October 3, 
1979. Subsequently, the EDF appealed the ruling. The appeals court upheld the 
decision in 1981. However, the application of the Clean Water Act and water 
development projects continued to be a point of controversy through the Reagan 
Administration. The uncertainty of the law and its application to irrigated agriculture 
and water development continued to cause concern, and raised fears about increased 
federal intervention under the Carter administration. These concerns and fears 
                                                 
11 “EDF-Trout Unlimited-Wilderness Society Urge Use of Sec 404 to Block Dallas Creek and Dolores 
Projects.” Colorado Water Congress Newsletter, (July 1977), 1. 
12 “State Urged to Fight EDF Suit,” Colorado Water Congress Newsletter, (August 1977); “CWC to 
Join Salinity Suit,” Colorado Water Congress Newsletter, (November-December, 1977); “Salinity Suit 
Filed by legal Group” Colorado Water Congress Newsletter (March 1978). 
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contributed to the overall anxiety and anger against the Carter administration's efforts 
to implement its water policy initiatives.13 
 
 
Water Policy Initiative 
 
Implementation of the Water Policy Initiatives began in earnest in July of 
1978.  After announcing the water policy reforms in June, Cecil Andrus continued to 
lead the water policy task force. Carter sent his thirteen water policy initiatives to 
federal agencies on July 12, 1978. Separate interagency task forces were developing 
plans and specific implementation activities for all federal agencies. This also 
involved the creation or revision of regulations relating to water use and water 
conservation hands sending legislative proposals to Congress. 
One of the thirteen initiatives included improving coordination between 
federal, state, and local governments.  The Intergovernmental Task Force convened 
for its first meeting on December 12.  The meeting, led by Cecil Andrus, met in the 
White House and brought together representatives from the National Governor’s 
Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, National Association of 
Counties, and the National League of Cities.   After the meeting, Andrus reported to 
the President that the meeting was largely successful; however, he noted some water 
interests were working to slow it down.  Colorado continued to lead the opposition, 
though he thought other states were starting to yield.  And he noted in conclusion, 
“Gary Hart will be cautiously helpful in the Congress.”14   
                                                 
13  657 F.2d 275, Environmental Defense Fund v. Douglas M. Costle, April 21, 1981, United States 
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit; Environmental Law Report  20: 459, 
14 Andrus to Carter, November 9, 1978; December 15, 1978, Andrus papers, box 8, folder 5. 
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 After the new Congress convened in January 1979, the administration 
continued to push the water policy reforms.  The success of the veto override in the 
long run had soured relations between President Carter and Congress.   As a result, the 
White House determined to change its tactics and focus its efforts.  Specifically, they 
worked to secure funding increases for the Water Resource Council, implement cost-
sharing policy, and to implement full funding criteria for water projects.   
In mid-February, Andrus met with Senator Hart in an attempt to craft a plan to 
help Hart create constructive dialog on Colorado’s water concerns in a tacit exchange 
for hard support of the administration's legislative agenda.  Colorado’s governor and 
delegation, among Carter's harshest critics, posed a serious political threat to slowing 
down the efforts in Congress.  Hart believed that if they could find a compromise on 
the Narrows project, he could help the administration overcome the opposition of the 
other members of the delegation to the administration's policy proposals.  Andrus 
reported back to the President after the meeting, “I don’t think it will change our 
chances in 1980, but it will help Gary and keep the anti-West feeling from spreading,” 
Andrus reported to Carter.15   
As a result of the new political strategy, and in an effort to reduce the cost of 
projects by completing them on a faster timetable, the administration proposed a 
generous budget for water projects development, including funding to initiate 
construction on twenty-six projects.  National Journal reporter, Dick Kirschten noted 
that one consequence of the changed strategy was complaints from allies in the 
                                                 
15 Andrus to Carter, February 23, 1979,  Andrus papers, box 8 folder 5. 
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previous year’s water battles.  For example, Brent Blackwelder at the Environmental 
Policy Center issued a press release condemning the decision. 16 
But even with its focus narrowed to water policy issues, the administration still 
found considerable opposition in Congress. Many members of Congress thought that 
implementing independent evaluation of projects by the Water Resource Council and 
the full funding provisions amounted to giving up its turf.  For example, Kirschten 
reported that “Representative Doug Bereuter (R-NE) complained to OMB's executive 
associate director that Congress is ‘not about to give up our stewardship’ over water 
projects.”  He also reported Representative John P. Meier (R-IN) declared Congress 
would not become a "rubber stamp" letting the White House set project preferences.  
He explained that under full funding, control over spending shifted to OMB once 
Congress had appropriated the full project cots.  Congress feared this could 
theoretically allow the White House to slow down or even kill projects they opposed.17  
Moving forward with its three priorities, despite the opposition, Carter wrote to 
the Chairman and members of the Water Resources Council (WRC) on January 4, 
1979, announcing that he had signed an executive order that day to establish the 
review function with in WRC.  The White House expected to have funding in place by 
the FY 1981 budget to implement the review.18  To accomplish this and other new 
tasks under his Water Policy Initiative, Carter wanted to quintuple the WRC’s budget.  
He proposed increasing its budget for planning grants from $1 million to $25 million a 
                                                 
16 Dick Kirschten, “Carter's Water Policy Reforms -- Trying Not to Make Waves,”  National Journal 10 
number 10 (March 10, 1979): 395. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Carter to Chairman and members of the Water Resources Council, January 4, 1979, Andrus papers, 
box 8, folder 2. 
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year and providing another $25 million in new funds annually for state technical 
assistance grants to promote water conservation.19 
However, Tom Bevill blocked efforts to include funding for the Water 
Resource Council.  Not only was he not willing to appropriate money for the 
following year’s budget, but he also blocked Andrus’ efforts to reprogram funds from 
other parts of the Interior’s budget for the current fiscal year to set up an independent 
review capability for water projects. As a result, in May Andrus reported to Carter that 
he did not think they would get any money in 1979.  He explained Congressman 
Harold “Bizz” Johnson (D-CA) had joined forces with Bevill to reject the proposal 
because Andrus thought they knew “their pet projects can’t stand a technical 
review.”20 
 Despite the setback, Stu Eizenstat told Kirschten for his March article, “We are 
far from giving up in terms of reforming the whole water area, but our major battle 
this year is to sell Congress on such concepts as full funding and state participation.  It 
is going to take all our resources.”21 
Thus, emphasis on state participation in funding water projects, or cost-sharing 
as termed by the administration, became the next big legislative push.  Trying to build 
support ahead of submission of legislation, Andrus met with different water user and 
planning agencies.  For example he attended the Missouri River Basin Governor's 
Conference Regarding Cost-Sharing Proposals, held May 1, 1979.  By mid-month, the 
White House was ready and sent its proposed cost-sharing legislation to Congress.  
                                                 
19 Dick Kirshten, “Carter's Water Policy Reforms -- Trying Not to Make Waves,”  National Journal 10 
number 10 (March 10, 1979): 397. 
20 Andrus to Carter May 18, 1979, Andrus papers box 8, Folder 5   
21 Kirschten, “Carter’s Water Policy Reforms.” 
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While Andrus thought the water developers would oppose the bill, he wrote the 
President there seemed to be “strong support from those looking to reform the pork 
barrel and also from some states.”22  
The official press release sent from the Interior described the proposal as a 
“key element” of Carter’s water policy reforms.  Noting that states had been 
inadequately involved in setting project priorities Andrus explained “the 
Administration measure will put states in a position of opportunity and responsibility 
for meaningful involvement in Federal water resource project selection, development, 
and operation.’  Although various national water policy groups had advocated for 
water project financing reforms unsuccessfully for decades, Andrus expressed a 
measure of confidence:  “Water developers will oppose as they always do, but we 
have support from those who object to the pork barrel.  Some states are also 
supportive so we are not alone.”23 
 Despite his expressed optimism, it quickly became apparent that none of the 
supportive states were in the West.  Jack Barnett, the former director of the Western 
States Water Council wrote to Senator Hart a few days later that the seventeen 
“reclamation states,” in addition to Iowa and Minnesota, unanimously opposed the 
legislation.   Soon after, a letter arrived from the former director of the Colorado 
Department of Natural Resources, Harris Sherman, to Hart’s legislative aide stating 
that the Lamm Administration strongly opposed the President's cost-sharing 
                                                 
22 Andrus to Carter May 18, 1979, Andrus papers box 8, folder 5.   
23 DOI, Office of the Secretary, “Water Cost-sharing Proposal Sent to Congress,” May 16, 1979. 
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legislation.  Sherman noted that they would work with other states’, farming and water 
organizations to defeat the legislation.24 
While Congressional committees held hearings, Carter’s cost-sharing proposal 
was essentially dead on arrival. Despite having increased appropriation requests for 
several projects and recommending twenty-six new project starts, Congress would not 
budge on the cost-sharing proposal.  On top of that, Congress once again saw Carter as 
negotiating from a point of weakness.  The respective congressional appropriations 
committees loaded up the pork.   
Not only did that year’s appropriations bill increase spending beyond the 
President’s request, it also contained a provision that exempted the Tellico Dam from 
the Endangered Species Act.  Even though government reports indicated that the 
government would save money by not completing the dam that was ninety percent 
finished, its Congressional supporters wanted it anyway.  The dam also threatened a 
small fish known as the snail darter.  It was originally thought that it only lived in the 
portion of the Little Tennessee River to be inundated by the dam’s reservoir.  In a 
well-documented controversy, many people saw the dam as the perfect poster child for 
Carter’s crusade against wasteful, environmentally destructive water development 
project.  They lobbied the president to once again veto the public works bill.  Many on 
the other side of the argument saw the tiny fish as representing everything that was 
wrong about the environmental movement.25     
                                                 
24  Jack Barnett to Gary Hart, May 18, 1979; and Harris Sherman to Stephen Saunders, May 24, 1979, 
Gary Hart Papers, box 153, folder “water.” 
25 Marc Reisner provides a colorful narrative of the Tellico Dam and snail darter controversy.  323-329.   
A thorough analysis of the project, which the TVA saw as a model to stay in the construction business is 
William Bruce Wheeler and Michael J. McDonald, TVA and the Tellico Dam 1936-1979: A 
Bureaucratic Crisis in Post-Industrial America (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986).   
Wheeler and McDonald’s history documents that the TVA had engaged in serious manipulation of the 
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In the end, Carter signed the bill.  William Ashworth called it “one of the worst 
pork barrel bills of all time” in his book on the subject.  In addition to exempting the 
Tellico Dam from the Endangered Species Act, the $10.6 billion energy and water 
development act of 1979  authorized nine projects which had not been included in 
either the presidential or congressional budgets and on which the Corps of Engineers 
had not completed either economic or environmental reviews.  The bill also failed to 
fund the Water Resource Council. The President faced a tough decision, but the 
politics were against him.  The message had come from the House leadership that the 
Tellico was nonnegotiable.   
They had given notice that Tellico was nonnegotiable.  House majority 
leader Jim Wright told the President that if he vetoed the legislation “it 
would just add fuel to the fire and he probably wouldn't get anything 
else out of Congress.”  Then just to make sure, the House began to 
attach identical Tellico riders to virtually every bill that passed.26 
 
By the end of the session as Congress recessed for its holiday break, it was 
clear that the Carter administration had not accomplished any of its water policy goals.  
The cost-sharing legislation died in committee, the appropriations committee rejected 
the proposal for full cost appropriations, and Congress not only denied Carter’s 
request for increased funding for the WRC to take on independent evaluations, 
coordinated planning, and a water conservation grant program, they had cut its budget 
to zero.    
Frustrated by the complete lack of progress, Carter attempted to gain a tactical 
position to bargain from.  In an effort to increase pressure on Congress to approve the 
administration’s water policy reform, the administration excluded any new starts from 
                                                                                                                                            
projects cost-benefit analysis, like the ACOE and Bureau of Reclamation had done one other Hit List 
projects.    
26 Ashworth, 168. 
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its 1981 budget proposal.   The President outlined this reasoning in his budget 
message.  The reaction in the West was predictable.  For example, the Denver Post ran 
an editorial headlined, “Carter Revives the ‘Hit List.’”  The newspapers editors wrote 
that Carter was “holding water projects hostage.”  After reminding its readers about 
the original Hit List controversy, the paper continued, “But now it appears the old 
wounds have been reopened—this time over a backdoor attempt by the administration 
to grab control of national water policy from congress.”  Later the editorial stated, 
“Carter is telling citizens their lawmakers will not be allowed to function in the public 
interest unless they approve the President's pet policy measures. 27 
Judging by the Post’s coverage of every aspect of Carter’s water policy issues 
as an attack, one imagines that the scabs over any wounds must have been thin.  The 
editorial also shows that it was easy to argue that Carter’s tactics often appeared to 
infringe on closely guarded turf.   As more proof of this, a month later twenty-nine 
senators wrote the President, concerned that the move to withhold new construction 
starts was “a first step in an Administration effort to block all new water projects—




The one piece of water related legislation that the Carter administration had 
had any influence on was acreage limitation.  There had been several different 
versions of legislation tackling the issue.  Numerous hearings had been held.  The 
                                                 
27 “Carter Revives the “Hit List”” Denver Post, Feb 3, 1980. 
28 John Melcher, et. al to Jimmy Carter, March 19, 1980,  BSU, MSS 56, Frank Church Collection, 
Series 1.1 box 108, folder 7.  
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Senate, under the guidance of Frank Church (D-ID) and Malcolm Wallop (R-WY), 
passed an acreage limitation bill friendly to big growers.  In the house, H.R. 6520, 
which had the administration’s support, had successfully been reported out of 
committee.   But at the beginning of September, Andrus learned that White House 
staff had succeeded in holding the legislation up in the Rules Committee.  In his 
weekly memo to Carter, Andrus strongly encouraged the President to send the 
message to release the legislation to a vote, warning, “This is a mistake, and a serious 
mistake, when the newspapers are aware that we are holding it from the floor.”   
Andrus noted that parts of the bill were unacceptable, but was confident changes could 
be made on the floor.  The differences with the Senate version of the bill—which had 
a cap but not a residency clause or participation clause—he felt could be worked out in 
conference.   
Andrus explained that in a worst-case scenario, where the bill was not changed 
to have a cap or residency provision, that Carter could veto the bill in a manner that 
sides with the family farmer, not national corporations.   Without a bill, Andrus was 
under court order to enforce the existing law which would be widely unpopular.  His 
statistics indicated that 98 percent of farmers receiving subsidized water owned less 
than 320 acres, and 97 percent of farm operations were under 960 acres if leased land 
was included. However, the three percent of farm operations larger than 960 acres 
farmed 31 percent of the land. Carter wrote in the margin “Cecil, you need to talk to 
Frank, Stu, & Ham re HR6520.  Then advise me. J.”  The conversation bore fruit as 
the Rules Committee cleared the bill for floor debate on September 29, 1980.29 
                                                 
29 Andrus to Carter, September 5, 1980, Andrus papers box 8, Folder 5. 
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The corporate farms had lobbied hard all year for the bill, and made campaign 
contributions to those who supported it or to the candidates running against people 
who opposed it.  Despite the lobbying effort, George Miller (D-CA) succeeded in 
opposing the bill.  Even after the rules committee had given it a green light, he had 
been able to keep it from a floor debate.  The biggest objection to the bill was that it 
exempted the farmers using water from Kings River.  As discussed previously, the 
Army Corps of Engineers had constructed the Kings River Dam, and the large farmers 
thought that it should thus be exempt from Bureau of Reclamation limitations.  The 
courts had decided otherwise. The biggest landowners included J.G. Boswell Co., the 
world's largest cotton growers with over 88,000 acres.  Other massive corporate farms 
in round numbers were Sayer Land Co. 29,000 acres; Southlake Farms, 27,000 acres; 
Westlake Farms, 20,000; Chevron, 13,000; and Getty Oil, 4,000.  Both the Senate bill 
and the House Interior committee bill reported out in September included a provision 
to exempt these farms from acreage limitations. 30  
But after Carter’s loss to Reagan that November, Andrus changed his position.  
He announced that he was not opposed to exempting the big farms.  A Washington 
Post article reported on the change and stated that Andrus had changed his mind after 
visiting the area for the first time at the suggestion of Morris Udall (D-AZ), Chairman 
of the House Interior Committee.  In the past, Andrus indicated he would recommend 
a veto of any bill that did not meet his standards, which included exempting Kings 
River.  That threat had given George Miller a strong position to block the bill.  Andrus 
changing his position left Miller high and dry.  The intense controversy over the Kings 
                                                 
30 Ward Sinclair, "Andrus Flip-Flop Would Exempt 1,000,000 Acres from Water Law," Washington 
Post November 27, 1980. 
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River and other issues had allowed Miller to keep the Bill from floor debate. In an 
eleventh hour attempt to move the bill forward, Udall tried to craft a compromise.  In 
the end, despite Andrus’ support for the exemption, Miller succeeded in keeping the 




 The Supreme Court ruling in the case Arizona v. California cleared the way for 
the Central Arizona Project.  But it also had an unexpected outcome.  While 
adjudicating the various claims to Colorado River water made by California and 
Arizona, the Supreme Court also examined other claims in the lower basin that could 
be made to those same waters.  The court recognized various American Indian tribes 
had reserved water rights to the Colorado under the longstanding precedent of the 
Winters Doctrine.  Additionally, the court found that other federal reservations, 
specifically the national recreation areas, wildlife refuges, and national forests in the 
drainage area of the lower Colorado River also had a reserved right.32   
 A few years later in the Cappaert v. United Sates case, the Supreme Court 
extended federal reserved rights to include lands in the national park system.  In that 
case the Cappaert family owned a ranch one mile away from Devil’s Hole, a part of 
Death Valley National Monument.  The monument had been created to preserve the 
cave and a pool of water inside it that was the only habitat of the pupfish.  In 1968 the 
Cappaerts began pumping water from wells in the same aquifer as Devils Hole.  As a 
consequence, the water levels there began to drop, threatening the pupfish.  The 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 For the history of the Winters Doctrine see Donald J. Pisani, Water, Land, and Law in the West: The 
Limits of Public Policy, 1850-1920 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996). 38-48. 
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federal government sued to restrict the pumping, and preserve the habitat of the 
pupfish.  The Supreme Court ruled in 1973 that because the purpose in setting aside 
the land in the monument had been to preserve the fish, the government had at the 
same time also reserved water rights to preserve the fish’s habitat.33   
 One did not need to be a legal scholar to understand that traditional land and 
water users in the West would be troubled by the expansion of federal reserved rights.  
For water users in the West, the threat that federal government could lay claim to an 
unknown quantity of water at any time was disconcerting.  To paraphrase Frank 
Trelease, a scholar of water law, it was as if someone gave the government a blank 
check to your account that they could fill at any time and in any amount.34  
 But the issue became more complicated in 1978, when the Supreme Court 
ruled on the United States v. Mexico, also known as the Mimbres Case.  The Forest 
Service had claimed reserved water rights to the Mimbres River in the Gila National 
Forest in New Mexico to maintain minimum stream flows.  New Mexico claimed that 
the Forest Service did not have any vested rights to the water and filed suit.  The court 
delivered a mixed ruling.  Following the precedent in the Cappaert decision, the court 
held that the Forest Service could only claim rights to water to fulfill its primary 
purpose under the Organic Act.  Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 
found two purposes: “to preserve water flows for downstream use, and to produce a 
continuous supply of timber,” rejecting the Forest Service’s argument that Congress 
had “intended to reserve water for aesthetic, recreational, and fish-preservation 
                                                 
33 Rand Hoffman, "Extension of the Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine for Environmental 
Protection"  Harvard Environmental Law Review 1 (1976), 174-5. 
34 See Frank Trelease, “Federal-State Relations In Water Lot: Final Report..” (Arlington Virginia: 
National Water Commission, 1971). 
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purposes.”  While Congress recognized those uses in the Multiple Use Sustained Yield 
Act of 1960; that was not the original purpose of the reservation.  Further, the court 
found that the legislative intent stated those uses were to be “supplemental to, but not 
in derogation of” the original purposes.35   
 
Krulitz Ruling 
After the Supreme Court ruling in the Mimbres Case on July 3, 1978 and in 
response to Carter’s 1978 Water Policy Message calling for quantification of federal 
water rights, the Department of the Interior’s Solicitor, Leo Krulitz, studied to see if 
the reclassification of forest lands under the Wilderness Act granted reserved right.  
His opinion, issued July 25, 1979, stated that federal reserved rights could be claimed 
to fulfill the purpose of wilderness areas.  Some attorney’s, like Christopher Meyer, 
the counsel to the National Wildlife Federation, believed “the opinion broke no new 
ground on the issue of federal reserved water rights.”  However, that was not how the 
ruling was received in the West. 36   
 In his ruling, Krulitz maintained that current state laws would prevail to 
acquire water rights on non-reserved land; however, federal claims to water trumped 
state water laws in cases where there was a federal responsibility to protect federally 
owned resources.   While Krulitz had not gone any further than the Supreme Court in 
its ruling in asserting a federal reserved right, Krulitz had given the Department of the 
Interior grounds to move forward in its efforts to quantify and secure those rights.   
                                                 
35 Janice L. Weis, "Federal Reserved Water Rights in Wilderness Areas: A Progress Report on a Western 
Water Fight,”  Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 15:1(Fall 1987), 132-4. 
36 Christopher Meyer to Western Affiliate Representatives, January 9-10, 1982, Papers of Governor 
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  That threat scared western water users.  Andrus attempted to reassure the West.  
At a meeting with governors on February 4, 1980 Andrus reassured that he would 
negotiate with states whenever possible, and that the Krulitz Ruling would be “used 
sparingly.”  His reassurance aside, many thought that if push-came-to-shove, Andrus 
could use it at a minimum as a bargaining chip.  Failing that, there would be nothing 
stopping him if he chose to use it.  As water attorney Northcutt Ely explained to the 
National Water Commission, November 6, 1969:  
The Federal Reserve water rights doctrine is "a first mortgage of 
undetermined and undeterminable magnitude which hangs like a sword 
of Damocles over every title to water rights on every stream which 
touches a federal reservation.37 
 
 
Evaluating Carter’s Success 
 
 For many in the West in 1980, Carter himself must have seemed a sword of 
Damocles.  They waited to see where, not when, the next “attack” might come.  For 
them, Carter’s water policies, indeed perhaps all of his natural resource polices had 
been a failure.  Ironically, many with strong environmental convictions also 
considered much of Carter’s environmental policies a failure for not going far enough, 
fast enough.   
 Up to now, there have been few studies that have considered the success and 
failure of Carter’s water policies from a historical perspective.  As has been noted, the 
bulk of the scholarship on the Hit List has been conducted by political scientists.  The 
recent work of Frisch and Kelly, mentioned previously, is one example.  Their book 
investigated Carter’s veto strategy.  They conclude erroneously:  
                                                 
37 Quoted in,. Weis, 125.  
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Jimmy Carter's demand for changes in the way that water projects were 
considered by Congress was largely successful.  The purpose in 
challenging Congress and using the veto was to eliminate "wasteful" 
spending and change the standards by which future water projects 
would be evaluated… the leverage afforded the administration by 
sustaining the veto allowed several important long-lasting changes in 
future water policy.  The most important to the administration was that 
appropriations bills should include estimates of the full costs of water 
projects in order to unmask the long-term costs of water projects.38 
 
Later they state, “President Carter and his team wrung significant concessions 
out of Congress due to Carter's willingness to carry through on his veto threat and then 
to defeat the override attempt after investing considerable personal and organizational 
resources in the fight.”39   This conclusion is flawed.  President Carter did not succeed 
in gaining any significant concessions from Congress.  They failed to pass cost-
sharing legislation or fund the Water Resource Council.  Further, they did not, in fact, 
implement full funding of water projects.  Water project authorizations had included 
estimates and cost ceilings, but Congress did not, during the Carter administration or 
since, switch from incremental funding to full funding of water projects. 40   
While they do not cover the water projects review in great detail, and do not 
discuss his efforts to change water policy at all, Daynes and Sussman concluded that 
Carter was moderately successful in implementing his environmental policies.  Their 
overall discussion is limited to using the event to provide the evidence for Carter's 
                                                 
38 Frisch and Kelly 166-7 
39 Frisch and Kelly, 167. 
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difficulties in dealing with Congress.  Unlike Frisch and Kelly, who discussed the veto 
in positive terms, they see it as a negative:   
His veto of that year’s annual Public Works legislation increased 
tension between the President and Democratic members of Congress, 
showing that the President must be sensitive to the needs of 
Congressional partisans" and conclude their discussion by arguing that 
the issue demonstrated that presidents and legislators, despite common 
partisanship, often view public policy in very different ways.41 
 
Garland Hass draws a similar conclusion:  
 
Ironically, the victory in the fight over the water projects turns out to be 
a political disaster for Carter as the injured Congressman took their 
revenge on his major legislative proposals -- including his energy 
conservation program.  His announcement of the proposed cuts also set 
off a firestorm of protest in the Western states, where water subsidies 
and funds for road construction are as important as urban development 
aid or welfare are in the East.  In the end, Carter was forced to back 
down, but by then he had hastened to the show several key Western 
states from the Democratic Party.42 
 
But, while not disputing the political ramifications of his actions, William Ashworth 
argues Carter’s entire method of reform was flawed.  He believes the real reason the 
President’s Valiant pork-reform efforts failed. 
 
 It was not that they were ineffective or poorly enforced; it was not the 
Congress had run roughshod over them, nor that a weak president had 
given him, nor that the special interests had to get to them.  The 
reforms failed because they were reforms of the wrong things.  Jimmy 
Carter tackled water-project standards, but the pork barrel knows no 
standards.  He had tried to reform the cost-benefit ratio, but he'd 
forgotten the Corps fix-it shop.  He had written new rules of the game, 
but it wasn't his game.  Congress held the cards and Congress didn't 
need to follow Jimmy's rules…. Standards are meaningless unless they 
are adhered to, and there is nothing short of the Constitution itself that 
can force Congress to adhere to anything.43 
 
 
Robert Gottlieb makes a different argument.  Rather then seeing Congress as 
unable to change, he argues that Carter’s failure to significantly alter water projects or 
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policy resulted from poor execution of the process of change and lobbying Congress.  
Gottlieb states, “Both Carter and the environmental groups failed to mobilize 
constituencies at the local level in advance of these new policies [energy and water 
policies] and allowed industry groups to assume a local, grassroots stance as part of 
their pro-development counter mobilization.”  Gottlieb sees this as evidence of the 
growing split between the big Washington D.C. based environmental groups and the 
plethora of grassroots environmental groups that started during the 1970s.  He notes 
that while many local groups have sought the help of the Washington D.C.-based 
groups, interaction had been “a one-way street.”  Compounding the problem created 
by failure to mobilize and strengthen support for environmental policies at the local 
level, was the simultaneous strengthening of a more organized movement against 
environmental and business regulations.  He argues that "the industry lobbyists, 
through their anti-regulatory counterrevolution, put the mainstream groups and 
environmental bureaucracies increasingly on the defensive.  Politically unprepared to 
fight back, the Carter administration in small-group envirocrats began a full-scale 
retreat regarding questions of efficiency, regulation, and resource development.”44   
While these conclusions are mixed, the shared commonality is that the water 
projects review, and as an extension, the water policy initiatives were a political 
disaster.  The President and his team made mistakes and miscalculations.  Some of 
these came from inexperience.  Others of them came by nature.  Carter’s personality 
as a consummate technocrat and his need to do the right thing made it difficult to 
delegate authority, and caused him to over-analyze decisions that should have been 
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quick to make; while simultaneously causing him to make quick decisions on other 
issues that required more caution.45   
The interpretations of why those mistakes matter vary by author.  But one 
interpretation that has not been considered is the impact of Carter’s water policy on 
the West.  Virtually every decision that Carter made with respect to water resulted in a 
back lash from the West.  They interpreted either the policy, or his motivations, as 
attacks on traditional economic activities: Activities which in many cases helped to 
define western culture and attitudes.  As was noted above in Chapter 3, many of the 
problems with the West began before his presidency.  Further, they were not all 
limited to water issues.  But, the original Hit List coming so soon after taking office 
seemed to confirm the region’s worst fears.46   
Adding fuel to the fire, the Carter administration did not make just one attack 
on the West.  While it began with his Hit List, it was followed by a water policy 
review, acreage limitation enforcement, Clean Water Act rules and an expansion of 
federal reserved rights; all of which increased the federal power and bureaucracy 
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natural resources extraction, water was believed to be a key to economic development in these 
industries. Many were simply not ready for a “new West” advocated by others, but exemplified by 
Carter.  
 
Further compounding this issue, many reclamation projects also provided municipal water.  It was 
easier therefore for many Westerners to see a connection between all reclamation projects.  Thus even 
when Carter was attacking agricultural projects it was easy for many Westerners to fear their municipal 
project might be next.    
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intruding into their lives.  Within the broader context a growing constituency came to 
believe that environmental policies had gone too far and that "extremists" imperiled 
American jobs and economy at a time of high unemployment and high inflation as 
reflected by the spike in the misery index at the end of Carter’s term in office.  Thus, 
in the West, Carter faced not only the “anti-regulatory counterrevolution,” but his 
“attacks” on water—and by extension the way of life in the West—Carter helped to 





Within the context rose a strong movement in many western states to reduce 
the power and influence of the federal government.  This movement became known as 
the Sagebrush Rebellion.  Many “sagebrush rebels” believed the solution to increased 
regulation of federal land use, which increasingly restricted grazing rights, timber 
sales, mining, and some recreation activities was to convert federal land into state 
land.  For this reason, most historians investigating the Sagebrush rebellion have not 
included much discussion about the impact of Carter’s water development and water 
policy choices.  This seems understandable given sagebrush rebels demands for state 
control over federal lands. But, threats to traditional water rights and uses played a 
significant role in creating the perception of a federal “war on the West” under the 
Carter’s command.47   
                                                 
 
47 There were many reasons that for Westerners to dislike the Carter administration.  Perhaps it is as 
simple as some have suggested that they could never like or trust a Southerner.  This has been suggested 
as an explanation of Carter’s poor electoral performance in the West in 1976, despite the success of 
many Democratic Governors Senators, and Representatives.  As was pointed out earlier in this study, 
many at the time suggested that the fact that Carter only won Texas and Hawaii in the general election 
was a basis for the “War on the West.”  But, it could be pointed out that even in the primaries, Carter 
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As has been seen in the previous chapters, many of those in favor of water 
development projects in the West have extensively used language suggesting “attacks” 
or a “war on the West,” and other language that expressed anxiety or dissatisfaction 
with Carter's treatment of water development.  However, this type of language was 
readily in use by Sagebrush Rebels. Further, water issues are listed by many rebels 
among their top concerns. 
Morgan Smith, the Commissioner of the Colorado State Department of 
Agriculture, in a discussion memo about the Sagebrush Rebellion placed water first on 
his list of specific issues motivating supporters of the movement.  He wrote, “This 
includes the reaction to the Carter ‘Hit List’ as well as federal water quality programs 
that are perceived to be an intrusion into state water law.”48 
 A briefing paper on the Sagebrush Rebellion by the National Association of 
Counties (NACo) contained the follow declaration which also listed water 
prominently.  
 
Why is the Sagebrush Rebellion gaining broad western support?   
It is a basic states rights issue regarding control of land, resources, and 
water 
It is a backlash of western water project battles 
It is a backlash of Alaska lands, RARE II, and BLM wilderness 
proposals 
It is a backlash concerning FLPMA, clean air, flood control, grazing, 
and other regulations on land use, especially during the past 3 year void 
without advisory committees to allow state and local input on federal 
land management programs.49  
                                                                                                                                            
performed poorly in the West.  Further the West was the home of the ABC movement—“Anyone But 
Carter”—during the 1976 campaign with western candidates Senator Frank Church of Idaho and 
Governor Brown of California. 
  
48 Morgan Smith to James Kurtz-Phelan, Dec 11, 1980, Lamm papers, box 64451,   
folder “Sagebrush Rebellion [No 1]” 
49 “NACo Breifing Paper -“The Sagebrush Rebellion,’” Dec 14, 1979, Lamm papers, box 64451,   
folder “Sagebrush Rebellion [No 1]” 
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 In his 1980 Utah Law Review article, Richard Clayton investigated the 
Sagebrush rebellion movement.  He argued at the time that the discontent and causes 
extended beyond the enactment of the Federal Land Management Policy Act 
(FLPMA) in 1976.  He contended that there were three underlying causes: “The 
West's ineffectiveness in Congress, the imbroglio of federal regulation, and adverse 
economic impact.”  Explaining the first point he wrote, “Proponents of the rebellion 
argue that the West has no clout in the decision making processes that directly affect 
them.  They cite as example President Carter’s restrictive water policies.”50  
 In a six-page memo updating Gary Hart and his office on the politics 
surrounding the debate of a “Sagebrush” bill in the Colorado Legislature, one of his 
advisors wrote, “… the issue of water-rights is now emerging in the Colorado 
Sagebrush bill.  Such divergent people as Senator Yost and Senator Harvey Phelps 
appear to be zeroing in on that aspect—especially with water originating primarily on 
FS [Forest Service] lands, rather than BLM.”51  
 All of these examples suggest that water was an integral part of the emotions 
and thinking driving the demand for state control of lands.  However, the actions that 
newly elected President Ronald Reagan and his Secretary of the Interior, James 
Watt—who both styled themselves as Sagebrush Rebels— provide an even more 
compelling example of the significance of water in understanding this western 
movement.  
                                                 
50 For Clayton’s list see, Richard D. Clayton, “The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the 
Public Lands?”  Utah Law Review, (1980), 509-12;  for the first point and “restrictive water policies,” 
see 509. 
51 Steve Labriola to Gary [Hart], Stephen, Sue [Furniss], February 25, 1981, Gary Hart papers, box 157, 
folder 15.  
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 Tasked with resolving the concerns of western states, Watt implemented what 
he called his “Good Neighbor Policy.”  Ostensibly this policy returned more input and 
power to states in determining uses and regulations of federal lands.  While more 
complicated in practice, Watt explained that it simply meant that when dealing with a 
problem between federal and state governments, he would ask, “What would a good 
neighbor do?”  His policy was effective in defusing much of the anger felt by 
sagebrush rebels.52 
 One of the first tasks that Watt undertook to implement his policy was meeting 
with western governors on February 25, 1981.  At the meeting, Utah Governor Scott 
Matheson presented Watt with five water policy recommendations.   
 
A.  Assertion of Non-reserved Federal Water Rights 
Recommend that the secretary direct the new Solicitor too undertake a 
thorough reexamination of his predecessor’s opinion and that opinion 
should be withdrawn pending review.   
B.  Financing of Water Projects.  
Recommend close consultation with the states in the development of 
any proposals for altering the present system of authorization and 
appropriations of water resource projects.  
C.  Carter Administration Water Policy Reform 
Urge the Secretary of Interior, who was formerly designated by 
President Carter as the lead official in the water policy reform effort, to 
seek immediate suspension of implementation of President Carter’s 
water policy decisions pending a thorough review and full consultation 
with the Governors and their representatives, in order that the states can 
be full and participating partners in establishing a truly national water 
policy.  
D. Endangered Species Act 
Recommend a thorough review of the administration of the act, with 
the goal of seeking avenues of minimizing, within the framework of the 
law, potential adverse impacts on vested water rights, and the authority 
of the states to allocate water resources for the achievement of other 
important national goals. 
E. Section 404 of Clean Water Act 
                                                 
52 Ron Arnold, In the Eye of the Storm: James Watt and the Environmentalists (Chicago: Regnery 
Gateway, 1982), 226-7; James Watt interview with author, April 25, 2011. 
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Instruct the FWS to avail itself of state laws and procedures in 
representing its interest in the protection of instream resources.53   
 
 Matheson had worked closely with Secretary Andrus in the effort to craft 
President Carter’s water policy initiatives.  But the list illustrates that even that effort 
did not yield satisfactory results.  Matheson advocated the rollback of essentially every 
major point of Carter’s water policy.  At the top of the list was the reexamination of 
non-reserved federal water rights.  
 
Coldiron Decision 
Following the February meeting with Secretary Watt, Governor Matheson worked 
closely with Watt’s office and the new Department of the Interior Solicitor, William 
Coldiron.  Matheson was still the chair of the National Governors Association 
committee on water issues.  He also was heavily involved in the Western Governor’s 
Policy Office (WESTPO) with Governor Lamm.  By June, Matheson and his staff at 
WESTPO and the Western States Water Council had crafted a draft of a ruling that 
reinterpreted the Krulitz Decision, overturning the concept of federal reserved right.  
The document returned control of water rights back to the states.  On June 8, 1981, 
Matheson forwarded a draft of the proposed Solicitor’s opinion to Dave Russell at 
DOI.  At a follow up meeting with the Governors on Sept 11, 1981 in Jackson, 
Wyoming, Secretary Watt announced that Solicitor Coldiron had issued his opinion 
repudiating the theory of federal non-reserved water rights.  The lead counsel for the 
National Wildlife Federation noted at the time that Coldiron’s final draft and 
Matheson’s draft bore “a noticeable resemblance” and summed, “It is essentially a 
                                                 
53 “Meeting of western governor’s with Watt on Feb 25, 1981” Papers of Governor Scott Matheson, 
Natural Resource Working Files, Utah State Archives, Series 19161, reel 36, box 17, folder 24. 
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move to undermine the government’s ability to protect instream flows from future 
appropriators.”54 
 
Water Policy 1981 
 In addition to moving quickly on the governors’ request to reexamine the 
Krulitz decision, Watt moved forward with several of the other agenda items on 
Matheson’s list.  A month after the meeting in Reno, Watt had announced proposals to 
eliminate the Water Resource Council.  In its place Watt proposed to transfer 
oversight to the President’s Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and Environment 
which he chaired as the Secretary of the Interior in the short term and the creation of a 
new Office of Water Policy at the DOI.  Watt’s planning group had not decided in the 
new DOI office would review all water projects, or only focus on advising the 
President on broad policy issues.55   
 At the same time Watt was considering this policy, the Senate also was 
considering legislative proposals to replace the WRC.  Senator Abdnor (R-SD), chair 
of the Water Resources Subcommittee, drafted an alternative plan that proposed to 
rotate control over water policy between the EPA, DOI, and ACOE.   As Abdnor 
moved forward with hearings on his legislation, Watt announced on July 15 that he 
would not pursue the creation of the new office of Water Policy and “would leave any 
further water policy initiative to Congress.”56   
                                                 
54 Christopher Meyer to Wester Affiliate Representatives, January 9-10, 1982, Matheson Papers, Series 
19161, reel 36 box 17, folder 13.  
55 Joanne Omang, “Watt Wading into Water Policy” Washington Post, April 18, 1981. 
56 Omang, “Watt Wading into Water Policy;  for any further see, Lawrence Mosher, “If There's a 
National Water Crisis, You Can't Tell It in Washington,” National Journal 13 No 30 (July 25, 1981),  
1332. 
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 Watt did move forward with plans to eliminate the WRC.  He also discarded 
the policy manual created under Andrus’ leadership that outlined the guidelines for 
reviewing new projects.   Watt included these among the many accomplishments he 
claimed in his first annual report to President Reagan.57    
 
Acreage Limitation 
After failing to pass acreage limitation in the last hours of the Congressional 
session, several members of Congress reintroduced their various versions of reform 
legislation.  Both chambers made significant progress on the issue during the second 
session of the Ninety-Seventh Congress in 1982.   Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) 
shepherded his version of the bill, S. 1867.  The Senate Energy committee approved 
the bill on April 21, 1982 for floor debate.  The senate debated the bill over July 15 
and 16.    
During consideration of the measure in July, Ohio Senator Howard 
Metzenbaum (D) attempted to block passage of the bill, or force changes.  
Metzenbaum thought it was unfair to subsidize farmers in the West while farmers in 
other parts of the country were struggling.    Wallop’s original version had increased 
the acreage limit to 2080 acres.  Metzenbaum creatively used a quasi-filibuster. Under 
the time agreement for the debate, no time limits had been placed on amendments.  He 
was thus free to call up as many amendments as he wanted without fear of being 
muzzled either by a time limit, or by the Senate voting to force an end to a filibuster.   
His first amendment failed by a vote of 75 to 7, but he remained determined to 
continue despite the vote and the consternation of other senators.  However, he did not 
                                                 
57 A Year of Change: To Restore America’s Greatness (Washington: Department of the Interior, 1982). 
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have to persist long in his threat.  Indicating that he was willing to compromise, 
Wallop agreed.  After a two-hour closed door negotiation, the bill was amended to 
reduce the limit to 1280.  The senate approved the bill by a vote of 49 to 13.58 
 The house passed a similar version of the bill, but had a lower cap of 960 
acres.  This forced the bill to a conference committee.  In the end, the Senate approved 
reducing the cap to the house level.  Further, this limit applied to individuals and 
corporations with fewer than twenty-five shareholders who would receive federally 
subsidized water on up to 960 acres of owned or leased land.  But corporations with 
more than twenty-five shareholders could get water for up to 640 acres, but have to 
pay the full cost of water to farms more than 320.  Thus in the end, the final version 
was strikingly similar to the version that the Carter administration supported, setting 
the same upper limit.  The primary difference between the bill was that Congress had 
already enacted provision exempting the Imperial Valley and Kings River from 
acreage limits under Reclamation law.59 
  
Cost-sharing for Water Projects 
 Another similarity between Carter and Reagan is that they both believed that 
the nation could not afford to construct numerous large-scale water development 
projects due to the poor economy and significant budget deficits.   Both proposed that 
users pay a fair price for the benefits received from projects, and that state and local 
government share a portion of the construction costs up front through cost-sharing 
plans.  As mentioned above, Carter proposed a ten percent local cost share for water 
                                                 
58 Ward Sinclair, "Bowing to Metzenbaum, Senate Amends, Passes Reclamation Bill," Washington 
Post, July 17, 1982. 
59 UPI,  "Senate passes Bill to expand irrigation land," Washington Post September 25, 1982. 
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projects.  The Reagan administration would propose much higher figures, but 
differences of opinion between the Department of the Interior and the Army Corps of 
Engineers hampered efforts to recommend a formula to Congress. 
 Initially, the administration did not propose any cost-sharing program.  
Secretary Watt had focused his attention on problems that could be corrected quickly.  
One of the top priorities was diffusing the tense emotions in the West underlying the 
calls for a Sagebrush Rebellion.  Meetings with western governors resulted in many 
changes to DOI policies.  Proposing that states front a large portion of construction 
costs for Bureau of Reclamation projects was not the best medicine to treat sagebrush 
fever.   
 Instead of originating from the administration, the cost-sharing proposals being 
debated in 1981 came from within the halls of Congress.  The proposal was the 
product of a unique pairing of Senators Pete Domenici (R-NM) and Pat Moynihan (D-
NY).   The latter had expressed concern throughout the Carter administration over the 
lopsided water development funding which favored the South and West.  It will be 
remembered, for example, that he made this point during the debate over the March 
10, 1977 amendment to the Public Works bill rebuking president Carter for the Hit 
List.   Moynihan and Domenici proposed converting all water programs into block 
grants with a twenty-five percent local cost share.  Moynihan saw this as a way to 
increase aid to eastern state facing with aging municipal water systems.  Domenici 
saw the proposal as a way to resume construction of stalled water projects in his state 
and throughout the West.60   
                                                 
60 “An Age of Economies and Stilled Water Projects,” New York Times, Aug 8, 1981. 
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 There was not a lot of enthusiasm in Congress for the use of block grants 
proposed in the Domenici-Moynihan National Water Resources Policy and 
Development Act.  But, there was growing interest in Congress and within the Reagan 
administration in cost-sharing as a way to make water projects more affordable.  In the 
spring of 1982, the Cabinet Council under the director of Secretary Watt began 
debating the merits of such a policy.  They were now considering a local cost share up 
to thirty-five percent.  
By late May they had a draft memorandum for the President briefing him on 
the issue.  At that point there were only minor suggestions from the council members.    
Bill Niskaanen, representing the Council of Economic Advisors, and Bill Gianelli both 
suggested that cost-sharing should not be made a part of the revised “Policies and 
Standards” document that the Council was drafting to replace the Carter era version.  
Garrey Carruthers, the DOI Assistant Secretary for Land and Water suggests a text 
change to emphasize “the largest feasible reduction in federal cost should take place.”  
The original draft had used the words “reduction in subsidy.”  The change was largely 
semantics, but Carruthers obviously saw the potential for a western reaction from 
Reclamation water users who insisted they repaid projects costs and failed to see 
interest free repayment on irrigation projects as a subsidy.61   
 In June 1982, someone in the administration leaked Watt’s memo to the 
President.  This resulted in what one observer—James Maddy at the WESTPO 
office—termed a “blast of adverse reaction from the West.”   While there had been 
talk of implementing a cost-sharing plan, the administration had been tight lipped.  
                                                 
61  Boggs to Harper, et. al., May 24, 1982; for suggested changes see, Boggs to Harper, et. al., May 27, 
1982, Reagan Library, Danny Boggs papers, OA11962, folder “Natural Resources-Water Cost-sharing 
1 of 7.” 
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Gary Hart had sent a letter to Watt in April complaining that DOI officials “have been 
locked down for months in internal disputes over the details of the department's cost-
sharing criteria.”62   
 While Maddy could see the adverse reaction from his office in Denver, 
political correspondent Peter Oginbene observed that in Washington it appeared as if 
most western politicians would  “probably accept it with little or no crumbling.”  He 
had interviewed Garrey Carruthers; J.W. O’Meara, the executive vice president of the 
National Water Resources Association; and Neil Sampson, executive vice president of 
the National Association of Conservation Districts.  All noted the difference was not 
the amount proposed for cost-sharing, but the overall attitude of the administration 
towards water projects.  For example, Neil Sampson stated specifically:  
Carter set the tone with the Hit List.  When you compare the proposals, 
it was 10% plus a heavy federal hand on what [the states] do with water 
projects versus Reagan's 35% with a much lighter federal hand.  And it 
looks to me like [the Reagan administration is] going to be able to 
strike a better bargain.63  
 
 J.  W.  O'Meara stated:  
 
The distinction is very clearly a matter of philosophy.  The Carter 
administration said, ‘No development.  All we have to do is conserve 
the water we had; we didn't need to develop anymore.’  This 
administration says, ‘we will develop all we can within the budgetary 
restraints that we have.’ 64 
 
These quotes, and the others cited in the article show that despite numerous 
claims by the Carter administration to the contrary, the widely held perception was 
that Carter was against the West and against water development projects.  Ironically, 
                                                 
62 For “Blast” see James Maddy  to Lamm, June 21, 1983 Lamm Papers, Box 6445; for Hart letter see 
Peter J. Ognibene, “Selling Water Users in the West on Sharing Reclamation Project Costs,” National 
Journal 14 (8/14/82), 1424.  
63 Oginbene, 1421. 
64 Oginbene, 1421. 
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in September 1981 Reagan issued an executive order giving OMB the power to veto 
proposed water projects. 65   
 Watt tried to conciliate water users at a National Water Resources Association 
meeting that November.  He announced ten new construction starts.  Most were minor 
projects or loans and did little to help pacify those upset over the cost-sharing 
proposal. On January 25, 1983 Watt sent a personalized telegram to all western 
governors asking them to provide any input on the proposal over the next two months. 
66    
We all recognize that if our nation is to enjoy continued economic 
growth and prosperity, there must be a recommitment to economically 
viable, environmentally sound water projects.  Over the last year the 
cabinet council on national resources and environment has deliberated 
on the extremely complex and difficult issue of water project cost-
sharing.  No cost-sharing policy had been announced.  However, it is 
clear beneficiaries of water resources development must share a larger 
portion of project costs.67  
 
 Reacting to Watt’s telegram, the WESTPO governors met on February 27 to 
coordinate a strategy and response.  An advisor to Governor Lamm, Chips Barry 
briefed the governor prior to the meeting.  Barry noted that while the request for 
comments might indicate the administration finally expected to announce a policy, all 
the intelligence indicated the opposite.   
What we are hearing is that Watt's request is only a face-saving 
political gesture and that he in fact has no intention of ever announcing 
a formal polity or enunciating formal guidelines.   The reasons for this 
appeared to be significant differences in opinion between Carruthers 
(interior) and Giannelli (COE).  Second, Watt wants to back away from 
the issue gracefully since Congress has been so adamant in stating it 
alone will formulate and put in place any new requirements.68   
                                                 
65 Oginbene, 1425.. 
66 James Maddy (WESTPO office) to Lamm, June 21, 1983 Lamm Papers, Box 64451. 
67 Watt to [Governor], January 24, 1983, Lamm papers,  
68 Chips Barry to Dick Lamm, February 22, 1983, Lamm papers. 
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Barry also reported that the issue was further complicated by politics in 
Congress.  Word had gotten back to Barry’s office from Ival Goslin, the former 
director of the Upper Colorado River Commission who now acted as a legislative 
consultant for water districts in western Colorado, Congress wanted to protect their 
turf.  Goslin reported that Tom Bevil's staff informed him that Bevill believed his 
committee—the House Appropriations subcommittee onverseeing water 
development—should determine any cost-sharing policy.   If a state and DOI  reached 
an agreement on cost-sharing, Bevill's committee would not act on it until Congress 
had acted on cost-sharing. 
In April 1983, rumors surfaced that Watt and Gianelli were at opposite poles 
on cost-sharing.  Watt advised the subject be dropped and Gianelli kept pushing to get 
a policy in place.  On April 27, Senator Paul Laxalt (R-NV) joined by fourteen other 
western Senate Republicans wrote President Reagan, warning the cost-sharing issue 
would be viewed as anti-West and anti-water in the 1984 election campaign.  
Encouraging him not to approve the policy they wrote, “We have yet to initiate 
construction on any new Western projects in the past two years, and we are now 
contemplating an up-front financing scheme even more Draconian than that proposed 
by Jimmy Carter.” 69  
Gianelli charged that Watt put the senators up to it, and responded himself.  
Gianelli had been advocating from the beginning that cost-sharing would not only 
make the projects more economical for the federal government, allowing progress to 
                                                 
69 James Maddy (WESTPO office) to Lamm, June 21, 1983 Lamm Papers, Box 64451; “Prospects 
Uncertain: Water Projects Await Funding as Debate Over Cost-sharing Stall Action on Capitol Hill”  
July 30, 1983, Congressional Quarterly, 1553. 
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be made on stalled projects, but he also held—like those in the Carter 
administration—that forcing states to carry part of the cost would weed out bad 
projects.  He was the former head of Reagan's California Department of Water 
Resources where he advocated for the California State Water Project.  However, 
because California paid for the project, Gianelli saw it as a role model of cost-sharing.  
As a result, he disappointed water industry insiders who expected him to be gung-ho 
to build federal water projects.70 
In contrast, Robert Gottlieb notes Commissioner Robert Broadbent fought 
against cost-sharing and clashed with the OMB over the size of the Bureau's budget.  
His boss, Garrey Carruthers, argued some cost-sharing was appropriate.  Gottlieb 
contends that James Watt was “decidedly ambiguous” about cost-sharing and refused 
to take a position.71  
 While the internal debates continued within the DOI and between the Army 
Corps of Engineers, little progress was made on moving authorizations and 
appropriations forward in Congress.  But in July, Gianelli charged that Congress was 
to blame for the hold up.   
In years past the Congress has pretty well blamed the administration for 
any deadlock with respect to water development and now it is 
interesting that Congress is actually up approval of at least 14 new 
starts that have been proposed by the administration.  The message here 
as far as I’m concerned is that this administration wants to move ahead 
with new water projects.  It doesn’t have a Hit List.  It’s not against 
them--but it feels they have got to move ahead under new guidelines.72 
 
 By late summer Western governors questioned whether cost-sharing would 
actually achieve the stated purpose for reducing federal deficits.  In a briefing prepared 
                                                 
70 Robert Gottlieb, A Life of Its Own, 65-6. 
71 Ibid,, 66-7. 
72 “Prospects Uncertain,” 1556. 
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by the Western States Water Council for the upcoming WESTPO governor’s meeting, 
the council also pointed out that given the economic conditions prevailing at the time, 
that most state or local governments would find it “difficult, if not impossible,” to 
finance water projects.   They also noted that because of federal spending cuts, state 
and local government budgets would be stressed to make up the differences.  While 
noting other concerns with the cost-sharing formula Watt proposed, the memo 
concluded that, “One of the biggest questions left unanswered is the effect on projects 
currently under construction.” 73  
  By the fall of 1983, the administration had still not made an official decision 
regarding cost-sharing.  While the WESTPO analysts debated the administration 
position, David Stockman—Reagan’s head of OMB—was seeking help from 
Congrassman Silvio Conte, the ranking Republican on the House Appropriations 
Committee and an ally of Carter during the water wars and well known for fighting 
pork.  In an October letter, Stockman emphasized the administration had attempted to 
break “the deadlock” over water development projects by proposing cost-sharing.  The 
administration had also made a reasonable budget recommendation of fifteen proposed 
new starts with total costs of $700 million.  However, in approving HR 3958, the 
House Appropriations Committee added twenty-nine additional new starts raising the 
total cost to $4.4 billion.74  Exacerbating the issue, over half of that amount went to 
projects in four states—Alabama, California, Colorado, and Louisiana.  In making his 
                                                 
73 “Western States Water Council Recommendations for WESTPO Governor's Meeting,” Received Aug 
30, 1982, Matheson papers, reel 36, box 17, folder 13. 
74 Members of Congress introduced three different appropriations bills for water projects funding.  The 
House and Senate had both taken positive action on HR 3958.  It was the least expensive of the three 
bills, less than half of the total cost of the HR 3678, the Roe bill, S. 1739, the Abdnor bill which both 
topped $10 Billion in new starts. 
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case to Conte, Stockman took a stance very reminiscent of the Carter administration.  
He stated:   
As I noted above, this administration has been trying very hard to 
implement changes in policy that will enable this nation to get on with 
the job of building essential new water development projects.  It is with 
considerable regret that I must inform you that unless the serious 
deficiencies in HR 3958 are corrected, the President's senior advisers 
could not recommend that he approve the legislation.  I urge you to 
exercise leadership in removing the obstacles to favorable action on 
this very important matter.75   
 
 In other words, Stockman now threatened to do the very thing that Carter had 
done, veto the appropriation bill.  Despite the threat, Congress or water proponents did 
not howl in protest as they had done with Carter.  In much the same way that they had 
done over the issue of cost-sharing itself, there was less effort to sell the public the 
idea of a new war on the West.  Instead Governor Lamm, who had been one of the 
most outspoken of Carter’s critics, worked with other western governors primarily 
through the political process to lobby for the best. 
 In January, President Reagan decided to forego a set formula for cost-sharing 
on water projects and instead directed each agency to negotiate financing 
arrangements on a case by case basis.  William Clark, who replaced Watt after his 
resignation the previous October, wrote individually to each western governor 
announcing the decision.  He wrote that, “The comments and suggestions offered by 
the western Governors played a key role in developing this policy.”76 
                                                 
75 David Stockman to Silvio Conte, October 4, 1983.  Simpson papers box 305 folder 3.  The bill passed 
the house, and was cleared by the Senate Appropriations Committee for consideration by the Senate.  
However, due to disagreements between the Senate and House over appropriations generally, Congress 
failed to pass any regular appropriation measure that fall and resorted to a stop gap, continuing 
resolution. See, Helen Dewar, “Stopgap Funding Approved: President Signals His Intent to Sign 
Spending Measure Congress Approves Scaled-Down Stopgap Appropriation Measure,” Washington 
Post, November 13, 1983. 
76 Reagan to Paul Laxalt  January 24, 1984; William Clark  to Matheson, January 24, 1984, Matheson 
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 The Army Corps of Engineers, under Gianelli and his successor Robert 
Dawson, used cost-sharing to secure authorization for over 200 projects and planning 
studies in bills passed in1984, 1985, and 1986.  Although many of these 200 projects 
enlarged or modified existing projects, the total cost of the projects is nearly $16 
billion, with $4 billion provided by non-federal sources.77     
 The following spring, President Reagan vetoed a bill authorizing water 
resources research funding performed in partnership with state universities around the 
country.  The bill re-authorized establishment of water resource research institutes in 
the states and authorized $10 million in federal matching grants to them annually for 
fiscal 1985 through 1989.  Reagan thought that the institutes were at a point they could 
stand on their own and then they primarily did work that was local or at best regional 
in nature and not appropriate to federal funding.  Congress overrode his veto in March.  
While the spending measure was a minor one, it is interesting to contrast the reaction 
to Reagan’s veto.  There were no vitriolic cries about attacks on the West, or on the 
states.  Congress simply argued that the program provided valuable research and that it 
widely disbursed funds that benefited many state universities.   One can only imagine 
the type of reaction that Carter would have received had he taken a similar action at 
any point in his presidency after the announcement of the Hit List.  It seems that those 
who had complained so bitterly about Carter’s War on the West—Member of 
Congress, as well as traditional natural resource users in the West and their 
                                                                                                                                            
papers, Reel 36 Box 17 Folder 13; see also, Gottlieb, A Life of Its Own, 66.  
77 Gottlieb, A Life of Its Own, 69. 
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lobbyists—were less willing to see a conspiracy against them by someone whose 
rhetoric matched their own.78  
                                                 




The Ugliest Dog: The Garrison Diversion 
 
 
The usual slugfest over ‘pork barrel’ projects is 
on the agenda again, as was evident by the 
grilling of Secretary of the Interior before a 
Senate Appropriations committee Wednesday.  
North Dakota Senators took strong exception to 
Andrus’ recent characterization of the Garrison 
Diversion project as ‘a dog.’  Andrus made no 
apologies. 
-Margot Hornblower, Washington Post1 
 
 
When Jimmy Carter began his initial review of water projects, his 
administration singled out the worst Bureau of Reclamation projects then under 
construction.  These included some of the last massive federal water projects Congress 
approved, and also some of the worst.  As discussed in Chapter 1, Carter’s transition 
team created what became known as the Hit List. While not opposed to the process 
and politics Carter used to push his Hit List, Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus did 
favor cutting the worst of the projects which he liked to call “dogs.”  When ranking 
the projects in terms of bad economic investments, ecological disasters, or creating 
some other major problem, the Garrison Diversion Project in North Dakota topped all 
of the lists.  Had Carter never proposed his Hit List, it is clear that the administration 
still intended to stop this project.  It was the one that Andrus had first started calling a 
dog, and it was the ugliest.  
                                                 
1 Margot Hornblower, “Water Policy, Whether Timid or Menacing, Needs a Hard Sell,” Washington 
Post, March 18, 1979.  
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The Bureau of Reclamation’s Garrison Diversion Project deserves further 
discussion here for many reasons.  As the project the Carter administration deemed the 
worst, tracing its history, particularly after 1978, provided a good way to test the 
relative success or failure of Carter’s effort to stop costly and destructive water 
development projects.  Second, in many ways the project and its defense by the 
traditional iron triangles in 1977 are reflective of the majority of projects on the Hit 
List.  Finally, what happened to the Garrison Diversion after the Carter Hit List 
demonstrates the growing power of environmental interests on both a local and 
national level while reflecting the over shift in federal water development that 
accompanied the reciprocal decline of traditional iron triangles.   
 
At the beginning of the Carter Presidency, the administration singled out one 
Bureau of Reclamation project more than any other for reform, the Garrison 
Diversion.  Had Carter chosen to move forward with the limited water projects review, 
as advocated by Andrus and Mondale, Garrison would have been their primary test 
case.  The worst of the worst, Garrison epitomized the problems that the 
administration wanted to fight.  It was outrageously expensive, had limited benefits, 
had a vocal opposition, and created significant environmental damage.  Like other 
projects placed on the Hit List, it was a relic of what Marc Reisner dubbed “the Go-Go 
years.”   Reclamation envisioned the project to ultimately be its largest, irrigating one 
million acres.  Like other projects Carter opposed, Garrison had already been 
embroiled in National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) controversies and a court 
challenge.  However, it was now embroiled in a second NEPA court case.  Unlike 
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other projects, Garrison was also involved in diplomatic entanglements.  The Canadian 
government opposed the projects which it believed violated a longstanding treaty.  The 
project was so fraught with problems that the administration had already prepared 
plans to stop the project, even if they had chosen not to pursue any type of water 
policy reform. 
 The project shared additional similarities with its companions on the Hit List.  
The Governor, Congressional Delegation, a majority of the state legislature, along 
with many Local politicians, newspapers, and businessmen ardently supported the 
project.   They maintained the federal government had promised to build the project to 
mitigate for the inundation of prime agricultural lands behind the Garrison Dam; 
keeping that promise outweighed virtually any economic, social, or environmental 
costs.  Like other projects on the list, their support of the project won continued 
congressional funding in 1977.    And like other projects, Garrison was subject to 
continued efforts by the Carter administration to solve objections to the project.  It also 
faced continued Congressional scrutiny during the Reagan administration.   Thus, 
these similarities and the project’s history make it worthy of closer inspection as it 
helps to illuminate the evolution of federal water policy under Carter and Reagan.   
 
Compensating North Dakota 
 
The Garrison Diversion cannot be removed from the context of the 1930s.  The 
severe, multi-year drought of the 1930s led to renewed calls for irrigation development 
in the Missouri River Basin and across the West.  Conceived to protect against future 
catastrophic droughts, the Central Arizona, Central Utah, Garrison, Oahe, Narrows, 
and other Bureau of Reclamation projects on the Hit List all include the 1930s drought 
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as a significant part of their origin narratives.   The Bureau of Reclamation planned the 
Garrison Diversion Project in the late 1930s in response to the severe drought which 
plagued the West that decade.  As part of its comprehensive scheme for developing the 
Missouri Basin, it outlined a project to irrigate a million acres, justified in part to 
compensate North Dakota for the loss of prime farm lands to the Garrison and Oahe 
Dams.2  Motivated by severe flooding on the Missouri River in 1943, Congress 
authorized these dams and the Garrison Diversion as part of the Pick-Sloan Plan in the 
Flood Control Act of 1944.3  
In addition to surveying canal routes, and preparing cost estimates, the Bureau 
of Reclamation established development farms in the area to study the suitability of 
the land for irrigation.   In March 1950, Regional Director Kenneth Vernon shocked 
project supporters by announcing experiments at the Bureau-sponsored Bowbells 
                                                 
2 ; “Reclamation’s Hall of Fame: Nomination No. 11, W. G. Sloan Co-author of the Missouri River 
Basin Plan,” Reclamation Era 37, no. 4 (April 1951): 79. 
3 U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, “Overview, Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin 
Program,” by Toni Rae Linenberger  (Denver: Bureau of Reclamation History Program, 1998), 7-13.   
Under the guidance of regional director William Glen Sloan, the Bureau of Reclamation investigated a 
comprehensive development plan for the entire Missouri River which would later evolve to become the 
Garrison Diversion.  The largest scheme was the proposed Missouri-Souris Project.  Originally, Sloan 
proposed an irrigation diversion using a long canal from the Missouri River below Fort Peck in 
Montana, running through the Souris River Basin in North Dakota, and extending to Devils Lake. See, 
“Reclamation’s Hall of Fame: Nomination No. 11, W. G. Sloan Co-author of the Missouri River Basin 
Plan,” Reclamation Era 37, no. 4 (April 1951): 79. 
 
As planning for the Missouri-Souris moved forward, Sloan also began investigation of an additional 
diversion project utilizing the newly authorized Garrison Dam.  He had originally opposed the dam 
because it flooded existing irrigation projects and an additional 50,000 acres he had proposed to 
develop.  However, the agency concluded in a 1946 preliminary report on the Garrison Diversion that 
while Garrison Dam closed the door on the 50,000 acres, the loss could be compensated by the 
development of the Garrison Diversion.  Over the next several years the Bureau of Reclamation 
continued to study the two projects, anticipating construction of all or part of both.  This is an important 
point.  Many discussions of the history of the Garrison Diversion assume that the project had always 
been planned as a replacement for the Missouri-Souris Unit.  For example see Robinson, 463.   The 
1946 report indicates that at least early on, Reclamation did anticipate construction of both projects.  
See U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, “Report on Garrison Diversion 
Investigations” (Billings: Bureau of Reclamation, Upper Missouri Region, 1946), 4, 38 in Box 63, 
Accession 8NS-115-95-076, National Archives and Records Administration, Rocky Mountain Region, 
Denver. 
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Development Farm had disqualified 500,000 acres of the proposed project lands west 
of the Des Lucas River.  While they were arable and productive under dry farming 
techniques, the soil had heavy clay layers within a few feet of the surface that would 
impede irrigation drainage and damage crops.4   
The Bureau rejected plans to engineer its way out of the problem,5 and rather 
than abandon the project by simply moving the project farther east to the better 
drained soils in the eastern Souris River Basin.6  After years of study and review, 
Secretary of the Interior Fred Seaton gave his final approval to the Garrison Diversion 
plan on June 21, 1958.7 
North Dakota Congressman Otto Krueger introduced legislation to authorize 
the Garrison Diversion. However, Congressman Wayne Aspinall (D-CO), who chaired 
the powerful House committee overseeing water development projects, cautioned that 
the authorization of such a massive and expensive reclamation project would be 
extremely challenging.8  Aspinall’s prediction, based no doubt on his recent 
experience securing passage of the Colorado River Storage Project the previous year, 
proved accurate.  But the size and cost of the proposed project would have made it an 
easy prediction for anyone to make.  Congressman Krueger’s bill sought the 
authorization of the entire one million acres, and carried a price tag of $695 million.  
                                                 
4 Paul Edward Kelly, “Under the Ditch: Irrigation and the Garrison Diversion Controversy” (master’s 
thesis, University of North Dakota, 1989), 56-7; Kenneth F. Vernon, “Oral History Interview” 
Transcript of tape-recorded Bureau of Reclamation Oral History Interviews conducted by Brit Allan 
Storey, April 24, 1995 in Fullerton, California, 127-136. 
5 Kelly, 62, 83-4; “Reclamation’s Hall of Fame: Nomination No. 11,” 70.  
6 Kelly, 108-11. 
7 Garrison Diversion Unit, xiii-xviii. 
8 At a special hearing in Devils Lake, North Dakota, on October 30, 1957. House Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, Garrison Diversion Unit, Missouri River Basin Project: Hearing before a special 
subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on H.R. 
7068, Eighty-Fifth Congress, First Session (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), 
1-9. 
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While the Garrison Diversion anticipated the ultimate development of over one 
million acres, the Bureau of Reclamation pared down the proposal to a 250,000 acre 
initial stage.9   
Even the costs of the 250,000 acre plan remained high enough that the 
Eisenhower administration opposed Garrison.  Additionally, both the Department of 
Agriculture and the Bureau of Budget released critical reports questioning 
Reclamation’s cost-benefit analysis—demonstrating that manipulating data was not a 
bureaucratic vice limited to just the 1970s.  The Bureau of the Budget also complained 
about the heavy reliance on secondary benefits.  It noted that without the considerable 
amounts of secondary benefits credited to recreation and wildlife enhancement, the 
direct benefits of the project over a fifty year period versus the project costs dropped 
to a ratio of 0.53 to 1.10    
After sitting on the shelf for three years, the stalled project began to gain 
traction when President Kennedy gave the project his strong endorsement after taking 
office in 1961.  However, even the support of a popular president did not smooth the 
project’s path through Congress.  Like other projects on the Hit List, Garrison faced 
significant challenges and roadblocks before Congress approved the project.  
Congressman Aspinall raised serious objections, fearing that rising construction costs 
                                                 
9 Garrison Diversion Unit, Missouri River Basin Project: Hearing before a special subcommittee…, 7.   
In his letter to President Eisenhower endorsing the project, Secretary Seaton stated that “A 250,000 acre 
unit is the smallest independent plan that I consider to be consistent with sound development,” Garrison 
Diversion Unit, ix.   
10 Because of the numerous methods of calculation, cost-benefit ratios always have the potential to 
generate controversy.   In the case of the Garrison Diversion, the debate between Reclamation and 
Budget involved two main points: the projected period of operation, and the inclusion of secondary 
benefits.  Reclamation stated that a life expectancy of one hundred years was reasonable.  The Bureau 
of the Budget’s official formulas only allowed for a fifty year life expectancy.  This decrease affects 
how long benefits accrue and reduces the overall total benefits of the project, reducing the benefit to 
cost ratio.  Garrison Diversion Unit, ix-x, 215-8. 
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and low hydropower revenues had eroded the projected surpluses underwriting 
Missouri Basin irrigation projects.  In 1964 Aspinall succeeded by adding a provision 
to a bill seeking to increase the maximum authorized costs of the Pick-Sloan project—
something that had become an annual occurrence—requiring Congress to reauthorize 
all Pick Sloan units not already under construction.11   
Aspinall's move subjected the proposed project to further congressional review 
and debate. The House Rules Committee kept legislation to authorize Garrison—
which had passed the Senate in February and was favorably reported by the House 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs—from a floor.  Making the project a 
campaign issue, its supporters persuaded President Johnson to pressure House 
leadership to push the bill to the floor arguing that Eisenhower had been heavily 
criticized by Democrats for his “no new starts” policy with regard to water projects 
and that now the roles had been reversed.  Running for reelection that year, North 
Dakota Senator Quentin Burdick’s reelection campaign met critical opposition from 
his Republican opponent over his perceived failure to get the Garrison authorization 
through Congress.12   
                                                 
11 The measure passed the House of Representatives in 1963, but was shot down by Missouri Basin 
senators who succeeded in removing the language from a substitute version of the bill passed later that 
year. Because the legislation had only provided an additional $16 million increase for the Missouri 
Basin, the issue returned to Aspinall’s committee again in 1964.  That year’s legislation increasing 
authorized spending of $120 million contained Aspinall’s limiting language from 1963.  The bill passed 
both houses before the summer recess that August. The 1964 bill containing the provision was H. R. 
9521 which became Public Law 88-442. Congressional Record 109, 11413-7; 110, 8380-1; U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Federal Reclamation and Related  Laws Annotated, 
Volume 3, (Denver: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 1737, 1755. 
12 John Kamps, “Water Bill Leg[islation] Likely Issue,” Denver Post, September 1, 1964; Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Water and Power to Frank Burnett, Congressional Liaison Office, Sept 9, 1964 in 
Folder 18, Box 48, Carl Albert Collection, Departmental Series, Carl Albert Center Congressional 
Archives, University of Oklahoma; and Tom Kenan to Carl Albert, September 14, 1964 in Folder 65 
Box 78, Carl Albert Collection Legislative Series, Carl Albert Center Congressional Archives, 
University of Oklahoma. 
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Despite the heavy pressure tactics, the Rules committee prevailed, keeping the 
Garrison Diversion bottled up.  Undaunted, North Dakota’s Congressional Delegation 
reintroduced bills to authorize the project in January, which made it to the House floor 
for debate in mid-June. After years of delay, the Garrison Diversion quickly made its 
way to President Johnson's desk who signed the bill at noon on August 5, 1965 at a 
White House ceremony.13  
The 1965 plan for the Garrison Diversion approved by Congress was similar to 
the other massive irrigation works approved in the two decades following WWII.  
Like the CAP, CUP, Oahe and Auburn-Folsom Unit of the California’s Central Valley 
Project (CVP), it included massive, expensive engineering feats to move water great 
distances towards subsidized farms.   Garrison’s plan anticipated pumping Missouri 
River water from Lake Sakakawea impounded behind Garrison Dam.  Using a series 
of gravity canals and regulating reservoirs, the water would irrigate farmlands along 
the Souris, James, and Sheyenne Rivers.  To get the water from the Missouri to the 
distribution canals and farms, the Bureau of Reclamation planned what it termed the 
Principal Supply Works consisting of the Snake Creek Pumping Plant, the McClusky  
Canal, and Lonetree Reservoir.    
An embankment carrying U.S. Highway 83 serves as a dam across the right 
arm of Lake Sakakawea (Garrison Reservoir) forming a sub-impoundment called Lake 
                                                 
13 The full House debated the bill for the first time on June 16, 1965.  After years of opposition and 
tactical delays, the House passed the bill after an hour of debate on a voice vote.  On July 1, the Senate 
Reclamation Subcommittee unanimously approved amendments to the Senate version of the bill to 
conform to the version passed by the House.  The bill moved to the Senate floor on July 22 and passed 
on a voice vote.  Associated Press, “Garrison Project is Voted by House,” Washington Post, June 17, 
1965; Associated Press, “Senate Approves N.D. Water Project,” Washington Post, July 2, 1965; 
“Garrison Diversion Unit, Missouri River Basin Project,”  Congressional Record  Volume 111, Part 13 
(July 22, 1965): S 17872-6; Federal Reclamation and Related  Laws Annotated, Volume 3 (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 1841-4.  
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Audubon (Snake Creek Reservoir).  When Lake Sakakawea is below the full level, 
three large pumps at the Snake Creek Pumping plant lift water into Lake Audubon.  
From the lake’s east end, the water enters the McClusky Canal.   
 
Figure 8  Map of Garrison Diversion showing Principal Supply works and 
watersheds. 
 
The controversial McClusky Canal lies at the heart of the project.  The canal 
begins at a headworks structure at the east end of Lake Audubon, and meanders to the 
southeast and then forms a giant u-shape as it swings back to the northeast.  The canal 
terminates at the site of the proposed Lonetree Reservoir in the headwaters of the 
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James and Sheyenne Rivers. Reclamation planned for Lonetree Reservoir to serve as a 
hub in the project’s principal supply.  A canal would convey water from its northwest 
corner to irrigate the lands along the Souris River as it arcs through the top of North 
Dakota and to provide a supplemental municipal supply for the City of Minot.  From 
Lonetree’s northeast corner, the New Rockford Canal would convey water eastward to 
irrigate lands in the Sheyenne, Devils Lake, and James River Basins.     
Prior to the authorization of the Garrison Diversion Unit, the Army Corps of 
Engineers had completed the Garrison Reservoir and the Snake Creek Embankment.  
While not constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation, the completed reservoir 
provided the water supply for the project, while Lake Audubon, formed by the Snake 
Creek Embankment, serves as a regulating reservoir and maintains the proper level in 
the McClusky Canal.  In April 1953, construction crews dumped loads of earth, 
closing the dam and forcing the river into the outlet tunnels.  Construction continued 
for two more years before crews completed the dam in 1955.14 
The Bureau of Reclamation inaugurated construction on the project on July 14, 
1968 at a festive groundbreaking ceremony for the Snake Creek Pumping Plant that 
attracted an estimated 3,600 people.  In the interim between the ceremony and Carter’s 
                                                 
14 Construction of the dam had been highly controversial as it flooded the Fort Berthold Reservation, 
home of the Three Affiliated Tribes.  While the three tribes had never been at war with the United States 
and always been friendly, the Army Corp of Engineers, led by General Pick treated the Native 
Americans poorly.  One account states that Pick had been personally insulted by a member of a small 
dissident group who burst into a negotiation settlement.  After that incident, Pick refused to offer the 
tribe any concessions. As a result, the tribe has maintained a legitimate grievance against the 
government which would later be addressed as Congress reconsidered the Garrison Diversion in the 
mid 1980s and late 1990s.   Billington, David P., Donald C Jackson and Martin V. Melosi, History of 
Large Federal Dams (Denver: Bureau of Reclamation, 2005), 278-80; Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: 
The American West and Its Disappearing Water Revised and Updated Edition (New York: Viking 
Penguin Books, 1993), 186-91; Michael L. Lawson, Dammed Indians: The Pick-Sloan Plan and the 
Missouri River Sioux, 1944-1980  (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982), 60-2, On the 
personal insult to Pick, see Reisner, 189. 
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review of the Hit List, the Bureau of Reclamation completed construction of the 
pumping plant and McClusky canal.15   
 The Snake Creek Pumping Plant is a monolithic concrete structure.  Its 
construction is not unlike a concrete dam.  The concrete is placed in sections to form 
the larger building.  These sections interlock for strength and form the foundation, 
walls and floors of the building. Because the bulk of the structure normally lies below 
the water line, it is often difficult to appreciate the mass of the structure in pictures or 
in person.  The building measures 130 feet across, 80 feet wide and 180 feet tall and 
required over 10,000 cubic yards of concrete to construct.  Complicated by 
groundwater problems and a landslide, the structure took seven years to complete the 
concrete work and install the plant’s massive pumps.  The contractor turned over the 
keys in December 1975. 16 
Contractors began construction on the massive seventy-three-mile McClusky 
Canal in 1970.   In reality, the word canal does not seem to adequately describe this 
man-made river.  The project’s engineers designed the canal to deliver enough water 
to meet the needs of the project when expanded to its ultimate size of irrigating one 
million acres.   The canal is twenty-five feet wide at its bottom and ninety-four feet 
wide at the water surface, and operates at a depth of over seventeen feet.  Construction 
of the canal required the excavation of 55 million cubic yards of material.  The deepest 
                                                 
15 “Garrison Diversion Project Starts with a Bang as 3,600 Observe,” Bismarck Tribune, July 17, 1968;  
Marilyn Hoegmeyer, “Groundbreaking Will Launch N.D. Garrison Irrigation Project,” Minneapolis 
Tribune, July 14, 1968; “Site, Program Set for Groundbreaking,” Minot Daily News, July 3, 1968. 
16 Annual Project History Volume I, 85-6; Annual Project History Volume II, 59-60; U.S. Department of 
the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation “Garrison Diversion, Snake Creek Pumping Plant, Weekly Progress 
Reports” 1970 Folder 2 Box 21, Accession 8NN-115-85-008, NARA Rocky Mountain Region, Denver. 
Garrison Diversion Unit, North Dakota, Monthly Construction Progress Report (L-29), February 1972. 
Hereafter cited as L-29 with the corresponding month(s) and year(s).  “Final Construction Report on 
Snake Creek Pumping Plant No. 1,” 3-4,. 7; L-29 June, and July 1972. 
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cut required on the canal was 115 feet which required a right-of-way over one-half 
mile.  The minimum right-of way width required was 360 feet.17   
Acquisition of the right-of-way proved to be extremely controversial because 
of the size and the canal’s meandering nature.  The topography of the area prevented 
the canal in many cases from following section or property lines.  In some cases, the 
canal effectively divided farms into two or more pieces.    With only twenty-two 
crossings planned along its length, many of these farmers would have to travel miles 
to access portions of their severed farms.   
In addition to the right-of-way issue, another controversy plagued the canal 
and, indeed, the entire project.  Over its course, the canal crossed the divide between 
the Missouri River and Hudson’s Bay drainages.  Because of Canadian government 
concerns over the passage of water pollution and biota—invasive plants, fish and fish 
diseases—between the two basins, two plugs currently prevent water from passing 
into the Hudson’s Bay drainage.  An earth plug at milepost 59 blocks the canal, and at 
milepost 58 a short section of canal linking two lakes was not excavated, forming the 
second plug.  
Canal excavation also raised serious environmental and safety concerns.  As 
excavation of the canal proceeded using scrapers and draglines. it crossed through 
wetlands, potholes, and lakes.  In some cases, Reclamation incorporated the lakes into 
the canal; in others it drained these areas, devastating aquifers, natural springs, and 
many a farmer’s water wells.  This destruction of prairie wetlands sparked additional 
                                                 
17 United States Department of the Interior, Water and Power Resource Service, Project Data. 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1981), 874. 
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controversy.  In response, Dr. Glen Sherwood, a wildlife biologist, wrote New Wounds 
for Old Prairies, in 1972.18 
The short booklet was among the first to point out the many problems with the 
project.  Sherwood noted the high costs of the project, estimated at the time to be $900 
per acre, of which farmer’s would repay $1.20 per year for 40 years.  The balance of 
the repayment would mostly come from hydropower revenues.  However, there was 
serious concern at the time if the Pick-Sloan hydropower revenues would be sufficient 
to repay the projects already constructed, let alone the massive Garrison Diversion.  
Sherwood also documented the high human and environmental costs of the 
project.  He chronicles the plight of a representative group of farm families whose had 
farms severed and well dry up as a result of project construction.  Many environmental 
impacts also went unstudied or underrepresented by the Bureau of Reclamation.  
Construction of the McClusky Canal resulted in the desiccation of several lakes, 
springs, and wetlands.  Sherwood discovered that the government’s mitigation plan 
which claimed a net increase of 16,000 acres infact would result in a probable net loss 
of 42,000 acres due to counting existing wetlands in mitigation plans and 
underestimating or misrepresenting the impacts of drainage on additional wetlands.   
The loss of these wetlands would significantly impact important breeding area for 
duck populations.19     
Near-record rainfall during construction triggered numerous landslides in some 
of the canal’s deep cut sections, while a 300-foot-long slump occurred elsewhere.  In 
spite of repeated repair efforts, sliding continued to be a problem in several sections of 
                                                 
18 Annual Project History Volume IV (1971), 87, 8NS-115-93-241 Box 2; Glen Sherwood, New 
Wounds for Old Prairies (Pequot Lakes, Minnesota: Country Printing, Inc., 1972).   
19 For costs and farm impacts see 40-46, for environmental impacts see 51-57. 
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the canal.  Repairing these slides increased project costs and critics used these failures 
to question the judgment and competence of the Bureau’s engineers and the safety of 
the project.   
 The problems associated with the construction of the Garrison Diversion are 
not unlike those of other large Bureau of Reclamation projects on the Hit List.  The 
passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1970, followed by Earth 
Day on April 22, 1970, marked increased public concern for the environment.   As 
noted elsewhere, water development projects had played an important role in the 
growth of the new “environmental movement,” particularly the loss of Glen Canyon 
and the fight over the “Grand Canyon dams.”  Taking a cue from these fights, 
continued water development project continued to attract the attention of national 
environmental and conservation organizations.  But all of the Hit List projects 
increasingly began to attract more local opposition questioning the Bureau of 
Reclamation about the environmental and social costs, demanding accountability and 
enhanced mitigation of these costs.  These opponents joined together to form grass 
roots organizations to fight the projects, and found support from national 
environmental organizations.  The enactment of NEPA in 1970 also provided a new 
and powerful forum for redress.  
Construction of the McClusky Canal sparked new criticisms of the Garrison 
Project.   Disgruntled land owners felt cheated and bullied by the Bureau of 
Reclamation.  They felt frustrated by the low prices offered for their land, and 
believed they deserved compensation for the hardships the division of their farms 
would cause.  The Bureau responded by threatening recalcitrant land owners with 
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condemnation if they did not accept the governments offer.  Undaunted they fought 
back.  One Farmer, Ben Schatz, who had his farm divided into three pieces, famously 
erected a huge billboard facing a local highway which read: “My farm ruined by the 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.”  Disgruntled farmers joined with increasingly vocal 
environmentalists and in 1972 formed the Committee to Save North Dakota.  The new 
group quickly filed suit against the Bureau of Reclamation on December 11, 1972, 
claiming that the bureau had violated NEPA by continuing the Garrison Diversion 
without a final environmental statement.20  
 In the initial period after the passage of NEPA, there remained considerable 
ambiguity over the requirements of environmental statements, and the status of 
projects like Garrison, CUP, Oahe, Auburn, and others on which construction had 
begun prior to the passage of the law.  On the Garrison project, the Bureau of 
Reclamation attempted to comply with the law by preparing an eleven-page draft 
environmental statement for review.  Reclamation released the statment on January 8, 
1971, soliciting comments for review by interested agencies.  These comments were 
incorporated into a draft environmental statement submitted to the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) on April 23, 1971.   However, CEQ determined that 
this flimsy draft did not meet the requirements of NEPA.   
 As the Bureau of Reclamation worked on revising a second draft, the 
Committee to Save North Dakota filed its lawsuit in Federal District Court in 
Bismarck.  Within about six weeks, by the end of January 1973, Reclamation released 
                                                 
20 Peter Carrels, Uphill Against Water: The Great Dakota Water War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1999), 69-70; Gary L. Pearson, Walter L. Pomeroy, Glen A Sherwood, and John S. Winder, Jr., 
eds.,  A Scientific and Policy Review of the Final Environmental Statement for the Initial Stage, 
Garrison Diversion Unit Volume 1 (Washington D.C.: Environmental Impact Assessment Project of the 
Institute of Ecology, 1975), 5.  
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a 145-page “Preliminary Final Environmental Statement.”  Subsequently, the district 
judge denied the plaintiff’s petition for an injunction, allowing construction to 
continue while the court determined if Reclamation had met the requirements of 
NEPA.  After the court denied the injunction, Reclamation released an expanded 246-
page “Draft Environmental Statement” on April 5, 1973 to replace the earlier 
“preliminary draft.”21   
 Following the release of the draft statement, the Bureau of Reclamation held 
the mandatory public hearings. Over a period of two days in Minot, North Dakota, 
eighty-four speakers provided a variety of comments for and against the project, and 
the sufficiency of the environmental document to address the project impacts on the 
environment.  An additional thirty-four individuals and organizations submitted 
written comments.  The hearing transcript runs to 900 pages.  Perhaps the toughest 
critic to testify was the Environmental Protection Agency.  Under the direction of the 
CEQ, the EPA compiled a list of recommendations to reduce the project’s negative 
effects on the environment. Reclamation responded to these recommendations and 
filed the revised “Final Environmental Statement” with the CEQ on January 10, 1974.  
Subsequently, the CEQ accepted the document and allowed the project to continue.  
This decision also rendered the case of the Committee to Save North Dakota moot, 
and the organization began preparing new strategies to stop the project.22 
                                                 
21 A Scientific and Policy Review of the Final Environmental Statement for the Initial Stage, Garrison 
Diversion Unit, 5. 
22 U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, “Testimony at Public Hearing and other 
Comments received on Draft Environmental Statement, Initial Stage of Garrison Diversion Unit” 
(Bismarck: Missouri-Souris Projects Office, 1973), Box 522, accession 8NS 115 -95-083. NARA 
Rocky Mountain Region, Denver; John E. Carroll and Roderick M. Logan, The Garrison Diversion 
Unit, Canada-U.S. Prospects   (Montreal: C.D. Howe Research Institute and National Planning 
Association, 1980), 27-28.  
271 
With a final environmental statement completed, the Bureau determined to 
move forward with the completion of the McClusky Canal and to initiate construction 
of the Lonetree Reservoir.  The reservoir site is situated near the headwaters of three 
distinct river drainages; the Wintering River (Souris Drainage), the Sheyenne River 
(Red River Drainage) and the James River (Missouri River Drainage).  To contain the 
reservoir, Reclamation planned to build two dams and a series of dikes.  The Lonetree 
Dam would be across the Sheyenne River southwest of Harvey, North Dakota.  To 
keep the reservoir from flowing into the James River Drainage, a series of dikes would 
be constructed along the low ridge dividing the Sheyenne and James River basin.   
The Wintering Dam would serve a similar function along the divide between 
the reservoir site and the drainage of Wintering River.23  Reclamation had begun 
acquiring land for the Lonetree Reservoir in 1969.  In 1975 the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s contractor began excavation work for the dam.  Construction of the 
dam proceeded at a rapid pace facilitated by the lack of any outlet works or spillways, 
functions filled by the proposed Lonetree Dam.  The contractor completed the dam on 
December 3, 1976, a year ahead of schedule.24 
While Reclamation and the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District 
celebrated the completion of the Wintering Dam ahead of schedule, they no doubt felt 
under attack from all sides.  Simultaneous to the construction of Lonetree Reservoir, 
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the Committee to Save North Dakota and its allies published a critique of the 1974 
Environmental Statement, the National Audubon Society filed suit to stop the project, 
the Carter Administration placed the project under review, and the Canadian 




One of the biggest obstacles and challenges to the construction of the Garrison 
Diversion unit proved to be the concerns of the Canadian government over increased 
water pollution in the Souris and Red Rivers from farm runoff as well as potential 
biota transfer —invasive fish, fish eggs, fish diseases, plant material, snails, and other 
forms of aquatic life—from the Missouri to the Hudson’s Bay drainages.  They feared 
the introduction of invasive species could devastate the commercial fishery on Lake 
Winnipeg.   Either condition would violate long standing treaties. The Canadian 
government had expressed these concerns since the authorization of the project.  
Despite attempts to address these concerns via official diplomatic channels at the state 
department in 1969 and 1971, the Bureau of Reclamation pushed construction 
forward.  In October 1973, Canada requested urgently “that the Government of the 
United States establish a moratorium on all further construction of the Garrison 
Diversion.”  In its official reply on February 5, 1974, the State Department recognized 
the U.S. obligation and assured the Canadian government that no construction 
affecting Canada would be undertaken until it was clear the treaty obligation would be 
met.25  
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Continued official discussion through 1974 resulted in a formal request in 1975 
that the International Joint Commission (IJC) take up the issue.  The two governments 
had established the IJC in 1911 to meet the provisions of the International Boundary 
Waters Treaty of 1909.  Specifically, its principal task was to deal with issues such as 
Garrison Diversion, which affected the waters shared by both nations.   To deal with 
the question of the Garrison Diversion, the IJC established the International Garrison 
Diversion Study Board.  The board undertook a year-long investigation, which it 
began by holding three hearings in November 1975 to obtain opinions on the possible 
effects of the project.   
Despite maintaining a rigorous schedule to determine existing conditions and 
estimate the impact of Garrison Diversions return flows, the amount of data forced a 
delay in the completion of the board’s report.  When the International Garrison 
Diversion Study Board announced that it was forced to delay the completion of its 
report, the two governments issued a join communiqué on August 16, 1976 that 
reiterated that the United States would meet its obligations under the 1909 treaty.  
However, despite these assurances, the ongoing construction of the Wintering Dam 
caused the Canadians to question those assurances.  Essentially, they maintained that 
the continued construction of the Lonetree Reservoir would be a powerful argument 
for its operation, and complicate the implementation of the IJC’s findings.  As a result 
they issued another call for a construction moratorium on October 12, 1976.26 
The government’s attitude toward the project and its tone toward the 
Canadians made a dramatic turn following the election of President Carter.    Thus 
when Carter took office, the unresolved treaty concerns and environmental concerns 
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made the Garrison Diversion an easy target.  At the end of December the Carter 
transition team had requested that action—independent of any larger efforts to review 
water projects or implement policy reform—to prevent the award of a contract for 
Garrison’s Lonetree Reservoir.  Within three weeks of taking office, Secretary Andrus 
informed the president that the Department of the Interior recommended postponing 
the bidding process on Garrison's Lonetree Reservoir.  Andrus wrote in his weekly 
memo to Carter, “Frankly this project is a dog and should never have been considered 
in the first place.”27 
 After returning to work after the weekend, Andrus learned from Carter his 
plans to move rapidly forward to eliminate multiple water projects from his revisions 
to the Ford Budget due out in just over a week.  In his memo objecting to the 
president’s plan, Andrus suggested as an alternative selecting a few of the worst 
projects he felt merited review and deferral.   Garrison topped the list because of the 
Canadian concerns.  Andrus’s language makes it clear a second time that Garrison 
would have been stopped even without the Hit List as Andrus and the Carter 
administration were prepared to “recommend deferral of the Lonetree Dam contract 
until after the IJC review [was] completed.”28   
By the end of the week, Carter had decided to move forward with the Hit List.  
In an official reply on February 18, 1977, timed to coincide with an official state visit 
by Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau beginning on February 21, the Carter 
administration promised via State Department communiqué, that the government 
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would not award a contract for the construction of Lonetree Dam until after the IJC 
had reported its findings.  Although the newspaper reports spoiled some of the 
surprise, President Carter also informed Trudeau he had included the Garrison 
Diversion in recommended funding cuts.     
After analyzing a mass of data, and compiling its findings, the board held an 
additional five hearings in March 1977 to receive comments.  In its final report, the 
board concluded that the Garrison Diversion would cause significant impacts to the 
waters and commercial fisheries of the province of Manitoba.  While the report 
acknowledged that most of the impacts could be mitigated by modifying Garrison, it 
declared that no mitigation measure existed which could fully address the possible 
transfer of biota.  The IJC endorsed the report on August 12, 1977, recommending that 
the portion of the Garrison Diversion affecting waters flowing into Canada not be built 
at that time.29   
Simultaneous to the controversy with Canada and President Carter’s “Hit List,” 
local and national opponents continued their fight against the Garrison Diversion.  
During 1975, the Institute of Ecology published a review of the Final Environmental 
Statement for Garrison.  One of the four editors of the project was Dr. Glen Sherwood, 
the author of New Wounds for Old Prairies.  The report attempted to build a case for a 
moratorium on further development of the project.  The Bureau of Reclamation 
reviewed the report, finding the “principal conclusions drawn and recommendations 
made in the review are based largely on misconceptions and erroneous assumptions.” 
Despite the errors pointed out by Reclamation, the report became prima facie evidence 
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motivating the National Audubon Society to file a second NEPA lawsuit in May 
1976.30 
Even while Congress debated Carter’s Hit List, both Houses ultimately 
providing continued funding, the Carter administration shifted the destiny of the 
project out of Congressional hands—at least temporarily.  On May 11, 1977, after 
Secretary Andrus had concluded the water project review recommending scrapping 
most of the project, the Department of the Interior reached an agreement with the 
Audubon Society to settle the suit.  The settlement came through a legal mechanism 
called a Stipulation and Order.  The government agreed to cease all construction 
activity on the project—with the exception of the completion of the McClusky 
Canal—pending the completion of a comprehensive supplementary environmental 
statement to implement the President’s proposed modified plan.  Following the 
completion of the environmental statement, the Stipulation and Order required the 
Department of the Interior to propose legislation requesting authorization of an option 
for project development based on the study’s findings.31 
After Secretary Andrus signed the agreement, the State of North Dakota—
which had entered the Audubon case along with the Garrison Conservancy District as 
interveners—made a motion to dismiss the original case, arguing the settlement 
rendered it moot.  However, Federal District Court Judge Charles R. Richey ruled on 
December 8, 1977, that the original case was not moot, but only stayed the 
                                                 
30 A Scientific and Policy Review of the Final Environmental Statement for the Initial Stage, Garrison 
Diversion Unit Volume 1; Sherwood, New Wounds for Old Prairies; United States Department of the 
Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, “Response to A Scientific and Policy Review of the Final 
Environmental Statement for the Initial Stage, Garrison Diversion Unit,” (Bismarck: Missouri-Souris 
Projects Office, 1975), 1. 
31 National Audubon Society v. James G. Watt, 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1982), 301-2. 
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proceedings.  Thus, Judge Richey had left the door open for the National Audubon 
Society to proceed with the case if it believed that the Department of the Interior did 
not meet the conditions of the Stipulation and Order.32   
In addition to the above motion, the State of North Dakota filed a separate 
lawsuit in the North Dakota Supreme Court against the Department of the Interior, the 
Bureau of Reclamation and other individuals claiming that by implementing the 
Stipulation and Order they had violated the Flood Control Act of 1944, and the 
Garrison Diversion Unit Reauthorization Act of 1965, and the Impoundment Act of 
1974.   The court subsequently moved this case to the District Court of North Dakota. 
  While this case began working its way through the courts, the administration 
took additional steps toward its goal of revising the Garrison Diversion.  First, on 
January 23, 1978 President Carter submitted his budget to Congress for fiscal year 
1979.  He proposed cutting funds for Garrison Diversion.  Because North Dakota had 
claimed the Stipulation and Order had prevented the expenditure of funds appropriated 
in the fiscal 1978 budget and amounted to a violation of the Impoundment Act, on 
May 12, 1978, Carter submitted a formal proposal to Congress to defer spending the 
appropriation, citing the agreement with the Audubon Society and the agreement 
between the State Department and the Canadian Government.33   
The Impoundment Control Act stipulates that only one house needs to pass a 
resolution to deny the president’s requests.  Further, the act states that Congress can 
reject the request by simply taking no action, which has become the normal course of 
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action.  North Dakota’s senators, however, wanted to send a clear message to 
President Carter.  On July 25 they introduced Senate Resolution 525 to disapprove the 
request.  The Senate Appropriations Committee reported favorably on the resolution 
on August 7, and the Senate passed the resolution on August 9, 1978 on a voice vote.  
In approving S.R. 525 the sponsors and Senate Appropriations Committee agreed in 
the committee’s report that in accordance with the findings of the International Joint 
Commission, construction should only proceed on portions of the project where return 
flows were to the Missouri Basin.34 
Believing that S.R. 525 nullified the Stipulation and Order, Secretary Andrus 
allowed the Bureau of Reclamation to resume limited construction activity on the 
Garrison Diversion.  Operating under this authority, the agency awarded a contract on 
October 12, 1978, for a fish screen testing facility on a turnout from the McClusky 
Canal.  Lakes Brekken and Holmes are two shallow saline lakes located in a closed 
basin near the McClusky Canal about 1 mile north of the town of Turtle Lake, North 
Dakota.  Reclamation and the Garrison Conservancy District had planned to raise the 
level of the lakes seventeen feet and to freshen their waters to provide a fishery and 
create a recreation area at the lakes as a part of the project’s mitigation plan.  The 
Bureau of Reclamation now selected the lakes as the site for field testing a prototype 
fish screen to test the effectiveness of the fish screens proposed for the McClusky 
Canal. 35 
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The project involved the construction of a small inlet canal from McClusky 
Canal to Lake Brekken.  However, the decision to resume construction met with 
opposition from the Audubon Society, which filed suit for an injunction.  On 
November 8, 1978 the district court granted a temporary restraining order halting 
construction.  Judge Richey subsequently ruled on December 11, 1978, that the 
stipulation order was not valid.  As a result of Richey’s decision, Bureau of 
Reclamation resumed construction on the fish screen after the weather warmed in the 
early spring of 1979, completing it that fall.  
 But, while the experiment ran, the project had enough ups and downs to make 
the observer motion sick.  In February 1978, the Department of the Interior released 
the draft environmental statement which evaluated the 96,000-acre plan proposed by 
Secretary Andrus during the Hit List review.  The Department of the Interior held a 
hearing to solicit comments on the draft statement in Minot, North Dakota, on March 
28, 1978.  At the hearing a number of project proponents voiced strong opposition to 
the plan, favoring instead the retention of the original plan.  The State of North 
Dakota’s official statement—in light of the state’s continuing litigation to force the 
continuation of the 250,000 acre plan—did not even recognize the need, or the 
validity, of the Department of the Interior’s action.36   
 
“A Dog is a Dog” 
 
 The Department of the Interior and Bureau of Reclamation released the “Final 
Comprehensive Supplementary Environmental Statement in February 1979. The 
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following month, Andrus had to make the difficult decision whether to push Congress 
to amend the project’s authorization to fit the 96,000 acre model, push for de-
authorization of the project, or allow it to move forward. Prior to making his 
recommendation to Congress, the Washington Post interviewed Andrus. The resulting 
article focused extensively on the Garrison Diversion, and got Andrus into a little hot 
water. 
As noted above, during the Hit List controversy, in private conversations, 
Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus started referring to the worst water projects as 
dogs.  The practice became public when Andrus made a flippant comment in a 
moment of candor he thought was off the record.  After giving a formal interview to 
the Washington Post editorial board outlining the administration’s solutions for fixing 
the Garrison Diversion, reporter Margot Hornblower walked Andrus to the elevator.  
As they walked, she asked him his personal feelings about the projects.  The formal 
interview had ended, and Andrus flippantly replied, “A dog is a dog.”  When the story 
was published the following day Andrus took a lot of heat from supporters of the 
project.  The following week Andrus appeared before the Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee.  In a follow-up article after his appearance, Hornblower reported that 
Andrus had taken a grilling from North Dakota's senators who “took strong exception 
to Andrus' recent characterization of the Garrison diversion project as a ‘dog.’ Andrus 
made no apologies.” 37     
 Andrus’s plan presented the 96,000-acre irrigation development as the 
recommended plan.  It retained Lonetree Reservoir at a reduced size-cutting the 
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maximum operating level by twenty feet and increasing the amount of space allocated 
to flood storage.  It excluded the Taayer Reservoir and irrigation development in the 
Oakes Area.38  But his plan had the same flaw as the original 250,000-acre plan; both 
destroyed about the same amount of farmland they created. Andrus’ plan called for 
purchasing 56,000 acres of farmland for project wildlife mitigation.  For this and other 
reasons, Andrus held reservations about his own plan. He told the Washington Post: 
Gut instinct tells me that I ought to just say deauthorize the whole 
thing. That would be the right thing to do but if I fail, then they could 
shove the whole 250,000 acres down your throat. So what's best -- to 
go down in the flames of being morally right or to reduce the plan to 
about 90,000 acres?39 
 
In response to Andrus’s plan, North Dakota officials proposed an alternative 
they termed “phased development.”  Essentially, they proposed keeping the 250,000 
acre plan authorized by Congress, but completing facilities to irrigate lands only in the 
Missouri River Basin. 
 But as the Bureau of Reclamation concluded fish screen tests and North 
Dakota pushed for phased development, the National Audubon Society took legal 
action and appealed the December 1978 ruling.  In September 1979, the National 
Audubon Society exercised their prerogative to resume litigation on the original case 
over the deficiency of the Environmental Statement.  Two years later, the appeals 
court reversed the decision of the lower court, remanding the case back for 
consideration.  After reconsidering the case, Judge Richey ruled on May 6, 1981, that 
the stipulation and order was in effect, that neither the 1978 Senate impoundment 
resolution, nor subsequent appropriations had nullified the order.  Because Congress 
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had not yet acted to “reauthorize, deauthorize, or modify the project as provided by the 
stipulation,” Judge Richey ordered all work on the project to stop.40 
 The government appealed Judge Richey’s decision.  The three sides—the 
Department of Interior, the State of North Dakota, and the National Audubon 
Society—each made different assertions regarding the interaction of NEPA, the 
powers of the executive branch, and Congress.  The District Court of Appeals in 
Washington D.C. heard arguments in the case on January 18, 1982.  After hearing the 
case, Judges Wright, MacKinnon, and Wilkey ruled on May 7, 1982, that the 
Secretary of the Interior had met the conditions of the stipulation when he submitted 
the completed environmental statement to Congress as required.  The judges accepted 
the position of the government that Congress had a reasonable amount of time to act, 
and failing to do so, the stipulation order was no longer binding.41      
 The National Audubon Society had previously petitioned the court to postpone 
proceeding on their original 1976 lawsuit pending the outcome of the government’s 
appeal on the stipulation and order.  In making their decision on the stipulation, the 
appeals court remanded that original 1976 lawsuit back to the lower court for a 
decision on the original suit.  On October 15, 1982 the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia ruled, and dismissed the Audubon Society’s suit without 
prejudice.42 
So, after the many legal contortions which had started and stopped the project 
three times, the court’s 1982 decision allowed land acquisition, planning, and 
construction activities to resume on the Garrison Diversion.  In that intervening 
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period, the policies and attitudes toward the project had changed with the election of 
Ronald Reagan and the appointment of James Watt as Secretary of the Interior.  
Following Watt’s “good neighbor policy,” Watt’s office accepted the 
recommendations of the state of North Dakota and used the ruling to justify dropping 
Andrus’s 96,000 acre plan and reverted the project to a phased implementation of the 
original 250,000 acre plan authorized by Congress.  With a green light from the courts 
and from Watt, the Bureau of Reclamation began moving forward with preparation of 
contracts to initiate construction on the West Oakes Test Area, the New Rockford 
Canal, and the Lonetree Reservoir.43    
During the legal controversy, Bureau of Reclamation engineers and biologists 
conducted three years of tests at the Lake Brekken Holmes screen facility.  During the 
tests, the fish screens operated a total of 8,500 hours.  Based on data from the 
experiment, it concluded that a fish screen facility could be constructed and operated 
in the McClusky Canal to effectively remove undesirable fish, fish eggs, and larvae of 
fish species which the Canadian Government deemed objectionable.  However, the 
tests also revealed that an entirely new fish screen facility would need to be built at a 
cost of $40 million as it was infeasible to modify the existing facility already on the 
McClusky Canal.  The report further concluded that the annual operation and 
maintenance costs of the facility would be $1.3 million per year.44 
Because of the costs involved, Canada’s reluctance to recognize the reliability 
of the facility, and because the project would not transfer Missouri River into the 
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Canadian drainage the Reagan administration simply determined not to construct the 
fish screen on the McClusky Canal.45 
Of the three major projects scheduled for construction—Lonetree Dam, New 
Rockford Canal, and the West Oakes Test area—the latter was the first one ready for 
construction.  The Bureau of Reclamation planned on developing irrigation along the 
James River as a part of the original 1965 plan for the Garrison Diversion.  It 
completed an environmental statement on the proposed irrigation along the James 
River in 1976.  The following year, the International Joint Committee recommended 
that a test irrigation area be developed along the James River in order to evaluate the 
potential impact of return flows in the Canadian watershed.  In 1978, Congress 
instructed the Secretary of the Interior to comply with this request by constructing a 
5,000-acre project in either the LaMoure or West Oakes irrigation area with interim 
water service from Jamestown Reservoir.  Reclamation subsequently examined both 
areas and determined that West Oakes was more representative and more economical.   
The Bureau of Reclamation attempted to begin construction on the Oakes Test 
Area project in early 1981.  However, shortly after awarding a contract, Judge 
Richey’s ruling suspended all work on Garrison and the Bureau subsequently canceled 
the contract.  The following spring, with the Audubon Case settled, Reclamation 
readvertised the project and awarded a new contract.46  However, concerned the 
impacts of the proposed irrigation and diversion from the James River had not been 
adequately addressed in the project’s environmental statement, landowners joined with 
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the James River Flood Control Association—located downstream from the Oakes 
Area in Brown and Spink Counties of South Dakota—and filed suit to stop the project.  
The action caused a temporary delay until the appeals court lifted a restraining order in 
June.  District Court Judge Potter ruled in favor of the project on Dec 22, 1982.47 
 The second major construction effort following the resolution of the court 
cases that had halted work on the Garrison Diversion was the New Rockford Canal.  
The contractor began construction of the canal in the spring of 1983.  Actual 
construction of the New Rockford Canal proceeded in much the same manner as the 
McClusky Canal, using scrapers and draglines.  But New Rockford differed from the 
McClusky Canal in that it tended to follow section and property lines, which reduced 
the impact on adjoining farms.  The canal was also smaller, and required less right-of-
way and less excavation.  Another difference was a difference in the topography the 
canals crossed.  New Rockford crossed an area with much drier soils and much fewer 
potholes and lakes, simplifying construction.48 
 The third major construction project the Bureau of Reclamation initiated was 
the Lonetree Reservoir, by constructing the Lonetree Dam and James River Dike, 
which together with the previously completed Wintering Dam and Dike would 
complete the reservoir.  To meet the concerns of the Canadian Government, the design 
included an emergency outlet to allow any flooding in the reservoir to drain to the 
James River rather than the Sheyenne—a feature  recommended by the International 
Joint Commission’s 1976 report. 
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As a consequence of the litigation against the Oakes Pumping Plant, 
Reclamation proceeded with the completion of a revised environmental statement for 
phased construction, incorporating the changes to Lonetree Reservoir.  The statement 
also included the proposed construction of drainage facilities to direct return flows to 
the James River and Devils Lake Basins.  Reclamation completed a “Supplemental 
Environmental Statement on July 15, 1983.  With the Environmental Statement 
completed, Reclamation proceeded with the construction of the Lonetree Dam.   The 
contractor, Central Excavating, began work on the dam in September 1983.49 
With major construction now underway on the Lontree Dam and New 
Rockford Canal, Garrison’s opponents continued to fight the project on Capitol Hill.  
The National Audubon Society and other environmental groups began lobbying 
congress to end appropriations for the project.  In 1977 the majority in Congress had 
voted to continue the projects on President Carter’s Hit List.  But attitudes had begun 
to shift as budget deficits continued to rise and the economy declined.  More 
importantly, several congressmen who allied themselves with Carter during the Hit 
List controversy grew frustrated by the failure of Congress to act prudently.  For them, 
Reclamation reform became personal goals and they made concerted efforts to win 
seats in key committees and move their proposals forward.   
For example, soon after the appeals court ruled in 1982, Congressman Silvio 
Conte succeeded in stripping appropriations for Garrison from the House 
appropriations bill.  However, when the bill went to the conference committee to 
resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions, North Dakota’s 
                                                 
49 U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Final Supplemental Environmental 
Statement on Features of the Garrison Diversion Unit for Initial Development of 85,000 Acres (Billings: 
Bureau of Reclamation, 1983), 1,box 65, accession 8NS-115-95-076, NARA, Denver. 
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senators—both of whom were on the appropriations committee at the time—
succeeded in keeping funding for Garrison intact. Undaunted, Garrison opponents 
tried to cut funding for the project again in 1983.  In the Senate, an amendment to cut 
funding to the Garrison Diversion led by Senators Humphrey and Proxmire failed after 
lengthy floor debate on June 22, 1983, by a vote of 35-62. The following day 
Congressman Conte attempted to pass an amendment requiring the House conferees to 
insist on keeping the Garrison cuts intact.  Feeling the amendment could “unduly 
limit” the committee members during the negotiations, the amendment failed by a vote 
of 150-215.50 
Prior to the vote, Wyoming Senator Alan Simpson’s staff prepared a brief on 
the project.  The memo reveals that the North Dakota delegation had exerted 
considerable political pressure to defeat the Humphrey-Proximire amendment.  For 
example, North Dakota Governor Allen Olson (R) had personally visited Simpson’s 
office to encourage the Senator to “stick with the Pick-Sloan states and support the 
Garrison Project.”   Simpson’s aide noted, however, that Simpson had “voted to curtail 
the project in the past evidently because of its cost and the ‘porkness’ of the project.”  
To remain consistent he recommended voting for cutting the funding.51   
Simpson, however, decided to vote in favor of the project.  In a draft letter to 
the five constituents who had written opposing the project, Simpson explained that he 
believed the modified plan keeping irrigation water in the Missouri Basin resolved the 
Canadian concerns.  His letter also suggested that the North Dakota delegation’s 
                                                 
50 “Amendment 1430,” Congressional Record 129 (June 22, 1983) S:16758-16778; Appointment of 
Conferees on H.R. 3132, Energy and Water Appropriation, 1984,” Congressional Record (June 23, 
1983) H:17152-17162 
51 Randall to Alan K. Simpson, June 21, 1983, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, Alan 
Simpson papers, ACC 10449, box 303, folder 2. 
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lobbying had been effective.  He explained in the letter that since Wyoming had 
benefited from the overall Pick-Sloan program, that he felt some obligation to support 
North Dakota, which he felt had a justification for seeking compensation for giving up 
prime farmland for the Missouri River reservoirs.52 
Undaunted, Garrison’s opponents in Congress tried again in 1984.  But this 
time they tried a different tactic.  The House version of the Energy and Water 
Appropriations bill approved that May once again cut all funding for Garrison.  
Congressman Conte strongly opposed any attempt to develop alternatives while 
construction moved forward to make modifications meaningful.  But the National 
Audubon Society was ready to try to reach a compromise with North Dakota’s 
senators.   
On June 1 Audubon President Russell Peterson and Chairman of the Board 
Donald C. O’Brien Jr. wrote to North Dakota’s congressional delegation.  The letter 
stated plainly, “We now recognize and accept the position of North Dakota that it is 
entitled to compensation for the acreage inundated by the creation of the Garrison 
Dam and the formation of Lake Sakakawea.  Further, we recognize and accept that 
North Dakota by its participation in and support of the Pick-Sloan plan has waited 
almost 40 years for project benefits.”  The letter offered to negotiate proposals that 
would ensure North Dakota would receive what North Dakota Senator Mark Andrews 
summarized as “a sound, responsible, water resource development program.”53  
                                                 
52 Six units of the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Project are located in Wyoming, Boysen Unit, Glendo 
Unit, Keyhole Unit, Kortes Unit, Owl Creek Unit, and Riverton Unit.  These provide hydropower, 
irrigation, recreation and flood control benefits.  Alan K. Simpson to Constituent, Draft, July 7, 1983, 
American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, Alan Simpson papers, ACC 10449, box 303, folder 
2.  
53 Silvio O. Conte, “Additional Views of Silvio O. Conte” Congressional Record 130 (May 22, 1984) 
H:13391; Audubon Society’s letter is reproduced as “Exhibit 1,” Congressional Record 130 (June 21, 
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By acknowledging the point, Peterson and O’Brien had bridged a gulf 
separating the two sides.  Previously, the National Audubon Society and other 
opponents had worked to kill Garrison and essentially denied the state had any claim 
to a federally supported water project.  Such claims had long been a primary 
contention of Garrison’s supporters, and for them it was much more than a rhetorical 
flourish designed to gain sympathy and votes for their water project.  Senator Andrews 
characterized Audubon’s previous position as “unreasonable and irresponsible 
negotiating demands.”    As Andrews explained to his colleagues on the Senate floor, 
“In essence supporters of Garrison were told, ‘Stop everything, then we will negotiate 
whether you will receive something we really don’t think you deserve.’”54 
Andrews agreed to a meeting and, after lengthy and heated discussions, the 
two sides reached a compromise.  Andrews presented the compromise agreement to 
the Senate.   His amendment to the 1985 Energy and Water Appropriations bill agreed 
to cut funds for Garrison until December 31, 1984, temporarily suspending all 
construction, while a special commission investigated the Garrison Diversion to 
recommend modifications to the project both sides could live with.   With support 
from both sides of the issue, the amendment easily passed on a voice vote on July 21, 
1984.  The temporary halt to construction helped Conte and the rest of the House 
agreed the amendment was a good compromise.  The House voted to accept the Senate 
version of the bill on June 27, 1984.55  
                                                                                                                                            
1984) S:17759-60. 
54 Debate on Amendment No. 3291, Congressional Record 130 (June 21, 1984) S:17758 
55 “Amendment No. 3291,” Congressional Record 130 (June 21, 1984) S:17757-62; “Energy and Water 
Development Appropriation Act of 1985,” 55 Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, 
Federal Reclamation and Other Laws Annotated (Preliminary)  Volume V (Denver: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 2001), 3402. 
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The immediate effect of the bill was to halt construction by September 31, 
1984.  At the time of the vote, it was not clear what the outcome of the study would 
be.  As a result, the Bureau of Reclamation determined to continue some work to make 
the construction sites safe during the shutdown period.  At the site of the Lonetree 
Dam, the contractor completed the excavation of the dam’s foundation and the 
placement of foundation material.  The placement operations continued through 
September when the height of the dam was slightly higher than the original ground 
and the entire site was capped. 56 
On August 11, 1984, the Secretary of the Interior appointed the twelve 
members of the Garrison Diversion Unit Commission to review the controversy 
surrounding the authorized project.  On December 20, 1984 the Commission 
submitted its final report to the Secretary of the Interior.  The report also contained the 
same crucial recognition of a federal obligation to North Dakota for the Garrison Dam.  
The Commission recommended an alternative plan, labeled the Commission Plan 
which proposed reducing the size of the project from 250,000 to 130,000 acres.  They 
proposed that Lonetree Reservoir not be completed, but that a canal be constructed as 
a functional replacement and that the project treat Missouri River water for release 
into the Sheyenne River for rural, municipal, and industrial use in Red River Valley.  
It anticipated serving a population of 376,000 in 130 towns and rural areas throughout 
the state.  The commission proposed making some of the municipal, rural, and 
industrial water project available to Indian reservations, and for Indian irrigation 
projects on 17,580 acres—15,200 on Fort Berthold Reservation and 2,380 on the 
                                                 
56 L-29, July, August, September 1984, January 1985. 
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Standing Rock reservation.57   As a result of the recommendation, Bureau of 
Reclamation terminated the contract for Lonetree.  The Reagan administration’s 
support of moving forward on the Garrison Diversion, despite the ongoing legal and 
international concerns, resulted in the government effectively wasting $7.2 million, 
just on the unneeded dam.58 
The commission recommended reformulation legislation and that Reclamation 
proceed with advance planning leading to preconstruction reports, NEPA compliance, 
final design, and prompt implementation.    The commission’s recommendation came 
at an opportune time.  Another Carter ally during the Hit List, California Congressman 
George Miller, had recently won appointment as the Chairman of the House 
Subcommittee on Power and Water.  Like Silvio Conte, Miller had made Reclamation 
reform a personal goal.  Miller also had the benefit of a constituency which supported 
him in those efforts.  Miller represented Contra Costa County, California.  Because the 
area’s water supply was affected by agricultural runoff from irrigated farms in the 
Central Valley, he and his constituents supported reforming Bureau of Reclamation 
projects and water policy.  Dan Beard, Miller’s assistant at the time, reports that Miller 
often stated “he can't be too unreasonable for his constituents on water issues.”  Miller 
was now in the position to become influential in moving that work forward, something 
that had been missing during the Carter administration.59   
Miller eagerly took up reforming the Garrison Diversion.  Not only did it 
remain symbolic of the worst of the worst from the Hit List, but the stage had been set 
                                                 
57 Garrison Diversion Unit Commission, “Final Report to the Secretary of the Interior…” (Washington 
D.C.: Garrison Diversion Unit Commission, 1984), i-iii and 1-2.  
58 L-29, January, and February 1985. 
59 Dan Beard Interview with Author, July 27, 2010. 
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for comprehensive reform thanks to the preliminary work of Senator Andrews and the 
Reform Commission.  Miller felt that the project would be an excellent test case to 
prove to his colleagues that he could broker the political compromises necessary to 
reform the projects and move them forward.60  
The Reformulation Act, which had the support of the State of North Dakota, 
the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District, the National Audubon Society, and the 
National Wildlife Federation passed with relative simplicity.  Since the act resolved 
the concerns of many project opponents, they supported the project.  George Miller 
helped work out the compromise legislation which both sides supported.  The House 
passed the bill by a vote of 254 to 154.  The senate followed five days later on April 
28, 1986. 61    
With its passage, Miller had done something that Carter and Andrus had 
wanted to do, but did not have the power to accomplish.  Miller’s reforms even went a 
step further than Andrus’s plan by eliminating the Lonetree Reservoir from the plan.  
In its place Congress authorized studies to link the McClusky and New Redford canals 
directly using the proposed Sykeston Canal as recommended by the commission.   
This was to appease Canadian concerns and to also lessen the project’s environmental 
impacts, thus solving what had been sticky issues during the Carter administration.    
Understanding Miller’s efforts and success are important.  As indicated 
previously, the Garrison Diversion serves as a good case study of the projects Carter 
proposed to discontinue. While no other project had such contorted or lengthy legal 
battles, nor such international implications, it is still representative of the last large 
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
61 Congressional Record 132  (April 23, 1986), H:8465; Federal Reclamation and Other Laws 
Annotated (Preliminary  Volume V, 3465-74. 
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Bureau of Reclamation projects. Like its peers on the Hit List, it faced environmental 
opposition, a NEPA challenge, complex engineering, and a giant price tag. Because it 
had been singled out as the worst of the worst projects, or the ugliest dog, 
understanding the Carter administration’s motivation to stop, and later to reformulate 
the project provides deeper understanding of the political challenges they faced; and, 
how they shifted their tactics to achieve their overall goal of cost savings and 
comprehensive policy reform. 
 But the Garrison Diversion does not just illustrate the Carter administration's 
challenges and failings, it shows us some of its success and how they influenced the 
success of reformers like Silvio Conte and George Miller. Further, Garrison's history 
helps one see the continued difficulties encountered by environmental groups lobbying 
Congress to stop controversial projects. 
Finally, understanding the history of the Garrison project also demonstrates an 
example of the stark contrasts between the Carter and Reagan administrations’ 
attitudes towards water projects. While it is true, that budget constraints kept the 
Reagan administration from moving forward with new water projects, its willingness 
to support large appropriations for the Garrison project, despite continued 
Congressional and environmental opposition, uncertainties about the project’s ability 
to overcome Canadian concerns, and uncertainties about the ability to find an 
acceptable solution for the Sykeston Canal is revealing.  Notwithstanding these 
concerns, the Reagan administration requested, and Congress approved, the 
appropriation of millions of dollars to complete the New Rockford Canal. As it turns 
out, finding a solution that addresses all of the environmental and Canadian opposition 
294 
to the project proved to be a monumental challenge for a federal bureaucracy 
dedicated to building monumental projects. 
The Garrison Diversion Unit Reformulation Act of 1986 authorized 
implementation of the commission’s other recommendations, but mandated a two year 
moratorium on construction of the James River Feeder Canal, the Sykeston Canal, and 
any channel improvements on the James River until their effects on the environment 
could be determined.  62 
After the special commission reported its recommendations on the project, and 
the Garrison reformulation legislation worked its way through Congress, the 
Department of the Interior lifted the order to suspend work on the West Oakes Area 
and the New Rockford Canal. In cooperation with the State of North Dakota, US Fish 
and Wildlife Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency, the Bureau of 
Reclamation prepared a Draft Supplemental Environmental Statement on the 
reformulated plan prior to the authorization of the bill.  Reclamation filed this draft on 
March 6, 1986. 63  
As the New Rockford Canal progressed to completion, the Bureau of 
Reclamation tried to find an alternative to link it with the McClusky Canal now that 
the Lonetree Reservoir was off the table.  Reclamation studied thirteen possible canal 
alignments to bridge the gap.  However, it could not find an alternative which 
balanced the cost of the canal, the environmental impacts, and minimized the risk of 
biota transfer.  The best option to minimize biota transfer, an alignment that stayed 
completely or mostly within the Missouri River basin was the most costly, required 
                                                 
62 Helen Hoehn Correll, “Until the Old Men Die: A Case Study of the Garrison Diversion Project in 
North Dakota,”  (PhD. Dissertation, Michigan Technological University, 2000), 80. 
63 L-29, February 1985. 
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more property, and affected more property owners.  Unable to find a solution that 
satisfied everyone, the engineers concluded that despite the higher risk of biota 
transfer in a flood event, the best route for the proposed canal would be through the 
Lonetree Reservoir site.64 
The Canadian government declared it an unacceptable solution.  In a formal 
diplomatic note, it responded that the risk assessment report did not adequately 
address many of their concerns about biota transfer.  As a result, on September 26, 
1989, the United States-Canada Consultative Group reestablished the Joint Technical 
Committee (JTC), a new name for the IJC, which had produced the evaluation of the 
project in the mid-1980s.  In November 1990 the JTC reported on three alternatives to 
connect the two existing canals.  The reports recommended three possible solutions,  
proposed a Missouri Valley alignment for the Sykston Canal with no Lincoln Valley 
Irrigation, the Mid Dakota Reservoir with relocated outlet and a fisheries/recreation 
management plan to minimize the risk of “bait bucket transfer,” or the southern 
alignment with a relocated east end.65 
  As a result of the continuing controversy, and the rising costs of completing 
the Sykeston Canal, the Department of the Interior’s Office of the Inspector General 
simultaneously completed cost estimates for finishing the Garrison Diversion.  It 
concluded that the reformulated project was so expensive; irrigators could not even 
afford to pay the project’s operating costs.  A February 1991 report announced the 
                                                 
64 U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation,  “Projects Report on Sykeston Canal: 
Evaluation and Risk Assessment, Garrison Diversion Unit, North Dakota” (Biskmark: Mo-Souris 
Projects Office, 1989), S1-S2,   
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65 Garrison Joint Technical Committee, “Garrison Diversion Unit: Joint Technical Committee Report to 
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Bush Administration’s withdrawal of support for funding completion of the Garrison 
Diversion principal supply works and non-Indian irrigation based on the Inspector 
General’s report.  However, the administration continued to support funding of the 
other authorized features of the project.66 
As a result of this action, local project supporters attempted to find a financing 
mechanism for the project, including increasing the local cost share which until now 
they had avoided.  During its 1992 session, the North Dakota State legislature defeated 
a proposal by Governor George Sinner to increases taxes to support water 
development, including Garrison Diversion.  As a consequence, the North Dakota 
Water Users Association and the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District supported a 
state-wide ballot initiative in 1992 to create a water tax.  Two-thirds of North Dakota 
voters sent the new tax down the drain.   
 At the same time, the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District began meeting 
with Congressman George Miller, The National Audubon Society and the National 
Wildlife Federation, concerning the status of the project.  Prior to the water tax vote, 
the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District pushed the North Dakota delegation to 
try and find a way to move the project forward.  The district proposed major 
amendments of the Reformulation Act to Congress and asked Congress to push 
forward the Environmental Impact Statement on alternatives to the proposed Sykeston 
Canal.  As a result, the 1993 Energy and Water Appropriation Act (H.R. 5373, Title II, 
Section 207) required that the Bureau of Reclamation continue the process of selecting 
                                                 
66 U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, “Sykeston Canal Alternatives Study, 
Garrison Diversion Unit, North Dakota” ([Billings]: Bureau of Reclamation, 1994), I2-3. 
297 
a Sykeston Canal Alignment.  Congress set March 31, 1994, as the deadline for the 
completion of the report.  
The study evaluated the concerns and recommendations outlined in the 1990 
Joint Technical Report in response to the 1989 Sykeston alignment study.  The 1994 
report eliminated the northern route through the Lonetree area, and eliminated the 
Lincoln Valley irrigation area.  The report also noted that landowners were adamantly 
opposed to any further land acquisition for any Sykeston alternative.67 
 As could be expected, the report did not magically discover a new inexpensive 
canal alignment that minimized environmental and landowner impacts, while 
promising to eliminate any possibility of biota transfer.  As a result, project supporters 
began what they described as the “Collaborative Process” meeting with all the 
stakeholders to discuss options and negotiate yet another reformulation that would 
allow the project to continue.   The National Audubon Society pulled out of the 
discussions in 1995 after recently retired Bureau of Reclamation Commissioner Daniel 
Beard had taken the position of Senior Vice-President for Public Policy of the 
National Audubon Society.68  
 The meetings produced enough consensus that in October 1995, the Garrison 
Conservancy District Board voted to endorse the proposed legislation package, which 
essentially converted the project from irrigation to a municipal and rural water supply 
similar to what had been done to the Oahe Project in South Dakota a decade earlier.  
Despite the radical change, without the support of project opponents like the National 
Audubon Society, the project continued on life support. 
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Two years later, North Dakota Senator Kent Conrad held a “summit meeting” 
with stakeholders and succeeded in hammering out the first draft of the Dakota Water 
Resources Act.  They had intentionally left the name Garrison out of the name 
because, according to Senator Conrad, “Garrison had become too pejorative.”69  
Because the conservancy district had drafted the bill without consulting the 
environmental groups which had been present at the summit meeting, they withdrew 
their support.  Daniel Beard testified at a hearing on the proposed legislation in 
Bismarck.  He contended that the bill was deeply flawed.  Beard and other project 
opponents remained critical of the reauthorization attempt.  However, North Dakota’s 
congressional delegation pressed forward, and other environmental groups agreed to 
continue to negotiate.  In 1999 the North Dakota Delegation introduced versions of the 
bill in the House and Senate.  After two years of debate the project squeaked through 
at the eleventh hour as part of an omnibus bill, and the bill became law on December 
21, 2001.70 
 The final compromise had been over two decades in the making.  Essentially, 
North Dakota followed the pattern and precedent laid out by the Carter administration 
when it supported the construction of a municipal-rural water supply to replace the 
Oahe Project.  Even though Garrison supporters had agreed to a similar conversion in 
1986, the logistical problems related to trying to utilize the portions of the project 
already constructed ended in more delays.  And even though the Dakota Water 
Resources Act authorized the construction of two municipal water supply projects to 
                                                 
69 Correll,  84-86. 
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on October, 13, 2000.  The House passed the omnibus bill on December 15, 2000 just before adjourning 
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replace the Garrison Diversion, neither project has been completed.    One project 
would import treated Missouri River water through a pipeline to the City of Minot, 
North Dakota, replacing the original Minot Extension of the Garrison Diversion Unit.  
A second project would provide municipal water to the Red River Basin.  Both 
projects have been delayed due to extensive environmental studies.  Continued 
objections by Manitoba to the transbasin diversion of Missouri River water have 
resulted in court cases requiring further studies making delivery of Garrison water to 
Minot unlikely until 2016.71  
 Following the passage of the Dakota Water Resource Act, the Bureau of 
Reclamation developed the Red River Valley Water Supply Project to meet future 
demands for water in the Red River Valley.  Environmental studies completed in 
December 2007 recommended importation of Missouri River water from a treatment 
plant near the eastern terminus of the McClusky Canal.  After treatment, a pipeline 
would convey the water into the Red River Basin to possibly several points.  Because 
the study recommends an importation scheme, Congressional approval of the project 
is needed.  Congress has yet to act on the project.72 
                                                 
71 Jill Schramm, “Study Means More Delays,” Minot Daily News, May 27, 2010.   
72 U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Red River Valley Water Supply Final 
Environmental Impact Statement (Bismarck: Bureau of Reclamation, 2007), 46;  “Garrison Diversion 
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Figure 9  2007 Map showing the “preferred alternative” for the Red River Water 
Supply, largely an effort to find some return on the investment into the failed Garrison 
Diversion 
The massive Snake Creek Pumping Plant helps to maintain the water level in 
Lake Audubon and the McClusky Canal.  As a result, property owners on the shores of 
the lake enjoy relatively constant water levels.  The McClusky Canal remains the most 
visible reminder of the project.  In July 2012 the Garrison Diversion Conservancy 
District signed the first contract with the Bureau of Reclamation for delivery of 
irrigation water from up to 24,000 acres in the area around the canal.  The cost of the 
irrigation “Central Supply Works” will be split evenly between the State Water 
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Commission and local water users.  Using non-federal funding with a 50% local cost 
share is a sharp contrast to the cost-share proposals advocated by Carter or Reagan.73   
 While it seems safe to predict that the municipal water projects replacing the 
original Garrison Diversion will be constructed someday, the municipal water 
development, like the irrigation project recently approved will come at a high price.  
What is certain at this point is that Glen Sloan’s original dream of irrigating millions 
of acres on the Northern Plains has been crushed.  The Garrison Diversion, in any of 
its iterations as an irrigation project, has been altered almost beyond recognition.  
Perhaps more than any other project on the Hit List, the Garrison Diversion 
epitomized how the Bureau of Reclamation came to be seen as anachronistic and 
abusive by many at the end of the 1970s.  The Bureau had manipulated cost estimates, 
overstated benefits, bullied landowners, flaunted treaties, and bulldozed the prairie.  
The subsequent legislative reviews suggest that the project should have been stopped 
during the Carter administration until the Canadian government could support the 
project.  The continued construction during the Reagan administration in spite of the 
Canadian objections wasted millions on a buried dam, and ultimately produced a true 
boondoggle, the New Rockford Canal.  Further, the fact that President George H.W. 
Bush stopped the project in February 1991 seems to vindicate Carter’s actions 
fourteen years earlier.  An additional two decades of political machinations, 
environmental and engineering studies, and litigation have further limited and delayed 
the skeleton of a project attempting to make use of the enormous federal investment in 
monuments to a generation of water buffalos that did not know when to call it quits.  
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But understanding why those water development proponents have refused to 
abandon the project is also an important part of understanding the significance of the 
Hit List and President Carter’s efforts to create a comprehensive national water policy.  
It is true that many of the proponents of the Garrison Diversion fit the model of the 
iron triangle.  But, in the case of Garrison, the state politicians and the North Dakota 
Congressional delegation pressed the hardest to save the project. This is not to say that 
local water users, politicians or the board members of the Garrison Diversion Water 
Conservancy District did not push for the project as well.   They were certainly 
involved, but North Dakota’s governors, senators, and congressmen have labored to 
ensure that the state receive its due.   They refused to give up on the project that was to 
compensate for the loss of lands, tax revenues, and economic stimulus lost under the 
waters of Lake Sakakawea—with the bulk of the flood control and navigation benefits 
accruing not to North Dakota but to downstream users.  
Robert Gottlieb may be right that had Carter not initiated a large-scale water 
project review, which rallied the dam builders and water development proponents, the 
era of large federal water projects may have ended sooner.  But, when one considers 
the history of Garrison Diversion, that thesis seems inadequate to describe how the 
events and processes kept the ugliest dog alive.  Thus it seems that the adamant belief 
held by locals that the federal government promised to build the project, and keeping 
that promise outweighed virtually any economic, social, or environmental costs, would 
have kept the Garrison Diversion going regardless of Gottlieb's alternative ending.  Of 
all the similarities Garrison Diversion shares with its companions on the Hit List, this 
may be the most important.  Local politicians, newspapers, and businessmen ardently 
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supported the project.  Like other projects on the list, their support won it continued 
congressional funding in 1977.  And like other projects, Garrison was subject to 
continued efforts by the Carter administration to solve objections to the project.  It also 
faced continued Congressional scrutiny during the Reagan administration.  The new-
found power of Carter’s Congressional allies from the Hit List controversy made 
possible reforms that addressed their concerns, but kept the project moving forward to 
“keep faith” with  promises made to local project beneficiaries.  For evidence of this, 
one need only look from the ugliest dog, to the Cadillac of water projects in the 
Mountain West, the Central Utah Project.  
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 Chapter 6 
 
From Cadillac to Chevy: The Central Utah Project1 
 
We have presented Congress with a fiscally 
responsible project—one which we can argue 
should be authorized for valid reasons.  The 
Central Utah Project is now a Chevy instead of 
the Cadillac; now we asked Congress to support 
our efforts to complete this project, to begin 
delivering water to the Wasatch Front and 
beyond to Southern Utah, and to mitigate the 
damages with the same sense of urgency. 
—Congressman Wayne Owens2 
 
 
   As Utah interests pushed for the “Cadillac” of Utah water projects—the 
Central Utah Project [CUP]—concern over the project’s high economic and 
environmental costs began to erode the congressional support that had kept the project 
alive during the Carter Administration.  As a result, the CUP faced new legal and 
political challenges that delayed the completion of the project, and altered the project’s 
design, scope and beneficiaries.  The fight over the CUP climaxed in a five year 
congressional battle to rescue and reauthorize the project.  The resulting compromise 
legislation converted the “Cadillac” into what Utah Congressman Wayne Owens 
called a “Chevy.”3 
                                                 
1  This chapter draws on my master’s thesis and an essay distilled from it with the same title which has 
been published as  “From Cadillac to Chevy: Environmental Concern, Compromise, and the Central 
Utah Project Completion Act,” in Utah History in the Twentieth Century, ed. Brian Q. Cannon and 
Jessie Embry (Logan, Utah: Utah State University Press, 2009). 
2 Remarks of Congressman Wayne Owens, Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources, Proposals to Raise the Authorized Cost Ceiling for the 
Colorado River Storage Project: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources of 
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 18 April 1988 and 4 May 1988, 
40. 
3 Ibid.  Also see, 422-6. 
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The Central Utah Project shared many characteristics with the Bureau of 
Reclamation projects on the Hit List.  Local politicians, newspapers, and businessmen 
ardently supported the project.  Like the other projects, locals maintained Congress 
had committed to build the project, which was necessary for the state to utilize its 
allocation of Colorado River water.  As with other projects, the lobbying activities of 
local water interests played a key role in winning continued congressional funding in 
1977.  The project also faced continued scrutiny by the Carter administration and like 
the Garrison Diversion, underwent a major congressional revision during the Reagan 
and Bush administrations.   Thus, like Garrison, the Central Utah Project provides 
general insight into both the workings of the Bureau of Reclamation that created an 
objectionable project and the steps that were taken to address those objections and 
bring to a close the end of the big dam era.   
 
Cadillac Unveiled 
Like most of the projects on Carter’s Hit List, the Central Utah Project 
epitomized Bureau of Reclamation projects during the big dam era.  Like many others, 
engineers had conceived the concept behind the project at the turn of the twentieth 
century.  But like many potential projects identified during the early years of federal 
involvement in reclamation, the project posed serious technical challenges.  New 
technologies pioneered on the monumental projects undertaken by the Bureau of 
Reclamation during the Great Depression reopened doors for many projects like the 
CUP that had previously been considered a pipe dream.   The long tunnels of the 
Colorado-Big Thompson and the Provo River Project in Utah encouraged the 
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designers of the CUP, while the success of large hydroelectric dams like Hoover and 
Grand Coulee inspired the concept to subsidize the costs of the water diversion.4 
 
Figure 10 1947 Map showing the original plan proposed for the Central Utah Project. 
The Bureau of Reclamation’s evolving plans for the CUP were ambitious.  
 In the 1940s the agency proposed a massive dam on the Green River at either 
Flaming Gorge or Echo Park.  Using gravity and a long tunnel from Flaming Gorge, or 
the hydroelectricity generated at Echo Park to power pumps, they planned to divert 
water  
directly from the Green River to an expanded network of reservoirs, canals, and 
pipelines to supply the cities and farms of the Uinta Basin.  The existing water from 
                                                 
4  On the original concept that would become the CUP see, Abraham Fairbanks Doremus, Third 
Biennial Report of the State Engineer to the Governor of Utah. 1901-1902 (Salt Lake City, Utah: Star 
Printing Company, 1903), 9-14;  and U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Third 
Annual Report of the Reclamation Service 1903-1904 (Washington D.C.: 1905), 509.   
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virtually every stream and river along the southern slope of the Uinta Mountains 
would then be diverted through a series of pipelines into an enlarged Strawberry 
Reservoir, and then to the farms and cities of the Bonneville Basin.  Further, the 
agency planned to construct dikes to close two shallow bays on Utah Lake in hopes of 
eliminating water lost to evaporation.  The water saved would be stored in a new 
reservoir on the Provo River above Heber City.  Additional water would be stored 
through a water rights exchange.  Rights to Provo River water in Utah Lake held by 
Salt Lake County irrigators would be fulfilled by importing Colorado water from the 
Uinta Basin stored in Strawberry Reservoir, allowing the original Provo River water to 
be held upstream of Utah Lake for diversion to other users.  The rest of the diverted 
Colorado River water would be sent to Central Utah farmers.5 
But the complicated and expensive project, first introduced in Congress by 
Utah Senator Abe Murdock in 1946, quickly met with opposition.  This opposition 
came first on economic grounds, to which later would be added the opposition of 
downstream users of the Colorado River and environmentalists concerned about a 
proposed dam at Echo Park inside Dinosaur National Monument.  Despite opposition, 
a coalition of western senators and congressmen secured passage of the Colorado 
River Storage Project (CRSP) in 1956.  The CRSP authorized the construction of 
“main stem” dams along the Colorado and its significant tributaries in the Upper Basin 
States.  The power stations at these dams would develop hydroelectricity to generate 
revenue to offset the cost of irrigation projects, and the water stored in the reservoirs 
would guarantee water deliveries to the lower basin.  Additionally, the CRSP 
                                                 
5 United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Storage Project and 
Participating Projects, Upper Colorado River Basin, December 1950, particularly 13-14.  
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authorized thirteen participating irrigation projects, including the Central Utah Project, 
the largest of them all.6  
In order to win approval, CRSP proponents, led by Congressman Wayne 
Aspinall, amended the legislation to remove the controversial Echo Park Dam.  In 
exchange, the Sierra Club agreed to drop its opposition to CRSP.  Utah politicians and 
water officials preferred the Echo Park alternative as it would have been cheaper to 
construct, produced more hydropower, and impounded more water of a higher quality 
 
Figure 11 Exploded view of 1947 map showing both the Echo Park and Flaming 
Gorge Reservoirs and Aqueducts.  Also note the Strawberry Aqueduct intercepting 
every river flowing south out of the Uinta Mountains. 
                                                 
6 For Murdock’s proposals see S. 2313, Congressional Record, June 7, 1946 Volume 92, Part 5, 6438 
and “Echo Park Project Goes to Senate For Approval,” Vernal Express, June 13, 1946.  For Colorado 
River Storage Project Act, see Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Federal Reclamation 
and Related laws Annotated, Volume 2 (Denver: Government Printing Office, 1972), 1248-1259..  
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than the Flaming Gorge alternative.  However, as a result of the compromise, 
Reclamation altered plans for the Ultimate Phase of the CUP to include a diversion 
from Flaming Gorge to the Uinta Basin through a long tunnel.7   
After the passage of the CRSP, work progressed quickly on the large main 
stem storage reservoirs—Flaming Gorge and Glen Canyon—but construction lagged 
on the CUP as the Bureau completed its detailed planning.  Because of the size and 
scope of the CUP, the Bureau divided it into six units.  Congress authorized the four 
initial units—Bonneville, Vernal, Jensen, Upalco—in 1956 in the CRSP Act.  In 1968 
Congress authorized the Uintah Unit, and advance planning for the Ute Indian Unit—
also known as the Ultimate Phase.  Because planning for the Vernal Unit had been 
completed as an independent project, it was the first to be started.  In June 1958 the 
newly created Uintah County Water Conservancy District entered into a repayment 
contract with the Bureau for the Vernal Unit.  Construction on Steinaker Dam—the 
Unit’s primary feature—began on May 14, 1959.8   
While scaled back from the ultimate phase plan, the Bonneville Unit was still 
large and ambitious.  Construction began in 1967 with the Starvation Dam on the 
                                                 
7 On the compromise see Mark Harvey, A Symbol of Wilderness: Echo Park and the American 
Conservation Movement  (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 223-227; Stephen C. 
Sturgeon, The Politics of Western Water: The Congressional Career of Wayne Aspinall (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 2002), 47-50; Reisner, Cadillac Desert (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 
283-288; and John Upton Terrell, War for the Colorado, Volume 2 (Glendale, CA: The Arthur H. Clark 
Company, 1965), 237-238.  On the preference for the Echo Park alternative see Harvey, 38-42. 
8 On construction and subsequent controversy of the Glen Canyon Dam see Russell Martin, A Story that 
Stands Like a Dam: Glen Canyon and the Struggle for the Soul of the West (New York: Henry Holt & 
Co., 1989) and Jared Farmer, Glen Canyon Dammed: Inventing Lake Powell and the Canyon Country 
(University of Arizona Press, 1999). On the Vernal Unit see, “Vernal Project Contract Signed in 
Washington,” Vernal Express, June 12, 1958;  “Vernal Project Groundbreaking Planned Today,” Vernal 
Express, May 14, 1958;  “Massive Bulldozers Plough Earth in Vernal Project Opening Rites,” Vernal 
Express, May 21, 1958. In 1956 the Bureau of Reclamation also began construction on its second 
largest project in Utah, the Weber Basin Project which Congress authorized in 1949.  See, Richard W. 
Sadler and Richard C. Roberts, The Weber River Basin: Grass Roots Democracy and Water 
Development (Logan: Utah State University Press, 1994).     
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Duchesne River drainage to store surplus flows and allow for the later diversion of 
Duchesne water into the Strawberry system.  The diversion would be made by the 
Strawberry Aqueduct and Collection System.  Reaching from the Strawberry 
Reservoir to Rock Creek, the 37 miles of tunnel and pipeline would intercept the flows 
of twenty-three streams and rivers, diverting a large portion of their flow.  The 
Collection System also included two small diversion dams and two larger dams.  The 
reservoirs behind the two larger dams, Currant Creek Dam in the middle and Upper 
Stillwater Dam on Rock Creek at the upper end would regulate the system.9 
The water diverted through the Strawberry Collection System would be stored 
in the enlarged Strawberry Reservoir behind the new Soldier Creek Dam.  Diversions 
to the Wasatch Front from Strawberry would be made via a new tunnel and pass 
through a series of reservoirs and power plants in Diamond Fork Canyon to generate 
hydropower.  The Wasatch Aqueduct would allow the diversion of Strawberry water 
from Diamond Fork Canyon 83 miles to Sevier Bridge Reservoir passing through 
three tunnels, totaling 5.6 miles along the way.  The Bureau also retained plans to dike 
Utah Lake and construct Jordanelle Dam and Reservoir to develop a large municipal 
supply for northern Utah and Salt Lake Counties.10 
But almost as soon as construction began on the Bonneville Unit, the project 
encountered fiscal challenges.  Due to budgetary pressures created by the ongoing 
Vietnam War and President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” and competition 
                                                 
9  For an early description of the CUP see, The Colorado River, “A Natural Menace Becomes a 
National Resource:,” 117-118.  For complete description of the CUP see, Bureau of Reclamation.  
Central Utah Project, A supplement to the Colorado River Storage Project Report. February 1951, 
Synopsis 1-4 and U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Region 4, Salt Lake City, 
Central Utah Project Initial Phase Bonneville Unit, Definite Plan Report (Salt Lake City: August 
1965), summary sheets 1-3; Bureau of Reclamation, Final Environmental Statement, Authorized 
Bonneville Unit, Central Utah Project, Utah, 19. 
10 Ibid.  
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for limited construction funds among the other large projects that would end up on the 
Hit List like Garrison, Central Arizona, and Auburn, Congress significantly reduced 
reclamation appropriations for the CUP.  Additionally, new environmental concerns 
began to surface nationally.  Worsening air and water pollution, fears of chemical 
contamination, and the loss of wildlife led to a greater environmental consciousness.  
As a result, Congress passed a series of significant new environmental laws with 
bipartisan support.  Of them, the Wilderness Act (1964), National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) (1969), and the Endangered Species Act (1973) had the greatest 
impact on the CUP.11 
Like the Garrison Diversion, meeting the requirements of NEPA proved to be 
challenging for the Central Utah Project.  Following the passage of NEPA, work on 
the Starvation Reservoir, Soldier Creek Dam, and the first sections of the Strawberry 
Aqueduct under existing contracts could continue.  But the law required the Bureau to 
complete an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before it could issue any new 
construction contracts.  The completion of the EIS took two years.  However, 
unsatisfied with the conclusions of the Bureau’s EIS, a coalition of environmental 
groups, led by the Sierra Club, filed a lawsuit in 1973 in federal Utah District Court.  
They claimed that the Bureau had only analyzed a portion of the Strawberry Aqueduct 
and Collection system, and did not consider the cumulative impacts of the entire CUP.  
The District Court ruled in favor of the Bureau.  The Sierra Club filed an appeal to the 
                                                 
11 On the growth of the environmental movement and passage of federal legislation see Charles A. 
Reich, The Greening of America (New York: Random House, 1970);  Hal Rothman, The Greening of a 
Nation? Environmentalism in the United State Since 194. (New York: Wadsworth, 1998); Philip 




Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the lower courts ruling.  Work on the 
project could continue, but was now several years behind schedule.12   
With the court challenge resolved, the Bureau of Reclamation issued a contract 
to extend the Strawberry Aqueduct and to construct the Currant Creek Dam.  Work 
had barely begun when President Carter placed the project on the Hit List. 
President Carter gave four reasons for eliminating the Bonneville Unit of the 
CUP that closely followed the arguments long used by project opponents of the CUP. 
First, he stated that the project posed serious environmental damage through the 
depletion of stream fisheries and the loss of habitat through the diking of Utah Lake, 
and that the exportation of Colorado River water would aggravate salinity problems in 
the Colorado  River.  He further argued that the CUP complicated Ute Indian Claims 
to water.  He calculated that the project was not economically sound since it could not 
be completed under authorized ceilings established in the original program.  The ‘Hit 
List” also argued that using current interest rates, the project no longer had a positive 
cost-benefit analysis.  Finally, the list claimed alternative sources of municipal water 
existed for the Salt Lake Valley.13 
The Department of the Interior held special hearings on the Bonneville Unit in 
the Salt Palace Little Theater on March 24, 1977.  The hearing was scheduled to last 
for seven hours, with three hours for each side and a thirty-minute rebuttal period.  Ed 
Clyde, the attorney for the project’s local sponsor, the Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District, coordinated the proponents’ testimony while Dr. David C. 
                                                 
12 Sierra Club, et al. V Gilbert Stamm, Commissioner, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, et. al., United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, No 74-1425.  Bob Hilbert, interviewed by Adam Eastman,  May 
20, 2004, Salt Lake City, Jordan Valley Water Concervancy District History Project. 




Raskin, former Sierra Club member and outspoken critic of the CUP, coordinated the 
opponents’ side.14 
The following morning, the Salt Lake Tribune editorialized about the hearings 
that had far exceeded their anticipated schedule: 
 
Nothing in the twelve hours of hearing at the Salt Palace persuaded us 
that the CUP, along with its Bonneville Unit is so inherently bad that it 
should be abandoned… None of the alternatives proposed by 
opponents, when taken in the context of what has already been 
accomplished on the Bonneville Unit, are viable or acceptable…. One 
striking observation of the Salt Palace hearing was the penchant of 
Bonneville Unit opponents to seemingly brush aside as of no 
consequence the legal obligations that have been incurred during the 
project’s three decade history.   They choose to ignore the several 
contracts in existence promising delivery of much needed water at 
some future date.15   
 
As a result of the hearings and additional study, Secretary of the Interior Cecil 
Andrus recommended to President Carter that the project be modified.  The 
recommendation endorsed by Carter proposed completing only the existing features 
under construction.  Water users argued that the plan amounted to a colossal waste of 
the money already spent and that Andrus’ plan would not develop as much water as 
planned.  The Department of Interior review team had calculated using the storage 
capacity of Currant Creek, however, the dam which was almost completed at the time, 
had been planned as a regulating reservoir, not a storage reservoir.  As a result, the 
outlet works had been placed at the top of the dam.  Andrus’ recommendation could 
not work as he suggested.  The plan’s shortcomings combined with pressure from 
project proponents and Utah’s Congressional delegation led Congress to reject the 
                                                 
14 Miller, 195-197, 221-225; Joe Bauman, “Second Chance or Death Blow? Bonneville Unit hearing 
brings pros, cons into focus,” Deseret News, March 23, 1977  




administration’s recommendations to modify the CUP.  As a result of the compromise 
with Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill, the administration continued to fund the 
CUP.16  
However, Carter and O’Neill’s compromise did not end the controversy about 
the CUP.  As the contractor began construction, CUP opponents continued their 
attacks on the project.  The Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, and a small group calling 
itself Citizens for a Responsible CUP filed protests with the Army Corp of Engineers 
(COE) seeking the denial of a the “404 Permit” which allowed alteration to a stream.  
While that agency had previously granted permits for other project features, officials 
at the COE regional offices in San Francisco responded to the complaints by initiating 
a full review of the Strawberry Aqueduct’s impacts on stream flows.   The review 
prompted the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources to criticize the CUP impacts on 
trout habitat.  Sympathetic to both sides, Utah Governor Scott Matheson intervened to 
renegotiate the 1965 stream flow agreement.   On February 7, 1980, Reclamation, the 
CUWCD, and State of Utah signed an agreement making up to 44,000 acre feet of 
water available annually for in-stream flows.  As a result of the agreement, the COE 
issued a permit in the spring of 1980.17 
Simultaneous to the Sierra Club’s opposition to a 404 permit, the CUP faced 
an even larger problem; the Bureau of Reclamation was running out of money to 
construct the project.  With costs escalating due to these construction problems and 
delays it became apparent  that the Bureau could not finish the project within either the 
                                                 
16 Miller, 290-1.  
17 Citizens for a Responsible CUP, “Water Log,” [April 1979] in Dorothy Harvey Papers, University of 
Utah Marriott Library, Special Collections Accession 2232 (hereafter cited as Harvey Papers), Box 156, 
Folder 10; and Lynn Ludlow to Gunn McKay, September 26, 1979, Harvey Papers, Box 51, Folder 1; 
“Bonneville Unit, Annual Project History,” Volume XV – 1980, 7, 16. 
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budget authorized by the Colorado River Storage Project or the amount authorized by 
the 1965 repayment contract approved by voters in the Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District (CUWCD).  Both limits would need to be raised.  The Bureau 
began negotiating a new repayment contract with the CUWCD.  During the autumn of 
1980, Ed Clyde worked with the Bureau of Reclamation to draft the new supplemental 
repayment contract.  At the District’s November 13, 1980 board meeting, Clyde 
presented the final draft of the contract to the board for its approval.  The Board 
unanimously passed a resolution supporting the contract and favored submitting it 
under the current Presidential Administration to prevent delays in bringing the new 
members of the Reagan administration up to speed.18   
But the plan did not work as hoped.   As one of his final actions before leaving 
office, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Guy Martin, wrote a scathing review of the 
supplemental repayment contract.  In the memo, Martin called the proposed contract 
flawed.  “As drafted, the contract contains several provisions which are clearly illegal, 
others that have questionable legal basis, and several provisions which are not fiscally 
prudent.   Moreover, the contract masks costs of hundreds of million of dollars from 
the clear view of the people who must pay for the project and the taxing public.”  
Additionally, he labeled the project as environmentally unsound.19 
CUWCD board members called the move a parting shot of a Carter aide.  
However, Ed Clyde advised the Board that it would “not be prudent to ignore the 
criticisms” and recommended they recall the contract to analyze the concerns raised.   
Clyde later explained that the reasons for the questionable language and subsequent 
                                                 
18 CUWCD Board Minutes, November, 13, 1980, 5-7.  
19 John Serfustini, “Carter Aide’s Parting Shot Scorches CUP,” Salt Lake Tribune March 10, 1981; 
CUWCD Board Minutes February 12, 1981, 6-7. 
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withdrawal involved uncertainty over the costs to construct Jordanelle.  The Bureau 
had not completed its investigation and plans and did not know the final design or cost 
of the dam.20 
 Ed Clyde and the staff of the Bureau of Reclamation’s local offices came up 
with an alternate solution.  They invoked the Water Supply Act of 1958 which allowed 
the Bureau or Army Corp of Engineers to enlarge a proposed water project to store 
additional municipal water to meet future demand and defer the extra costs associated 
with the enlargement for a period of ten years.  The agencies designated 60,000 acre 
feet of the 99,000 acre foot anticipated municipal supply for Jordanelle as “future 
supply.”   This exempted two thirds of the Bonneville M&I supply from a repayment 
contract.  Project critics and the General Accounting Office would later question the 
legality of the use of the Water Supply Act because in the case of Jordanelle 
Reservoir, the Bureau had not actually changed the plans.  The change had been made 
previous to the execution of the 1965 repayment contract.21 
To keep construction moving forward, the Bureau of Reclamation and the 
water district negotiated a new supplemental repayment contract which the district 
took to voters within the District’s boundaries.  The supplemental repayment contract 
added an additional $335 million to the maximum amount that taxpayers within the 
district agreed to repay towards the municipal supply system of the Bonneville Unit of 
the CUP.  At a special election held in November, 1985 voters approved the contract 
                                                 
20 CUWCD Board Minutes February 12, 1981, 6-7; Edward W. Clyde, letter to Don A. Christiansen, 
March 5, 1986, in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
Supplemental Repayment Contract for the Bonneville Unit, Central Utah Project, 99th Congress, 2.nd 
session (Washington, D.C.:1986, 104.   
21 Carrie L. Ulrich and R. Terry Holzworth, “Opening the Water Bureaucracy,” in Daniel McCool, ed., 
Waters of Zion (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1995), 56-58.  
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by a margin of 73%, and carried a majority in favor in 290 of the 307 voting 
districts.22 
 With the vote, Utah’s congressional delegation began working on the passage 
of legislation to increase the congressionally authorized costs.  The Bureau and Utah’s 
congressional delegation thought they could quickly obtain Congressional approval.  
Senator Jake Garn introduced legislation to increase the total authorized project cost 
by $750,000,000.  But, when Democratic leaders Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) and 
Congressman George Miller (D-CA) who controlled the key House and Senate 
subcommittees refused to move the bill forward without addressing the lingering 
environmental and economic concerns, it quickly became apparent that the CUP now 
faced its largest hurdle. 
 Bradley and Miller had not singled out the CUP for scrutiny.  Rather, they saw 
the reauthorization, as they had the Garrison reauthorization a few years earlier, as an 
opportunity to force desperately needed of reform on an antiquated agency.  Neither of 
them would allow out of their subcommittees any reclamation bill that did not address 
their environmental and economic concerns.  Thus, the blockage of Garn’s 
reauthorization bill cannot be seen as a partisan move.  In fact, both Bradley and 
Miller worked openly with Utah’s Republican-dominated congressional delegation in 
the process of drafting reauthorization legislation because it provided an opportunity 
to reform the Bureau in the process.23  
                                                 
22 Ibid;  Lisa Mote “Voters Approve CUP Repayment by 3-to-1,” and “Provo Voters Fail to Support 
Council Stand,” Daily Herald, November 20, 1985. Don Christiansen, Oral History Interview, 
Transcript of tape recorded Central Utah Water Conservancy District History Project interview 
conducted by Adam Eastman,  March 24, 2004, Orem, Utah..   
23 Don Christiansen; Jake Garn; Thomas Melling, “Dispute Resolution Within Legislative Institutions,” 




From Luxury to Utilitarian 
Determined to keep the project alive, the entire Utah delegation continued to 
work on the reauthorization of the CUP.  Congressman Wayne Owens, a Democrat 
representing the Salt Lake City area, served as a majority member of the House 
Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources.  Because of his assignment, and 
because he was the only Democrat from Utah serving in Congress, Owens took the 
lead in the effort to draft new legislation that met the demands of Chairman Miller.  
In February 1988, Owens began spending a great deal of time developing a 
plan that would address the fiscal and environmental concerns.  It was a daunting task, 
but one Owens accepted with enthusiasm.  If he succeeded, he could earn a great deal 
of political capital in Utah.  But more important, Owens felt strongly about the 
environmental damage the project had caused in Utah.  In response to Owens’s efforts, 
the Sierra Club of Utah, Utah Wildlife Federation, Utah Wilderness Association, and 
sixty additional environmental, conservation and sportsman’s groups organized the 
Utah Roundtable of Sportsmen and Conservationists.   
The Utah Roundtable quickly identified problems they had fought for many 
years.  First the Strawberry Aqueduct and Collection System diverted the entire stream 
flows of twenty-three streams and rivers in the Uintah Basin, dewatering a total of 245 
miles.  Wildlife specialists estimated that 78 percent of the fish population in the 
streams would be lost.  The Utah Division of Wildlife Resources wildlife biologists 
felt that fifty percent of the fish population could be maintained if minimum instream 
flows were kept at 44,000 acre feet.  In the 1980 deal brokered by Governor Scott 
Matheson, the CUWCD had agreed to allow this amount until the Strawberry 
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Aqueduct was completed, after which flows would be cut to 22,300 acre feet.  The 
Division of Wildlife Resources and project opponents now wanted to make the 44,000 
amount permanent. 24 
But the loss of water did not just impact fish; it meant the loss of the entire 
river ecosystem.  In addition to the habitat lost to diverted streams, further riparian and 
wetlands habitat would be lost under the dams and reservoirs built by the project.  The 
loss of habitat would impact both game animals and endangered species.  The 
diversion of water from Utah Lake also posed a threat of increasing the salinity level 
in the lake to levels beyond the toleration of its native plants and animals.  
Specifically, environmentalists and wildlife advocates worried about the impact on the 
endangered June Sucker in the Utah Lake.25   
While environmental groups lobbied to increase minimum stream flows, they 
also sought to set maximum flows on other rivers.  Several streams saw increased 
flows because of project diversions.  For example, the Strawberry Tunnel emptied 
directly into Sixth Water Creek and Diamond Fork Creek.  During the peak irrigation 
season, the flows in the creeks were ten times the normal amount.  A large quantity of 
water in a narrow streambed caused erosion of the stream banks, scouring of the 
stream bed, and washing of cottonwood saplings from the banks of the river.  Because 
the saplings did not survive the irrigation season, the trees did not replenish 
themselves, and much of the cottonwood forests along these creeks had died away. 
                                                 
24 On the dewatering of streams, see Tom Melling, “The CUP Holds the Solution: Utah’s Hybrid 
Alternative to Water Markets,” Journal of Energy, Natural Resources, and Environmental Law 13 
(1993): 186.  On the 404 permit see Rod Collett, “CUP Officials Question 404 Dam Permit Delay,” 
Provo Daily Herald, October 12, 1979.  For the 1980 Streamflow agreement, see Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District, “Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Board of Directors” January 30, 1980, 
Orem, Utah, 2-14; and CUWCD, “Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Board of Directors” April 10, 
1980, Orem, Utah, 2.  
25 “Water Official Warns Salinity Will Increase in Utah Lake,” Salt Lake Tribune, November 1, 1989.     
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Owens, along with environmental groups, also expressed concern over a similar 
situation in the Provo River, particularly between Deer Creek Dam and the Olmstead 
Diversion near Upper Falls.26 
Owens needed to find solutions to three additional issues.  Little had been done 
to mitigate the damage caused by the project.  Owens discovered that of the $1.2 
billion that had been spent on the project, only $10 million had been expended to 
repair the environmental, fish, and wildlife damages caused by the project.  
Additionally, Owens had to come to terms with the cost of the Bonneville Unit’s 
irrigation component.  The Bureau’s studies showed that the project’s benefits slightly 
exceeded its costs.  But, using different formulas some economists found that the costs 
actually exceeded the benefits.  Finally, the legislation needed to address the water 
rights claims of the Uintah and Ouray Ute Tribes.  In 1965 they had been promised 
water development projects in exchange for a forty year deferral of their water rights.  
Because their projects had not been constructed, it appeared that the Bonneville Unit 
could not legally divert any water after 2005.27 
As he searched for solutions to these problems Owens found help readily 
available.  He asked the CUWCD to prepare alternative plans for the irrigation project, 
including cutting some components and possibly using private financing.  The District 
proposed streamlining the project by dropping several features that had questionable 
cost-benefit ratios.  Congressman Owens also turned to the Utah Roundtable of 
                                                 
26 Michael Weland, interview with author, May 14, 2004.  River Proposals Upsets Officials,” Provo 
Daily Herald, October 31, 1989. 
27 Proposals to Raise the Authorized Cost Ceiling for the Colorado River  Storage Project: 40, 422-426.  
For a critical analysis of the economics of the Bonneville Irrigation Unit see, Jon R. Miller, “The 
Political Economy of Western Water Finance: Cost Allocation and the Bonneville Unit of the Central 
Utah Project,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69 (May 1987): 303-310. 
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Sportsman and Conservationists to determine priorities and propose solutions for the 
needed mitigation of the project’s adverse effects on the environment.  Owens worked 
with the organization’s member groups through March and into April of 1988 as they 
prepared a draft of a new reauthorization bill.  Chairman Miller scheduled a hearing in 
Salt Lake City to gather comment on the draft and further comments from all 
interested parties.  Owens continued to work on the draft, making changes right up to 
the day prior to the hearing. The process led Owens to comment at the hearing that, 
“The Central Utah Project is now a Chevy instead of a Cadillac.”28 
Chairman Miller opened the hearing on the rainy Monday morning of April 18, 
1988, in the auditorium of the Utah State Capitol Building.  Owens’s new draft 
contained seventeen sections and stretched to twenty-six pages.  The proposal 
contained two provisions that quickly divided the group in the auditorium.  The first 
proposal was the mandated permanent increase to 44,000 acre feet of in-stream flows 
in the rivers, creeks, and streams intercepted by the Strawberry Aqueduct.  The second 
was a proposal for an independent federal commission to oversee the fish and wildlife 
mitigation projects that the Bureau had neglected.29 
 Although Congressman Howard Nielson worried about the impact of 
decreasing diversions to Bonneville irrigators, the CUWCD board and staff believed 
they could still deliver enough water to them and supported the in-stream flow 
agreement as “fundamentally fair and environmentally sound.”  The District also 
supported the creation of a new, independent commission to oversee the 
environmental mitigation.  They thought that the commission represented “a truly 
                                                 
28 Remarks of Congressman Wayne Owens, Proposals to Raise the Authorized Cost Ceiling for the 
Colorado River Storage Project, 40.  Also see Owens comments on 422-426. 
29 Proposals to Raise the Authorized Cost Ceiling for the Colorado River Storage Project, 4-29. 
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innovative method of mitigating for water project construction.”  The District believed 
that an independent commission would be more efficient than the Bureau and would 
also prevent the transfer of appropriations away from the intended project.  The 
commission would also provide a voice to sportsmen and environmental groups 
through the commission’s board.30    
In contrast to the District, Garn, Hatch, Nielsen, and Governor Norman 
Bangerter all opposed the formation of the commission.  While they all agreed that the 
Bureau had done a horrendous job and suffered from huge inefficiencies, they felt that 
the job could be done by an existing state or federal agency.   Another group opposing 
the commission was public power users.  Owens proposed using revenues from the 
sale of CRSP hydropower to fund the mitigation commission.  Power officials reacted 
with concern as the proposal would increase power rates.31 
In fact, public power interests opposed Owens’s bill almost universally.  The 
irrigation project would largely be subsidized by power revenues.  Further, the 
diversion of water out of the Colorado River Basin decreased the capacity of 
hydroelectric plants downstream.  Thus, the one provision that they could support was 
the increased stream flows in the Uinta Basin.  But Owens’s bill contained an even 
more threatening proposal, a National Academy of Sciences study of hydroelectric 
plants throughout the CRSP to determine if the operational practices caused 
environmental damage.  Had the study concluded the practices did cause damage, the 
capacity and revenues of the plants would have been cut significantly.32   
                                                 
30 Ibid, 91-92, 96. 
31 Ibid, 334-344, 407-412. 
32 This provision arose from environmentalist concern over the practice of increasing power generation 
during peak demand.  The practice caused significant fluctuations in the river downstream from the 
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Despite the significant environmental concessions in the bill, serious 
objections still remained over unresolved environmental issues and over the fiscal 
issues surrounding the irrigation unit.  Unsatisfied with the bill, Miller again refused to 
let it out of committee.  Undaunted, the Utah delegation and CUWCD General 
Manager Don Christiansen moved forward with more negotiations to further resolve 
the concerns over the project.  National environmental and wildlife groups represented 
by Ed Osann, Director of the National Wildlife Federation’s Water Resources 
Program, and David Conrad, Friends of the Earth Water Resource Specialist, also 
became involved in the negotiations.  Their concerns over the environmental issues 
surrounding Jordanelle, the irrigation projects, and the water rights of the Ute Indians 
prompted Chairman Miller and Bradley to scuttle another attempt to move a bill 
forward in the spring of 1990. 33   
  
Getting the Chevy Off the Lot 
Failing again, the Utah delegation, CUWCD, and the national environmental 
groups met for another round of negotiations.  Miller imposed a unanimous vote rule.  
Owens, trusted by all parties, acted as a mediator.  Further, all parties agreed not to run 
to the press to influence the negotiations.  Frustrated by continued delays and 
unwillingness to compromise, Miller left the Bureau completely out of the 
                                                                                                                                            
dams.  Of particular concern was damage being done within the Grand Canyon below Glen Canyon 
Dam.   
33 “Wildlife Foundation Wants CUP Funds Stopped,” Provo Daily Herald, April 10, 1990; “Clock Ticks 
Away on Controversial CUP Funding,” Provo Daily Herald, April 14, 1990. 
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negotiations.  After several long weeks, a revised bill began to emerge that met the 
concerns of Miller, Bradley, and the environmental groups.34   
Chief among the environmentalists’ concerns was the lack of provisions for 
water conservation.  The CUP’s critics had argued along with the Carter 
administration during the battle over the Hit List in 1977 that water conservation could 
eliminate, or at least postpone the need for the project’s waters bound for the Salt Lake 
Valley.   Without water conservation measures, continued population growth in the 
Salt Lake Valley would require the importation of additional water, this time from the 
Bear River.  Engineers from the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District—later 
renamed the Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District—already had plans on the 
drawing boards for the project.    
Water conservation became central to further negotiations.  National 
environmental groups represented by Ed Osann and David Conrand pressed for strict 
conservation measures in the legislation.  As noted above, their opposition over the 
lack of conservation measures resulted in the bill’s failure in 1990.   At the time, 
Osann who headed the National Wildlife Federation’s Water Rescource Program, was 
pushing for national water conservation and refused to let the CUP move forward 
without including water conservation efforts concurrent with the construction on the 
project.     
After reaching a tentative agreement with Osann, the Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District’s General Manager, Don Christiansen, called to relay the details 
of the compromise to water officials in the Salt Lake area.  Believing Christiansen had 
                                                 
34 Don Christiansen, interview with author March 24, 2004; Thomas Melling, “Dispute Resolution,” 
1695.     
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given too much away to the environmental groups, they reacted with alarm.  
Christiansen hurriedly arranged a meeting between the water managers and the 
environmental groups.  A group of six water managers from the Salt Lake Valley flew 
to Washington.  Meeting in Congressman Owens’s office, the water managers, Don 
Christiansen, Marcus Faust—the CUWCD’s Washington counsel, Ed Osann, and 
David Conrad negotiated into the night.  Finally, just after two o’clock in the morning, 
the group came to an agreement. 35   
The compromise provided that through cost-effective and environmentally 
sound means, the District had to first make “prudent and efficient use of currently 
available water prior to the importation of Bear River water into Salt Lake County.”36  
This language challenged the old conceptions of water development that had focused 
on increasing supply rather than decreasing demand.   The water districts balked at the 
proposal because conservation of water posed the threat of decreased revenues and 
potential difficulty repaying its bonds.  But, in the end the districts were able to 
compromise, proving that they were not so entrenched in the traditional views to give 
politically expedient concessions to new West environmentalists.37 
The conservation compromise cleared the way for a version of the legislation 
Miller and Bradley would let out of their respective committees following hearings in 
February and September 1990, respectively.  The new version, officially titled the 
                                                 
35 The six water officials were Dave Ovard, Jerry Maloney, and Dale Gardiner from the Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District and Nick Sefakis, LeRoy Hooton, and Joe Novak from the 
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake and Sandy.  David Ovard, interview with author, June 30, 
2004.  Don Christiansen, interview with author, March 24, 2004; Dave Ovard, interview with author, 
June 20, 2004; Marcus Faust, interview with author, August 10, 2005. Public Law 102-575. 
36  This wording remained in the legislation as a stated purpose of the conservation or “water 
management improvement” provisions of CUPCA . Public Law 102-575 Section 207 (a)(5).  





Central Utah Project Completion Act, contained four main sections.  CUPCA raised 
the authorized costs by $924,206,000.  But, it also implemented a local cost sharing 
agreement which mandated that the CUWCD must now pay thirty-five percent of the 
reimbursable project costs.  The legislation de-authorized several features of the 
original CUP plan including the diking of Utah Lake, irrigation projects in the Mosida 
area southwest of Utah Lake and the Leland Bench in the Uinta Basin, and the Ute 
Indian Unit which proposed the diversion of water directly from the Green River.  
Additionally the legislation scaled back plans for the Uintah and Upalco Units.   
The Completion Act took further steps which changed longstanding 
reclamation policy.  It allowed counties that had not received project water to 
withdraw from the CUWCD and receive a rebate of property taxes paid toward the 
project.  It took oversight of the project from the Bureau and gave control to the 
CUWCD.  Further, the legislation addressed environmental criticisms by stipulating 
that environmental mitigation would proceed concurrently with construction.  The act 
created a new federal agency to oversee environmental mitigation and established a 
fund to complete mitigation efforts.  The act mandated that the CUWCD and its 
customer agencies meet goals for water conservation and that the District fund water 
conservation efforts.  Finally, it provided a monetary payment to the Northern Ute 
Tribe to settle their environmental justice claims and satisfy their water rights.38 
Utah’s congressional delegation again had a difficult time moving the bill out 
of committee.  But, this time it was not Miller or Bradley applying the brakes; rather, 
                                                 
38  Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Water ,Power, and 
Offshore Energy Resources, H.R. 3960 Central Utah Project Completion Act: Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Water, Power, and Offshore Energy Resources of the Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 6 February 1990, 2-116.  
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it was the Bureau and the Bush administration.  The Bureau unilaterally opposed the 
bill.  They objected to oversight and construction being turned over to the District.  
They opposed the formation of the mitigation commission and compensation to the 
Northern Ute Tribe.  They opposed the legislation because they simply had been left 
out of the negotiations.  However, exerting his influence, Garn pressured the 
administration and pushed the bill onto the floor.  As it moved forward, the legislation 
became an omnibus bill attracting funding provisions for twenty-two other projects 
and provisions that further reformed reclamation policy.  After an additional two years 
of debate, Congress passed the bill in October 1992.  Despite veto threats, President 
George H. W. Bush signed the bill on October 30, 1992.39 
 
The Affordable, Dependable, and Reliable Car 
After the passage of the CUP Completion Act, the project moved forward.  
However, President Bush’s signature did not end criticism or political controversy 
over the CUP.  Individual groups still pushed their interests, and some battles 
continued to be fought.    
One of the first challenges facing the CUWCD was the withdrawal of Millard 
and Sevier counties from the District, under CUPCA’s provision allowing counties 
that had not received any benefit from the project to leave the District.  Farmers in 
Millard and Sevier counties argued that the provisions of the CUPCA were too costly.  
Representing views held by many traditional land and water users who had battled the 
Carter administration and who had sympathized with the Sagebrush Rebellion,  
                                                 
39 The bill became Public Law 102-575.  Title II through V comprise the Central Utah Project 
Completion Act.  
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Thorpe Waddingham, the farmer’s water rights attorney, succinctly summed up his 
feelings for the reformulated CUP by telling a reporter, “We are big supporters of the 
CUP.  But the CUP has steadily deteriorated from the 1970s to the 1980s until now in 
the 1990s it’s gone completely to hell.” 40    
Waddingham cited concerns that the project had been modified to meet the 
demands of cities and environmental groups; as a result, the amount of water available 
to the two counties had decreased, the local cost share had risen, and accepting the 
water under the new law would bring unwanted federal regulation.  While the move by 
the two counties to get out initially caused some concern within the District’s board, it 
had little long-term impact.  Because those counties withdrew, the original irrigation 
project was scaled back to serve Juab and southern Utah County.41   
Another major blow to the Bureau of Reclamation’s original plans for the CUP 
to primarily serve farmers came in 1999.  The Strawberry Water Users Association 
withdrew their support of the District’s Environmental Impact Statement for the 
proposed Spanish Fork-Nephi Pipeline which would have benefited farmers in Juab 
County.  The Association felt it could get more CUP water if the pipeline remained 
un-built.  With the Strawberry Users no longer supporting the EIS, the Department of 
the Interior would not approve the project.  As a result, the project was scaled back 
further so that Juab County water would be split between Salt Lake County and 
southern Utah County.  However, Juab County received assistance through water 
conservation programs to offset the loss of project water.42  
                                                 
40 Steve Hinchman and Larry Warren, “Two Utah counties flee water project,” High Country News, 
September 20, 1993. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid;  Roscoe Garrett, Interview with author, April 16, 2004; Don Christiansen, interview with author 
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As a result of this turn of events, the Central Utah Project went back to the 
drawing boards.  The original Bureau plan for the Diamond Fork System had called 
for three reservoirs in the Diamond Fork drainage as part of a massive power 
generating scheme.  As the District moved forward with its planning of the project, it 
deleted two of the reservoirs.  But local environmental groups still criticized the 
decision to build a dam at Monk’s Hollow.  During the debate over the Spanish Fork-
Nephi Pipeline, they had questioned the wisdom of developing water supplies for 
alfalfa farmers in Juab County subsidized with Salt Lake tax dollars, while the water 
district was moving forward with plans for new diversions from the Bear River. 
 
Figure 12 Central Utah Project, Bonneville Unit map showing reconfiguration as a 
result of the Central Utah Project Completion Act and subsequent events.   
 
                                                                                                                                            




Because of the new environmental study, the district altered the plans for the 
projects.  It eliminated plans for the dam as well as plans for water delivery to Juab 
County and converted the remaining 60,000 acre foot block irrigation water into a 
municipal supply split between southern Utah County and Salt Lake County.  In an 
ironic twist, at least one CUP critic used the changes to criticize the district.  
University of Utah political scientist Dan McCool criticized the district for wasting 
millions of dollars planning for the Monk’s Hollow Dam which it canceled.  He also 
railed against the district for continuing to plan for the Spanish Fork-Nephi irrigation 
project “at a time when such projects were considered wasteful boondoggles.”43 
Although many critics doubted the need for an independent mitigation 
commission, the Utah Reclamation Mitigation and Conservation Commission proved 
more successful than the Bureau of Reclamation in completing environmental 
mitigation of the project.  The most visible success has been the restorations of the 
Provo River below the Jordanelle Dam.  Equally important, but less visible due to 
their remote locations is the restoration of numerous lakes in the Uintah Mountains.  
The natural lakes had been enlarged and turned into reservoirs by irrigation companies 
in the early 1900s.  When the storage capacity of these high mountain reservoirs was 
transferred to new CUP reservoirs, the lakes could be restored and stabilized at their 
original levels. The Commission also undertook other projects to protect native 
                                                 
43 Don  Christiansen, interview with author, March 24, 2004; Michael Weland, interview with author, 
May 14, 2004.  Daniel McCool, “The CUP: A Project in Search of a Purpose” in Water in the West: A 
High Country News Reader, ed. Char Miller (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 2000).  For 
other examples of McCool’s criticism of the CUP see, Daniel McCool, Waters of Zion: The Politics of 
Water in Utah (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1995), and “Water Welfare, Green Pork, and 
the ‘New’ Politics of Water,” Halcyon 14, (1992): 85-102. 
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species, protect and preserve wetland habitat, and enhance riparian habitat throughout 
the CUP area.44 
Similarly, as noted above, managers of several of the local municipal water 
agencies expressed a concern over the conservation programs included in the CUP 
completion act.  Their reluctance, however, largely evaporated.  The districts adopted 
progressive conservation campaigns that alleviated the need to institute water 
rationing during a six-year drought.  Additionally, the CUWCD created the Water 
Conservation Credit Program to meet the mandate of Section 207(b) of the 
Completion Act.  The program provided 65% of the funding for selected conservation 
projects.  As of 2004 the program had funded thirty-three projects, saving 94,969 acre 
feet of water.45   
Despite the reservations of the local water districts and water users, the 
provisions of the Central Utah Project Completion Act have been largely successful.   
However, the legislation is still not without its critics.  Congressman Howard Neilson 
maintained that Utah’s delegation gave too many concessions to the environmental 
community which increased the cost of the project and reduced the amount of water 
delivered by the project.  On the other side of the coin, some opponents of the CUP, 
                                                 
44 Three lakes (Trial, Lost, and Washington) have been maintained to supply irrigation water to farmers 
in the Kamas area above Jordanelle Reservoir.  The Bureau of Reclamation and the CUWCD rebuilt the 
dam at Trial Lake in 1989 and Lost Lake and Washington Lake Dams in 1994-1995.  The District and 
Mitigation Commission partnered on the stabilization of twelve lakes on the upper Provo River 
drainage as stipulated in section 308—Big Elk, Crystal, Duck, Fire, Island, Long, Wall, Marjorie, Pot, 
Star, Teapot and Weir—to their natural water levels.  In conjunction with the enlargement of the Big 
Sand Wash Reservoir in the Uinta Basin, the District is currently undertaking the stabilization of 
thirteen high mountain lakes. Bluebell, Drift, Five Point, Superior, Milk, Farmers, East Timothy, White 
Miller, and Deer lakes are located in the in the Upper Yellowstone River watershed and four (Brown 
Duck, Island, Kidney and Clements lakes) are in the upper Lake Fork watershed.   Michael Weland, 
interview with author, May 14, 2004.  Extensive information on the projects of the Utah Reclamation 
and Conservation Commission is available on its website, 
http://www.mitigationcommission.gov/index.html. 
 
45 Lee Wimmer, interview with author March 24, 2004; CUWCD Annual Report 2004, 7. 
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including McCool, argued the compromise amounted to “Green Pork.”  To some 
extent, both criticisms seem valid.  Due to changes resulting from the passage of 
CUPCA, the amount of water delivered by the Bonneville Unit was cut and the price 
increased.  As a result, CUP water ranked among the most expensive ever developed 
by the Bureau of Reclamation when considering the total project costs compared to the 
amount of water developed. 46  
In the end, recognition that both sides in the debate believed CUPCA fell short 
does not discount the very real benefits for the environment and water users.  Tangible 
environmental benefits provided by the legislation include the restoration of Uinta 
lakes and the Provo River, mandated stream flows, deauthorization of plans to dike 
Utah Lake, other mitigation efforts, and water conservation programs.  Municipal 
water users, primarily in Salt Lake and Utah Counties, benefit from an additional 
60,000 acre feet of water.   
 By and large the Central Utah Project Completion Act and subsequent events 
have radically altered the Central Utah Project.   The legislation addressed the primary 
concerns raised by the Carter Administration during its review of the project in 1977.  
It incorporated key elements of the Carter Administration’s policy review, most 
notably local cost sharing and mandated water conservation.  The changes deleted 
several economically questionable irrigation schemes in the original plan and killed 
plans for the “Ultimate Phase,” the direct diversion of Green River water from the 
Flaming Gorge Reservoir.  The Completion Act required additional environmental 
                                                 
46 Howard Neilson, interview with author June  29, 2006; “Green Pork” is first attributed to Daniel 
McCool, “The New Politics of the Environment and the Rise of ‘Green Pork.’” Free Perspectives IV 
(December 1990): 5-7.  McCool specifically offers the CUP as an example of Green Pork in “Water 
Welfare, Green Pork, and the ‘New’ Politics of Water,” Halcyon 14, (1992): 98. 
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mitigation overseen by an independent commission.  Many of the mitigation efforts 
undertaken by the commission not only repaired and compensated for damage caused 
by the CUP, but sought to repair a legacy of environmental damage inflicted by a 
hundred years of water diversions undertaken by private, local, state, and federal 
interests.  The Completion Act resolved an environmental justice claim, compensating 
the Northern Ute Tribe for their water rights lost to water development.   
 In addition to the changes mandated within the Completion Act, the new 
requirements resulted in additional ongoing changes to the CUP.  One of the biggest 
complaints against the project was the heavily subsidized and economically 
questionable Bonneville Irrigation and Drainage System which remained in the 
project.  Also, the new environmental requirements and increased cost share prompted 
Millard and Sevier Counties, as well as the Northern Ute Tribe to withdraw from CUP 
irrigation projects.  Despite some skepticism, the change placing the Central Utah 
Water Conservancy District in charge proved beneficial as the District altered its 
plans, albeit sometimes reluctantly, in response to continued environmental concerns.  
The District dropped the Monks Hollow Dam and in its place built tunnels and 
pipelines that allowed the restoration of Diamond Fork Creek.  They altered plans for 
the Bonneville Irrigation and Drainage Supply, converting all of the water to 
municipal use.  The new Utah Lake System to implement this plan includes significant 
measures to protect and enhance the habitat for the endangered June Sucker.  The 
Uintah Basin Replacement Project restores thirteen lakes in the High Uintah 
Wilderness Area, an action sought by wilderness advocates since 1964. 
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Thus, the Central Utah Project serves as an example of the forces which 
pushed the Bureau of Reclamation to design and advocate large irrigation projects 
subsidized by huge hydroelectric dams.   The project is indicative of the types of 
challenges and opposition these projects faced as environmental awareness increased 
across the nation in the 1950s and 1960s.  Unable to stop projects like the CUP, 
Garrison, Auburn and others, even with the powerful new environmental laws, the 
high economic and environmental costs of these projects convinced President Carter 
that the time had come to stop funding projects which no longer made sense to many.   
The Central Utah Project is an example of how the changes that the Carter 
Administration advocated were later achieved by their supporters in Congress.  While 
we will never know with absolute certainty, it seams reasonable to speculate that if 
President Carter had followed the course advocated by Secretary Andrus, Vice 
President Mondale, and others that the administration could have successfully blocked 
or modified projects like the CUP or Garrison in 1977.    
The success of Congressman George Miller in wresting substantial concessions 
from the water users demonstrates not only his personal opposition to business as 
usual for the Bureau of Reclamation, but the changes to the CUP wrought by the 
passage and implementation of the CUPCA illustrate the historical shift of reclamation 
projects from irrigation to municipal supplies.  Perhaps most importantly, the transfer 
of construction oversight from the Bureau to the CUWCD marked an end of an era for 






I believe I developed good relationships with 
almost all members of congress….But on a 
number of occasions, I really played hardball 
with legislators, especially when prohibiting the 
building of dams that were unnecessary or when 
vetoing public works bills that were, in my 
judgment, too full of pork-barrel projects.   A 
somewhat less rigid approach to these sensitive 
issues could have paid rich dividends. 
—Jimmy Carter1   
 
After Carter left office, Congress passed compromise legislation to increase 
acreage limitation, and as previously mentioned, to reauthorize two projects that had 
escaped cuts during Carter’s years.  At the center of each of these compromise 
measures was Congressman George Miller of California.  Miller—who came to 
Congress on a wave of reformers in the wake of Watergate—had been intent on 
reforming western water projects and was a strong supporter of Carter.  During the 
1980s, Miller employed as his legislative aide, Daniel Beard, who had preciously 
served as an assistant to Guy Martin, the number two man in the Department of 
Interior over water projects.  Beard’s experiences in the Carter Administration shaped 
his attitudes and opinions.  Like Miller, he was intent on reforming water policy and 
stopping the worst of the large water projects.  When Miller became the chair of the 
House Subcommittee on Water and Power, he employed Beard to head the 
subcommittee staff.  It was from this position of influence that Miller and Beard 
helped to reshape water politics and reformulate the Garrison Diversion and Central 
Utah Projects.  
                                                 
1 Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2010), 526.  
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In 1992, following the election of President Bill Clinton, Miller helped secure 
Beard’s appointment as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation.  As 
commissioner, Beard helped to complete a process that had really begun with Carter’s 
efforts and had continued through the Reagan and Bush administrations, changing the 
mission of the Bureau of Reclamation from water development to water management.  
The Hit List controversy played a critical role in motivating both Beard and Miller to 
seek the significant reforms they later helped to pass. 
Thus, while the Hit List controversy provided a short run boost to water project 
advocates, and to Sagebrush Rebels, in the long run the controversy helped to motivate 
dam opponents and led to further shifts in opinion.  Environmental activists continued 
to oppose the projects and Miller, Beard, and others helped secure change through the 
legislative process.  Another individual influenced by the Hit List who had a 
significant and direct long term impact on public opinion was Marc Reisner.  Reisner 
authored his well known exposé, Cadillac Desert, in response to his experiences 
during the Hit List controversy.   During the Hit List controversy Reisner had a front 
row seat.  He served as the communications director for the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, which had been involved in supporting the administration’s efforts 
to cut water projects and attempts to educate both members of Congress and the public 
about the projects on the Hit List.  In his book, Reisner was critical of the press 
coverage during the Hit List controversy.  As someone who worked to get accurate 
information about the true impacts of the projects to the media, the negative response 
in Congress and the press to the Hit List motivated him to embark on his efforts to 
expose the worst of the West’s water problems.  In the preface to Cadillac Desert’s 
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sequel Reisner wrote, “Watching Carter blown over backwards by the reaction [of 
Congress to the Hit List] it seemed to me that the West’s, and Congress’s, infatuations 
with water projects would never end.  So, Cadillac Desert was conceived as a work of 
history with a warning attached.” 2 
While Carter’s water policies were not as successful as he had hoped, he did 
succeed in cutting several projects.  While the bulk of these projects faced strong vocal 
opposition that had even succeeded in temporarily halting projects—like the Bureau of 
Reclamation's Oahe unit and the Army Corps of Engineer’s Meremec Park and La 
Farge dams—Carter's actions insured that local opposition achieved permanent 
victories.  But Carter was even successful in stopping projects that had strong local 
support favoring construction, like the Savory-Pot Hook, Fruitland Mesa, and Narrows 
projects in Colorado. 
Overall, his success in getting Congress to cut funding to authorized water 
projects already under construction, and his proposed policies to change the evaluation 
criteria for new dams served as a catalyst, which added to environmental and 
economic factors and created the formula that ended the Era of Big Dams.   While in 
the short term, Carter’s efforts fueled a backlash in much of the West, his opponents 
were largely unsuccessful in the long run.  Despite a congressional decision to abolish 
the Water Resource Council, and action by Secretary of the Interior James Watt to 
abolish the Carter administration's carefully planned “principles and standards,” they 
could not convince fiscal conservatives, conservationists, and environmentalists that 
the country needed new massive water development projects.  Further, the vitriolic 
                                                 
2 For the criticism of the press coverage of the Hit List, see Cadillac Desert, 315-316.  The quote is 
from Marc Reisner and Sarah Bates, Overtapped Oasis (Washington, D.C., Island Press, 1990), xv. 
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reaction in Congress and in the press to Carter’s water projects review and water 
policy initiative motivated environmentalists and other dam opponents, including 
George Miller, Dan Beard, and Marc Reisner, to continue to push for reform to 
existing projects—like the Garrison Diversion and the Central Utah Project—to 
complete  the process started by Carter. 
 Of the nine projects Congress cut from the FY 1978 budget in the compromise 
deal with Carter, only one, the Yatesville Lake in Kentucky, was subsequently funded 
and completed.  More significant, Carter’s allies succeeded in passing a bill in 1982 
deauthorizing dozens of projects that had not made it beyond early planning stages. 
 Jimmy Carter did not break new any new ground with his criticism of large 
water development projects.  Objections to the loss of aesthetic and environmental 
values had been raised repeatedly in fights over dams in well known places like Hetch 
Hetchy, Echo Park, Glen Canyon, and the Grand Canyon.  In the later fights, Sierra 
Club Executive Director David Brower questioned the projects on economic grounds.  
He suggested that coal power plants could produce the power more cheaply.   He, 
along with others, believed the investment in old technology at such great cost when 
the prospect of inexpensive nuclear power promised by government engineers loomed 
on the horizon. 
 While Brower was among the first to question the validity of the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s calculation of project cost and benefits, he merely opened a door.  
Others, such as the University of Montana economist Thomas Power, demonstrated 
how pervasive its tactics had become.  The ultimate criticism of the Bureau of 
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Reclamation was Richard Berkman and Kip Viscusi’s condemnation of agency’s 
mission and existence in their study for Ralph Nader, Damming the West. 
 But Carter’s significance is not that he was the first to question larger federal 
water development projects.  The significance is that he not only raised concerns, but 
that he took action as President to curtail water projects under construction.  Unlike 
like previous presidents, such as Dwight Eisenhower, who had instituted a policy of 
“no new starts,” Carter essentially not only limited new construction, but suggested 
the country would be better off not finishing projects on which millions of dollars had 
already been spent.   In doing so he consciously challenged the prerogative and 
judgment of Congress.   Instead of focusing on what Carter failed to achieve in his 
subsequent battles with Congress, this study has sought to draw attention to the 
success that achieved in forcing projects to be abandoned or redesigned.  As noted 
above, it has also sought to show how the battle over these projects did not end when 
Carter left office.  Allies in Congress continued to fight against projects while others, 
like Marc Reisner, insured continued publicity and public awareness.   
 
In the wake of the success of George Miller, Brent Blackwelder, Marc Reisner 
and others, the end of new Congressional authorizations of major construction projects 
left the future of the Bureau in question.   Beginning in 1985, the agency began a slow 
conversion process from a construction-oriented agency to one of management and 
maintenance.   Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel had begun using the phrase “the 
new Bureau of Reclamation.”  Taking his comments to mean the “old Bureau of 
Reclamation” was obsolete and even questioning if the agency could be “scrapped,” 
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the Commissioner C. Dale Duvall and regional Directors collaborated on a study to 
redefine the agency's mission.  
While it is unclear if the report ever progressed beyond a draft version, it 
foreshadowed many of the changes that marked the evolution of the agency.  Yet, the 
study reveals that many in the agency anticipated the continuation of water projects.  
That report stated, “New massive structures are no longer required, but smaller, less 
capital-intensive projects are.”  Duvall anticipated the Bureau upgrading older 
structures and becoming more involved in constructing usable water supplies. He also 
anticipated the agency’s expertise would be tapped to assume new responsibilities 
possibly including a role in the “nationwide expansion of municipal and industrial 
infrastructure development, maintenance, and rehabilitation; the management of 
hazardous waste sites for EPA; engineering and construction management services for 
Interior agencies; and consultation between foreign nations and the US private sector.”  
Further, the study outlined new priorities in water management, conservation, and 
Environmental quality.3 
 The archives contain a second version dated August 23, 1985.  The cover of 
the report proclaimed in bold block letters, “The New Bureau of Reclamation.”  This 
report was followed up by an agency-wide assessment: Assessment ’87 which 
reaffirmed the change from construction of federally financed agricultural projects to 
become an “environmentally sensitive resource management organization.”4   
                                                 
3 Commissioner to Undersecretary, no date, “The Bureau of Reclamation, 1985-2005,” NARA, Rocky 
Mountain Region, RG 115, Ascension 8NS-115-95-090, box 13. 
4  “Report of the Commissioner’s Program and Organization Review Team” (Denver: U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, August 1993), 2. (Copy in NARA, Rocky Mountain region, RG 115, Ascension 8NS-115-
95-090 box 6). 
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 Further changes to the Bureau of Reclamation came under President Reagan in 
the mid-1980s. Reclamation Commissioner Robert Broadbent was promoted to 
replace Garrey Carruthers as assistant Secretary of the Interior.  Broadbent served 
under William Clark and Donald Hodel; both refused to appoint a new commissioner 
friendly to the water interests.  As Robert Gottlieb explains, “For more than two years 
the position of Reclamation Commissioner remained open, reinforcing the perception 
in Washington that the agency was vulnerable.”5 
Dale C. Duvall was named commissioner in the fall of 1986 “as part of the 
effort to reshape the Bureau.”  Duvall’s budget request in 1987 was the most striking 
demonstration of the redefinition of the Bureau of Reclamation.  There was no request 
for funding for unauthorized projects, and cutbacks or elimination of funding for new 
authorizations or projects just getting underway.  Prioritization shifted a large share of 
the agency’s budget to completing the big projects like the Central Arizona Project 
and the Central Utah Project “whose lengthy delays come to represent the Bureau’s 
paralysis.”  Secretary Hodel stated plainly at the time that the budget request 
represented the end of the era of the big dam.  He stated, “the most gigantic projects 
are already done, or in the process of being built or already rejected on economic or 
environmental grounds.”  The shift became more official later that year when a new 
assistant secretary for water and science, James Zigler replaced Robert Broadbent.  He 
announced a formal change of the Bureau's mission from “an agency based on 
federally supported construction to one based on resource management.”6 
                                                 
5 Robert Gottlieb, A Life of Its Own: The Politics and Power of Water (San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1988), 69-70. 
6 Ibid, 70-2; for Hodel quote see,  Philip Shabecoff, “After 85 Years, The Era of Big Dams Nears End,” 
New York Times, January 24, 1987. 
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Under the George H. W. Bush administration, Reclamation conducted a follow 
up study titled Strategic Plan.  The document revised the mission statement, “the 
mission of the Bureau of Reclamation is to manage, develop, and protect water related 
resources in an environmentally and economically sound matter in the interest of the 
American public.” 
 In May of 1993 Commissioner Dan Beard began the process of reorganization 
to implement the changes outlined in Strategic Plan.   The first step was another 
review conducted by a team of eight employees to recommend changes based on 
declining budgets and changing public values.  The team completed its report in 
August 1993 after four months of study and review.  Based on the team’s 
recommendations, Beard and his staff drafted a detailed plan titled “Blueprint for 
Reform.”    
 Beard’s Blueprint finalized the transition process that had been sought during 
the Carter administration.   Beard officially reaffirmed the new mission statement, 
emphasizing the agency’s role as a manager of water in the West.  Beard’s plan also 
officially stated that the agency would not construct any new federal irrigation 
projects.  The reorganization of the Bureau of Reclamation under Beard between 1993 
and 1995 resulted in the reduction of employees by more than 1,500.  Reduced several 
layers of management, and reorganized and consolidated the number of offices at the 
regional and local.7     
Dan Beard's time as commissioner did not so much mark a turning point; 
rather it marked the culmination of a long process begun during the Carter 
                                                 
7 Mark Svendsen, “Restructuring the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation: A Case Study,”  (Government of 
Japan, Institute of Irrigation and Drainage, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 1997), 16-7. 
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administration, a process with which Beard was intimately familiar. A process which 
continued as he worked with California Congressman George Miller to reshape 
reclamation projects like the Garrison Diversion and the Central Utah Project.  Thus, 
when seen through the arc of Dan Beard's career, the significance of what Jimmy 
Carter attempted to do becomes more evident.  Despite the mistakes, controversy, and 
setbacks, President Carter both achieved and inspired significant success. 
 
While that success did come at a cost, today, more than ever, the significance 
of what President Carter attempted becomes clear.  The level of deficit spending and 
the federal deficit have exponentially ballooned since Carter's term in office.  The 
United States still does not have a comprehensive water policy.  With growing 
population and the potential for increased water scarcity due to climate change, the 
need for a national water policy is greater than ever.  Perhaps the valuable lessons can 
be learned from the Carter administration for those willing, and brave enough to take 
on the challenge like Carter did.  One wonders, despite the success noted here, if 
Carter had taken a "less rigid approach" what kind of “rich dividends” his efforts 
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